On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents

Abstract. Rank-order tournaments are usually implemented in organizations to provide incentives for eliciting employees' effort and/or to identify the agent with the higher ability, for example in promotion tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by experimentally analyzing a ceteris paribus variation of the prize spread – being the major design feature of tournaments – in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting. We find that effort significantly increases with the prize spread as predicted by standard theory. However, only for sufficiently large prize spreads weak players competing against strong players strain themselves all the more and sorting of agents is feasible.     

Asymmetric Contributions to Research Joint Ventures

We show that ex ante identical oligopolists may find it optimal to contribute asymmetrically to a research joint venture. The reason is found in the trade-off between the desire to increase the variance of the distribution of unit costs within the oligopoly (which increases gross profit, though not necessarily net profit, of the group) and the incentive to efficiently carry out R&D activities by equalizing marginal R&D costs across firms. Conditions for non-existence of symmetric contributions are given. We also propose a profit sharing rule for asymmetric research joint ventures.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L23.     

Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures

Antitrust agencies and courts have expressed concerns that jointventures and strategic alliances between firms that competein other markets might serve to reduce the vigor of their competition.This article explores a mechanism through which a joint venturebetween two (or more) firms in one market can serve to facilitatecollusion in another market—even one unconnected verticallyor horizontally by costs or demand. In the models studied here,play in one market has the effect of altering players' beliefsabout their rivals' play in the second market. A joint venturein one market may provide a credible punishment mechanism forfirms colluding in another market. The joint venture may alsoprovide a vehicle for the transmission, between players, ofinformation in a way that helps cooperative types find eachother and collude in other markets. (JEL L12, L41, K21)     

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

The Abatement Market A Proposal for Environmental Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries

We present a model of interaction among technologically asymmetriccountries whose use of an open-access environmental resource generatesmutual externalities. We show that countries can improve bothenvironmental quality and their individual welfare levels by buying/sellingpollution abatement. This market mechanism, which reduces incentive forfree-riding, is more effective the larger the technological gap betweencountries.     

新时期农村土地股份合作制探析

农村土地股份合作制的局限性表现为农地产权不完善影响农地股权稳定性;区域发展不平衡影响农地股份合作发展;农地股份合作制内部机制存在弊端;农地股份合作制缺乏法律保障。加强农村土地股份合作制度建设,必须增强农民土地处置权能;赋予农民土地资产性权利;确保农民土地使用权长期化。     

Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric

We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous countries or group of countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a tradeoff actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.     

欧盟科技合作项目中知识产权的保护和利用

欧盟在科技合作的知识产权管理方面有先进的经验和完善的管理体系。对欧盟框架研发计划及原子能计划有关知识产权管理规定进行了研究。欧盟在主体科技计划及重大科技项目等方面都对背景及前景知识产权的归属、保护、信息共享、转让和开发利用等进行了规范。建议：我国在开展国际科技合作中,必须加强科技人员知识产权意识,重视和发挥科技合同的作用;与欧盟开展科技合作,要充分了解欧盟主体科技计划知识产权管理相关规定,在保护我国国家利益及知识产权人利益的基础上,最大限度地行使自己的合法权利,共享和利用各方知识、数据和信息,充分挖掘和利用新增知识产权为我所用。     

联产品协同生产的成本驱动实证研究

实证研究证明，联产品生产的协同作用也是产品成本的驱动因素。协同成本的动因在于联产品的组成变量。在联产品协同生产过程中，所采取的基于非线性成本函数的边际成本计算法，应该是数理依据严谨、实务应用可行的方法。     

Asymmetric price adjustment in a menu-cost model

In this paper we demonstrate that the menu-cost model implies that prices adjust asymmetrically to nominal-demand shocks and that the asymmetry is linked to the elasticity of demand as well as menu costs. These implications are tested using manufacturing and retailing panel data for the OECD countries. The empirical results give some support for the menu-cost model.     

FASB和IASB概念框架联合项目动因探析

概念框架对于指导和评价会计准则体系的建立具有重要意义,我国有必要构建财务会计概念框架.在构建财务会计概念框架、借鉴当前世界上已有的概念框架时,要注意到它们之间的差异和不足,符合我国的国情.我国应加强会计准则国际协调,积极参与会计准则国际一体化的工作.     

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

China and the EU as Global Actors:Challenges and Opportunities for Joint Cooperation

This paper examines the level of cooperation which China and the EU undertake on global issues,especially with regard to the future roles of international organizations such as the UN,the IMF,the World Bank,the G20,the form and practice of multilateralism,the prospects and direction of a multipolar/core world,and whether the two tend to be partners rather than competitors on issues of climate change and energy policy.It applies the approach of international security cooperation and relies primarily on documentary evidence(e.g.,communiqués on global or regional governance aspects,issued at EU-China summits or separately by each).This paper argues that themisunderstandingon principles between the EU and China is at odds with the growing economic interdependencies between the two sides.The EU and China,two of the pillars in the emerging multipolar order,have fundamentally opposed attitudes to key aspects of global politics,such as sovereignty and multilateralism,and these differences are bound to create further tensions in the development of global governance regimes in the future.The originality of this paper lies in that it moves beyond the traditional form of investigating on how each China and the EU perceive each other in cooperation terms by focusing instead on the level of cooperation both partners pursue with regard to multilateralism and within the activities of international organizations.     

Cooperation in a fixed-membership labor-managed enterprise

Conditions are examined under which we can ensure efficiency in a fixed-membership labor-managed firm when the preferences of members over labor and income are unknown. The main result is the derivation of a necessary and sufficient condition on technology that ensures that we can find some reward scheme that gives efficient outcomes. Some commonly suggested reward schemes are examined and it is shown that assumptions that have been used to simplify previous analysis are, in fact, critical to many of the results that have been obtained.     

Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting

Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where “similar” voters make “similar” voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.     

产学研合作主体参与新产品开发的研发投入行为——基于竞赛模型

基于竞赛模型,针对具有一定市场风险的产学研合作主体共同参与新产品开发时各参与主体的研发投入问题建立博弈模型。通过数值模拟,深入分析了科研院所参与数量、分配收益方式以及新产品效用函数形式等对参与主体研发投入的影响。研究发现:除了产学研合作团队以跨功能形式组成且科研院所按研发投入费用比例分配收益以外,产学研合作团队的总研发投入量和科研院所的总研发投入量都随着科研院所数量的增加而减少;按研发投入比例分配收益有助于促进参与主体增加研发投入;跨功能形式下参与主体的研发投入高于混合功能形式下的研究投入。     

中国与中亚国家资源合作模式研究

中亚是丝绸之路经济带的核心区,中亚五国自然资源禀赋状况与中国存在互补性,其矿产资源具有价格和物流安全的比较优势,在多种资源领域可作为中国的战略替代区,应鼓励企业在中亚地区实施资源开发项目。文章梳理了跨国资源开发项目多种合作模式,基于不同合作模式的商业回报风险和差异,建立了组合矩阵,为企业实施资源开发项目提供了决策分析框架。文章进一步分析了东道国法律体系、政府效率和物流能力等因素对跨国资源合作项目的影响。在此基础上建议,企业应在投资前谨慎研究合作项目的可行性,减少投资的盲目性,提高项目运作和生产经营水平的国际化程度,并注意监控合作期间的政治风险。     

借助国际合作提升我国制造业信息化软件水平--山东华天软件公司国际合作成果调研报告

作为现代化工业设计不可或缺的平台,三维计算机辅助设计（CAD）和辅助制造（CAM）软件是支撑工业发展的最重要的技术之一。长期以来,中国三维CAD/CAM软件市场主要被欧美软件所垄断。山东华天软件公司通过国际合作成功开发出我国第一款具有自主知识产权的三维CAD/CAM系统SINOVATION,一方面使国内企业的软件使用和维护成本大幅降低,另一方面也使制造业产品的创新能力得到显著提升。对该项国际合作项目进行了详尽介绍,希望该项目在技术和人才方面的合作经验能对国内其他企业有所借鉴。     

Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union

We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. The relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
JEL classification : F 33; F 40