Why do accruals predict earnings?

Higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings. We show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales, profits, and working capital respond to changes in a firm's product markets. Empirically, high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long-lasting drop in both profits and profitability. Accruals also predict an increase in future competition, suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high—and, in equilibrium, transitory—true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry. Overall, the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product-market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment.     

On the acquisition of equity carve-outs

We examine the role played by the parent’s motive in undertaking a carve-out; the parent’s post-IPO influence over the carved-out subsidiary; and anti-takeover provisions and industry structure of a carve-out on its acquisition likelihood and its acquisition premium. We find that the probability and hazard of a carve-out acquisition increase when the parent’s objective is to unlock the value of a subsidiary and when the parent and the subsidiary are tied with a product-market relationship. We also find that the post-IPO parent ownership significantly affects the acquisition likelihood and the level of acquisition premium. Additional analyses examining the post-IPO carve-out status suggest that the product-market relationship and post-IPO parent ownership increase the probability of re-acquisition.     

The profit effects of product-market growth strategy: A financial services example

The paper presents an empirical examination of the relationship of an organisation's growth strategy to performance. The study includes a sample of chief executive officers in the financial services sector, specifically credit unions. In particular, the relationship of product-market growth strategy to profitability is investigated while also controlling for firm size and the perceived environment. The authors find that product growth strategy has no impact on profits but that market growth strategy does significantly affect profitability. In particular, those firms that emphasise new markets in their growth strategies are the highest performers and are significantly more profitable than credit unions that emphasise growth through either emphasis of products, current markets, or both current and new markets.     

The relationship between capital structure and product markets: evidence from New Zealand

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the capital structure of New Zealand firms influences their product-market performance in the period from 1984 to 2008. Our main findings are that the use of leverage by publicly listed New Zealand companies leads to an increase in relative-to-industry sales growth, but a decrease in relative-to-industry return on assets (ROA). We also conduct a reverse causality test by examining whether sales growth and ROA influence leverage. We find no evidence that sales growth has an impact on the use of debt, but significant evidence that ROA is negatively correlated with its use. Our results suggest that New Zealand firms use debt to compete more aggressively in their product markets, even though this strategy comes at a cost of lower relative-to-industry profitability. A possible explanation for this behavior is the more competitive trading environment that has developed in New Zealand over the last 25 years.     

Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in Asymmetric Cournot Oligopolies

This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxes in asymmetric homogenous Cournot oligopolies with constant marginal costs. We show that for any given level of industry output, ad valorem taxes are superior to specific taxes in terms of revenue raised. If the tax rates are sufficiently high, for any given specific tax one can find an ad valorem tax that leads to greater tax revenue, consumer surplus, and industry profits.     

Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters

We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision‐making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.     

Do foreign investors insulate firms from local shocks? Evidence from the response of investable firms to monetary policy

Extant research shows that stock returns of investable firms are highly sensitive to foreign market and global information shocks, suggesting that having foreign investors might insulate investable firms from shocks to local fundamentals. Examining 24 emerging markets, we find that both investable and non-investable firms are sensitive to local monetary policy shocks. This allays the concern that emerging-market opening reduces the efficacy of local monetary policy. We also find that in 11 countries (46% of our country-sample), investable firms are more sensitive to local shocks than non-investable firms. Differences in leverage, stock liquidity, size, domestic product-market exposure, or industry cyclicality do not drive this finding.     

Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves

We review the role of the central bank's balance sheet in a textbook monetary model and explore what changes if the central bank is allowed to pay interest on its liabilities. When the central bank (CB) cannot pay interest, away from the zero lower bound its (real) balance sheet is limited by the demand for money. Furthermore, if securities are not marked to market and the central bank holds its bonds to maturity, it is impossible for the CB to make losses, and it always obtains profits from being a monopoly provider of money. When the option of paying interest on liabilities is allowed, the limit on the CB's balance sheet is lifted. In this case, the CB is free to take on interest‐rate risk – for example, by buying long‐term securities and financing those purchases with short‐term debt that pays the market interest rate. This is a risky enterprise that can lead to additional profits but also to losses. To the extent that losses exceed the profits of the monopoly operations, the CB faces two options: either it is recapitalised by Treasury or it increases its monopoly profits by raising the inflation tax.     

The effects of ownership and stock liquidity on the timing of repurchase transactions

We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership reduces companies' opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases profits from timing OMRs.     

Intra–day Behavior of Treasury Sector Index Option Implied Volatilities around Macroeconomic Announcements

If option implied volatility is an unbiased, efficient forecast of future return volatility in the underlying asset, then we should be able to predict its path around macroeconomic announcements from responses in cash markets. Regressions show that volatilities rise the afternoon before announcements that move cash markets, and that post–announcement volatilities return to normal as rapidly as cash prices do. Although implied volatilities are predictable, the Treasury options market is efficient since informed traders do not earn arbitrage profits once we account for trading costs.     

Trading Profits in Dutch Auction Self-Tender Offers

We document abnormal trading profits in Dutch auction self-tenders. Tender period profits—buying after announcement and selling just before expiration—are 1.74 percent ( Bhagat, Brickley, and Lowenstein (1987) report similar profits for interfirm tenders). Buying just before expiration and tendering yields abnormal profits of 1.36 percent ( Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) report 9 percent for fixed-price self-tenders using a filter rule). Total profits from buying just after announcement and tendering remain positive after adjusting for bid-ask spreads. Trading profits are higher for smaller firms, and positively correlated with tender period unsystematic risk, suggesting that they arise due to the pricing of event risk.     

Shorting costs and profitability of long–short strategies

We examine how the profitability of long–short arbitrage strategies based on anomalies is affected after adjustment for two shorting costs: implicit cost due to unavailability of stocks in the short-leg to sell short and loan fees actually paid to stock lenders. The combined shorting cost amounts to almost 40 percent of long–short gross returns over the sample period from January 2006 to December 2017. After adjustment for these shorting costs, long–short arbitrage profits are thus reduced by almost 40 percent. Even after adjustment for risk, the proportion of shorting costs is also substantial. If other trade-related transaction costs are considered, long–short arbitrage profits would be reduced further. Our results provide explicit evidence that casts doubt on the profitability of long-short arbitrage strategies based on anomalies.     

Sticky Expectations and the Profitability Anomaly

We propose a theory of the “profitability” anomaly. In our model, investors forecast future profits using a signal and sticky belief dynamics. In this model, past profits forecast future returns (the profitability anomaly). Using analyst forecast data, we measure expectation stickiness at the firm level and find strong support for three additional model predictions: (1) analysts are on average too pessimistic regarding the future profits of high‐profit firms, (2) the profitability anomaly is stronger for stocks that are followed by stickier analysts, and (3) the profitability anomaly is stronger for stocks with more persistent profits.     

Trading volatility spreads: a test of index option market efficiency

If returns on two assets share common volatility components, the prices of options on the assets should be interdependent and the implied volatility spread should mean revert. We first demonstrate, using the canonical correlation method, that there is a common component in the volatilities of the returns on S&P 100 and S&P 500 indices. We then exploit this commonality by trading on the volatility spread between tick-by-tick OEX and SPX call options listed on the CBOE. Our vega-delta-neutral strategies generated significant profits, even after transaction costs are taken into account. The results suggest that the two options markets are not jointly efficient.     

An Analysis of Bidding in the Japanese Government Bond Auctions

We examine the bidding patterns and auction profits in the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) auctions and empirically test the predictions of auction theory. We find that the average profit in JGB auctions is not reliably different from zero, and the degree of competition and the level of uncertainty are insignificant in determining auction profits. The winning shares of the U.S. dealers are positively related to auction profits, whereas the winning shares of their Japanese counterparts show a negative association. We also find that the share of winnings of Japanese dealers tends to be correlated with the share of winnings of their compatriot dealers but a similar relation is not found for U.S. dealers.     

Valuation-driven profit transfer among corporate segments

This paper investigates whether the desire to achieve higher equity valuations induces conglomerates to manipulate their segment earnings. I extend the Stein (Q J Econ 104:655–669, 1989) model to a multi-segment setting and show that conglomerates have incentives to transfer profits from segments operating in industries with lower valuation multiples to those with higher multiples, even if the market is not fooled in equilibrium. If companies engage in such manipulation, segments with relatively high (low) valuations should report abnormally high (low) profits. The empirical tests confirm this prediction and further show that the relation is stronger for firms with more dispersed segment valuations. This paper also demonstrates that the simple sum-of-the-parts valuation with multiples tends to overestimate the enterprise values for conglomerates and that the measurement errors increase with segment valuation dispersion.     

Kyle v. Kyle (’85 v. ’89)

We characterize equilibrium outcomes in a Kyle demand-submission market model of speculative trade. This market design mirrors that used at open on most exchanges, as well as the auction format used for many IPOs. We contrast equilibrium outcomes with those that obtain in the corresponding competitive market maker structure. We prove that the two market structures yield identical total speculator profits only if their signals are independently distributed. If the signals of speculators are correlated in any way, market design matters: the demand-submission market design increases competition, drives down speculator profit, and leads to more informative prices. We argue that these facts explain the prevalence of the demand-submission market design. We thank Pete Kyle for helpful comments. Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation grant SES-0317700. See, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and dynamic multi-speculator extensions such as Foster and Viswanathan (1994), (1996), Back, Cao and Willard (2000), Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001), Baruch (2002), and Bernhardt and Miao (2004).     

Information dissemination by insiders in equilibrium

This paper generates an equilibrium explanation for partial disclosure of information by an insider to privileged associates. In our model, prices are set by competitive market makers in anticipation of trading volume, but not affected by the actual number of trades. Liquidity demand is not perfectly inelastic, but rather liquidity traders are sensitive to trading costs through a reservation price. Because profits from liquidity traders are bounded, the feasibility of an equilibrium depends on the balance between the number of associates, the precision of information and the number of liquidity traders. Partially, rather than fully, disclosing information alters this balance by limiting the informational advantage of individual associates. If the number of associates is exogenous, partial disclosure prevents market failure. If the insider chooses the number of associates, partial disclosure allows him to serve more associates but still increase total associate profits.     

Incentive contracting when boards have related industry expertise

We posit that presence of informed directors, by enhancing the board's information and ability to advise and monitor management, will affect the nature of incentive contracts offered to CEOs. In particular, we study the effect of directors from related industries (DRIs) i.e., downstream or upstream industries: our premise is that DRIs contribute information about product-market prospects. Using a simple optimal-contracting model to develop testable predictions, we hypothesize that DRIs reduce a firm's reliance on stock-based incentives. Our empirical evidence is strongly supportive: CEO pay and replacements are less sensitive to stock performance, particularly when industry-related information is crucial and when stock price is less informative.     

A Dynamic Model of Characteristic‐Based Return Predictability

We present a dynamic model that links characteristic‐based return predictability to systematic factors that determine the evolution of firm fundamentals. In the model, an economy‐wide disruption process reallocates profits from existing businesses to new projects and thus generates a source of systematic risk for portfolios of firms sorted on value, profitability, and asset growth. If investors are overconfident about their ability to evaluate the disruption climate, these characteristic‐sorted portfolios exhibit persistent mispricing. The model generates predictions about the conditional predictability of characteristic‐sorted portfolio returns and illustrates how return persistence increases the likelihood of observing characteristic‐based anomalies.