Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?

I examine the (lack of) economic logic that underlies the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s latest iteration of network neutrality regulations. I explore potential unintended consequences and find a substantial tension between the regulations and the objective of promoting consumer choice and sovereignty. I also identify market developments that could largely neutralize the regulations unless they are expanded to constrain Internet access providers’ actions further.     

Real Estate Settlement Pricing: A Theoretical Framework

This paper examines the pricing of real estate settlement services. Prices charged by real estate brokers, title insurers, private mortgage companies and other settlement service providers have been a public policy issue for a decade. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 did little to alleviate public concerns or change pricing practices.
The paper provides both a conceptual framework and some observations on how prices for settlement services are determined. It concludes that the demand has little to do with the services themselves, but rather depends on the demand for housing. This creates an environment for unnecessary services to be performed and for prices to be far in excess of cost.     

The impact of sustainable public procurement on supplier management — The case of French public hospitals

In the public sector, procurement managers are now required to comply with new sustainable regulations and to look for suppliers able to provide a sustainable offering. Stating that contracts can only frame part of the interaction and that parties often turn to more negotiated agreements, we investigate whether sustainable expectations within public hospitals could impact supplier management and imply rearrangements between public buyers and private providers. Data were collected from fifteen French hospitals through semi-structured interviews. Findings first highlight the sustainable expectations of public buyers from global key providers, and, second, that sustainable procurement does impact the relationship by creating new rules. Building on these results, managerial implications are suggested.     

Prices for long-distance voice telephony in Germany

This paper examines the first 16 months of competition in the German market for long-distance voice telephony on the fixed network. It concentrates on price level and price structure. Competition induced by the entry of both network operators and switch-based service providers decreased the price level substantially. Furthermore, after initial attempts to design innovative price structures, most firms gave up differentiation, and instead charged uniform prices for long-distance calls for residential customers. Moreover, the decrease in the price level seems to have induced a shift in the peak-load structure, which raises concern about the regulation of the peak-load structure of interconnection charges.     

Can a margin squeeze indicate the need for deregulation? The case of fixed network voice telephony markets

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection.     

Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market

Bargaining is common in markets for heterogeneous goods and differences in bargaining power between buyer and seller affect the negotiated transaction price. Previous research has found systematic evidence in the housing markets that weak buyers pay higher prices and weak sellers receive lower prices for their homes. Earlier work has modeled the bargaining effect as a parallel shift in the hedonic function, implicitly assuming that attribute shadow prices were unaffected by the bargaining process. In this paper, we use a sample of home sales where the seller's bargaining power is weakened by the fact that the home is vacant at the time of sale to test whether the effect of bargaining is best captured by a shift in the hedonic constant or whether the attribute shadow prices vary as well. The question is significant for property valuation where estimation of the marginal value of an attribute is commonly used to adjust comparable sales data. We find strong confirmation that bargaining power influences the negotiated price. We also find evidence that bargaining power alters attribute prices, although we do not find a consistent pattern across markets.     

The FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision and Stock Prices

More than a year after a court invalidated its “net neutrality” rules on broadband Internet service providers (ISPs), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decided to extend public-utility (Title II) regulation on broadband services. This paper uses traditional event analysis of the movements in the values of major communications and media companies’ equities at key moments in the FCC’s path to this decision to estimate the financial market’s assessment of the likely effects of regulation on ISPs, traditional media companies, and new digital media companies. The results are surprising: the markets penalized only three large cable companies to any extent, and even these effects appear to have been short-lived. The media companies, arguably the intended beneficiaries of the regulations, were unaffected.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

(Non-)Insurance Markets,Loss Size Manipulation and Competition: Experimental Evidence*

The common view that insurer buyer power may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in pushing for price and cost reductions. We develop theory and provide experimental evidence that the interests of insurers and consumers may be misaligned when insurers have the power to influence the service supplier’s cost. Insurers with such buyer power may benefit from increasing initial loss sizes to create demand for insurance. Insurer competition eliminates their profits but markets do not return to the initial non-insurance state. This constitutes a welfare loss.     

Land Development Regulation: A Case Study of Dallas and Houston, Texas

This paper compares the approaches to land development regulation in Dallas and Houston and attempts to measure the impact of regulation on lot prices in the two cities. Land development in Dallas appears to be subject to a greater degree of regulation than in Houston, especially with respect to zoning and the provision of utilities. In Houston, utilities are provided by Municipal Utility Districts which give developers greater flexibility in subdivision site selection. Other regulations concerning land use, platting, road financing and environment are examined for their impact on development costs in the two cities. The paper closes with a "full" lot cost comparison for selected subdivisions in Dallas and Houston. Lot prices are found to be lower in Houston. The difference is largely explained by differences in regulation and a transfer of cost from the private to the public sector.     

Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned

This paper analyzes the evolution of prices and competition in intra-EU international roaming markets. It addresses three main research questions: (i) to what extent have market forces by themselves brought competition to retail roaming markets? (ii) Has the evolution of market dynamics in wholesale roaming improved competition? (iii) Is wholesale regulation sufficient to lead to a reduction in retail roaming prices? Data show that there has been little price-based competition both at wholesale and retail levels, despite prices being well above costs and the significant margins allowed by regulation. Available data from the period preceding the entry into force of the first EU roaming regulation also point to the same conclusion. Lack of competitive pressure in retail roaming markets and inelastic demand give little incentives for retail roaming service providers to lower prices. Wholesale international roaming markets have complex competition dynamics. They are characterized by the reciprocity of wholesale roaming agreements and traffic internalization inside transnational groups. These circumstances limit price competition at the wholesale level. The traditional regulatory approach applied to electronic communication markets has been primarily focused on wholesale regulation. However, empirical evidence shows that even if wholesale charges are reduced, retail roaming markets continue to operate at very high retail margins (for example, more than 200% retail mark-up over wholesale charges for data roaming services and incoming calls). This proves that in international roaming markets wholesale charge reductions are not necessarily passed on to retail prices. It can thus be inferred that wholesale price regulation alone is in most cases not sufficient to ensure that benefits are passed through to end users.     

Centrality and pricing in spatially differentiated markets: The case of gasoline

We highlight the importance of ‘centrality’ for pricing. Firms characterized by a more central position in a spatial network are more powerful in terms of having a stronger impact on their competitors' prices and on equilibrium prices. These propositions are derived from a simple theoretical model and investigated empirically for the retail gasoline market of Vienna, Austria. We compute a measure of network centrality based on the locations of gasoline stations in the road network. Results from a spatial autoregressive model show that prices of gasoline stations are more strongly correlated with prices of central competitors.     

Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

In a housing insurance market buildings have different damage probabilities. High-risk houses need investment, low-risk houses don't. Insurers use imperfect tests to assess risks. The market is a natural monopoly: with more than one active insurer, high-risk house owners continue to apply to insurers until they are eventually assigned to the low-risk class. The natural monopoly need not be sustainable. In equilibrium the incumbent accommodates entry even when the natural monopoly is sustainable. We explain recent observations from Germany and Switzerland where damage rates and prices went up drastically after the transition from state monopolies to competitive environments.     

Price Controls and Market Structure: Evidence from Gasoline Retail Markets

In this paper we study the effect of price floor regulations on the organization and performance of markets. The standard interpretation of the effects of these policies is concerned with short‐run market distortions associated with excess supply. Since price controls prevent markets from clearing, they lead to higher prices. While this analysis may be correct in the short‐run, it does not consider the dynamic equilibrium consequences of price controls. We demonstrate that price floor regulations can have important long‐run effects on the the structure of markets by crowding them and creating endogenous barriers to entry for low‐cost retailers. Moreover, we show that these factors can indirectly lower productivity and possibly even prices. We test this in the context of an actual regulation imposed in the retail gasoline market in the Canadian province of Québec and show that the policy led to more competition between smaller/less efficient stations. This resulted in lowered sales, and, despite the reduction in efficiency, did not increase prices.     

Service Regulations,Input Prices and Export Volumes: Evidence from a Panel of Manufacturing Firms

Using a panel of firm‐level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better service regulation reduces the price of intermediate inputs paid by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small‐to‐medium sized corporations (SME’s), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests itself in international markets. We find evidence of an input cost channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such a channel is weaker for SME’s. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 to 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an average of 20 per cent as a result of the direct input cost effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the ‘best practice’ regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional nine per cent. We conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate input prices and export volumes.     

Optimal dynamic volume-based price regulation

We consider a model of optimal price regulation in markets where demand is sluggish and asymmetric providers compete on quality. Using a spatial model, which is suitable to investigate the health care and education sector, we analyse within a dynamic set-up the scope for price premiums or penalties on volume. Under the assumption of symmetric cost information, we show that the socially optimal time path of quality provision off the steady state can be replicated by a simple dynamic pricing rule where the dynamic part of the rule is ex-ante non-discriminatory in the sense that the price premium or penalty on volume is common across providers, despite their differing production costs. Whether the price schedule involves a penalty or a premium on volume relates to two concerns regarding production costs and consumer benefits, which go in opposite directions. Price adjustments over time occur only through the price penalty or premium, not time directly, which highlights the simplicity and thus applicability of this regulation scheme.     

Stakeholder value appropriation: The case of labor in the worldwide mining industry

Research Summary : We evaluate how the value appropriated by employees varies in response to an exogenous shock to the price of the firm's product and how this variation depends on institutional and ownership structures. Institutional and ownership structures that favor employees can influence firms’ location decisions and shareholders’ incentives to invest. Using data from the main copper mines in the world, we show that the value appropriated by employees rises in response to an exogenous increase in the price of minerals. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the increment in the value captured by employees is larger in stated‐owned companies, when labor regulations promote productivity‐based payments, when wages are determined through a centralized bargaining process, and when regulations associated with hiring and firing are more flexible. Managerial Summary : We show how labor regulations and state ownership affect the value appropriated by employees when there are exogenous changes in the price of the firm's products. Since the value generated by a firm is distributed among different stakeholders, a higher appropriation of value by employees results in lower appropriation by another party. Therefore, by changing the distribution of value, managerial decisions about location and entry could be affected. For instance, shareholders of firms with positive future expectations about the prices of their products might prefer to enter markets in which salary negotiations are not centralized or where partnership with the local government is not mandatory. Overall, our analysis calls for the consideration of the external environment when evaluating value appropriation by different types of stakeholders.