Chicago Plan und Vollgeld als Alternative zum Kreditgeld: ein Weg zu stetigem Wachstum?

One drawback of our current credit economy is that commercial banks could potentially make too many loans. The supporters of full reserve banking and positive money therefore claim that the abolition of commercial bank money creation would lead to fewer financial crises. This paper argues that the market would bypass any lending regulations by creating its own money substitutes. Such a reform does not take into account the relationship between saving and investing in a growing monetary economy, abandons the benefits that commercial banks have in financing corporate investments, and is harmful for economic growth. As an alternative approach, further macroprudential instruments are suggested.     

次贷危机背景下我国商业银行对个人住房信贷风险的防范

美国次贷危机已演变成为了全球性的金融危机。我国商业银行的个人住房信贷扩张累积了较大风险与个贷危机,次贷危机的冲击将使个人住房贷款者信用风险的集中爆发,也会使房地产市场发展的不确定性风险加大等问题完全暴露。我国商业银行必须采取措施,提前防范其对银行体系内个人住房信贷所产生的不良影响,严格控制个人住房贷款者的信用级别,完善并严厉执行银行体系的内部控制,增强银行自身的流动性,加强金融创新监管,以全面保证商业银行信贷资产运作的安全性。     

Local Public Corruption and Bank Lending Activity in the United States

Using a conviction-based measure, we find that local (state-level) public corruption exerts a negative effect on the lending activity of US banks. Our baseline estimations show that the difference in public corruption between, for example, Alabama, where corruption is high, and Minnesota, where corruption is low, implies that banks headquartered in the former state grant 0.55% less credit (or $3.52 million for the average bank) ceteris paribus. Using proxies for relationship lending and monitoring, we also find that these bank characteristics weaken the negative effect of public corruption on lending. These results are robust to tests that address endogeneity, to the use of perception-based measures of corruption, and after controlling for credit demand conditions. In further analysis, we show that these effects are more evident for smaller banks and banks operating in a single state. These findings provide evidence that public corruption could facilitate information asymmetry in the lending market and, thus, could hinder local development by reducing bank credit.

     

Cyclicality of lending in Africa: The influence of bank ownership

Ownership structure of banks has dramatically changed over the past two decades in African countries with privatization and foreign bank entry, including the expansion of Pan-African banks. The objective of this paper is to investigate how bank ownership influences cyclicality of lending in Africa. We are then able to assess how changes in bank ownership influence the economy. To this end, we measure the sensitivity of bank loan growth to GDP per capita growth of the host country with dynamic GMM estimations. We use panel data from 190 commercial banks covering 20 African countries spanning the period from 2002 to 2015. We find that lending of African banks is procyclical for all types of banks. However, we observe that Pan-African banks are the least procyclical banks, while no significant difference in procyclicality is observed between state-owned banks, domestic private banks, and other foreign banks. In addition, we find evidence that foreign banks are influenced by GDP per capita growth of their home country. Therefore, our findings support the view that the expansion of Pan-African banks contributes to reduce cyclicality of lending. However, foreign bank entry can enhance the transmission of external shocks.     

Political uncertainty and city bank lending in China: Evidence from city government official changes

Using data hand collected in China between 2001 and 2016, this paper examines how political uncertainty affects city bank lending. Our results show that political uncertainty causes banks to significantly increase loan growth. These results are moderated by the characteristics of government officials, bank characteristics, and the degree of marketization. Our results further show that changes by government officials increase medium-term loan growth, mainly for the real estate and public utilities sector. Finally, we show that city government official changes increase bank lending and, thus, increase credit risk, that is, bank lending has a mediating effect.     

Banking Reforms for the 21st Century: A Perfectly Stable Banking System Based on Financial Innovations*

Although bank loans themselves are somewhat illiquid because of private information, most of their cashflows are not. Recent financial innovations allow commercial loans to be liquefied via credit derivatives and actual and synthetic securitizations. The loan originating bank holds the remaining illiquid equity tranche containing the concentrated credit risk, private information rent and the ‘excess spread’ that incentivize the bank to continue to monitor and service the loans. Empirically, we find that the average size of the equity tranche is about 3% for the representative commercial loan portfolios in our sample. The liquefaction of bank loans makes possible a banking system that restricts the guaranteed accounts to be backed by 100% reserves and the non‐guaranteed deposits to be backed by liquid securitized loan tranches, while retaining the deposit‐lending synergy. Such a system is perfectly safe without deposit insurance and it renders banks bankruptcy‐remote without sacrificing a bank's traditional role as a financial intermediary.     

Lending to Small and Medium-Sized Firms: Is There an East-West Gap in Germany?

The financing of small and medium-sized firms is important for the catching-up of the East German to the West German economy since reunification. We explore whether it is restricted by unfavorable bank loan terms, using bank-survey data on lending decisions to small and medium-sized firms. A comparison of the terms of lending between the former East German and West German states yields a lending gap given by higher loan prices and collateral requirements in East Germany. This gap can be explained by differences in credit risks and lending strategies of banks.     

Lending technologies,lending specialization,and minority access to small-business loans

We investigate minority access to small-business loans using a probit model of loan application denial that recognizes two loan types (line-of-credit loans and non-line-of-credit loans) made by two lender types (commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions). We estimate our model on data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances. We find evidence consistent with minority equal access to bank credit lines and nonbank non-line-of-credit loans in highly competitive loan markets; in less competitive markets we find evidence consistent with unequal access to these loans. We also find evidence consistent with unequal minority access to bank non-line-of-credit loans, regardless of loan market competitiveness. Our findings differ from previous research which treats small-business loans as a homogenous product and finds evidence consistent with unequal minority access to small-business loans generally. We argue that the existence of multiple small-business lending technologies and loan specialization by lenders account for our findings and demonstrate the need to treat small-business loans as a heterogeneous product when investigating equal access to small-business credit.     

中小企业融资中的自有资金信贷机制

银行贷款收益取决于贷款利率和贷款风险两个因素。在贷款利率受到管制时,理性的银行为了实现期望利润最大化,要求企业提供足够抵押来规避贷款风险。我国中小企业由于自身特征及所处信贷环境的原因,银行向其贷款风险大,且得不到足够抵押品,也没有第三方提供担保,这就导致中小企业贷款难现象。因此,我国商业银行应该灵活运用抵押、担保、关系贷款和自有资金多种手段,积极构建中小企业的多层次信贷机制体系。     

Bargaining power and information in SME lending

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are informationally opaque and bank dependent. In SME lending, banks largely rely on soft information, because the scale and scope of hard information are limited. We analyze whether and how hard and soft information affects the borrower??s bargaining power vis-à-vis its bank. We use the fact that, for a given credit rating, certain borrowers obtain better loan terms than others to define measures of relative bargaining power. Using SME loan data from the USA and Germany, we find that more favorable soft information (management skills and character) increases borrower bargaining power. We also show that more favorable soft than hard information improves borrower bargaining power. The results are not driven by manipulation or statistical limitations of the credit ratings. Our study suggests that soft information represents an important and direct determinant of borrower bargaining power, affecting the outcomes of the loan contracting process.     

The Global Financial Crisis and Stock Market Reaction to Bank Loan Announcements

This study investigates how equity investors react to bank loan announcements in China using an event study methodology. By estimating the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) over the event period and controlling for the impact of other factors such as borrower, lender and loan characteristics, we find that the overall reaction is negative. However, the results for the two sub-sample periods are different. After the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the average CARs are no longer statistically different from zero, indicating higher lending standards and improvement in the quality of credit analysis of Chinese banks.     

Effect of climate-related risk on the costs of bank loans: Evidence from syndicated loan markets in emerging economies

Based on a novel dataset that combined syndicated loans originated in the emerging market economies with greenhouse gas emission intensity data of borrowers, this study examines whether and to what extent banks in these emerging markets have factored in climate transition risk in their lending decisions. On loan pricing, our results suggest that banks in these emerging markets have started to price-in climate transition risk for loans to emissions-intensive sector since the Paris Agreement. This could reflect their increased awareness of a climate-transition risk towards such firms. The extent of the transition risk premium is also found to be dependent on the environmental attitude of banks. Specifically, green banks are found to charge a higher loan spread than other banks, when lending to the same brown firm after the Paris Agreement. Apart from pricing a transition risk premium in the loan spread, we find evidence that banks may also consider imposing more stringent non-pricing contractual terms, such as shortening loan tenor and imposing collateral requirement, on brown firms especially when the associated credit risk impacts on these firms are more uncertain.     

Financial underdevelopment,distorted lending and export market survival

This paper examines the impact of financial development on exporter survival in foreign markets with Chinese firm-level data over the period 1998–2008. We measure financial development using the size, lending efficiency, term structure of bank loans and degree of state intervention in financial resource allocation, respectively. We find that a larger scale and greater efficiency of bank lending and less state intervention facilitate while the relative abundance of long-term credit deteriorates exporter survival. These effects are more pronounced for private exporters compared with state-owned exporters. For foreign-invested exporters, weakened state intervention is of relatively great importance. We attribute this disproportional impact to the government's intervention in funding investment and the distortional lending of banks, which varies across regions and industries with different levels of presence of state-owned enterprises.     

Public bank lending in Africa in times of crisis

This paper examines State-owned bank lending in Africa in times of crisis. We exploit a sample of 112 banks, including 24 State-owned banks, operating in 8 West African countries over the period 2000–2019. We focus on how bank ownership affects lending, during and after crises. Results indicate that, contrary to domestic-private banks, public banks continue to lend at the same rate during and slightly increase their lending after a crisis. The main explanation of the previous finding is the stability of State-owned bank resources. Finally, the countercyclicality of public banks does not affect their profitability or portfolio quality.     

Consumer debt in Australia: why banks will not turn their backs on profit

Five years into the 21st century and consumer debt levels in Australia are still escalating. Simultaneously, there is concern that an increasing number of consumers may be unable to meet their future financial commitments and also mounting alarm at the relative ease with which the majority of consumers can access additional credit facilities. At the same time, credit providers are avidly seeking greater profits by enticing consumers to borrow more and more. Against this background, the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Australian consumer credit industry is discussed. The application of strategic stakeholder management theory to the activities of a specific class of lender – banks – is then discussed. The aim is to better understand why the contemporary demands of CSR will not lead banks to undertake a more vigilant approach to consumer lending advocated by consumer groups who, witnessing the impact of the growing level of consumer indebtedness on a number of consumers, are calling for more responsible lending practices. The opportunity to contribute to debate aimed at alleviating the risk of growing consumer indebtedness is highlighted. The paper concludes with an acknowledgement that, without intervention, factors such as competition in the free market for consumer credit, the demands of shareholders for profits, and consumers’ own folly in demanding immediate gratification and readily accepting additional credit as a means of financing their consumption, ensure that consumer debt levels will continue to rise.     

利率市场化进程中我国中小银行的经营策略选择

文章在分析中小银行与大银行实力对比的基础上,研究了利率市场化的影响,即放开存款利率上限与贷款利率下限,为中小银行提出了针对利率市场化改革的策略选择：充分利用价格手段积极竞争,在短期以量补价,拓展有自身特色的中间业务;在长期逐步转型,紧紧抓住中小企业贷款业务,与非正规金融逐利;提前建设利率风险管理体系,加强信用风险管理。     

MODELLING BANKS' LENDING BEHAVIOUR IN A CAPITAL‐REGULATED FRAMEWORK

This paper adds to the literature on the money supply theory by assessing the effect of banks' equity on the loan generating process. First, a new ‘credit’ multiplier is examined, the so‐called ‘equity’ multiplier model. This, in a second stage, is incorporated in a new multivariate lending model. The models are assessed by using panel data cointegration techniques for the G7 countries. According to our results, a feedback relationship exists between banks' loans and equity. Moreover, the factors determining loans are: the aggregate demand, the loan–customer relation, the banks' equity and banks' portfolio adjustments and/or the monetary stance.     

Small Business Borrowing and the Owner–Manager Agency Costs: Evidence on Finnish Data

This study investigates the impact that managerial ownership has on loan availability and credit terms. We find that managerial ownership is common in a sample of small and medium‐sized Finnish firms. Our results suggest that an increase in managerial ownership decreases loan availability. The results on loan interest rates suggest that though an increase in managerial ownership initially increases interest rates, the effect is reversed at higher levels of ownership. Collateral requirements increase monotonically with managerial ownership. Overall, the results suggest that banks view that there are agency costs involved with managerial ownership even in small and medium‐sized firms and that this is taken into account when lending to these firms.     

The contribution of macroprudential policies to banks' resilience: Lessons from the systemic crises and the COVID-19 pandemic shock

This study examines the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in reducing the banks' risk during the COVID-19 pandemic and compares these results with the systemic banking crises years. Based on a sample of 624 banks across 40 countries during the period 2006–2020, we find that loosening capital-aimed macroprudential policies effectively reduced banks' risk during the COVID-19 pandemic, while this behavior led to increased risk during the systemic crises years. In contrast, tightening the remaining macroprudential policies during the systemic crises years and during the pandemic proved effective in reducing banks' risk. Furthermore, we show that the magnitude of the impact of macroprudential policies was stronger during the systemic crisis than that during the pandemic. Finally, we show that the results are driven by the capital requirement prudential policy, both during the systemic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, although the conservation buffer and the leverage limit also contributes to the ineffectiveness of these policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. The banks' leverage and loan growth also play an enhancing role of the effects of the macroprudential policies.     

投资等待与信贷配给均衡

斯蒂格利茨和韦斯 (1 981 )认为风险高的投资项目能够承受更高的贷款利率 ,所以当银行提高贷款利率时低风险的投资项目将会退出市场 ,而银行的最优选择是施行信贷配给。如果投资者可以等待关于其项目的信息充分披露从而项目的投资成功率更高时 ,高风险的投资项目将从等待中获得较大的收益 ,并只能承受相对较低的贷款利率 ,从而信贷配给在一定程度上得到消除。