An integrated approach for ex-ante evaluation of public policies for sustainable agriculture at landscape level

An integrated methodological framework for ex-ante evaluation and planning of public policies for sustainable agriculture at agro-landscape level is proposed. The components of the framework are to: (1) determine the private, i.e. farmers’, and public benefits associated to agro-landscapes, consisting of an agricultural land-use system, according to its performance for several market and non-market functions. Market forces determine the market benefits and preferences of society the non-market benefits; (2) explore and select potential sustainable agro-landscapes based on the private and public benefits associated with possible land-use alternatives; (3) define efficient public policy mechanisms for improving social net benefit of agro-landscapes.The framework is illustrated with a case study in a small dairy farming dominated agro-landscape in The Netherlands, with gross margin, landscape quality, nature value and environmental health as the analysed ecosystem functions. Alternative landscapes consisting of hedgerow configurations and grassland management practices were explored, yielding a set of alternatives representing the solution space in terms of change in private and public benefits. Policy mechanisms were defined to move from the current to a desired landscape based on changes in social net benefits. Moreover, the necessity of a modification in the current agri-environmental support was analysed for each landscape. The analysis considered all farmers in the agro-landscape jointly. The results for the case study showed potential prototypes of landscapes and their performance compared to the current landscape. Extension was the most efficient policy mechanism to promote the change to the socially optimum landscape alternative.     

Enhancing ecosystem services through afforestation: How policy can help

We employ an integrated spatial economic model to assess the net private and public benefits of converting marginal agricultural land into forest plantations (afforestation) in New Zealand. For numerous locations, we conduct policy analysis considering the magnitudes of net private and public benefits of land use changes to determine whether a policy response is justified and, if so, to identify the appropriate policy instruments to encourage adoption of afforestation. Net private benefit is commonly negative, so much so, that in most cases no policy response is justified. However, in certain cases, net private benefits are slightly negative and public benefits are significantly positive justifying the use of positive incentives as the most appropriate policy instrument to encourage afforestation in New Zealand. The most commonly used policy instruments for afforestation in New Zealand, extension and awareness training, are found to be appropriate in only a minority of situations.     

Does agricultural extension pay?

Compared to studies evaluating the benefits from agricultural research, there are relatively few empirical studies of the net economic benefits of agricultural extension, and even fewer that consider both public and private sector extension effort. In this study we examine regional differences in the adoption of lupins in Western Australia (WA) in order to estimate the net economic benefits of public and private sector extension. Impacts of extension and other variables on adoption were analysed for 40 shires using multivariate regression analysis. The results suggest that both public and private extension activities influenced farmer uptake of lupins, particularly by bringing forward the start time of the diffusion curve. Economic benefits of extension, based on the statistical analysis, were combined with costs of extension estimated from public sector records and surveys of private sector extension agents and used to estimate the net present value of extension investments by the public and private sectors in the study area.     

Investment in soil conservation in northern Ethiopia: the role of land tenure security and public programs

A double hurdle statistical analysis of 250 farms in the Tigray region of Ethiopia reveals different causal factors for soil conservation adoption versus intensity of use. Farmers' reasons for adopting soil conservation measures vary sharply between stone terraces and soil bunds. Long‐term investments in stone terraces were associated with secure land tenure, labour availability, proximity to the farmstead and learning opportunities via the existence of local food‐for‐work (FFW) projects. By contrast, short‐term investments in soil bunds were strongly linked to insecure land tenure and the absence of local food‐for‐work projects. Public conservation campaigns on private plots reduced adoption of both stone terraces and soil bunds. Whereas capacity factors largely influenced the adoption decision, expected returns carried more influence for the intensity of stone terrace adoption (measured as metres of terrace per hectare). More stone terracing was built where fertile but erodible silty soils in higher rainfall areas offered valuable yield benefits. Intensity of terracing was also greater in remote villages where limited off‐farm employment opportunities reduced construction costs. These results highlight the importance of the right kind of public interventions. Direct public involvement in constructing soil conservation structures on private lands appears to undermine incentives for private conservation investments. When done on public lands, however, public conservation activities may encourage private soil conservation by example. Secure land tenure rights clearly reinforce private incentives to make long‐term investments in soil conservation.     

Integrated assessment of public investment in land-use change to protect environmental assets in Australia

A framework for comprehensive integrated assessment of environmental projects is developed and applied in partnership with a regional environmental body. The framework combines theory with practice, bringing a pragmatic and efficient approach to the rigorous assessment of projects for a large number of environmental assets in the north central region of the state of Victoria, Australia. The approach is codified as the Investment Framework for Environmental Resources (INFFER). The analysis assisted the environmental body to make strong business cases for a number of environmental projects, resulting in funding for those projects. Key features of the study include extensive participation of decision makers and stakeholders, integration of a comprehensive set of information about projects, explicit assessment of uncertainties and information gaps, and analysis of the most appropriate policy mechanism for each project. The process of applying the framework involved four steps: identification of around 300 important environmental assets in the region, filtering the list of assets to remove those that are less likely to provide opportunities for cost-effective public investment, development and detailed assessment of projects for a subset of assets, and negotiation of funding for projects. Implications for land-use policy include that environmental projects vary widely in their cost-effectiveness, requiring careful targeting of funds if environmental benefits are to be maximised. Many existing environmental programs use simplistic analyses to support decision making, resulting in missed opportunities for substantially greater environmental benefits. Promoting adoption of improved analytical methods is very challenging, requiring changes in mind-set and culture in environmental organisations. Widespread adoption is unlikely unless funders create incentives by rewarding those project proponents who undertake rigorous and comprehensive project assessments that focus on achievement of environmental outcomes.     

Urban encroachment,forest regrowth and land-use institutions: Does zoning matter?

As concern grows regarding urban sprawl and forest and agricultural land preservation, the effectiveness of land-use policies in shaping land-use change warrants further study. We evaluate the impact of county-level zoning laws, the most predominant land use policy in the USA, and land rents on the relative amounts of forest, agricultural, and developed land, while controlling for demographic information and taxation rates. Over the past decades, southern Indiana has experienced forest regrowth on private lands, but this regrowth has declined in recent years with increased conversion of open space for urban residential development. We develop a model of land-use shares in 40 southern Indiana counties based on the net benefits to agriculture, forestland, and urban uses using a maximum likelihood estimation of a Dirichlet distribution. We find agricultural land rent and indicators of land productivity are the most important predictors of the proportion of agriculture and urban uses. Forest use is better explained by shifting regional economic structure and hilly terrain. Counties with a greater proportion of their work force in the service sectors have a greater proportion of land forested. Finally, to some extent zoning may protect agricultural land in the region, although land rents, land characteristics, and population are strong predictors of the ratio of agriculture to urban use.     

Abstracts of Award-Winning Theses

This thesis determines the tradeoff between producer welfare and the provision of environmental benefits, through reduced soil erosion and fertilizer applications, on agricultural working land. A land-use allocation model of two Iowa counties is formulated as a mathematical programming problem, building upon the Takayama and Judge framework. Slope is used to reflect terrain heterogeneity, such that the spatial allocation of land-use practices impacts economic and environmental outcomes via a yield damage function and differentiated rates of soil erosion. The model differs from prior empirical models in that it includes both crop and livestock production, which gives the model the flexibility to choose whether the two activities are optimally nonseparable.
Price policy analysis indicates that the land use allocation is relatively insensitive to changes in commodity prices, i.e., altering commodity-based support payments is insufficient to attain environmental improvements. Several "green" policy instruments are simulated to estimate the cost to producers of reducing environmental damages. Limiting soil erosion with either a regulatory standard or a per unit tax reduces the average return to land by 10%. Shifting current income support payments into a system of payments for conservation land management practices, similar in essence to the Conservation Security Program, cannot attain the same soil erosion reduction with less cost to producers. Overall, the inelastic response of land use practices to commodity prices indicates that targeting the use of productive inputs, as opposed to commodity outputs, may be a more efficient means of attaining environmental improvements.     

Piloting a systematic framework for public investment in regional natural resource management: Dryland salinity in Australia

The Salinity Investment Framework (SIF3) is designed to help environmental managers make better policy decisions about protecting key assets under threat of dryland salinity, a major degradation problem in Australia. This study reports results from applying SIF3 in partnership with two regional organizations (in the states of Victoria and Western Australia) with contrasting institutional powers and structures. We also engaged relevant policy makers with a view to influencing national policy. Available knowledge, science, and data were used to develop region-specific recommendations for public investment in salinity management. SIF3 proved easy to apply, requiring minimal changes from its original version. Establishing trust and credibility with stakeholders was extremely important. More time was required to be spent on communicating what SIF3 was and what it would mean for stakeholders than in applying it in the catchments. In both regions, recommendations included making a clear distinction between localized assets (such as a particular wetland) and dispersed assets (such as agricultural land as a whole); more targeted investment in spatially identified localized assets; using a broader range of policy tools; basing recommendations on the levels of public and private net benefits; anticipating the adoptability of sustainable land-management practices; and formally integrating relevant scientific, economic and social information with community values. The differences between current action and recommendations were significant in both regions, particularly in Victoria. As a result of our work both regions have decided to implementing a similar asset-based approach covering various environmental threats in addition to dryland salinity. The research indicates that it is feasible to use decision frameworks such as SIF3 to improve the rigour of decision making by community-based environmental management organizations. A broader range of policy tools are needed for dryland salinity, with less reliance on extension and small grants, and more emphasis on intervention around key assets and investment in technology development. We have influenced policy makers to some extent at state level and nationally through discussion of SIF3 in a national inquiry, preparation of a policy paper for peak multi-government policy committees, briefings and provision of advice on policy design. Despite this, achieving significant policy change at the state and national levels remains difficult for a number of reasons. Governments give limited signals to environmental managers to achieve environmental outcomes, being more concerned with community participation objectives and political considerations. We hope for significant policy change with increased scrutiny about sound decision making and public accountability.     

Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial

The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and government. The present paper describes the key elements of auction and contract design employed and the results obtained from a pilot auction of conservation contracts run in two regions of Victoria. The pilot demonstrated that it was possible to create at least the supply side of a market for nature conservation and in conjunction with a defined budget, prices were discovered and resources allocated through contracts with landholders. The present paper compares a discriminative price auction with a hypothetical fixed-price scheme showing that an auction could offer large cost savings to governments interested in nature conservation on private land. The paper identifies some important design problems that would need to be solved before auctions could be applied more broadly including: multiple complementary outcomes, reserve prices, sequential auction design and contract design. Nevertheless, the paper does show that auctioning conservation contracts for environmental outcomes is an important new policy mechanism that deserves closer examination.     

Managing increasing environmental risks through agrobiodiversity and agrienvironmental policies

Agrobiodiversity can provide natural insurance to risk‐averse farmers by reducing the variance of crop yield, and to society at large by reducing the uncertainty in the provision of public‐good ecosystem services, for example, CO₂ storage. We analyze the choice of agrobiodiversity by risk‐averse farmers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for agrienvironmental policy design when on‐farm agrobiodiversity generates a positive risk externality. While increasing environmental risk leads private farmers to increase their level of on‐farm agrobiodiversity, the level of agrobiodiversity in the laissez‐faire equilibrium remains inefficiently low. We show how either one of the two agrienvironmental policy instruments can cure this risk‐related market failure: an ex ante Pigouvian subsidy on on‐farm agrobiodiversity and an ex post payment‐by‐result for the actual provision of public environmental benefits. In the absence of regulation, welfare may increase rather than decrease with increasing environmental risk, if the agroecosystem is characterized by a high natural insurance function, low costs, and large external benefits of agrobiodiversity.     

Editorial - Decision rules, government rules, and the costs of vegetation protection in New South Wales

Governments regularly spend public funds to purchase environmental amenities. They might purchase land to add to the public estate, pay to fence stock out of endangered native forest, or offer stewardship payments as incentives to conservation. Governments also regularly introduce policies to achieve environmental goals, even though these policies impose costs on firms, households or farms. The basic decision rule, to maximise environmental benefits from a given budget, in all these cases is received wisdom within the economics profession. In the case of purchase of land to add to the public estate:Maximise environmental benefits by purchasing land in descending order of the ratio of benefit to cost until the budget is exhausted.More generally, funds should be allocated to individual activities within a programme in order of the decreasing ratio of benefits to costs until the budget is exhausted. This rule can be applied when benefits can be measured in any monetary or non-monetary quantitative index. In the case of conservation of vegetation, it can be applied relatively simply in the field when vegetation types and land values can be mapped jointly through GIS techniques.This simple decision rule is not always followed by government agencies that manage environmental programmes. Consider the protection of native vegetation, which is defined to include native forest, native woodland and native grassland. To meet international obligations to protect this kind of environment, most countries must involve private landholders in conservation because there are insufficient government reserves to meet the international commitments. Indeed, most countries have already introduced many policies to encourage private landholders to protect native vegetation on their forests and farms.The New South Wales state government, in Australia, has introduced the Native Vegetation Conservation Act (1998) to ensure that private landholders protect vegetation. The Act constrains farmers to retain all the native forest, native woodland, and native grassland, on their land irrespective of the costs to them. Farmers can then apply for consent to clear and crop this land, but consent is rarely granted in full and often not at all. The Act is consistent with a decision rule of “maximise-benefits-only” - protect all vegetation irrespective of the costs to those who have to conserve it.Constraints of this kind will inevitably lead to a loss of income and land value when they restrict the farm enterprises, and so will impose opportunity costs on the farmer. There is already ample published evidence on the sizes of these costs - from publications of the relevant state agency itself, consultants' reports, farmer submissions and independent research. For example, in a large region in the northwest of New South Wales, where land could be cropped very productively:- some farmers bear only small losses (a quarter lose less than five per cent of their potential income),- some farmers bear very large losses (another quarter lose more than half of their potential income),- the overall losses of income per farm are high (an average loss of almost 30 per cent of potential income across the region), and- the losses are highest for those who have already conserved most woodland.Consider now the problem of reducing these costs by applying the benefit-cost rule as opposed to the maximise-benefits-only rule that has led to this position. There are three economic decision rules that might be used to rank projects or activities.The benefit-cost rule: Impose the constraint on the farm with the highest ratio of environmental benefit per dollar of opportunity cost first, then on the farm with the next highest ratio, etc., until the environmental goal is met. And so maximise the ratio of benefits to opportunity costs.The benefit-only rule: Impose the constraint on the farm with the highest environmental benefits first, then on the farm with the next highest benefits, etc., until the environmental goal is met. And so maximise benefits.The cost-only rule: Impose the constraint on the farm with the lowest opportunity costs first, then the next lowest cost, etc, until the environmental goal is met. And so minimise opportunity costs.But do these rules normally lead to different outcomes? If the “budget” or willingness to impose opportunity costs were large enough, all three would lead to the same outcome because constraints would be imposed on all suitable land. Otherwise the outcomes differ - that is the different rules lead to different levels of environmental benefit from the imposition of a given level of opportunity cost (or from the expenditure of a given budget).Both the benefit-only and cost-only rules lead to inefficiencies (see Babcock et al (1997) and Wu et al (2000) for a discussion of the associated statistical issues). Benefit-only targeting leads to the retirement of highly-productive land from agricultural uses - which is a major reason why opportunity costs are often high when native vegetation is conserved under the Act in New South Wales. The cost-only rule can lead to the reservation or purchase of land with few environmental benefits, even though expenditure or opportunity cost is minimised.A comparison of the benefit-cost rule and the benefit-only rule in the northwest of New South Wales illustrates the problem. The region is potentially highly-productive crop land but large areas of it are presently covered by native forest and woodland which cannot now be cleared. Much of this vegetation is under various degrees of threat even though it is not rare or endangered. The farm is the unit of assessment under the Act, so is used in the example. Benefits are measured as the percentages of species that are saved on each farm when its vegetation is protected rather than cleared to crops. The total benefit is the aggregate of percentage species saved across the farms - again following the present administration of the Act. The opportunity costs are measured as the losses in land value because land cannot now be cleared due to the Act.The comparison of the two rules indicates substantial savings with the benefit-cost rule. For example, 90 per cent of the total benefits can be obtained by imposing 93 per cent of the total opportunity costs with the benefit-only rule, and by imposing only 54 per cent of the total opportunity costs with the benefit-cost rule. The benefit-cost rule saves 39 per cent of the total costs at this level of benefits. Again, 80 cent of the total benefits can be obtained by imposing 86 per cent of the total opportunity costs with the benefit-only rule, but by imposing only 46 per cent of the total opportunity costs with the benefit-cost rule. The benefit-cost rule saves 40 per cent of costs at this level of benefits.While such results can only be indicative of the magnitudes, they do serve to highlight the inefficiencies of decision rules used by government agencies. In New South Wales, the Native Vegetation Conservation Act imposes high opportunity costs on farmers, partly because it is implemented through a high-cost decision rule. Now that suitable GIS technology, vegetation maps, and spatial land value data, are becoming available, these costs can be lowered with a more rational decision rule to guide choices in the field.The environmental goal is not at issue, but the cost of achieving it is. We can identify who bears the opportunity costs of environmental conservation, and often value the magnitude of these costs. Now we can also reduce the levels of these costs with the use of the benefit-cost decision rule.Jack SindenAgricultural and Resource EconomicsUniversity of New EnglandArmidale, New South WalesReferencesBabcock Bruce A, Lackshminarayan PG, Wu JunJie and Silberman D (1997) “Targeting Tools for the Purchase of Environmental Amenities”, Land Economics, 73, 325-339.Wu JunJie, Adams Richard M., Zilberman David, and Bruce Babcock (2000) “Targeting Resource Conservation Expenditures”, Choices, Second Quarter, 2000, 3-8.     

Controlling nitrate pollution: An integrated approach

The introduction of the EU Water Framework Directive requires policy to address non-point source pollution as part of an overall integrated strategy to improve the ecological status of water bodies. In this paper, we combine an economic optimisation framework with a dynamic simulation model of N transport in the Kennet Catchment to link decisions taken at the farm level to reductions in nitrate concentrations in the River Kennet. We examine a variety of policies targeted at reducing fertiliser use and changing the way in which farm land is used. We find that a tax on nitrogen emerges as the best policy both in terms of cost- and environmental effectiveness. Such a policy involves a considerable reduction in fertiliser use, as well as, a restructuring of land-use away from arable towards increased use of set-aside. Budgetary implications of such a radical move towards set-aside would be huge and hence unlikely to be politically palatable given the objective of reducing the EU budgetary allocation to agriculture. Additionally, the current rise in world demand for food may also mitigate calls for increasing the proportion of land taken out of agricultural production. Although the study succeeds in establishing a link between actions on the farm and nitrate concentrations in the stream water, further work is required to explore the effect of the retention of nitrates in the unsaturated zone and groundwater on this link.     

Modeling linkages between climate policy and land use: an overview

Agriculture and forestry play an important role in emitting and storing greenhouse gases. For an efficient and cost-effective climate policy, it is therefore important to include land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) explicitly in economy-climate models. This article gives an overview and assessment of existing approaches to include LULUCF into partial and general equilibrium economy-climate models. For each class of models, we describe different examples, their treatment of land, and their potential for and applicability to policy analysis, as well as their shortcomings. We identify data requirements and conceptual problems, and provide suggestions for future research.     

Land occupations and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon

Researchers are increasingly interested in understanding the impact of contentious social processes on land change. In the Brazilian Amazon, there are often contentious interactions between landholders defending private property rights and squatters who have the right to occupy land that is deemed unproductive. Previous studies suggest that the contentious social processes inherent in the Brazilian land tenure and land reform system cause a significant amount of deforestation. An environment of insecure land title, and policies that value deforested land over forested land, among other factors, encourage both landholders and squatters to deforest more land than is necessary for pasture or crop production. This paper examines the impact that land occupations have on deforestation at the municipal scale across the Brazilian Legal Amazon, from 2000 to 2009. We show that land occupations have a direct influence on deforestation. We use spatial analysis as well to show that land occupations have a spatial component in the effect on deforestation: occupations in one municipality affect deforestation in adjacent areas.     

Habitat and Open Space at Risk of Land-Use Conversion: Targeting Strategies for Land Conservation

Funds available to purchase land and easements for conservation purposes are limited. This article provides a targeting strategy for protecting multiple environmental benefits that includes heterogeneity in land costs and probability of land-use conversion, by incorporating spatially explicit land-use change and hedonic price models. This strategy is compared to two alternative strategies that omit either land cost or conversion threat. Based on dynamic programming and Monte Carlo simulations with alternating periods of conservation and development, we demonstrate that the positive correlation between land costs and probability of land-use conversion affects targeting efficiency using parcel data from Sonoma County, California.     

Mapping properties to monitor forests: Landholder response to a large environmental registration program in the Brazilian Amazon

Across the tropics, development banks and conservation donors are investing millions in property mapping and registration projects to improve accountability for deforestation. An evaluation of the effectiveness and accuracy of existing environmental registries is crucial to assure the success of future efforts. This study presents an evaluation of deforestation and registration behavior in response to one of the largest of these property registration programs to date — the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) in the Amazonian state of Pará. From late 2007 to 2013, approximately 100,000 properties covering 30 million hectares of self-declared claims were entered in this digital registry. We used fixed effects regression models and property level data to assess how registration influenced deforestation on different sizes of properties. Registration had little impact on deforestation behavior, with the exception of a significant reduction on “smallholder” properties in the size range of 100–300 ha. We link this reduction to interacting incentives from forest protection and land regularization policies and suggest that desire to strengthen land claims motivates these landholders’ response to the environmental registry. We also present evidence that some landholders may be registering incomplete or inaccurate parcels into the self-declared system to strategically benefit from policy incentives. Our results for smallholder properties indicate that environmental registries may have potential to facilitate reductions in deforestation if combined with a favorable combination of incentives. However, in places where land tenure is still being negotiated, the utility of environmental registries for forest policy enforcement and research may be limited without ongoing investment to resolve uncertainty around land claims.     

New markets and technological change for the traditional cereals in semiarid sub-Saharan Africa: the Malian case

During the last three decades in sub‐Saharan Africa, development and research resources have concentrated on the higher‐rainfall and irrigated regions, especially on export crops and the principal food crops grown there. There has been much less concern and investment in semiarid regions without irrigation. Another negative factor has been the lack of public policy concern with the profitability of the basic food crops. With good weather, prices collapse. With bad weather, governments and NGOs dispense food crops as food aid or at subsidized prices. This article documents the importance of the demand side to facilitate diffusion of new technologies for the basic food commodities of semiarid regions—the traditional cereals. With farm programming models aggregated into a sector model, the combination of technological change and demand shifts for sorghum are evaluated in one semiarid region where the traditional cereals are concentrated. It focuses on combining policies to increase the prices farmers receive after introduction of technologies that use higher input levels. It also compares benefits of a strategy that focuses on yield and demand increases for a traditional cereal of the semiarid region, sorghum, with two alternative strategies for the higher‐rainfall zone.     

Technology and the future bioeconomy

New discoveries in life sciences and the challenge of climate change are leading to the emergence of the bioeconomy where basic methods of advanced biology are applied to produce a wide array of products while also improving environmental quality. The emergence of the bioeconomy is a continuing evolutionary process of transition from systems of mining nonrenewable resources to farming renewable ones. This transition benefits from the modern tools of molecular biology that have expanded the human capacity to breed new organisms and utilize them to increase productivity in agriculture and fisheries as well as produce a wide array of products that were extracted in the past. This transition is leading to the integration of the agricultural sector with the energy and mineral sectors. The introduction of biotechnology has already improved the productivity of medicine as well as agriculture but, in the case of agriculture, has encountered resistance and regulatory constraints. The evolution of the bioeconomy requires continuous public investment in research and innovation as well as the establishment of a regulatory framework and financial incentives and institutions that would lead to continuous private sector investment in the development and commercialization of new products. One of the biggest challenges is the development of a regulatory framework that would control possible human and environmental externalities from new biotechnology products and, at the same time, not stifle innovation.     

Negotiation issues in forming public–private partnerships for brownfield redevelopment: Applying a game theoretical experiment

The redevelopment of a brownfield can provide a range of societal, environmental but also economic benefits for a number of entities. In the Netherlands (and elsewhere), public–private partnerships are common practice for such projects, because of two main reasons. First, limitations to public funding have led governments to invite the private sector into various long-term arrangements for capital-intensive projects. Second, a comprehensive approach for the whole brownfield area may be more efficient and profitable, compared to piecemeal development via interventions by individual owners. This article investigates, with respect to brownfield redevelopment, the interaction behavior of two key parties in forming partnerships: the municipality and a private developer. It is assumed that, apart from their mutual interest to redevelop the brownfield area, they will have different interests as well. In order to indicate their specific interest and the negotiation outcome regarding the forming of a public private partnership, this paper makes use of an experimental game theory approach. Three specific negotiation issues were analyzed in our research: a building claim, future land use and reparcelling of the land. In addition, this paper suggests an eight-step procedure to conduct a game theoretical experiment. A survey was conducted in order to gather the required data for the experiment. The data have been used to estimate the payoffs variations between the two key parties in the mentioned negotiation games. Finally, by comparing sub game perfect Nash equilibrium generated game outcomes and direct expected outcomes of respondents, this paper experimentally proves that the game theoretical analysis provides a valid representation of a real world brownfield redevelopment negotiation within the Dutch institutional-economic context. The outcome of the experiment confirms the Dutch tradition of public private partnerships in urban development practice, with public and private bodies willing to share financial risks and returns in these projects.     

What lies beneath: Climate change,land expropriation,and zaï agroecological innovations by smallholder farmers in Northern Ghana

Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) are increasing in Ghana amid a weak legal and regulatory framework. This paper explores the impacts of this phenomenon on farmer innovations under recurrent environmental changes. Using a case study of zaï, an indigenous innovative farming practice, the paper makes two interrelated arguments. Firstly, it shows that the pervasive enclosures coerced by the Ghanaian state undermine how indigenous knowledge could be proactively deployed for climate risk management. Secondly, LSLAs produce a social barrier to climate change adaptation, as they lead to heightened uncertainty and apprehension among farmers, which affects decisions on climate risk management. More specifically, land expropriation is an example of how adaptation could be hindered by governance, institutions, and policy at the extra-local scale, including not only existing land use laws, but also the constitutional guarantee of private property. The evidence supporting these arguments come from survey data on 619 plots, 70 in-depth interviews, village-level transect walks, and participant observations. Overall, the paper contributes to emerging debates at the interface of land use policy, climate justice, and sustainable adaptation. Theoretically, it also contributes to understanding State-society relations, as well as the political economy of eminent domain, often justified through discourses of “public benefits.”