The effect of the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian multilateral trade liberalization

In this paper show that the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) tariff preferences have triggered a decline in Canadian external tariffs, explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998. Next, we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the US firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in Canada; this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the US and Canada. Finally, we estimate the effect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in Canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity.     

Welfare‐improving Coordinated Tariff and Sales Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition

This paper studies the welfare effects of coordinated domestic sales tax reform associated with a reduction of the import tariff under imperfect competition. We set up a simple oligopoly trading model where domestic and exporting firms compete in the home market. We show that, if the initial levels of import tariff and sales tax are positive, there always exist welfare‐improving sales tax reforms. In some cases, a reduction of the sales tax accompanied by a reduction of the import tariff increases social welfare, whereas in other cases, raising the sales tax can increase social welfare.     

碳税政策效应理论研究评述

本文对国外有关碳税政策效应的理论研究进行了系统的回顾和梳理,分析了碳税的环境效应、经济效应、分配效应和福利效应,并比较了碳税与能源税、排污许可证交易制度在碳减排效果和政策成本方面的区别。本文分析表明,中国要实施碳税应充分借鉴国际经验和现有研究成果,并要结合我国经济社会的发展状况,作出进一步的理论分析与实证研究。碳税政策的制定,既要考虑自身的多重效应,又要仔细分析它与其他政策工具之间的相互影响。     

Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries

This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies with heterogeneous firms. The analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country have negative productivity and welfare effects on the trading partner. Second, symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions are inferior. Third, there are gains from trade even for a country whose monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by switching from autarky to trade.     

US Ethanol Trade Policy: Pollution Reduction or Domestic Protection

To mitigate dependence on fossil fuel and reduce pollution, the US government has undertaken several policies—an import tariff, tax credit, and mandate—to augment domestic ethanol production and increase ethanol in the fuel supply. This study uses a general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of the US ethanol import tariff on welfare by internalizing the externality and incorporating US fuel and ethanol policies and to determine the optimal tariff. The results show that because of the environmental benefits of imported ethanol, the adverse effects of domestic ethanol on the environment, the need for the imported ethanol to boost the blended gasoline production, and the economy‐wide interactions of various markets, the optimal trade policy may call for subsidizing rather than taxing ethanol imports.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Is there a rationale for output-based rebating of environmental levies?

Political pressure often exists for rebating environmental levies, particularly when incomplete regulatory coverage allegedly creates an “unlevel playing field” with other, unregulated firms or industries. This paper assesses the conditions under which rebating environmental levies is justified for the regulated sector, combining a theoretical approach with numerical simulations parameterized to reflect the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Rebates are undesired if one can instead tax the production of the unregulated sector. Otherwise, rebating is justified only when the goods of the competing sectors are close substitutes with similar emissions profiles. Policy constraints are costly in terms of welfare and environmental effectiveness.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

The German Business Tax Reform of 2000: A General Equilibrium Analysis

In the year 2000 Germany enacted a major tax reform involving significant cuts in corporate and personal tax rates and a controversial change in the system of dividend taxation. This paper discusses the effects of the business tax reform on the German economy. The analysis is based on a detailed general equilibrium model of the OECD economy which is designed to illustrate the domestic and international effects of national tax policies. The simulations indicate that the German business tax reform will raise domestic economic activity and welfare, although the welfare gain will accrue disproportionately to households with a high ratio of property income to total income.     

SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

What Happened to the Japanese Model?

Japan's steep postwar growth was nested in a political economy built around producer‐oriented policies: by fostering the growth of large firms using the tools of industrial policy, the government could jumpstart development. Many large firms, and their employees, benefited indirectly from this growth program, and very small firms and industries not included in the growth model were compensated through preferential policies or subsidies. Japan's social contract evolved around this system, having as its centerpiece lifetime employment. The government spent more resources on supporting exporting industries and compensating domestic ones than on building a forward‐looking welfare system. Japan's decade‐long economic downturn marks a structural transition towards a postindustrial society. While excelling in producing tangibles, Japan has fallen behind in fostering modern industries, including services; the country also lacks a welfare system to handle increasing structural unemployment that this transition brings about. Without a commitment towards a welfare system and a welfare society, and a reorientation of the social contract towards citizens, Japan is unlikely to transition successfully.     

The incidence of income taxes on high earners in Canada

This article explores the “brain drain” explanation for the concentration of incomes in Canada during the past 30 years, namely, that high-skilled Canadians make use of high salaries on offer in the United States to extract higher salaries at home. If this is the case, then for a given level of US salaries, the threat to accept outside offers should be more credible when the Canadian dollar is depreciating against the US dollar, and weaker when the Canadian dollar is appreciating. The data are broadly consistent with this claim: income concentration worsened during the depreciations of the 1980s and 1990s, and eased when the Canadian dollar began to appreciate in value. The article develops a simple two-parameter model based on the propositions that high earners in Canada can use US salaries to bargain for higher salaries, and that Canadian high earners can shelter part of their income from personal income taxes. It also offers some preliminary evidence about the parameter values consistent with available data. The results suggest that higher top marginal personal income tax rates may potentially accentuate top-end after-tax income inequality. If high earners are able to use their bargaining power to extract pay increases to offset higher tax rates, then the burden of increased personal income taxes will be deflected elsewhere, and may even have the perverse effect of making the after-tax income distribution more unequal than it was before.     

Distortionary company car taxation: deadweight losses through increased car ownership

We analyse the effects of distortionary company car taxation through increased household car consumption for the Netherlands. We use several identification strategies and demonstrate that for about 20 % of households company car possession increases car ownership. The annual welfare loss of distortionary company taxation through increased car ownership is generally rather small, maximally €120 per company car, and much less than the welfare loss through increased expenditure on the company car. However, for policies that exempt households from paying tax on their company car, the annual deadweight loss is likely higher. Our first-best tax policy recommendation is to increase company car tax rates. However, our current results suggest that a second-best policy, which keeps average company car taxation constant but which reduces the marginal tax on cheaper cars and increases the marginal tax on expensive cars, would be welfare improving as overconsumption of company cars will be reduced.     

Plant location and strategic environmental policy with inter-sectoral linkages

In recent debates on trade liberalisation the concern has often been expressed that with more competitive international trade governments will be worried that by setting tougher environmental policies than their trading rivals they will put domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage, and in the extreme case this could lead to firms relocating production in other countries. The response by governments to such concerns will be to weaken environmental policies (‘eco-dumping’). In competitive markets such concerns are ill founded, but there is a small amount of literature which has analysed whether governments will indeed have incentives for eco-dumping in the more relevant case of markets where there are significant scale economies; even here there is no presumption that the outcome will involve eco-dumping.In this paper we extend the analysis of strategic environmental policy and plant location decisions by analysing the location decision of firms in different sectors which are linked through an input-output structure of intermediate production. The reason why we introduce inter-sectoral linkages between firms is that they introduce an additional factor, relative to those already analysed in the literature, in the plant location decision, which is the incentive for firms in different sectors to agglomerate in a single location. This has a number of important effects. First, there is now the possibility of multiple equilibria in location decisions of firms. Following from this there is the possibility of catastrophic effects where a small increase in an environmental tax can trigger the collapse of an industrial base in a country; however there is also the possibility that a country which raises its environmental tax could attract more firms to locate in that country, because of the way the tax affects incentives for agglomeration. Finally, and again related to the previous effects, there is the possibility of a hysteresis effect where raising an environmental tax in one country can cause firms to relocate to another country, but subsequently lowering that tax will not induce firms to relocate back into the original country.We consider a simple model with two countries, two industries, an upstream and a downstream sector, and two firms per industry. The analysis proceeds through a three-stage game: in the first stage the governments of the two countries set their environmental policies; in the second stage the firms in both industries choose how many plants to locate and where; in the third stage firms choose their output levels, with the demand for the upstream firms being determined endogenously by the production decisions of the downstream firms. We assume that there are no limits to production capacity, so that firms do not build more than one plant in any country. However, firms may build plants in different countries because of positive transport costs. Although the model appears very simple, it cannot be solved analytically, so all the conclusions must be drawn from numerical simulations.     

气候政策的时间不一致性问题研究

经验证据表明,很多国家都很难严格执行既定的气候政策。从理论上证明追求社会福利最大化的政府在经济剩余、政府税收收入和碳排放的负外部性等多重目标约束条件下,实施碳税政策时会产生时间不一致现象。结果表明,即使考虑到公共资金的边际成本,由于企业投资的不可逆转性和沉淀性,相对社会最优而言政府也会在事后降低碳税率,导致更多的能源消费和更多的碳排放。为克服时间不一致问题带来的效率损失,建议政府应建立独立的碳排放管制机构,对碳税政策做出可置信的承诺,改变电源结构,鼓励减排技术的投资,完善碳交易市场。     

A Note on the Adverse Effect of Competition on Consumers

It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits consumers. We show that this may not be the case in an industry with asymmetric cost firms. A rise in the number of more cost‐inefficient firms makes the consumers worse off in the presence of a welfare‐maximizing tax/subsidy policy. A rise in the number of more cost‐inefficient firms also reduces social welfare.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.