Investing to access an adverse selection market

I analyse a market with asymmetric information and interdependent values. Accessing the market is costly and stochastic, e.g. requires lobbying, licences or R&D. For a range of parameter values, interventions that raise production or entry costs for all seller types increase trade, investment and payoff for all types. This effect is driven by a novel feedback loop between the market composition and the investment in access.     

研发与市场结构:基于成本视角的分析

本文从成本入手，探讨了研发与市场结构的关系。通过对平均成本、固定成本及知识特性的综合分析，认为由于技术复杂度的不断提高及研发带来的规模经济，在多数产业研发会导致市场集中度逐渐提高。通过对研发沉没成本的分析表明，在专利保护与许可证制度下，当研发导致的沉没成本比较小时，厂商数量较多的竞争性市场的福利好于寡占或垄断市场，因为其研发速度更快；反之，寡占或垄断市场的福利更好，因为研发的沉没成本得到了节约。在理论分析的基础上，本文就如何通过优化市场结构，提升我国企业研发能力，应对经济全球化的挑战，提出了三点对策。     

Sunk Costs,Extensive R&D Subsidies and Permanent Inducement Effects

Using firm‐level data on Spanish manufacturing firms we estimate a model of the firm's optimal R&D decisions (whether to perform R&D and how much to invest). We quantify the fixed (proper fixed costs plus firms' outside option) and sunk costs of R&D and find the former to be substantially higher than the latter. While sunk costs act as a barrier to entry into R&D for some firms, fixed costs are the binding obstacle for many more firms. Simulation based on the estimated model reveals that one‐shot trigger subsidies cause a substantial increase in both the share of R&D firms and average R&D expenditures. This effect shows persistence over time, but totally fades away after seven years as firms are gradually hit by negative R&D profitability shocks.     

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INDUSTRY R&D AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

This paper aims to shed some new insights on the long‐debated and both extensively and intensively explored relationship between market concentration and industry R&D intensity. In order to do so, this study develops, from a classic Dorfman‐Steiner [1954] model of firm R&D, a model of industry R&D, where consumer preference over quality and price, R&D technology, and the joint distribution of firm‐specific technological competence and market share jointly determine the level of industry R&D intensity. The joint distribution term, which reflects both the underlying distribution of firms‐specific technological competence and the strength of its link with market share, suggests that the concentration‐R&D relationship differs depending on the strength of the link or simply the appropriability of R&D in terms of market share: A positive relationship is predicted for low‐appropriability industries, where market concentration supplements low R&D appropriability, while a negative or an inverted U‐shaped relationship for high‐appropriability industries. An empirical analysis of data, disaggregated at the five‐digit SIC level, on R&D and market concentration of Korean manufacturing industries provides supportive evidence for the predictions.     

Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

R&D Partnerships and Innovation Performance: Can There Be too Much of a Good Thing?

R&D collaboration facilitates the pooling of complementary skills, learning from the partner as well as the sharing of risks and costs. Research therefore stresses the positive relationship between collaborative R&D and innovation performance. Fewer studies address the potential drawbacks of collaborative R&D. Collaborative R&D comes at the cost of coordination and monitoring, requires knowledge disclosure, and involves the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners. Thus, while for lower collaboration intensities the net gains can be high, costs may start to outweigh benefits if firms perform a higher share of their innovation projects collaboratively. For a sample of 2735 firms located in Germany and active in a broad range of manufacturing and service sectors, this study finds that increasing the share of collaborative R&D projects in total R&D projects is associated with a higher probability of product innovation and with a higher market success of new products. While this confirms previous findings on the gains for innovation performance, the results also show that collaboration has decreasing and even negative returns on product innovation if its intensity increases above a certain threshold. Thus, the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation follows an inverted‐U shape and, on average, costs start to outweigh benefits if a firm pursues more than about two‐thirds of its R&D projects in collaboration. This result is robust to conditioning market success to the introduction of new products and to accounting for the selection into collaborating. This threshold is, however, contingent on firm characteristics. Smaller and younger as well as resource‐constrained firms benefit from relatively higher collaboration intensities. For firms with higher collaboration complexities in terms of different partners and different stages of the R&D process at which collaboration takes place, returns start to decrease already at lower collaboration intensities.     

Empirical studies of entry and exit: A survey of the evidence

Over 70 empirical studies of entry and exit patterns covering eleven different countries generally support the expectation that entry is more frequent in more profitable, rapidly growing industries, and slower where the absolute costs of capital required to build a minimum efficient scale plant are imposing. Scale economies, excess capacity, and limit pricing receive little empirical support as entry impediments. The evidence concerning the effects of advertising and R&D intensity is confusing.Exit is faster where profits are lower, and slower where durable specific (sunk) capital costs are more important. Exit and entry are strongly correlated, probably due to displacement (of incumbents by more efficient entrants) and vacuum effects (in which entrants are enticed by the prospects of selling to uncommitted customers abandoned by a recent exit).     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,IMITATION, AND THE INCENTIVES FOR COST REDUCING R&D EFFORT*

I develop and test a model of strategic R&D investments where innovating and non‐innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals. I find that a larger proportion of non‐innovating rivals stimulates cost‐reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level R&D. Key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of R&D, using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of U.S. industrial R&D. Results also suggest that R&D and size are simultaneously determined, with R&D being proportional to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.     

R&D capabilities,intellectual property strength and choice of equity ownership in cross-border acquisitions: evidence from BRICS acquirers in Europe

The aim of the study is to investigate two relatively underexplored factors, namely, the R&D (research and development) capabilities of target firms and the strength of intellectual property (IP) institutions in target economies, that influences the choice of equity ownership in cross border acquisitions (CBAs) undertaken by multinational enterprises (MNEs) from BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. They developed the key hypothesis on foreign market entry through CBAs by incorporating insights from transaction costs economics, the resource-based view and institutional theory to investigate the determinants of full versus partial equity ownership. Using logistic regression estimation methods to a sample of 111 CBA deals of BRICS MNEs in 22 European countries, it was found that BRICS MNEs were likely to pursue full rather than partial acquisition mode when target firms have high R&D capabilities. However, the greater the degree of strength of IP institutions in target economies and higher the target firms’ R&D capabilities, the more likely it is for BRICS MNEs to undertake partial, rather than, full acquisition mode. They provided interesting theoretical insights and managerial implications that might underlie some of the key findings on CBAs by emerging market MNEs.     

A Structural Empirical Model of R&D,Firm Heterogeneity,and Industry Evolution*

This article develops and estimates an industry equilibrium model of the Korean electric motor industry from 1991 to 1996. Plant-level decisions on R&D, physical capital investment, entry, and exit are integrated in a dynamic setting with knowledge spillovers. We apply the novel approximation of oblivious equilibrium to estimate the R&D cost, magnitude of knowledge spillovers, adjustment costs of physical investment, and plant scrap value distribution. Knowledge spillovers are essential to explaining the firm-level productivity evolution and the equilibrium market configuration. A $15\%$ R&D subsidy maximizes industry output and is broadly consistent with a past policy initiative of the Korean government.     

Appropriability,preemption, and firm performance

The impact of strategies used to appropriate innovation rents on firm performance is analyzed using a sample of U.S. public manufacturing firms. Stronger appropriability at the firm level, achieved through patent protection or the ownership of specialized complementary assets, leads to superior economic performance, as measured by the stock market valuation of a firm's R& D assets. Among commonly used ‘nonconventional’ patent strategies, preemptive patenting allows incumbents to strengthen their market power. Consistent with theory, such effect is higher for incumbents with higher ex ante market power and facing a higher threat of entry, and lower when R& D competition is characterized by the discovery of drastic innovations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The significance of network resources in the race to enter emerging product markets: the convergence of telephony communications and computer networking, 1989–2001

This paper focuses on the role of network resources and examines the associated mechanisms that affect the timing of entry into an emerging product market. Linking network theory to market entry research, I analyze the pattern in the structure, relation, and composition of 517 firms' strategic alliances as the firms face the decision of whether and when to enter the networking switches market over a 13‐year period from 1989 to 2001. The context for empirical testing is the voice/data convergence between telephony communications and computer networking technologies during which the industry boundary blurs. Firms that have access to information of high quality, large quantity, and compositional heterogeneity are likely to enter the newly developed market more quickly. However, network configuration lock‐in and network costs may counterbalance the benefits derived from network resources. I discuss the implications of these findings for research on social networks and the timing of market entry. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure

In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under patent protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, patent protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection.     

Managing Technology for Competitive Advantage in Inter-industry Markets

The paper deals with the question of how a firm could develop a technological/R&D strategy to help it to maintain the initiative in its markets. The author extends Porter's analysis of competitive strategy to the R&D field and establishes the point that to remain profitable a firm must consciously manage its interfaces with its suppliers as well as its customers; it must take into account the threats and opportunities arising from such factors as the impact of existing competitors, new suppliers and competitors entering the scene and the possible appearance of substitutes for its products. A comprehensive corporate strategy would contain elements such as using technological change and R&D to raise the entry costs facing potential new rivals, inhibiting or anticipating the entry of substitutes, raising exit costs to customer and supplier by, for example, involving them in technological development.
The paper develops these possibilities in detail and concludes with a summarising checklist of practical options open to a firm to act on the conclusions the author draws from his analysis.     

INNOVATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE ‘BOUNDS APPROACH’ IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY*

This paper applies Sutton's [1998] ‘bounds approach’ to the chemical industry. The approach predicts that (i) the lower bound of the ratio of the 1‐firm concentration index to product concentration is bounded away from zero at high levels of product concentration only in high R&D markets and (ii) the lower bound on market concentration is higher and increasing in product concentration in markets with higher R&D intensities. We test these two hypotheses and find that the data strongly support them. A novel feature of our analysis is the use of plant level data in defining products and the classification of products into markets based on end‐use.     

How Do Switching Costs Affect Market Concentration and Prices in Network Industries?

I investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option. I find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option. Without a viable outside option, high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects, but with a viable outside option, switching costs increase market concentration. Furthermore, switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option, but generally raise prices otherwise.     

COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES*

I examine the question whether cooperation in R&D among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated‐game framework. Innovation under non‐cooperative R&D leads to an inter‐firm asymmetry, destabilizing collusion in pre‐discovery and post‐discovery periods. Innovation sharing under cooperative R&D preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit, thereby facilitating collusion. However, welfare may increase with cooperative R&D. I also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results.     

Do low-quality products affect high-quality entry? Multiproduct firms and nonstop entry in airline markets

This paper studies the effect of product ownership and quality on nonstop entry in the airline industry. Specifically, this paper empirically examines the decision of an airline to offer high-quality nonstop service between cities given that the airline may or may not be offering lower quality one-stop service. I find that airlines that offer one-stop service through a hub are less likely to enter that same market with nonstop service than those that do not. In addition, the quality of the one-stop service is an important determinant of entry. Airlines are more likely to enter a market with nonstop service if their own or their rival's one-stop service in the market is of lower quality. Estimates suggest that the entry of a rival nonstop carrier diminishes the probability a carrier enters the market with nonstop service. However, airlines offering one-stop service respond differently to nonstop rivals. In particular, relative to other carriers, those offering one-stop service are more likely to enter markets if there are nonstop rivals, suggesting that cannibalization effects are diminished in the presence of nonstop competition.     

Leaders,laggards, and the pursuit of foreign knowledge

This paper analyzes how firms in different technological and market share positions use foreign R&D to augment their technological capabilities. Technology transfer issues and absorptive capacity arguments are examined to analyze the different technological capabilities of leading and lagging firms. In addition, a new strategic rationale (in terms of non‐dominant market share firms) that has not been considered in prior studies analyzing knowledge‐seeking FDI is offered. From a panel dataset which includes information on all foreign R&D investments made by publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms (from 1974 to 1994), I show that Japanese firms investing in foreign R&D tend to be the non‐dominant market share firms, but also the technologically leading firms across fairly diverse industries. By considering both the technological and market share positions of firms, this study reveals important characteristics that influence when firms use foreign R&D as part of a strategy to augment their technological capabilities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic control systems and relative r&d investment in large multiproduct firms

This paper hypothesizes that tight financial controls associated with large diversified M-form firms lead to a short-term, low-risk orientation and thereby lower relative investment in R&D. Further, it is hypothesized that increasing levels of diversification require different control systems which have significant implications for investing in R&D. Results of the study of 124 major U.S. firms suggest that less diversified U-form firms invest more heavily in R&D than more diversified M-form firms after controlling for size and industry effects. Additionally, dominant business firms invested more in R&D than either related or unrelated business firms. Finally, the relationship between R&D intensity and market performance was negative for related and unrelated firms. The findings suggest that the market evaluates R&D investment more positively for firms that are organized to seek synergy than for those that are organized to pursue a hedging (or diversification) strategy.