A study on risk retention regulation in asset securitization process

We study the impacts of the recently proposed risk retention regulation for asset securitization, i.e. the issuer has to retain a certain proportion of securitized assets. We also consider the frequently discussed measure to require the issuer disclose certain information of the securitized assets. In a dynamic model with asymmetric information between a risk-averse originating bank and a continuum of risk-averse investors, we find that it is impossible for a flat-rate retention requirement to be optimal for all asset types. Although both risk retention and information disclosure regulations are effective in reducing investors’ informational loss, neither can unconditionally enhance social welfare upon the unregulated case. For both measures, there are associated regulatory cost: risk retention regulation aggravates adverse selection problem because it undermines the channel of informational revelation by the choice of securitization intensity, and information disclosure requirement incurs a signalling cost by distorting banks’ securitization intensity in sending signals. Under an appropriate set of conditions we find that information disclosure requirement complements risk retention regulation when investors are sufficiently risk averse.     

经营透明化与银行名誉风险管理

中国银行业经营透明化既是改革的要求,也是银行自身成本-收益比作用的结果,还是银行外部监管者提高监管能力的要求。然而信息屏蔽收益的递减并非意味透明化收益的自然递增,事实上,透明化也加大了银行的名誉风险。名誉风险有社会性、内生性、间接性和综合性等特征,对其进行科学管理能为银行带来巨大的商业利益。为此,中国银行业应加强名誉风险的基础管理,科学制订名誉规划,建立管理责任制度。同时,要强化名誉风险意识,扩大名誉风险管理视野,提高名誉风险管理人员素质,实行专业化管理。就现实而言,中国银行业名誉风险管理亟待解决商标管理、改革面临的矛盾、透明化进程及文化建设等四方面问题。     

Will corporate directors engage in bias arbitrage to curry favor with shareholders?

Bias arbitrage reflects a situation where agents engage in courses of action designed to take advantage of principals’ misperceptions of risk for personal gain (Aviram, 2007). The current study investigates whether corporate directors will attempt to curry favor with shareholders by engaging in bias arbitrage; specifically, we examine whether directors will support a costly initiative that, at best, would insignificantly lower the estimated probable risk of financial reporting fraud to bolster their chances of being reelected to the board. A total of 71 corporate directors participated in an experiment that included a within-participant treatment (shareholders’ perception of risk was the same as or higher than the director’s estimate of probable risk) and two between-participant treatments (director’s upcoming reelection risk was low or high; board meeting discussion transparency was low or high). When shareholders’ perceived risk and directors’ estimate of probable risk were the same, support for the initiative was relatively low across the reelection risk and discussion transparency treatments. When shareholders’ perceived risk was higher than probable risk, a significant interaction term indicates that support for the initiative was (1) low when reelection risk was low, irrespective of discussion transparency, (2) moderate when reelection risk and discussion transparency were high, and (3) high when reelection risk was high and discussion transparency was low. We provide evidence of a potential threat to effective enterprise risk management and director objectivity that has not previously been investigated and evaluate a method for mitigating this threat.     

Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks’ transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.     

Corporate tax avoidance: is tax transparency the solution?

Corporate tax avoidance has been a matter of considerable public attention, particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis. The nature of calls for tax reform and increased regulation, advocated most prominently by tax activists and NGOs, has revolved around transparency as a possible corrective to unacceptable tax avoidance, although there is no consensus as to what the term tax avoidance encompasses and when it becomes unacceptable. We examine two responses to calls for increased transparency about the tax affairs of multinational entities: firstly, country by country reporting that provides information to tax authorities, and secondly the UK requirement for publication of tax strategies, whereby large companies put information into the public domain. We find considerable misunderstanding about the benefits of transparency in this setting. By failing to consider the limits of transparency initiatives there is a risk of dysfunctional consequences, for example additional costs in providing and processing additional information, the prospect of increased disputes as new information generates new misinterpretations and uncertainty in determining the final tax position. There is a risk that greater disclosure will not effectively address concerns about unacceptable corporate tax avoidance.     

Enhancing bank transparency: Financial reporting quality,fraudulent peers and social capital

This study examines the role of social norms in financial markets by relating bank transparency to social capital. Using comprehensive data on commercial banks, we provide empirical evidence that high social capital contributes to more transparent financial reporting, thereby enabling more precise risk assessments and promoting financial stability. We find that the effect of social capital is more pronounced when commercial banks are more complex and disclosure incentives of bank managers are strong. Our results suggest that more opaque reporting by peers explains lower transparency but financial misreporting is less contagious when social capital is high. Our study suggests that social capital can effectively improve reporting transparency when other mechanisms are not effective, thus securing financial system stability.     

Is pledge risk matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market?

Based on a sample of share pledging by the controlling shareholders of A-share listed firms, we investigate whether pledge risk is matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market. The results show that, compared with broker pledgees, commercial bank pledgees accept pledged stocks with lower market risk and the corresponding listed firms are at lower risk, have higher levels of information transparency and are more likely to be state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We also find that commercial bank pledgees do not ease the risk requirement of pledged stocks for pledgers of SOEs. Further, we document that commercial bank pledgees face lower margin call risks than broker pledgees. After securities companies were authorized to compete in the share pledge market in 2013, the pledge risk faced by commercial bank pledgees further reduced. Our results support that China’s share pledge financing market generally achieves an efficient equilibrium in terms of pledge risk matching between pledgees and pledgers. We recommend that the macro control of share pledge risk be focused on broker pledgees.     

Interaction between securitization gains and abnormal loan loss provisions: Credit risk retention and fair value accounting

This study investigates whether managers use asset securitization gains to substitute loan loss provision (LLP) management for earnings management, and, if so, whether the percentage of credit risk retained affects such a relationship. The literature provides evidence that managers have used securitization transactions to boost earnings. Using 2001?2014 data for a sample of bank holding companies, I find that managers use securitization gains and LLPs as partial substitutes and that earnings management from securitization gains grows at an increasing rate to substitute income increasing LLP management as the level of risk retention increases. These findings are consistent with the argument that the higher the level of risk retention, the greater the potential impact on achieving earnings targets, given banks’ exercise of discretion over securitization gains through estimation of fair value of retained interest. In addition, I document that the substitution effect between the two tools is non‐existent in the post‐SFAS 166/167 period. Taken together, the findings have timely implications for accounting standards by informing the effect of risk retention that I measure through earnings management techniques. Moreover, my findings provide additional support for improved disclosures on assets‐backed securities.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test

Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Regulation of securitisation in China: Learning from the US experience

With the issuance of the latest adjustment on the Chinese securitisation regulatory framework, the originating institution only needs to hold 5% capital for each class of the securitised assets. Previously, the originating institution needed to hold a certain percentage of the lowest class of the securitised assets in one single securitisation deal, and the percentage in principal, should not be less than 5% of the entire term of the securitisation deal. This adjustment of the reduction of the minimum risk retention (MRR) requirement has to large extent, addressed the limitation of financing in participating in securitisation for Chinese banks. However, it has increased the risk of securitisation failure or even a crisis in the Chinese banking sector compared with the previous regulatory framework.In the light of the potential risks of this latest adjustment, the study critically examined the effectiveness of the regulatory framework of the current Chinese securitisation market drawing from the US experience during the global financial crisis (GFC). Overall, we evaluated the regulations on the current Chinese securitisation market as relatively effective, whilst we also raised concerns on the future of the regulations and thereby provided suggestions for improvements.     

评论

刘明康：银行应计提留存和逆周期资本缓冲 中国银监会主席刘明康撰文指出,宏观审慎监管与微观审慎监管应有机结合。应结合对宏观形势和银行业风险状况的判断,要求商业银行在最低资本充足率要求基础上,计提留存和逆周期资本缓冲。根据经济发展不同阶段、银行业金融机构贷款质量差异和盈利状况的不同,对贷款损失准备进行动态化和差异化调整。他表示,要持续加强对系统重要性银行的监管。     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

Carbon Disclosure,Financial Transparency,and Agency Cost: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies

Given the constraints on carbon emissions due to their impact on global warming, carbon disclosure has become an important way to deliver signals to the market. We examine the benefits associated with carbon disclosure from the standpoint of corporate social responsibility (CSR) for China’s manufacturing industries from 2010 to 2014. We divide corporations into heavily polluting and non-heavily polluting groups in order to control the industry factor. Based on the Principal-Agent Theory, we empirically test the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial transparency, and we evaluate the effect of carbon disclosure on agency costs and operations. Our results highlight that carbon disclosure is negatively associated with agency costs. However, we do not find enough evidence to prove what role financial transparency plays in the relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost. Therefore, the influence of financial transparency as a mechanism is not yet clear. This study provides a way to look at the intentions of firms that disclose carbon information, and it also enhances the literature on carbon disclosure and agency costs in China based on Chinese data.     

The dark side of transparency: Does the Nigeria extractive industries transparency initiative help or hinder accountability and corruption control?

This study explores the dark side of transparency by problematizing the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) as a transparency, accountability and anti-corruption initiative in Nigeria. It does this by interrogating the underlying assumptions that transparency in the form of increased information disclosure inevitably leads to enhanced accountability and reduced corruption. Theoretic insights are drawn from the transparency literature as well as from the International Accounting Standards Board's framework for financial reporting. The findings enable a more nuanced understanding of transparency – where and when transparency works, and where and when it may lead to unintended outcomes. They show how increased information disclosure conceals and legitimises the weak and corrupt reporting systems and practices of government agencies. They highlight the importance of understandability of information disclosed as a key requirement of transparency. They illustrate that transparency is a complex social process by highlighting the means by which the government tries to gain control of the NEITI organisation and how NEITI's ability to operate effectively is dependent on the political will of the government in power. The findings also demonstrate that the instrument through which transparency is enacted is itself a central actor in the transparency process as historical corruption within the NEITI bureaucracy as well as the opacity of NEITI as an organisation lead to outcomes of distrust, uncertainty and doubt amongst NEITIs target audience.     

Optimal Bank Transparency

Increasing transparency is recurrently offered as a centerpiece of bank regulation. We study a competitive banking sector whose illiquid assets are funded by short‐term debt that must be refinanced. We show that welfare is a nonmonotonic function of the level of transparency: Increasing transparency fosters efficient liquidation but has an adverse effect on rollover risk given the level of risk. Banks may compensate this adverse effect by taking more risk. These offsetting effects render an intermediate level of transparency optimal. Moreover, the existence of negative social externalities of bank failures calls for making banks more opaque rather than more transparent.     

Investor perceptions of an auditor’s adverse internal control opinion

In response to recent corporate scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which, among other things, requires that the auditor render an opinion as to the effectiveness of a company’s system of internal controls. The assumption implicit in this requirement is that the new internal control opinion provides investors with value-relevant information. Our evidence suggests that an adverse audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting provides incremental value-relevant information to investors beyond that contained in the financial statement audit opinion alone. Specifically we find that an adverse audit opinion on internal controls over financial reporting relative to an unqualified opinion is significantly associated with investors assessing a higher risk of financial statement misstatement, higher risk of a future financial statement restatement, higher information asymmetry, lower financial statement transparency, higher risk premium, higher cost of capital, lower sustainability of earnings, and lower earnings predictability. Overall, our empirical results support our hypotheses that the auditor’s opinion on the internal controls over financial reporting provides financial statement users with value-relevant information.     

基于民主监督视角的预算透明度问题探析

提高政府预算的透明度是党的十七大报告中提出的"深化预算制度改革,强化预算管理和监督"以及实现民主理财、科学理财和依法理财的最佳切入点,因为预算透明是政治民主与管理监督有效的前提,本文在分析借鉴有关预算透明的国际标准与经验的基础上,阐述了我国预算透明的现实依据,并指出实施预算透明应从法制建设、体制、机制和制度上加强建设和深化改革。     

What firm risk factors drive bank loan pricing and other terms? Evidence from China

This study investigates how firm risk factors affect bank loan pricing. Although firm-specific stock price crash risk affects bank loan costs directly, it also prompts other risks, including financial restatement and litigation, which in turn trigger higher bank loan costs. Strong internal and external governance mechanisms help reduce agency problems and improve information transparency, alleviating the adverse effect of stock price crash risk on loan costs. Our results confirm that bankers take good corporate governance into account in their bank loan decisions. We also show that bond investors price the adverse effect of stock price crash risk, prompting higher corporate bond costs. Futher evidence suggests that banks impose stricter non-price terms, such as smaller loan size, shorter loan maturity, and a higher likelihood of collateral requirement, on firms with higher crash risk.