The great divergence in South Africa: Population and wealth dynamics over two centuries

Does wealth persist over time, despite the disruptions of historical shocks like colonisation? This paper shows that South Africa experienced a reversal of fortunes after the arrival of European settlers in the eastern half of the country. Yet this was not because of an institutional reversal. We argue, instead, that black South Africans found themselves at the mercy of two extractive regimes: one in ‘white South Africa’ and another in the ‘homelands’. The political and economic institutions of each of those regimes favoured a small elite: in white South Africa, whites, and in the homelands, the black chiefs and headmen. Democracy brought inclusive institutions for black residents in white South Africa but not for those in the former homelands. This is why we see mass migration to the urban areas of South Africa today, and why addressing the institutional weaknesses of the former homelands are key to alleviating the poverty in these regions where a third of South Africans still reside.     

RESOURCE CURSE,POLITICAL ENTRY,AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”     

Rich or alive? Political (in)stability,political leader selection and economic growth

We develop a model that studies the incentives of the ruling elite regarding the selection of the political leader. We show that it is optimal for the ruling elite to choose leaders with more military experience in a politically unstable regime while more educated leaders are preferred in politically stable regimes. Using a dataset that includes 1569 national leaders from 177 countries over the period 1946–2011, we find empirical evidence that political stability contributes to the selection of more educated leaders, while the reverse holds for leaders with high military ranks. The empirical findings are robust to different subsamples, various proxies for educational and military attainment, and different measures for political stability. Our results suggest that leader selection is another reason why political instability is harmful for economic growth.     

Political repression in autocratic regimes

Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to respond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and horizontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important consequences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical results, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.     

Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China

The rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as major investors in the global economy has raised worries that they serve the geopolitical ends of owner countries. However, given the paramount importance of surviving domestic political competitions, SWFs are likely also tools of domestic political survival. In examining the corporate governance and underlying political environment in which SWFs in Singapore and in China operate, this paper further examines the role of political unity in directing SWF behaviour in authoritarian regimes. The main finding is that a highly unified autocracy is more likely to direct SWFs to maximise long-term profit, while a fragmented one like China is more likely to treat its SWF as an arena for domestic political and bureaucratic infighting. SWFs operating in a fragmented regime are unlikely to make long-term profit and foreign policy objectives top priorities, and their behaviour can be highly unpredictable.     

Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Elite fragmentation,natural resources and economic growth

A broad literature suggests that political regimes matter for the growth effect of natural resources. However, while several studies have concentrated on the difference between democracies and autocracies in this respect, an important topic overlooked so far is the differences between varieties of authoritarian regimes. This study uses the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on economic growth in the short run. We find that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher costs of fights over rents due to higher political uncertainty.     

Land use change, biomass production and HANPP: The case of Hungary 1961-2005

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the human appropriation of aboveground net primary production (aHANPP) in Hungary in the years 1961-2005. In this period aboveground HANPP dropped from 67% to 49% of the potential vegetation's NPP. The trajectory was not smooth, but aboveground HANPP fluctuated with changes in factors affecting agricultural production conditions. Both aboveground net primary production (aNPP) of the prevailing vegetation and harvested aNPP increased during the socialist regime, dropped when the system collapsed and has shown considerable fluctuations since. We discuss the development of aboveground HANPP and the Hungarian land use system in the context of socioeconomic changes during three distinct phases: (1) industrialisation of agriculture (1961-1989), (2) regime collapse (1989-1993) and (3) restructuring of a new economy (1993-2005). Within these periods, different driving factors influenced aboveground HANPP and its constituents. In the phase of industrialisation, mechanisation and agrochemical inputs reduced aHANPP while harvested amounts of biomass increased progressively. In the second phase, political and economic circumstances devastated production conditions resulting in a decline of productivity of actual vegetation and a temporary rise in aboveground HANPP. During the last twelve years, industrialisation patterns of agricultural production recovered. The restructuring of inefficient agricultural production systems raised harvest at moderate levels of agricultural inputs, while climatic conditions intimidated high yield and harvest security. The paper discusses the effect of different economic and political regimes and of major socioeconomic restructuring on the development of the land use system, biomass production and aboveground HANPP.     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Non‐linear geographics and the economics of transition and democratization1

The purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of geography on the transition process in authoritarian political regimes, and to investigate the nature of the links between political change, economic reforms and geographical location. A simple model of transition and democratization is presented wherein we show that the effectiveness of repression by the incumbent elite is a negative function of the distance to the ‘free world’. In consequence, geography has conflicting effects on shifts in political power. This article provides a rationale for the counterintuitive fact that the first authoritarian country to start a transition process towards democratization is not necessarily the one nearest to the free world.     

Institutions and growth in limited access societies

We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures. Committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes, such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite?s economic and political power.     

Populism and Fiscal Illusion

There is a widespread concern that anti‐elitist or populist opinion is on the rise. The policy concern is that political opportunists would exploit voter rational ignorance for their own cynical purposes. In this article I demonstrate that, in the field of taxation, this sort of behaviour already occurs. Fiscal illusion can be described as deceiving taxpayer‐voters into paying more tax than they would otherwise agree to. Taxpayers are already victims of political opportunism unrelated to the rise of populism.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

Regime change and critical junctures

In this paper we study how a society can transition between different economic and political regimes. When the current regime is elitism, the society is modeled as a collection of units of land where at each of these units there is a member of the elite and a peasant. Under the democratic regime, at each of the units of land there is a citizen whose role is to work the land and enjoy the full output he produces. At every period with some small probability a critical juncture arrives, giving a chance for a regime change. Among others, we find that a wider output gap can increase the number of different institutions that are possible after a critical juncture and that lower land profitability makes equilibria where an extractive regime continues less likely.     

Populist policies in the transition to democracy

This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this kind of redistribution as populist redistribution because, first it does not increase the poor's productive capacity (human capital), and second it seeks to “buy” political support (peace) to perpetuate the elite's control of political power. We examine the conditions under which ruling elites choose to deter the poor (by means of military repression and/or populist redistribution), to engage in a dispute with the poor for the control of political power, or, alternatively, to extend democracy. According to the results of the model populist redistribution (or military repression), if any, increases with initial wealth inequality and with the amount of redistribution that the poor can undertake under democracy, and decreases with the relative importance of a human capital externality in production. The model explains why in some cases the use of an apparently inefficient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for both groups (the ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is the use of military repression or default to conflict.     

Political regimes and foreign intervention

We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

Politico-economic inequality and the comovement of government purchases

This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality for the comovement of government purchases with macroeconomic fluctuations. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model, where households value government purchases which are financed by income taxes. A key feature of the model is a wealth bias in the political aggregation process. When calibrated to U.S. wealth inequality and exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, such a model is able to generate weaker positive comovement of government purchases than models with no political wealth bias. The wealth bias that matches the cross-sectional campaign contribution distribution by income is consistent with the mild positive comovement of government purchases in the aggregate data. We thus provide an empirically relevant example where economic and political heterogeneity matter for aggregate dynamics.     

Sharing oil rents and political violence

This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest.     

政治关联、制度环境与家族企业创新绩效

基于社会情感财富理论,以2012-2015年中国A股上市家族企业为研究样本,从研发投入与研发产出两个方面实证检验政治关联对家族企业创新绩效的影响,以及制度环境对该影响关系的调节作用。实证结果表明,无论是从研发投入还是研发产出看,政治关联都与家族企业创新绩效显著负相关,而好的制度环境则会削弱政治关联对家族企业创新绩效的抑制作用。家族企业应该权衡社会情感财富损益及政治关联得失而避免企业战略短期导向,政府则应为家族企业创新及其绩效提升营造良好的金融、法制、经营等制度环境,减少政治寻租空间。     

The political economy of resource-driven growth

In recent decades, resource-poor countries have out-performed resource-abundant ones. A stylised facts model of competitive industrialisation describes the long-run development of a resource-poor country with a political state that is developmental. Only minor change is required to adapt the model to trace the development trajectory of a resource-abundant country with a similar political state. However, most resource-abundant countries engender a political state that is factional or predatory and distorts the economy in the pursuit of rents. A staple trap model describes the development trajectory under these conditions. The model predicts a growth collapse from which recovery is protracted, especially for small economies that lack a niche trade link with a large economy.