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1.
Summary. We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information.
We show that if the economy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists.
Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show
that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information
economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.
Received March 22, 2000; revised version: May 1, 2000 相似文献
2.
Summary. The private core of an economy with differential information, (Yannelis (1991)), is the set of all state-wise feasible and
private information measurable allocations which cannot be dominated, in terms of ex ante expected utility functions, by state-wise
feasible and private information measurable net trades of any coalition. It is coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible
and also takes into account the information superiority of an individual. We provide a noncooperative extensive form interpretation
of the private core for three person games. We construct game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information
sets, and explain the rules for calculating ex ante expected payoffs. In the spirit of the Nash programme, the private core
is thus shown to be supported by the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a noncooperative game. The discussion contributes not
only to the development of ideas but also to the understanding of the dynamics of how coalitionally incentive compatible contracts
can be realized.
Received: July 21, 2000; revised version: January 16, 2001 相似文献
3.
It is shown that a non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium may not be coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible,
may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not belong to the weak fine core and thus may not be fully
Pareto optimal. These negative results lead us to conclude the non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium is not a sensible
solution concept.
We wish to thank Dr A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. We also
thank a referee for several, constructive suggestions. 相似文献
4.
Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by
the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals
is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and
strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies
attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially
symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation.
Received: June 20, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We wish to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fran?oise Forges, Franco Donzelli, Leonidas Koutsougeras, Aldo Rustichini, Rajiv
Vohra and Nicholas Yannelis for their comments.
Correspondence to: H. Polemarchakis 相似文献
5.
Summary. We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We
established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for
the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric
information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike
the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the
associated economy.
Received: February 15, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999 相似文献
6.
On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information
Summary. We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondences for economies with differential information, with Boylan (1971) topology on agents information fields.Received: 16 January 2004, Revised: 28 October 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D50, D82, C70.
Correspondence to: Ezra EinyWe wish to thank Carlos Herves, Nicholas Yannelis, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. 相似文献
7.
Summary. Using a general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for
example pollution). Considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public “bad” we explicitly introduce the concept of Lindahl equilibrium and the Lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy. Then, the Lindahl provision
is analyzed and compared with the Cournot-Nash provision. The main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that
the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation. In contrast, the asymptotic Cournot-Nash
provision of the public bad might approach infinity. Other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the
large finite economies with pure public bad commodities.
Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are indebt to Nicholas Yannelis and anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: B. Shitovitz 相似文献
8.
Summary. We point out several conceptual difficulties of the rational expectations equilibrium concept. In particular we show that such an equilibrium need not be incentive compatible and need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium . A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with the private core is also provided. We conclude that the private core is a more appropriate concept to capture the idea of contracts under asymmetric information.Received: 15 December 2003, Revised: 18 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
C71, C72, D5, D82.
Correspondence to: Nicholas C. YannelisWe wish to thank Dr A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. 相似文献
9.
We introduce a new topology on information which evaluates the similarity between information fields taking into account their compatibility, that is, the events that are commonly observed. With this “topology of common information”, the Walrasian expectations equilibrium (Radner 1968) and the private core (Yannelis 1991) are upper semicontinuous 相似文献
10.
Konrad Podczeck 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):699-725
Summary. It is shown that core-Walras equivalence fails whenever the commodity space is a non-separable Banach space. The interpretation
is that a large number of agents guarantees core-Walras equivalence only if there is actually a large number of agents relative
to the size of the commodity space. Otherwise a large number of agents means that agents' characteristics may be extremely
dispersed, so that the standard theory of perfect competition fails. Supplementing the core-Walras non-equivalence result,
it is shown that in the framework of economies with weakly compact consumption sets – as developed by Khan and Yannelis (1991)
– the core is always non-empty, even if consumption sets are non-separable.
December 12, 2001; revised version: December 6, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Thanks to E. Dierker, M. Nermuth, R. Tourky, and N. C. Yannelis for helpful discussions and suggestions, and thanks
to a referee for comments which helped to improve the final version. 相似文献
11.
Philip Bond 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):375-394
Summary. The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract
and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of maximal contractible information. Several characterizations are exhibited. In particular, it is shown that if either (a) punishments are bounded everywhere,
or (b) deviations from truth-telling are either always or never detected, then maximum contractible information coincides
with where is the information partition of agent j. An argument is given for why (b) may be expected to hold.
Received: August 7, 2000; revised version: December 21, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Michael Chwe, Douglas Diamond, Lars Stole, Robert Townsend, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for
helpful comments. 相似文献
12.
Nicholas C. Yannelis 《Economic Theory》2009,38(2):419-432
We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information
and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis
and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect
on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is
achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265,
1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003).
To the memory of Gerard Debreu. A preliminary draft was presented in Paris, in April of 2005. I have benefited from the discussion,
comments and questions of Erik Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseu, Bernard Cornet and Filipe Martins Da-Rocha and Conny Podczeck.
A careful and knowledgeable referee made several useful comments and rescued me from a mishap. 相似文献
13.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
14.
Erik J. Balder 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,102(2):437-470
For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory24, 79-94, Theorem 2.1). The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) unification and generalization of the two equilibrium distribution existence results by K. P. Rath (1996, J. Math. Econ.26, 305-324) for anonymous games, (ii) generalization of the equilibrium existence result of T. Kim and N. C. Yannelis (1997, J. Econ. Theory77, 330-353) for Bayesian differential information games, (iii) inclusion of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence results of P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1985, Math. Oper. Res.10, 619-632) and E. J. Balder (1988, Math. Operations Res.13, 265-276) for games with private information in the sense of J. C. Harsanyi (1967, Manage. Sci.14, 159-182). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. 相似文献
15.
Summary. We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto power of the grand coalition with respect the ability of blocking non-Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocations. We provide two different Walrasian expectations equilibrium equivalence results. First by perturbing the initial endowments in a precise direction we show that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition. The second characterization deals with the fuzzy veto in the sense of Aubin but within a differential information setting. This second equivalence result provides a different characterization for the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and shows that the grand coalition privately blocks in the sense of Aubin any non Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocation with endowment participation rate arbitrarily close to the total initial endowment participation for every individual. Finally, we show that any no free disposal Walrasian expectations equilibria is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible. Since the deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is a special case of the differential information economy model, one derives new characterizations of the Walrasian equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities.Received: 29 October 2003, Revised: 24 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, D82, D11.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for his/her careful reading and helpful comments and suggestions.C. Hervés and E. Moreno acknowledge support by Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER); and support by the Research Grant SA091/02 (Junta de Castilla y León). 相似文献
16.
Graciela Chichilnisky 《Economic Theory》1993,3(1):177-182
Summary This note links two conditions which have generated some interest in the literature and have an important role in proving the existence of an equilibrium, the second welfare theorem and the core equivalence theorem in infinite dimensional commodity spaces: These are thecone condition introduced in Chichilnisky and Kaiman (1980), and theproperness condition in Mas-Colell (1986a), which were studied also in Yannelis and Zame (1986), Aliprantis et al. (1987a, b) and (1989), Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1988), Mas-Colell (1986b), Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1992), and Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) among others. I establish that these two conditions are the same. Indeed, the cone condition coincides also with the assumption of anextremely desirable commodity used in Yannelis and Zame (1986) and Rustichini and Yannelis (1991). The motivation for studying these conditions comes from the same economic application, showing the need to bring within the scope of equilibrium theory commodity spaces whose positive orthants have empty interior, a typical situation in infinite dimensional linear spaces.I thank the participants of several seminars and workshops, two anonymous referees, CD. Aliprantis, D. Brown, D. Cass, D. Foley, G. Heal, H-M. Wu, A. Khan, R. Radner, A. Rustichini and N. Yannelis, for their comments and suggestions. Hospitality and financial support from the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics during the summer of 1991 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
17.
Summary. This paper introduces the framework of rational beliefs of Kurz (1994), which makes the assumptions of heterogeneous beliefs
of Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996) more plausible. Agents hold diverse beliefs that are “rational” in the sense
of being compatible with ample observed data. In a non-stationary environment the agents only learn about the stationary measure
of observed data, but their beliefs can remain non-stationary and diverse. Speculative trading then stems from disagreements
among traders. In a Markovian framework of dividends and beliefs, we obtain analytical results to show how the speculative
premium depends on the extent of heterogeneity of beliefs. In addition, we demonstrate that there exists a unique Rational
Belief Equilibrium (RBE) generically with endogenous uncertainty (as defined by Kurz and Wu, 1996) and that the RBE price
is higher than the rational expectation equilibrium price (REE) under some general conditions
Received: March 15, 2001; revised version: April 26, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are deeply grateful to Mordecai Kurz for his constant encouragement and inspiring guidance over the years. We wish
to express our gratitude to an anonymous referee for the very valuable comments provided. We also thank Kenneth Arrow, Peter
Hammond, Roko Aliprantis and Nicholas Yannelis for their helpful suggestions and Academia Sinica and the National Science
Council of the R.O.C. for their indispensable support.
Correspondence to: H.-M. Wu 相似文献
18.
In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie
setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also
not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791,
2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium
market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal),
which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments,
random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new
concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating
and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework
agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian
estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case
of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an
ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular,
we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist.
This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois. 相似文献
19.
In this paper the long-run trend in RPI inflation (core inflation) for the UK over the 1961–1997 period is estimated within the framework of a multivariate common trends model which extends
the bivariate VAR approach of Quah and Vahey (1995). In this context core inflation is directly linked to money and wage growth and interpreted
as the long-run forecast of inflation from a small-scale, cointegrated macroeconomic system.
First version received: September 1999/Final version received: October 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Work on this paper was partially conducted
when C. Morana was at Heriot-Watt University. 相似文献
20.
Isabelle Lefebvre 《Economic Theory》2001,18(2):275-291
Summary. We focus on the private core [19] of an economy with a finite number of agents with differential information, a continuum
of states and an infinite number of commodities. We state a nonemptiness result for the private core and provide a proof based
on a fixed-point argument.
Received: October 4, 1999; revised version: June 7, 2000 相似文献