In or out? The welfare costs of EMU membership

Sweden and the UK have repeatedly refused to join the European and Monetary Union (EMU). Surprisingly, there is very little work on the welfare consequences of the loss of monetary policy flexibility for these countries. This paper fills this void by providing a framework to evaluate quantitatively the economic costs of joining the EMU. Using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices we investigate the economic implications of the loss of monetary policy flexibility associated with the EMU for each country. The main contribution of our general equilibrium approach is that we can evaluate the effects of monetary policy in terms of welfare. Our findings suggest that these economies may experience sizable welfare losses as a result of joining the EMU. Results show that the cost associated with the loss of the monetary policy flexibility is higher in the presence of persistent government consumption shocks and small trade shares with the EMU.     

The role of global financial conditions for credit supply in EMU periphery countries

The article analyses the role of global financial conditions for credit supply and growth performance in individual member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In line with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, we find that in the short run, the Fed and European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate policy compensate for changes in global risk assessment thereby supporting net private credit flows to the European periphery. However, in later periods, a worsened risk sentiment weighs on credit flows to these countries. In contrast, EMU core countries are generally less affected by global financial shocks. This asymmetric influence of global conditions on EMU member states are smoothed by the uniform access of commercial banks to the Eurosystem’s open market operations in conjunction with the redistribution of liquidity via the TARGET mechanism.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

The Impact of EMU Enlargement on Structural Reforms: A Political Economy Approach

This paper analyzes the setting of labor market reforms in the European Monetary Union (EMU), as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of business interests and trade unions. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we model the impact of distorted and non-distorted Central Bank monetary policy on EMU member state incentives to reform its labor market. Paradoxically, a majority of citizens who do not support the reform can lead to an optimal level of reform. We also show that, in a context of EMU enlargement, inflationary policy generates a status quo if there is a majority of non-supporters. Surprisingly, inflationary policy enhances the reform if the share of non-supporters over supporters increases, and weakens it if this share decreases.     

A simple inflation indicator for the euro zone

This article proposes and estimates an inflation indicator for the European Monetary Union (EMU). This indicator is set up so that it is contemporarily not affected by the changes in price differentials among EMU countries. The results show that the Monetary Union Index of Consumer Prices (MUICP), which is the inflation measure that the European Central Bank (ECB) takes as a reference for monetary policy purposes, could be understating the value of the inflation in the euro zone. It is also concluded that regional peculiarities are fundamental in the evolution of prices in the different EMU countries.     

Transmission of Nominal Exchange Rate Changes to Export Prices and Trade Flows and Implications for Exchange Rate Policy*

We discuss how the welfare ranking of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model depends on the interplay between the degree of exchange rate pass‐through and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. We identify combinations of these two parameters for which flexible and fixed exchange rates are superior with respect to welfare as measured by a representative household's utility level. We estimate the two parameters for six non‐EMU European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK) using a heterogeneous dynamic panel approach.     

THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE

The European Monetary Institute (EMI) will prepare a framework for European Monetary Union (EMU) monetary policy during the transition to the EMU. This involves a trade-off between deepening financial market integration and harmonizing central bank instruments, a choice between centralized and decentralized monetary strategies with significant welfare implications, and a trade-off between expected welfare and certainty of policy outcomes. As a result of being dominated by national central bankers and of the conflict between the core and the periphery of the European Community (EC), the EMI is biased toward an inefficient solution. Enlargement of the EC by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) group would raise the probability of a more efficient, two-track EMU, which initially would involve only the core group.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

Leader of the pack? German monetary dominance in Europe prior to EMU

In this paper, the monetary policy independence of European nations in the years before European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is investigated using cointegration techniques. Daily data is used to assess pairwise relationships between individual EMU nations and ‘lead’ nation Germany, to assess the hypothesis that Germany was the dominant European nation prior to EMU. By and large our econometric investigations support this hypothesis, and lead us to conclude that the only European nation to lose monetary policy independence in the light of monetary union was Germany. Our results have important policy implications. Given that the loss of monetary policy independence is generally viewed as the main cost of monetary unification, our findings suggest a reconsideration of the costs and benefits of monetary integration. A country can only lose what it has, and in Europe the countries that joined EMU — spare Germany — apparently did not have much to lose, at least not in terms of monetary independence. Instead, they actually gained monetary policy influence by getting a seat in the ECB's governing council which is responsible for setting interest policy in the euro area.     

The Euro Area,a Stressful Monetary Union? Learning from Newspapers’ Monetary Policy Coverage

Through a textual analysis of national newspaper articles covering European central bankers’ statements and policy decisions from 1999 to 2011, I derive the concerns expressed by national media in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). I consider these concerns as a benchmark for national preferences, and thus for the preferences of national central bankers in the EMU. I also test the existence of groups of national media (i.e., national publics) according to their shared expressed concerns. The results show that in the euro zone, similar concerns are shared by different country groups, corresponding to a group of countries from Northern Europe (Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands), Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal), and the Periphery (Italy, Greece, and Ireland), but that there are two isolated countries (France and Germany), whose newspapers do not share the issues raised by the rest of the European newspapers. This approach provides further insights into the potential heterogeneity of the European central bankers inside the Governing Council of the ECB in terms of policy preferences.     

Has Inflation Persistence Changed under EMU?

This paper analyzes the persistence of inflation in the euro area and, in particular, whether the persistence properties have changed since the start of European Monetary Union(EMU). For that purpose, we compare pre‐ and post‐EMU inflation persistence, use rolling‐window estimates of persistence, and apply tests specifically designed to detect break dates near the end of the sample period. In contrast to previous research, we find that inflation persistence has fallen significantly since the start of EMU. Persistence of consumer price inflation, which is central to the European Central Bank's policy mandate, has fallen more than the persistence of deflator inflation. The drop in inflation persistence is consistent with the results from a simulated small New Keynesian model with a shift toward a more aggressive monetary policy stance.     

Business Cycle Synchronization in Europe: Evidence from a Dynamic Factor Model

This paper revisits the effect of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on the extent of business cycle synchronization across its member states. A dynamic latent factor model is used to identify the ‘regional’ effect of the euro area on output growth and inflation dynamics across European countries. The results of variance decomposition analysis confirm that both output growth and inflation tended to be more synchronized among European countries during the run-up to the EMU, but there is no strong evidence to support the argument that the ‘regional’ effects prevailed after 1999.     

Measuring business cycle comovements in Europe: Evidence from a dynamic factor model with time-varying parameters

Estimation results from a dynamic factor model confirm an increase in output synchronization across European countries during the run-up to the inception of EMU, but EMU by itself has not continued to foster the emergence of a common business cycle.     

European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement

This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin–Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.     

Testing for the stability of money demand in Italy: has the Euro influenced the monetary transmission mechanism?

Stability of money demand is a crucial issue for the efficacy of monetary policy. This is particularly true in the presence of significant exogenous shocks to the monetary system. By implementing the most recent econometric testing procedures, this article intends to investigate the consistency of the stability of money demand in Italy, one of the larger European Monetary Union (EMU) countries, before and after the EMU. Among others, the objective is, indeed, to ascertain the effect of a change in the currency regime on the monetary aggregates and to provide a valid empirical model which is a viable tool for policy performance.     

Wages and prices in Europe before and after the onset of the Monetary Union

This paper investigates possible structural changes induced by the Euro on the relations among wages, prices and unemployment for the five major European economies. The dynamic adjustment and the level relations are found to be different across subperiods as well as across countries. During the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) period, there is evidence of a conventionally-sloped Phillips Curve for the four economies within the EMU, with a higher degree of homogeneity with respect to the pre-EMU period; the UK presents instead a positively-sloped Phillips Curve in the EMU period. In this latter period, deviations from reference values are found to influence unemployment for all countries, including the UK. Only for Germany and Spain, instead, we find evidence that deviations from reference values influence inflation dynamics.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

金融发展与医药制造业发展间关系的实证分析——基于我国省级面板数据

利用1995—2008年我国29个省级地区的面板数据,利用面板数据的固定效应变截距模型和固定效应变系数模型,对金融发展与医药制造业发展之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究结果表明:我国金融发展对医药制造业发展的影响具有显著的地区差异;在西部地区,前者对后者具有显著的积极影响;在东部地区,前者对后者具有正面影响,但统计上不显著;在中部地区,前者对后者具有负面影响,但统计上不显著。最后提出应充分发挥政策性金融在医药制造业发展中的作用。     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

Abstract. This paper studies the design and effects of monetary and fiscal policy in the euro area. To do so, a stylized two‐region model of monetary and fiscal policy rules in the EMU is built. We analyse how monetary and fiscal rules affect the adjustment dynamics in the model. Both the effects on the individual countries and on the EMU aggregate economy are studied. Three aspects play an important role in the analysis: (i) the consequences of alternative monetary and fiscal policy rules, (ii) the consequences of asymmetries between EMU countries (asymmetries in macroeconomic shocks and macroeconomic structures), and (iii) the role of alternative degrees of backward‐ and forward‐looking behaviour in consumer decisions and inflation expectations.