A model of adjuncts in higher education

We examine the phenomenon of the expanded use of non-tenure-track positions (“adjuncts”) and construct a supply-side Harris–Todaro model. Low adjunct wages are attributable to a “Hope Rent” from the gap between private opportunities and tenure-track utility.     

Technological Progress: A Proposed Measure

The article suggests a direct measure of technological progress that can be quantified with reasonable confidence on the basis of historical data. The proposed measure is the efficiency with which resources (mainly energy sources) are converted into final services. It decomposes into two components, namely the thermodynamic efficiency of converting an energy source into mechanical work and the efficiency with which mechanical work is used to produce final services. The first part of this can be estimated, by sector, with fair accuracy. The second part can only be estimated with reasonable accuracy in a few cases (such as transportation and illumination), but the results are sufficient to permit some plausible extrapolation. The proposed measure is hopefully of interest in itself. But perhaps it is more important insofar as it suggests a way to construct an economic production function that explicitly reflects technological change, rather than treating “technical progress” as an unexplained residual.     

Collectively foreseeing future issues: Prospective strategy contributes to the Agriculture and Food Systems' ‘Futures Studies’ Club

The Agriculture and Food Systems' ‘Futures Studies’ Club, created in 1995 and spearheaded by BASF Agro France is in its 15th year. The Club has become a regular meeting place for the players of the agricultural and agri-food systems from the farmer to the consumer and a place to debate about their societal issues. It has addressed a dozen subjects of futures studies since it was created in 1995.BASF Agro France and the Club's members, mainly the company's clients, aim to understand and anticipate the changes that might in the future affect the agricultural world and the players of the agribusiness sector: suppliers, distributors, agri-food business, and retailers.To that end, free dialogue and debate between members in an atmosphere of mutual trust were strongly encouraged, which guaranteed the richness of the discussions and the pertinence of the wrap-ups and the conclusions drawn from them. Appropriate tools from what can be called prospective strategy or strategic prospective (coming from the French school of stratégie prospective) are used to reach a valid conclusion through a crystal clear group process.Members of the Club bear witness to the input and benefits gained by participating in the Club: prioritising issues, confronting and validating ideas, possible response leads, operational added value, whether to consider strategy or management. BASF Agro France follows through on the direct and operational conclusions, feeding its strategy, projects and programs, for example by contributing to a corporate vision which fully integrates sustained development.     

What crises could teach us about complexity and systemic management: The case of the Nestucca oil spill

In this article we attempt to uncover some systemic management principles for the better management of complex issues. Taking a pragmatic approach we have expanded the case methodology proposed by John Dewey to the case study of a major crisis. By proposing that crises allow for a better apprehension of complexity, we study the changes which were carried out or not, to this day, after the 1988 Nestucca oil spill that occurred in Canada only three months prior to the Exxon-Valdez disaster. After conducting a linear and systemic analysis of the crisis, we propose that the changes institutionalized thus far spring mostly from what we call “behavioral” and “paradigmatic” learning which are weak for addressing complex issues. Proposing that 15% of the people we have interviewed where able to derive a “systemic learning” from this crisis, we suggest several unlocking strategies that allow these systemic lessons to be institutionalized.     

Conceptions of the dual economy

Due to the current labor market problems and to the increase in personal “free time,” the “other half” of the economy is attracting increased attention: the household economy, the informal sector, black labor, the shadow economy, etc. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the current terminology and conceptual diversity in this field, in order to clarify the notions and thus the theoretical approaches which are a prerequisite for further work at the present stage of research.     

Government funding strategy in technology programs

Industrial R&D in a market economy is mainly implemented in the private sector, therefore public funding is a very important tool of government to guide private R&D activities. This paper investigates the experience of funding national programs in a number of industrialized countries, and reaches some preliminary conclusions: (a) To reduce opportunistic behavior and ingrain intrinsic incentive in firms, both competition and cost-sharing principles should be used concurrently in underwriting firms' R&D projects. (b) Competition principles can be applied across many candidate projects around the same time or a series of one-of-a-kind projects over a longer time horizon. (c) The major threat to application of competition principles is that there is no “real competition” due to few qualified candidates in specific technological fields or in some, especially small, countries. (d) In practice, the appropriate cost-sharing level is difficult to determine. Fifty-fifty is used as a rule of thumb in many countries to simplify the decision making and circumvent “bounded rationality.” (e) Full cost endorsement may be another “quantum” alternative for projects urged by government but not felt to be very relevant by firms.     

Increased price flexibility and output stability

Simulation results of previous authors show an ambiguous effect of increased price flexibility on output stability in models incorporating a Mundell inflation effect on aggregate demand. This paper interprets their results in an analytically tractable model with imperfect, goods-market competition. To be destabilizing, increased flexibility must increase the “hump” of the price level's response to demand shocks. Output variability is always reduced by increasing the size of the flex-price sector and sometimes reduced by shortening contract lengths in the fix-price sector.     

Imitation processes with small mutations

This note characterizes the impact of adding rare stochastic mutations to an “imitation dynamic,” meaning a process with the properties that absent strategies remain absent, and non-homogeneous states are transient. The resulting system will spend almost all of its time at the absorbing states of the no-mutation process. The work of Freidlin and Wentzell [Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems, Springer, New York, 1984] and its extensions provide a general algorithm for calculating the limit distribution, but this algorithm can be complicated to apply. This note provides a simpler and more intuitive algorithm. Loosely speaking, in a process with K strategies, it is sufficient to find the invariant distribution of a K×K Markov matrix on the K homogeneous states, where the probability of a transit from “all play i” to “all play j” is the probability of a transition from the state “all agents but 1 play i, 1 plays j” to the state “all play j”.     

Venture capital: Structure and incentives

Venture capital is a major source of financing for firms in their early stages of development. Such businesses, especially in the high technology industries, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and asymmetry of information. In this paper we analyze the relationship between a venture capital organization (“capitalist”) and the initial owner of an entrepreneurial entity in which it invests (“entrepreneur”). We focus on the agency problems and derive a compensation system. In our model the capitalist provides a combination of equity and debt financing while the owner provides equity financing which serves as a signal affecting the beliefs (“optimism”) of the capitalist. The interesting result is that since the capitalist is assumed to be more risk averse than the entrepreneur, he is made to be more optimistic than the entrepreneur at the optimum.     

Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why “pack and crack” does not work

We show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins (“cracking”).     

Will low technology products disappear?: The hidden innovation processes in low technology industries

Political discussions and analyses have usually been devoted to an understanding of the development of high technology products, although low technology products have dominated the industrial structure of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The important role of low technology products in these countries raises the question of whether we can observe a technological paradox in the industrial structure of the more advanced nations, the dominant role of this sector in spite of its competitive disadvantages because of high wages. Using the Danish packaging industry as an example, a central thesis in the article is that innovation processes are important in low technology industries. They are also often an integrated part of the marketing and production functions of the firm. The innovation processes in the low technology industries are therefore too complex for traditional R&D analyses to handle. The article points out that—especially in small firms—the “practical man” and his “tacit knowledge” play a very central role in both product and process development, and that low technology, even in the future, will play a central role in the industrial structure of the OECD countries.     

Government spending, capital accumulation and the optimal policy rule: The role of public service capital

In this paper, we modify the Djajić [Djajić, S., 1987. “Government Spending and the Optimal Rates of Consumption and Capital Accumulation,” Canadian Journal of Economics 20, 544–554.] model in such a way that government consumption expenditure provides utility to households via the total stock of government services rather than the government consumption flow alone. By using such a framework, we show that the optimality condition for the public service capital stock is the marginal rate of substitution between public service capital and consumption that equals the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation between the two goods. In addition, we show that the relationship between private consumption and public service capital in a household's utility plays an important role in determining the transitional behavior of relevant variables. We also examine the second-best government consumption expenditure policy. By contrast, in the standard flow specification, e.g., Turnovsky and Brock [Turnovsky, S.J. and Brock, W.A., 1980. “Time Consistency and Optimal Government Policies in Perfect Foresight Equilibrium,” Journal of Public Economics 13, 183–212.], Ihori [Ihori, T., 1990. “Government Spending and Private Consumption,” Canadian Journal of Economics 23, 60–69.], and Turnovsky and Fisher [Turnovsky, S.J. and Fisher, W.H., 1995. “The Composition of Government Expenditure and its Consequences for Macroeconomic Performance,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, 747–786.], the second-best government consumption expenditure is decided on the basis that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the discounted sum of the marginal utility of the government's flow spending.     

Can Japan succeed in “Chigyo-ka” (intelprise-formation)?

There are two aspects in today's information revolution that started in the late 1970s. The first is an aspect referred to as “the third industrial revolution,” which triggers the transition to the “21st century system of Industrialization.” The information revolution in this sense brings the creation of new “breakthrough industries (new multimedia industries).” And the second aspect of the information revolution possesses the characteristics of both a technological revolution and a social revolution and brings about the arrival of the third phase of the historical evolutionary process of the modern civilization, which proceeds through three phases, namely “militarization, industrialization, and then informatization.”If the bearers of modern industrialization are a “group of enterprises” that have been engaged in the race in order to gain “wealth” (generalized means of exchange/exploitation power), and if these enterprises' activities have been exercised in the world market where their products have been sold, then it is appropriate to call the bearers of informatization a “group of intelprises.” They will be engaged in the race to gain “wisdom” (generalized means of persuasion/induction power), then stages of their activities can be called a “global intelplace” where “sharables,” that is, information and knowledge, will be disseminated. And now, toward the 21st century, the third phase of modernization, which can be called the “informatization/intelprise formation” or the “wisdom game” (intellectualism), is about to begin.Japan's “ie society (a society based on the ie principle—literally, it means “house” but here it is interpreted as cultural principle for organizing a society), which has been going through the process of evolution on the Japan Archipelago, has developed a network-based organization with little stratification within its infrastructure. In this sense, Japanese society can be characterized as a “network-oriented society” in which intelprises and an intelplace in the broad sense have functioned as the essential components of the society since Middle Ages. In general, an intelplace and intelprises that operate actively within this framework serve as the flexible bases for different types of social relations and institutions, such as states and markets and eventually integrate these into the society to a certain extent. In fact, it took place quite regularly during the modernization “in the narrow sense,” or Westernization of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration. There exist some problems, however. Some of the characteristics found in Japanese society may become obstacles to activities aimed at the sharing and promotion of information and knowledge in the global intelplace and Japanese participation in the “wisdom game.” Badly needed are serious efforts for Japanese intelprise-formation to reduce these obstacles as much as possible.     

At the crossroads of “futurism” and “prospective”: Towards a Canadian synthesis?

North American “future studies” and the French concept of “prospective” have been integrated to provide the basis for an attempted “Canadian Synthesis” in the approach developed by the Montreal-based think-tank, the Gamma Institute. In this paper the founding president of Gamma outlines the four stages of the approach in a conceptual framework entitled the “Chronospace” and illustrates its applicability by referring to some of Gamma's projects in the last 12 years.     

On optimality in collective institutional choice

Conditions are investigated under which democratic choice of the division of land between collective and “private” use and of the distribution of collective income between “needs” and “work” payments will produce a Pareto-optimal land allocation and optimal collective labor incentives. Sen's optimal rule for the degree of “needs” distribution is found to result from self-interested voting on this parameter when the distribution of labor inputs is unskewed or when votes are weighted by labor contributions. This in turn increases the optimality of land allocation, which can be further improved by a simple rental scheme. J. Comp. Econ., Dec. 1981, 5(4), pp. 392–403. Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.     

Structure and understanding: Some observations on current activities in the field of structural modeling

Structural modeling has been under study in recent years as a method for dealing with complex societal problems, and is growing in acceptance as a tool for understanding complex social phenomena. Structural models demonstrate the interactions of the separate elements of a system and their combined overall effect. Thus, the nature of the problem for which this method of analysis is appropriate is different from complex problems of the traditional disciplines which lend themselves to reductionist approaches. This is because complex policy problems of society cannot be “solved” with precise analysis. Kenneth Boulding suggests that there are two ways to cope with a complex policy problem, either to “slice” the problem into partial equilibrium sections or “squeeze” it by aggregating numerous variables into a single index or macho variable. Structural modeling is an approach which comes under the general strategy of squeezing the problem and is promising because of the ability to include a range of macro variables which provide insights about social change. The articles in this issue treat several interesting aspects of this approach. In this article we wish to recall for consideration a central purpose for developing such methods. We have taken a historical approach to indicate some of the roots of the concern for the effect of technological process on social change. Within this context, we discuss the nature of the contributions made by the articles in this issue and what promise the methods offer to addressing the historical concern.     

War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's “intervention technology” interacts with the canonical “conflict technologies” of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either “peace-making”, “peace-breaking”, or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.     

Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there is a unique equilibrium, in which contract provision is split up into two phases. In phase 1, simultaneous offers at good (though varying) terms are made to a number of agents. In phase 2, offers must be made sequentially, and their values are “discontinuously” lower: they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options. When the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of these, the agents have the power to force delay. They can hold off the principal's overtures temporarily, but they must succumb in finite time. In both models, despite being able to coordinate their actions, agents cannot resist an “invasion” by the principal and hold to their best payoff. It is in this sense that “things [eventually] fall apart”.     

Equilibria in systems of social interactions

In this paper, we establish existence and uniqueness results for equilibria in systems with an infinite number of agents and with local and global social interactions. We also examine the structure of the equilibrium distribution and derive a “Markov”property for the equilibrium distribution of a class of spatially homogeneous systems.