Using Intuition in Fuzzy Front‐End Decision‐Making: A Conceptual Framework

The goal of decision‐making during the execution of the fuzzy front end (FFE) is to develop a creative new product concept. Although intuitive decision‐making has been found to increase new product creativity, the theoretical knowledge base as to why and under which conditions intuition use during the process of generating a creative outcome is beneficial, is rather limited. Therefore, this study develops a conceptual framework theorizing why and under which conditions using intuition in FFE execution decision‐making may or may not be (as) beneficial for new product concept creativity. To develop this framework, the authors combine a creativity perspective of the FFE and a dual‐processing perspective of intuition. Interviews with eight FFE practitioners are used to support and illustrate the framework development. The theorizing leads the authors to postulate that intuition use may be beneficial to making generation and evaluation decisions during FFE execution because of the capabilities of the unconscious mind from which intuition results. However, the framework acknowledges that, due to the shortcomings of the unconscious mind, intuition may not be as beneficial to FFE decision‐making in some situations. The authors believe that this framework offers researchers a fertile area for further research and practitioners better insight into when intuition might be effective in FFE execution decision‐making.     

Serial Innovators' processes: How they overcome barriers to creating radical innovations

Formal new product development processes typically are depicted in the literature as linear processes having some number of stages, each of which is completed by a cross-functional team. At the end of each stage a management committee makes a decision as to whether the project will proceed to the next stage, be stopped, or recycle through the previous stage to better complete some of the tasks or steps in the stage. Teams proceed stage by stage, until the product is launched into the market.However, this formal process typically is positioned as occurring after the “fuzzy front end” (FFE), the chaotic, messy up-front part of new product development before there is a solidified concept. Because incremental, evolutionary innovations go through an abbreviated FFE, or even have none at all, these formal processes work quite well for them. However, radical innovations typically have very messy, chaotic and fuzzy front ends, which are not helped by these formal processes. Formal product development processes may actually act as a barrier to radical innovation. Very little research to date has investigated processes that overcome the barriers to radical innovation and allow firms to successfully bring radical innovations to market.This research investigates the product development processes used by 19 Serial Innovators—individuals in large, mature firms who have been associated with one after another radical innovation success. We find that Serial Innovators' processes have four specific features that enable them to overcome organizational barriers and allow them to create and successfully commercialize radical innovations. Serial Innovators' processes:

• •are not at all linear in nature;
• •focus significant time and effort on the fuzzy front end;
• •explicitly manage the transition from the fuzzy front end tasks and outputs (a proposed solution to a problem) to the more formal and institutionalized development process; and
• •proactively work to create market acceptance.

     

Consistency Matters in Formally Selecting Incremental and Radical New Product Ideas for Advancement

Several new product development (NPD) scholars have argued that formal processes should be used when selecting incremental new product ideas for advancement at the very beginning of the fuzzy front end (FFE), but that such formal processes may be less beneficial when selecting radical new product ideas. However, arguments also exist for using formal idea selection processes for both types of new product ideas. In practice, informal processes are used for selecting both idea types and more formal processes are used for selecting radical ideas. Unequivocal empirical evidence for either of the opposing views or practices is lacking. This study sheds light on this matter using data from 161 of the firms that participated in the Product Development and Management Association's latest (2012) Comparative Performance Assessment Study. The results reveal that the highest idea success rate (i.e., the proportion of selected ideas that are eventually launched as new products and are successful in the marketplace) is associated with firms’ use of formal processes to select the vast majority of both incremental and radical new product ideas for advancement. This finding supports earlier claims that even for (raw) idea selection processes that take place at the very beginning of the FFE, managers need to adopt a portfolio perspective and consistently use formal idea advancement selection processes to ensure attaining the right balance between radical and incremental projects in later stages of the NPD pipeline to enhance overall NPD success. Notably, this finding shows that common managerial practices of using inconsistent approaches for selecting radical and incremental ideas for advancement need to be reconsidered.     

The Fuzzy Front‐End of Discontinuous Innovation: Insights for Research and Management

In an article by Reid and de Brentani, a theoretical model of the process and structure for the fuzzy front‐end (FFE) of new product development (NPD) for discontinuous innovations was proposed. Its basic premise is that information flow in the early development of such innovations moves from the environment into the firm, facilitated by individuals playing three key roles at three decision‐making interfaces: (1) the boundary spanner at the boundary interface, (2) the gatekeeper at the gatekeeping interface, and (3) what is identified in this paper as the “project broker” at the project interface. The current paper builds on and augments the ideas presented in this theoretical model with the primary objective of formulating a set of propositions detailing factors affecting the flow of information, and thus role effectiveness at each of these interfaces for discontinuous innovations. The focus is on radically new innovations both because this type of innovation has the highest level of uncertainty during the FFE and because the development of products resulting from such innovations entails the greatest lack of understanding and the fewest strategies for effective management. To achieve this objective, individual, social system, and environmental factors, which promote and/or inhibit the effectiveness of the roles played during the three FFE phases, are examined in terms of both the speed and the quality of information flow. This is done with the goal of substantially improving NPD information as it proceeds through the FFE. In turn, it can help researchers, managers, and team players to better anticipate and meet the navigational challenges of this intrinsically complex, risky, but high potential, NPD scenario.     

Managing strategic intellectual property assets in the fuzzy front end of new product development process

The strategic use of intellectual property (IP) is crucial for technology-based companies to gain competitive advantage. The recent transformation of the US patent system brings new challenges and opportunities in this arena. In this regard, this study attempts to identify techniques which can help with IP evaluation and selection in the fuzzy front end (FFE) of new product development (NPD) process. This study combines data collection methods such as mining the literature, conducting in-depth interviews, surveying questionnaires, and analyzing cases. This research serves as an analysis of modern literature and identifies a multicriteria weighted scoring model that can be employed to help with the patent decision process. The criterion to discern patent eligibility is a contended discussion. For this survey administration, 300 companies, as the targeted sample, were randomly selected to be reached from LexisNexis database. Consequently, this paper identifies the key decision criteria to incorporate into this model and obtains weights gathered from surveying IP professionals and R&D managers in US-based electronics manufacturing firms (SIC code: 36). This study proposes a structured approach to identify ideas that should be patented in the FFE of NPD process by way of an analysis of pertaining literature and case studies. The technique we present in this paper could be essential for many firms to achieve IP success as their strategic means. Moreover, this tool can help R&D managers not only speed up the FFE of NPD process but also make more informed and target-worthy decisions for IP filing.     

Exploring the Contributions of Involving Ordinary Users in Ideation of Technology‐Based Services*

Lead users have long been acknowledged as important contributors to the market success of innovative products and services. The ability of lead users to be such effective innovators has been ascribed to a combination of adequate technological expertise and superior knowledge of the user domain so‐called use experience. Drawing on the apparent success of lead users in innovation, many companies are now attempting to involve other types of users, namely, ordinary users, for ideation at the fuzzy front end (FFE) of new product and service development. However, ordinary users do not usually possess the technological knowledge of lead users, and the existing literature provides little guidance on how to manage such user involvement or its expected contributions. The purpose of the present study is, therefore, to contribute to scholarly knowledge regarding the benefits and management of user involvement during the ideation phase of innovation in technology‐based services. More specifically, the study investigates the contribution made in this respect by “ordinary” users, as opposed to professional developers. The research questions that are addressed are as follows: (1) What contributions do ordinary users make when involved in the FFE for ideation of new technology‐based services; and (2) how is the contribution of the users affected by their knowledge of the underlying technology? The study addresses these questions through a literature review and conceptual analysis of the involvement of users in innovation in mobile telephony, followed by an empirical study using a quasi‐experimental design in which the independent variable is the users' technological knowledge of the underlying mobile telephone system and the dependent variable is the quality of the created idea‐proposals from an innovation perspective. Various scenarios involving guided users, pioneering users, and professionals are investigated. The study finds that the users' knowledge of the underlying technology has an effect on their propensity to contribute with incremental or radical new ideas. The ideas from guided users tend to be more incremental whereas the pioneering users' ideas are more radical. Contrary to the users in the guided user scenarios, the users in the pioneering user scenarios have a propensity to produce ideas that challenge the prevailing dominant logic of the company; these ideas can be used to assist the company to think in new trajectories. The paper proposes that ordinary users should not be expected to contribute ideas that can be directly put into the new product development process; rather, ordinary user involvement should be regarded as a process whereby a company learns about users' needs and is inspired to innovate. The paper concludes that user involvement can actually be a stimulus for review of a company's business strategy.     

Innovation and competition: The role of the product market

We study how competition impacts innovation (and welfare) when firms compete both in the product market and in innovation development. This relationship is complex and may lead to scenarios in which a lessening of competition increases R&D and consumer welfare in the long run. We provide conditions for when competition increases or decreases industry innovation and welfare. These conditions are based on properties of the product market payoffs. Implications for applied work and policy are discussed.     

Cross-functional integration in the sustainable new product development process: The role of the environmental specialist

Companies in the twenty-first century are exposed to a variety of pressures to respond to environmental issues, and responding to these pressures affects several aspects of business such as purchasing, marketing and logistics. Managers increasingly view sustainability as a complement to their corporate agendas, or even as an opportunity. It is important to understand how firms integrate environmental issues into their businesses and how these integration strategies affect performance. The process of sustainable new product development (SNPD) is a key strategic focus to achieve economic and environmental sustainability. This paper examines the integration of environmental specialists into new product development teams that are composed of other functional specialists including marketing, manufacturing, and R&D personnel, and its impact on SNPD project performance across three stages: concept development, product development, and product commercialization. We empirically test our theoretical model using a sample of 219 firms from a range of business-to-business industries. We present evidence that integrating an environmental specialist into a new product team has a positive influence on SNPD project performance beyond what the traditional members of such a team would accomplish. We analyze this relationship across the stages of SNPD to obtain a clearer picture of the effects of this integration. In particular, the integration of the environmental specialist was more effective on SNPD project performance in the final stage of the SNPD process when the product was being launched; this effect is even greater for high-innovative projects.     

Linking Product Development Outcomes to Market Valuation of the Firm: The Case of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry*

The purpose of this research was to examine empirically the effects of new product development outcomes on overall firm performance. To do so, first product development and finance literature were connected to develop three testable hypotheses. Next, an event study was conducted in order to explore whether the changes in the stock market valuation of firms are influenced by the outcomes of efforts to develop new products. The pharmaceutical industry was chosen as the empirical context for the present study's analysis largely because the gate‐keeping role played by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides a specific event date on which to focus the event study methodology. As such, this study's events were dates of public announcements of the FDA decisions to approve or to reject the New Drug Applications submitted by the sponsoring firms. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, this study's results show that market valuations are responsive strongly and cleanly to the success or failure of new product development efforts. Hence, one of this study's key results suggests that financial markets may be attuned sharply to product development outcomes in publicly traded firms. This study also finds that financial market losses from product development failures were much larger in magnitude than financial market gains from product development successes—indicating an asymmetry in the response of financial markets to the success and failure of new product development efforts. Hence, another implication of this study's results is that managers should factor in a substantial risk premium when considering substantial new development projects. The present study's results also imply that managers should refrain from hyping new products and perhaps even should restrain the enthusiasm that the financial community may build before the product fully is developed. The effect on firm value is severe when expectations about an anticipated new product are not fulfilled. Managers in effect should take care to build reasonable and realistic expectations about potential new products.     

A Model of Supplier Integration into New Product Development*

In many industries, firms are looking for ways to cut concept‐to‐customer development time, to improve quality, and to reduce the cost of new products. One approach shown to be successful in Japanese organizations involves the integration of material suppliers early in the new product development cycle. This involvement may range from simple consultation with suppliers on design ideas to making suppliers fully responsible for the design of components or systems they will supply. While prior research shows the benefit of using this approach, execution remains a problem. The processes for identifying and integrating suppliers into the new product development (NPD) process in North American organizations are not understood well. This problem is compounded by the fact that design team members often are reluctant to listen to the technology and cost ideas made by suppliers in new product development efforts. We suggest a model of the key activities required for successful supplier integration into NPD projects, based on case studies with 17 Japanese and American manufacturing organizations. The model is validated using data from a survey of purchasing executives in global corporations with at least one successful and one unsuccessful supplier integration experience. The results suggest that (1) increased knowledge of a supplier is more likely to result in greater information sharing and involvement of the supplier in the product development process; (2) sharing of technology information results in higher levels of supplier involvement and improved outcomes; (3) supplier involvement on teams generally results in a higher achievement of NPD team goals; (4) in cases when technology uncertainty is present, suppliers and buyers are more likely to share information on NPD teams; and (5) the problems associated with technology uncertainty can be mitigated by greater use of technology sharing and direct supplier participation on new product development teams. A supplier's participation as a true member of a new product development team seems to result in the highest level of benefits, especially in cases when a technology is in its formative stages.     

Implementing the lead user method in a high technology firm: A longitudinal study of intentions versus actions

The customer or user's role in the new product development process is limited or nonexistent in many high technology firms, despite evidence that suggests customers are frequently an excellent source for new product ideas with great market potential. This article examines the implementation of the Lead User method for gathering new product ideas from leading edge customers by an IT firm that had not previously done much customer research during their new product development efforts. This case study follows the decision‐makers of the firm through the process, where the end result is the generation of a number of useful product concepts. Besides the ideas generated, management at the firm is also impressed with the way the method makes their new product development process more cross‐functional and they plan to make it a part of their future new product development practices. Approximately one year later the firm is revisited to find out if the Lead User method has become a permanent part of their new product development process. The authors find, however, that the firm has abandoned research on the customer despite the fact that several of the lead‐user derived product concepts had been successfully implemented. Management explanations for their return to a technology push process for developing new products include personnel turnover and lack of time. Using organizational learning theory to examine the case, the authors suggest that the nontechnology specific product concepts generated by the lead users were seen as ambiguous and hence overly simplistic and less valuable by the new product development personnel. The technical language spoken by the new product personnel also increased the inertia of old technology push development process by making it more prestigious and comfortable to plan new products with their technology suppliers. The fact that the firm was doing well throughout this process also decreased the pressure to change from their established new product development routine. The implications for these finding are that: 1) it is necessary to pressure or reward personnel in order to make permanent changes to established routines, and 2) researchers should be careful at taking managers at their word when asking them about their future intentions.     

Coordination of Design Supply Chains for Bundling Physical and Software Products*

Research on product development management has concentrated on physical products or on software, but not both. This article explores a special new product development (NPD) approach in which the internal development of core physical products is augmented by bundled and largely outsourced software features. We studied a medical device producer that has established a new medical information product group (MIPG) within their NPD organization to create software features that are bundled with their core physical products. The MIPG has conceptualized these software features as multiple software development projects, and then coordinated their realization largely through the use of external software suppliers. This case study centers on the question: how can firms effectively coordinate such product development processes? Our analysis of case evidence and related literature suggests that such product bundling processes, when pursued through design supply chains (DSC), are more complex than is typical for the development of streams of either physical products or software products individually. We observe that DSC coordination transcends the requirements associated with traditional “stage‐gate” NPD processes used for physical product development. Managers in DSC settings face a tension inherent to distributed work: keeping internal and external development efforts separate to exploit the design capabilities within a network of software suppliers, while ensuring effective delivery of a stream of bundled products. Many managers face this coordination tension with little, if any, prior knowledge of how to create a streamlined and effective DSC. Our research indicates that these managers need to make a series of interrelated decisions: the number of suppliers to qualify and include in or exclude from the DSC; the basis for measuring and modifying the scope of the suppliers' work; the need to account for asymmetric cost structures and expertise across the DSC; the mechanisms for synchronizing development work across elements of the DSC; and the approaches for developing skills—both technical and administrative—that project managers need for utilizing in‐house competencies while acquiring and assimilating design know‐how from external development organizations. When managers take a flexible approach toward these decisions based on a modular set of software development projects, they can improve their NPD outcomes through technical and organizational experimentation and adjust their own resource deployment to best utilize the suppliers' capabilities within their DSC.     

First Product Success: A Mediated Moderating Model of Resources,Founding Team Startup Experience,and Product‐Positioning Strategy

The success of the first product is of paramount importance for the future development of the new venture. Developing and launching a first product in the Chinese market is even more challenging than in a well‐developed market economy because of weak enforcement of intellectual property laws, a general consumer distrust of new products developed by Chinese firms, and the immediate threat of copycat. This article develops a mediated moderating model to examine first product success in Chinese new ventures, in which product‐positioning strategy (conceptualized as the degree of product differentiation) mediates the impacts of marketing resources, technical resources, and founding team startup experience on product success (conceptualized as timing of product launch and product market and financial performance). Furthermore, we argue that founding team startup experience moderates the impact of marketing and technical resources on building strong product‐positioning strategy. We test our conceptual model using a sample of 909 new products developed by 909 Chinese new ventures in a two‐step selection model. The empirical results provide important insight for new ventures' first product development. Product differentiation does not mediate the impact of marketing resource on product success; but it fully mediates the impact of technical resources on timing of product launch and partially mediates the impact of technical resources on product performance. Marketing resources have significant direct positive effects on both product performance and timing of product launch. Surprisingly, the impacts of marketing resources on product differentiation and product performance are negatively, not positively, moderated by founding team experience. When the founding team has nine years or less startup experience, an increase in marketing resources leads to a significant increase in product differentiation; and when the founding team has more than nine years of startup experience, an increase in marketing resources will not lead to an increase in product differentiation. The impact of marketing resources on product performance is smaller for founding teams with more prior startup experience than those with less prior startup experience. The impacts of technical resources are not moderated by founding team startup experience. Technical resources positively affect product market and financial performance directly as well as through its positive impacts on product differentiation. However, technical resources can negatively affect timing of the product launch because developing a highly differentiated produce can potentially delay the launch of the product. Therefore, new ventures have to be mindful in managing the available resources to succeed in the first product development.     

Is Integration Enough for Fast Product Development? An Empirical Investigation of the Contextual Effects of Product Vision*

Research into development time performance has suggested that integration—both internal, adopting cross‐functional organizational structures for development, and external, involving customers and suppliers in the process—can be a powerful driver when it comes to compressing cycle times and enhancing development punctuality. Some recent studies have also highlighted the compelling role of product vision to obtain high performances with product development. What these studies seem to suggest is that product vision guarantees the right goals and clarity of direction that integration mechanisms need to quickly develop new products and to stay on the development schedule. However, past studies have rarely considered or measured product vision as a construct and explicitly tested whether or not product vision acts as a contingent factor in determining the relationships between the aforementioned organizational drivers and development time. This research study maintains that product vision is crucial to pushing organizational drivers toward increased development efficiency. To find theoretical support for this position and to define a reference framework for the study, previous literature was analyzed. In the framework, both internal and external development integration are assumed to be positively related to time performance; however, these relationships are moderated by product vision. The model was then tested empirically on an international sample of 157 firms to verify and to obtain empirical support for the hypothesized relationships. The results confirm the importance of external integration in achieving better time performance. However, the influence of this driver on cycle time can also be increased by the presence of a very well‐defined product vision. The relationship between internal integration and time performance is more complex. Though it seems to slow down the process as a single factor, its interaction effect with product vision is in fact positive. These results have several managerial implications. First, externally integrated development can greatly improve time performance; however, the best results in terms of acceleration can be obtained when there is a well‐defined product vision. Furthermore, product vision is essential in the case of internal integration: A cross‐functional process alone would not be enough for development acceleration in the absence of product vision. Hence, managers interested in obtaining high time performances should accompany the adoption of integration mechanisms with increased attention to sharing clear objectives and directions with all those—both inside the firm (i.e., team members and functional representatives) and outside the firm (i.e., customers and suppliers)—involved in development and as well as throughout the firm.     

Managing seller-buyer new product development relationships for customized products: a contingency model based on transaction cost analysis and empirical test

Sellers often customize their product offerings in order to increase the value offered to individual buyers and gain a competitive advantage over the seller’s competitors. However, such customization has a downside—it usually requires considerable seller-buyer interactions aimed at matching the seller’s technological capabilities with the buyer’s needs, which can pose exchange risks such as the safeguarding and adaptation problems noted in the transaction cost analysis literature. In the present study, we develop a contingency model to investigate the impact of product customization on sellers’ perceived relationship satisfaction and subsequent expectations of relationship continuity. We draw on the logic of transaction cost analysis to hypothesize that product customization’s effect on satisfaction and continuity may be moderated by three activities that sellers may engage in during the new product development (NPD) process: education, product knowledge generation, and joint new product development.Our substantive hypotheses were tested with data from a national survey of 296 small to medium size firms in several high-tech industries using a series of hierarchical OLS regression models. Overall, we found mixed support for our hypotheses. The results indicated that joint new product development reduced the negative effect of product customization on seller satisfaction and enhanced customization’s positive effect on continuity, as expected. Contrary to our expectations, product knowledge generation activities increased the negative effect of customization on satisfaction; it also had no significant moderating impact on continuity. Buyer education activities were found to reduce the negative impact of customization on satisfaction, but showed no moderating effect on continuity.This study offers important theoretical and managerial implications. It is one of the first to rely on transaction cost analysis as a basis for examining how various relationship activities conducted during the new product development process moderate product customization’s effect on qualitative outcomes. Whereas traditional NPD processes have emphasized unilateral approaches to product development, our study provides evidence of how bilateral approaches to NPD can benefit sellers of innovations. We provide new insights for managers to consider when deciding whether to engage buyers early on and then continue interacting with them throughout the product development process when developing customized products.     

The Estimation of a Cusp Model to Describe the Adoption of Word for Windows*

This article revisits earlier work in this journal by Paul Herbig (1991) that proposed a catastrophe model of industrial product adoption under certain conditions. Catastrophe models are useful for modeling situations where organizations can exhibit both smooth and abrupt adoption behavior. It extends Herbig's work by focusing on organizations' adoption of new products when network externalities are an important part of the decision process, and it presents an empirical estimation of the model. Network externalities occur when firms do not want to adopt a new innovation or product unless other firms do. The reason is that they do not want to end up with an innovation that ends up not being a standard of some sort. Mistakes of this nature can be costly as the firm must invest twice and loses time relative to competitors who have not made such a mistake. However, when such externalities exist, for example with regard to technological adoptions, then normal diffusion gives way to sudden discontinuous shifts as all firms seemingly act together an move to a new technology. Since, technology is an area where the authors expect network externalities to exist, that is the focus of this article. The specific application is developed from two sets of panel data on the organizational adoptions of Microsoft's (MS) Word for Windows software by organizations that previously were using either Word for DOS or Word for Macintosh (Mac). The theoretical framework for the analysis is based on work in the economics literature on network externalities. However, the organization and new product development catastrophe model comes primarily from Herbig (1991) . The article focuses on an area of organizational adoption where relatively little empirical research has been done, namely organizational adoption “for use.” Longitudinal data provided by Techtel Corporation is used to develop the estimations. Results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical framework suggested in Herbig's article and in those found in economics and catastrophe theory literatures. This lends clear support to the idea that organizations will adopt a bandwagon‐type behavior when network externalities are present. It further suggests that in such markets, the standard S‐shaped diffusion curve is not an appropriate model for examining organizational behavior. From a managerial perspective, it means that buyers and sellers may face nonstandard diffusion curves. Instead of S‐shaped curves, the actual curves have a break or rift where sales end, and there is a sudden shift to a new product that is relatively high very early on. Clearly, for new product development (NPD), it suggest that organizations' “for‐use” purchases may be similar to regular consumers and may change rapidly from one product to another almost instantly, as in the case of the switch from vinyl records to compact discs (CDs). From an old product seller's viewpoint, the market is here today and gone tomorrow, while for the new seller it is a sudden deluge of sales requests. To put it in more everyday terms, sudden changes in adoption behavior are a September 11‐type experience for the market. It is the day the world changes.     

Continuity,Change, and New Product Performance: The Role of Stream Concentration*

Product development teams often face the challenge of designing radically new products that cater at the same time to the revealed tastes and expectations of existing customers. In new product development projects, this tension guides critical choices about continuity or change concerning product attributes and team composition. Research suggests these choices interact, but it is not clear whether they are complements or substitutes and if the level of change in one should match or not the level of change in the other. In this article, we examine the interaction between product attribute change, team change, and a new team-level factor, which we term stream concentration, as it captures differences among team members in terms of familiarity with the knowledge domain of the new product being developed. We measure stream concentration as team members’ prior NPD experience within a given set of products and assess its impacts on the management of change in new product development projects using longitudinal data from the music industry. We analyze 2621 new product development projects between 1962 and 2008 involving 34,265 distinct team members. Results show that stream concentration is a critical factor in new product development projects that, together with product attributes and team composition, affects new product performance. We discuss implications for research and practice.     

Export experience counts: exploring its effect on product design change

In this paper, we explore how managers' export experience can affect the change in product design following changes in perceived past performance. Using data from 519 Portuguese exporters, we find that performance improvement will encourage safe decision making in which firms either will not change the product design or will change it in a way that makes it more similar across the product range. However, when managers' export experience is greater, they encourage change in ways that could support product differentiation. The abilities of experienced managers to read the market, i.e. to interpret changes in performance and translate them into product specifications, help explain these findings. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we explore the relationship among past export performance change, product design, and managers' export experience. Second, we identify specific kinds of design changes that firms adopt in response to changes in different dimensions of organizational performance. Based on our findings, we would recommend to new product development managers to consider both managers' export experience and the dimension used to measure performance when evaluating calls for standardizing the design by export managers. Our findings suggest that such calls could be driven by short‐term gains in export performance. Furthermore, we would also emphasize the need to routinely capture information from experienced export managers to ensure that it is considered in future decisions about design changes.     

Investigating Adoption of Free Beta Applications in a Platform‐Based Business Ecosystem

Planning new product development (NPD) activities is becoming increasingly difficult, as contemporary businesses compete at the level of business ecosystems in addition to the firm‐level product‐market competition. These business ecosystems are built around platforms interlinking suppliers, complementors, distributors, developers, etc. together. The competitiveness of these ecosystems relies on members utilizing the shared platform for their own performance improvement, especially in terms of developing new valuable offerings for end users. Therefore, managing the development of the platform‐based applications and gaining timely end‐user input for NPD are of vital importance both to the ecosystem as a whole and to the developers. Subsequently, to succeed in NPD planning developers utilizing beta testing need a thorough understanding of the adoption dynamics of beta products. Developers need to plan for example resource allocation; development costs; and timing of commercial, end‐product launches. Therefore, the anticipation of the adoption dynamics of beta products emerges as an important antecedent in planning NPD activities when beta testing is used for gaining end‐user input to the NPD process. Consequently, we investigate how free beta software products that are built upon software platforms diffuse among their end users in a cocreation community. We specifically study whether the adoption of these beta products follows Bass or Gompertz model dynamics used in the previous literature when modeling the adoption of stand‐alone products. Further, we also investigate the forecasting abilities of these two models. Our results show that the adoption dynamics of free beta products in a cocreation community follow Gompertz's model rather than the Bass model. Additionally, we find that the Gompertz model performs better than the Bass model in forecasting both short and long out‐of‐sample time periods. We further discuss the managerial and research implications of our study.     

The influence of competition from informal firms on new product development

Research summary : Existing research describes a broad range of determinants of new product development (NPD), a fundamental competitive activity of firms. A considerable share of this work has occurred in the context of developed economies, raising a concern that some important determinants may remain unexamined. We suggest that one such determinant is competition from informal (unregistered) firms. Drawing from the attention‐based view, we investigate the effects of informal competition on NPD in a large sample of firms located across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We examine not only the direct effect but also how this effect is moderated by characteristics of the competitive and institutional context. Managerial summary : The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between competition from informal (unregistered) firms and new product development (NPD) by formal firms. We argue that NPD is an effective response to differentiate from informal firms, and our analyses of over 9,000 firms located in emerging economies across Eastern Europe and Central Asia indicate that NPD activities are more likely in formal firms who rate informal competition as a greater obstacle. The strength of this direct relationship depends on aspects of the competitive and institutional environment: it is weakened when levels of competition from other formal firms are higher, when alternative responses such as corruption are more available, and when managers are more optimistic about the regulatory environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.