从理性和有限理性角度看决策理论及其发展

决策理论的发展始终离不开对理性与有限理性的研究与探讨。本文首先叙述了理性与有限理性的内涵：其次根据理性程度的不同，阐述了由2种理论、4种模型构成的决策理论统一体；最后对非理性因素在决策中的作用进行了探讨，并指出要正视理性与非理性因素在决策中的辨证作用。     

有限理性的微观机理评述

理性假说是传统经济学理论逻辑和方法论的基础。但是,现实市场中普遍存在着有限理性(或非理性)现象,这表明理性假说过于简单、抽象和理想化。经济学家们从考察现实经济人的认知决策行为、经济人之间及其同外部市场制度(结构)的互动关系出发对有限理性现象的微观机理进行了研究。     

证券投资者的有限理性决策

证券投资者的有限理性决策行为特征一直是人们试图揭开的难题，本文首先系统地介绍了“展望理论”所揭示的投资者的决策模型及其有限理性的行为特征，接着阐述了行为金融学关于证券投资者有限理性行为特征的研究成果，并对中国证券投资者有限理性决策行为的研究进展进行了介绍，并展望了行为金融学未来发展方向。     

理性选择向非理性选择转化的行为分析

本文针对不确定条件下的人类选择行为提出一个新的可供研究的观点:人的非理性选择在很大程度上是由理性选择转化而来的。文章首先简要评说了早期行为经济学的动物实验和认知心理学,认为人的选择行为是理性和非理性的同构;继而,通过解析丹尼尔·卡尼曼等人创立的前景理论所蕴涵的理性向非理性选择转化的思想,构建了这种转化的抽象模型;最后,作为对本文分析观点的一种联系实际的论证,研究了金融市场中的非理性选择以说明这种转化现象的客观存在。本文的分析可视为对行为经济学非理性选择理论之深邃见解的一种挖掘。     

经济学中的不确定性和有限理性

经典期望效用理论不能为现实中的不确定性决策和有限理性行为提供具有描述意义的指导,解决这一问题需要在期望效用理论之外寻找新的思路。不确定性的本质在于决策者自身不知道相关概率分布,他的决策依据是自己确定的主观概率。尝试模型化不确定性的非期望效用理论需要正视这类决策中的"主观性"。而现实中不确定性环境下的具体决策过程呈现出有限理性甚至"非理性"特征,由此导致的宏微观经济效应也难以在期望效用理论框架下进行考察。关注"真实世界"的经济学应该对此给予更多的注意力。     

有限理性、规范内化与利他行为:一个演化视角

本文沿着有限理性的理论进路,通过规范内化对利他行为做出一个解释。以往的理论通过规范提供的外在奖惩解释利他行为,但无法解释在外在奖惩不存在的情况下出现的纯利他行为。本文认为,这些利他行为可以通过规范内化来解释,而后者则是有限理性的一个自然结果。为了阐明规范内化如何产生,本文给出了一个形式化的复制者动态,其结果表明,在考虑有限理性的前提下,社会交往越复杂,人类处理复杂性的认知能力越有限,规范内化出现的可能性就越大。针对复制者动态模型的局限,本文还运用基于行为主体建模对规范内化过程进行了模拟。模拟结果显示,当人类理性计算能力相对于社会生活的复杂程度越小,规范内化出现的可能性越大,该结果与之前分析结论一致。本文的分析结果再次支持了Herbert Simon对利他行为的解释,即利他行为是人类有限理性的结果,虽然利他行为自身减少个体适应性,但由于它是规范内化所产生的一个自然结果,所以利他行为因为规范内化所具有的适应性而留存。     

R＆D项目恶性增资行为分析：认知偏差视角

本文从有限理性人的认知偏差视角，从心理和组织因素方面探讨R＆D项目恶性增资行为。面对R＆D项目是否中止这样的复杂决策，决策者往往会受到感情等非理性因素的影响。文中分析了R＆D项目中止决策过程中的5种认知偏差及其对个人决策中的影响。     

一种关于理性的经济学说“西蒙决策理论重探

以往关于西蒙决策理论的研究主要侧重于他的“管理人”学说,因而将探讨的内容局限在纯经济学的范围之内。本文意在说明,西蒙的决策理论蕴含着更为深刻的关于理性行为经济化的思想。这一思想以决策过程为轴心,贯穿于他对经济、管理、认知等非常广泛的领域的研究之中。     

基于认知偏差的非理性决策行为解析

投资者是有限理性的行为个体,按照获得的信息,并依据知识与经验等技能进行投资决策。而认知偏差的产生源于信息、知识、技能等基础的差异。无论是个体投资者还是机构投资者,都是有限理性主体,市场的有效性决定了认知偏差下的非理性行为与其他理性行为必然同时存在于市场当中,投资者的角色伴随其认知决策后的行为而实现。     

项目投资决策中的有限理性实现程度

有限理性问题在项目投资决策过程中普遍存在,"有限理性实现程度模型"使经济学的理性再一次地逼近现实中的行为决策过程。首先回顾了传统项目投资决策中"经济人"假设的不足,提出了有限理性,并对其实现程度模型进行了简介,在此基础上探讨了有限理性实现程度在项目投资决策中的应用,为项目投资决策提供了新的理论基础和方法。     

从经济理性到生态理性

经济理性为市场经济和工业文明立下过历史性的功劳。当人类的经济规模尚未对生态平衡构成威胁时,经济理性是正确的;当经济规模超出自然界的承受范围,破坏生态平衡时,经济理性就得让位于生态理性。生态理性有更广阔的鸟瞰视野,更高的观控水平,把经济理性作为一个特例包含在自己的体系之中。悠久的中华文明充满生态智慧,党的十七大提出建设生态文明是对全人类的贡献。     

Choquet Rationality

Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her “expected” utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.     

Rationality without Transitivity

In this article rational choice behavior is investigated without assuming transitivity or completeness of the underlying preferences. These standard properties are replaced by a property concerning dominant alternatives. This permits the existence of preference cycles among alternatives which are dominated, while still ensuring the existence of a rational choice correspondence. We will also realize that some rational choice rules still hold in this context. Further we will see that in equilibrium analysis the existence of a competitive equilibrium follows when transitivity and completeness is replaced by this domination property.     

Rationality of Migration

The paradigm of a rational individual acting on the earnings-enhancing benefits of migration is subjected to statistical scrutiny, using data from Turkey. Results with robust selectivity correction support the rationality hypothesis: Both migrants and nonmigrants chose the option in which they had comparative advantage. However, the estimated gain from moving is negative for a substantial portion of migrants, whereas a minority realize very high returns. This suggests that migration is a lottery: Individuals are willing to invest in a proposition that has a high probability of yielding negative returns because of the potential for a very large payoff.     

Rationality and intertemporal choice

The alleged problems associated with self-control, hyperbolic discounting and other examples of seemingly irrational intertemporal choice are examined in the context of an evolution-based neurobiological model that emphasizes the role of the biological evolution of big brains and language and the cultural evolution of institutions. There is no utility function in the brain; it has no central-planner, in fact, the brain is a self-organized complex system, a decentralized spontaneous order. This spontaneous order is coordinated, much like an economy, by a distributed network that maintains and makes available the discounted net value of various options to decentralized and specialized areas in the brain when making decisions. Further, that decision making is embodied and embedded in the decision making environment. For humans, an important part of that environment is the social environment consisting of institutions and other components of culture. It was, in part, the evolution of this environment that made long-range planning possible. Additionally, it is very often the lack of embedded experience with the environment that leads to what seems to be irrational intertemporal choices. In fact, under close examination the evidence for consistent irrational intertemporal choice is weak.     

会计信息真实之程序理性观与结果理性观

本文通过对两份问券调查结果的分析，发现上市公司经理人与投资人对会计信息真实性的看法存在显著的视角差异，前者持会计信息真实的程序理性观，而后者持会计信息真实的结果理性观。从目前我国证券市场的现状来看，投资人处于信息严重不对称的弱势地位，上市公司会计信息失真使投资者蒙受了巨大损失。文章据此认为：对上市公司会计信息生成、审计和披露的监管，应偏重于会计信息真实的结果理性观，以保护投资者利益，降低经理人与投资人之间的信息不对称性。     

Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction

S. Modica and A. Rustichini (1994, Theory and Decision37, 107–124) provided a logic for reasoning about knowledge where agents may be unaware of certain propositions. However, their original approach had the unpleasant property that nontrivial unawareness was incompatible with partitional information structures. More recently, Modica and Rustichini (1999, Games Econ. Behav.27, 265–298) have provided an approach that allows for nontrivial unawareness in partitional information structures. Here it is shown that their approach can be viewed as a special case of a general approach to unawareness considered by R. Fagin and J. Y. Halpern (1988, Artificial Intelligence34, 39–76). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D80, D83.     

Rationality in a Political-Economic Environment

This paper develops a rational expectations model of the circle of public opinion and policy implicit in working democracies. The executive branch of government, in particular, takes into account its own preferences and, indirectly, those of the voters, which are not constant but depend on the policy context in which they are formed. As a result, policies and voter preferences become interdependent stochastic processes rather than solutions of static optimization problems. This interdependence has specific implications for policy and opinion. Most striking, when citizens' opinions develop in this environment, the existence of rationally held belief systems is consistent with the pattern of opinion instability Converse attributes to nonattitudes.     

Consumer Rationality and Consumer Sovereignty

Important social benefits of the market system are predicated on the assumption that consumers can effectively pursue their interest in the marketplace. Cause for concern exists to the extent that high consumption expenditures lead to relatively low levels of personal savings in the U.S. To the extent that they do, in fact, over spend, consumers appear to deviate from economic assumptions of rationality. This paper examines four conceptions of rationality (two variants of rational choice theory, institutionalism, and one derived from economic sociology), with a view to evaluating implications for consumer sovereignty under each. By explicitly accounting for differences among individuals, economic sociology appears to offer more realistic policy solutions.