Characterizations of optimal reinsurance treaties: a cost-benefit approach

This article investigates optimal reinsurance treaties minimizing an insurer’s risk-adjusted liability, which encompasses a risk margin quantified by distortion risk measures. Via the introduction of a transparent cost-benefit argument, we extend the results in Cui et al. [Cui, W., Yang, J. & Wu, L. (2013). Optimal reinsurance minimizing the distortion risk measure under general reinsurance premium principles. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 53, 74–85] and provide full characterizations on the set of optimal reinsurance treaties within the class of non-decreasing, 1-Lipschitz functions. Unlike conventional studies, our results address the issue of (non-)uniqueness of optimal solutions and indicate that ceded loss functions beyond the traditional insurance layers can be optimal in some cases. The usefulness of our novel cost-benefit approach is further demonstrated by readily solving the dual problem of minimizing the reinsurance premium while maintaining the risk-adjusted liability below a fixed tolerance level.     

Budget-constrained optimal reinsurance design under coherent risk measures

ABSTRACT

Reinsurance is a versatile risk management strategy commonly employed by insurers to optimize their risk profile. In this paper, we study an optimal reinsurance design problem minimizing a general law-invariant coherent risk measure of the net risk exposure of a generic insurer, in conjunction with a general law-invariant comonotonic additive convex reinsurance premium principle and a premium budget constraint. Due to its intrinsic generality, this contract design problem encompasses a wide body of optimal reinsurance models commonly encountered in practice. A three-step solution scheme is presented. Firstly, the objective and constraint functions are exhibited in the so-called Kusuoka's integral representations. Secondly, the mini-max theorem for infinite dimensional spaces is applied to interchange the infimum on the space of indemnities and the supremum on the space of probability measures. Thirdly, the recently developed Neyman–Pearson methodology due to Lo (2017a) is adopted to solve the resulting infimum problem. Analytic and transparent expressions for the optimal reinsurance policy are provided, followed by illustrative examples.     

Optimal Reciprocal Reinsurance Treaties Under the Joint Survival Probability and the Joint Profitable Probability

A reinsurance treaty involves two parties, an insurer and a reinsurer. The two parties have conflicting interests. Most existing optimal reinsurance treaties only consider the interest of one party. In this article, we consider the interests of both insurers and reinsurers and study the joint survival and profitable probabilities of insurers and reinsurers. We design the optimal reinsurance contracts that maximize the joint survival probability and the joint profitable probability. We first establish sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of the optimal reinsurance retentions for the quota‐share reinsurance and the stop‐loss reinsurance under expected value reinsurance premium principle. We then derive sufficient conditions for the existence of the optimal reinsurance treaties in a wide class of reinsurance policies and under a general reinsurance premium principle. These conditions enable one to design optimal reinsurance contracts in different forms and under different premium principles. As applications, we design an optimal reinsurance contract in the form of a quota‐share reinsurance under the variance principle and an optimal reinsurance treaty in the form of a limited stop‐loss reinsurance under the expected value principle.     

Optimal reinsurance with expectile

In this paper, we study optimal reinsurance treaties that minimize the liability of an insurer. The liability is defined as the actuarial reserve on an insurer’s risk exposure plus the risk margin required for the risk exposure. The risk margin is determined by the risk measure of expectile. Among a general class of reinsurance premium principles, we prove that a two-layer reinsurance treaty is optimal. Furthermore, if a reinsurance premium principle in the class is translation invariant or is the expected value principle, we show that a one-layer reinsurance treaty is optimal. Moreover, we use the expected value premium principle and Wang’s premium principle to demonstrate how the parameters in an optimal reinsurance treaty can be determined explicitly under a given premium principle.     

Optimal insurance and reinsurance policies chosen jointly in the individual risk model

The paper studies the so-called individual risk model where both a policy of per-claim insurance and a policy of reinsurance are chosen jointly by the insurer in order to maximize his/her expected utility. The insurance and reinsurance premiums are defined by the expected value principle. The problem is solved under additional constraints on the reinsurer’s risk and the residual risk of the insured. It is shown that the solution to the problem is the following: The optimal reinsurance is a modification of stop-loss reinsurance policy, so-called stop-loss reinsurance with an upper limit; the optimal insurer’s indemnity is a combination of stop-loss- and deductible policies. The results are illustrated by a numerical example for the case of exponential utility function. The effects of changing model parameters on optimal insurance and reinsurance policies are considered.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.     

“Social Security-Adequacy,Equity, and Progressiveness: A Review of Criteria Based on Experience in Canada and the United States,” Robert L. Brown and Jeffrey Ip,January 2000

Abstract

We consider an optimal dynamic control problem for an insurance company with opportunities of proportional reinsurance and investment. The company can purchase proportional reinsurance to reduce its risk level and invest its surplus in a financial market that has a Black-Scholes risky asset and a risk-free asset. When investing in the risk-free asset, three practical borrowing constraints are studied individually: (B1) the borrowing rate is higher than lending (saving) rate, (B2) the dollar amount borrowed is no more than K > 0, and (B3) the proportion of the borrowed amount to the surplus level is no more than k > 0. Under each of the constraints, the objective is to minimize the probability of ruin. Classical stochastic control theory is applied to solve the problem. Specifically, the minimal ruin probability functions are obtained in closed form by solving Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, and their associated optimal reinsurance-investment policies are found by verification techniques.     

Översikt av utländska aktuarietidskrifter

Abstract

In this paper a continuous-time model of a reinsurance market is presented, which contains the principal components of uncertainty transparent in such a market: Uncertainty about the time instants at which accidents take place, and uncertainty about claim sizes given that accidents have occurred.

Due to random jumps at random time points of the underlying claims processes, the absence of arbitrage opportunities is not sufficient to give unique premium functionals in general. Market preferences are derived under a necessary condition for a general exchange equilibrium. Information constraints are found under which premiums of risks are determined. It is demonstrated how general reinsurance treaties can be uniquely split into proportional contracts and nonproportional ones.

Several applications to reinsurance markets are given, and the results are compared to the corresponding theory of the classical one-period model of a reinsurance syndicate.

This paper attempts to reach a synthesis between the classical actuarial risk theory of insurance, in which virtually no economic reasoning takes place but where the net reserve is represented by a stochastic process, and the theory of partial equilibrium price formation at the heart of the economics of uncertainty.     

Reinsurance decisions in life insurance: An empirical test of the risk–return criterion

Recent studies have analyzed optimal reinsurance contracts within the framework of profit maximization and/or risk minimization. This type of framework, however, does not consider reinsurance as a tool for capital management and financing. In the present paper, we consider different proportional reinsurance contracts used in life insurance (viz., quota-share, surplus, and combinations of quota-share and surplus) while taking into account the insurer's capital constraints. The objective is to determine how different reinsurance transactions affect the risk/reward profile of the insurer and whether factors, such as claims severity, premiums, and insurer's risk appetite, influence the choice of a proportional reinsurance coverage. We compare each reinsurance structure based on actual insurance company data, using the risk–return criterion. This criterion determines the type of reinsurance that enables insurer to retain the largest underwriting profits and/or minimize the risk of the retained claims while keeping the insurer's risk appetite constant, assuming a given capital constraint. The results of this study confirm that the choice of reinsurance arrangement depends on many factors, including risk retention levels, premiums, and the variance of the sum insured values (and therefore claims). As such, under heterogeneous insurance portfolio single type of reinsurance arrangement cannot maximize insurer's returns and/or minimize the risk, therefore a combination of different reinsurance coverages should be employed. Hence, future research on optimal risk management choices should consider heterogeneous portfolios while determining the effects of different financial and risk management tools on companies' risk–return profiles.     

Enhancing Insurer Value Using Reinsurance and Value-at-Risk Criterion

The quest for optimal reinsurance design has remained an interesting problem among insurers, reinsurers, and academicians. An appropriate use of reinsurance could reduce the underwriting risk of an insurer and thereby enhance its value. This paper complements the existing research on optimal reinsurance by proposing another model for the determination of the optimal reinsurance design. The problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem with the objective of minimizing the value-at-risk of the net risk of the insurer while subjecting to a profitability constraint. The proposed optimal reinsurance model, therefore, has the advantage of exploiting the classical tradeoff between risk and reward. Under the additional assumptions that the reinsurance premium is determined by the expectation premium principle and the ceded loss function is confined to a class of increasing and convex functions, explicit solutions are derived. Depending on the risk measure's level of confidence, the safety loading for the reinsurance premium, and the expected profit guaranteed for the insurer, we establish conditions for the existence of reinsurance. When it is optimal to cede the insurer's risk, the optimal reinsurance design could be in the form of pure stop-loss reinsurance, quota-share reinsurance, or a combination of stop-loss and quota-share reinsurance.     

Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection

ABSTRACT

In light of the richness of their structures in connection with practical implementation, we follow the seminal works in economics to use the principal–agent (multidimensional screening) models to study a monopolistic reinsurance market with adverse selection; instead of adopting the classical expected utility paradigm, the novelty of our present work is to model the risk assessment of each insurer (agent) by his value-at-risk at his own chosen risk tolerance level consistent with Solvency II. Under information asymmetry, the reinsurer (principal) aims to maximize his average profit by designing an optimal policy provision (menu) of ‘shirt-fit’ reinsurance contracts for every insurer from one of the two groups with hidden characteristics. Our results show that a quota-share component, on the top of simple stop-loss, is very crucial for mitigating asymmetric information from the insurers to the reinsurer.     

Optimal Risk Transfer: A Numerical Optimization Approach

Capital efficiency and asset/liability management are part of the Enterprise Risk Management Process of any insurance/reinsurance conglomerate and serve as quantitative methods to fulfill the strategic planning within an insurance organization. A considerable amount of work has been done in this ample research field, but invariably one of the last questions is whether or not, numerically, the method is practically implementable, which is our main interest. The numerical issues are dependent on the traits of the optimization problem, and therefore we plan to focus on the optimal reinsurance design, which has been a very dynamic topic in the last decade. The existing literature is focused on finding closed-form solutions that are usually possible when economic, solvency, and other constraints are not included in the model. Including these constraints, the optimal contract can be found only numerically. The efficiency of these methods is extremely good for some well-behaved convex problems, such as Second-Order Conic Problems. Specific numerical solutions are provided to better explain the advantages of appropriate numerical optimization methods chosen to solve various risk transfer problems. The stability issues are also investigated together with a case study performed for an insurance group that aims capital efficiency across the entire organization.     

Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements Under Tail Risk Measures

Regulatory authorities demand insurance companies control their risk exposure by imposing stringent risk management policies. This article investigates the optimal risk management strategy of an insurance company subject to regulatory constraints. We provide optimal reinsurance contracts under different tail risk measures and analyze the impact of regulators' requirements on risk sharing in the reinsurance market. Our results underpin adverse incentives for the insurer when compulsory Value-at-Risk risk management requirements are imposed. But economic effects may vary when regulatory constraints involve other risk measures. Finally, we compare the obtained optimal designs to existing reinsurance contracts and alternative risk transfer mechanisms on the capital market.     

A constraint-free approach to optimal reinsurance

Reinsurance is available for a reinsurance premium that is determined according to a convex premium principle H. The first insurer selects the reinsurance coverage that maximizes its expected utility. No conditions are imposed on the reinsurer's payment. The optimality condition involves the gradient of H. For several combinations of H and the first insurer's utility function, closed-form formulas for the optimal reinsurance are given. If H is a zero utility principle (for example, an exponential principle or an expectile principle), it is shown, by means of Borch's Theorem, that the optimal reinsurer's payment is a function of the total claim amount and that this function satisfies the so-called 1-Lipschitz condition. Frequently, authors impose these two conclusions as hypotheses at the outset.     

Dynamic equilibrium and the structure of premiums in a reinsurance market

In this paper we present an economic equilibrium analysis of a reinsurance market. The continuous-time model contains the principal components of uncertainty; about the time instants at which accidents take place, and about claim sizes given that accidents have occurred. We give sufficient conditions on preferences for a general equilibrium to exist, with a Pareto optimal allocation, and derive the premium functional via a representative agent pricing theory. The marginal utility process of the reinsurance market is represented by the density process for random measures, which opens up for numerous applications to premium calculations, some of which are presented in the last section. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations of individual dynamic optimization are established for proportional treaties, and the term structure of interest rates is found in this reinsurance syndicate. The paper attempts to reach a synthesis between the classical actuarial risk theory of insurance, in which virtually no economic reasoning takes place but where the net reserve is represented by a stochastic process, and the theory of equilibrium price formation at the heart of the economics of uncertainty.     

Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market.     

Optimal reinsurance arrangements in the presence of two reinsurers

In this paper, we investigate the optimal form of reinsurance from the perspective of an insurer when he decides to cede part of the loss to two reinsurers, where the first reinsurer calculates the premium by expected value principle while the premium principle adopted by the second reinsurer satisfies three axioms: distribution invariance, risk loading, and preserving stop-loss order. In order to exclude the moral hazard, a typical reinsurance treaty assumes that both the insurer and reinsurers are obligated to pay more for the larger loss. Under the criterion of minimizing value at risk (VaR) or conditional value at risk (CVaR) of the insurer's total risk exposure, we show that an optimal reinsurance policy is to cede two adjacent layers, where the upper layer is distributed to the first reinsurer. To further illustrate the applicability of our results, we derive explicitly the optimal layer reinsurance by assuming a generalized Wang's premium principle to the second reinsurer.     

The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate

We compare the Nash bargaining solution in a reinsurance syndicate to the competitive equilibrium allocation, focusing on uncertainty and risk aversion. Restricting attention to proportional reinsurance treaties, we find that, although these solution concepts are very different, one may just appear as a first order Taylor series approximation of the other, in certain cases. This may be good news for the Nash solution, or for the equilibrium allocation, all depending upon one's point of view.

Our model also allows us to readily identify some properties of the equilibrium allocation not be shared by the bargaining solution, and vice versa, related to both risk aversions and correlations.     

An Industrial Organization Theory of Risk Sharing

Examining the global reinsurance market, we propose a new theory of optimal risk sharing that finds its inspiration in the economic theory of the firm. Our model offers a theoretical foundation for two empirical regularities that are observed in the reinsurance market: (1) the choice of specific attachment (the deductible) and detachment points (the policy limits or the retrocession); and (2) the vertical and horizontal tranching of reinsurance contracts. Using a two-factor cost model, we show how reinsurance should be optimally layered (with attachment and detachment points) for a given book of business in order to minimize the cost and total premium associated with catastrophic events.