Interest Arbitration and the Narcotic Effect: Evidence from Three Decades of Collective Bargaining in Ontario

We study whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration, that is, a narcotic or addictive effect or, alternatively, positive state dependence, in public sector contract settlements. We use contract data from three sectors (police, firefighters and hospitals) in the Canadian province of Ontario, which covers 1981 to 2012. The length of our study period yields much longer bargaining histories than previously used, which should provide more compelling evidence on whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration to settle bargaining impasses over time. We obtain our estimates using a dynamic probit model with random effects that models the initial conditions. Our estimates indicate — across all the sectors we consider and some robustness checks — that there is a narcotic effect in interest arbitration usage despite very different average propensities to use arbitration across sectors.     

Do Public-Sector Strike Bans Really Prevent Conflict?

This article examines the effectiveness of strike-ban laws in reducing industrial conflict at the municipal level of government. Our central findings are that job actions were higher in states that had no law or no finality in the law, publicity campaigns were used as a pressure tactic in the bargaining process, and grievance delays were greatest under final offer arbitration. Thus dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no finality in dispute resolution whether or not an explicit framework for bargaining exists.     

Labor Law and Reaching a First Collective Agreement: Evidence From a Quasi‐Experimental Set of Reforms in Ontario

This paper examines the effects of a major labor law reform package in the Canadian province of Ontario on the negotiation of first agreements for newly certified bargaining units using a quasi‐experimental research design. The findings indicate that first contract success rates were 8–14 percentage points higher under the regime that included automatic first contract arbitration relative to the comparison regime of “no‐fault” first contract arbitration, despite imposition rates being only 2–4 percentage points higher. Further, in the more hostile‐to‐labor regime, only 38 percent of petitions ultimately reached a first agreement despite the presence of quick‐votes, and “no‐fault” first contract arbitration.     

Collusion Under Risk Aversion and Fixed Costs

We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk‐averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits. With sufficient risk aversion and non‐trivial fixed operating costs, it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when demand is low and marginal dollars are highly valued, and when demand is high and potential defection profits are high: output relative to monopoly levels becomes a U‐shaped function of demand. Greater risk aversion or higher fixed operating costs make collusion more difficult to support in recessions, but easier to support in booms.     

Convergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitration in Professional Baseball

Many labor relations practitioners and theorists believe that final-offer arbitration by a neutral third party encourages union and management officials to resolve their bargaining differences. However, decision scientists have found that there is no median convergence between the parties. Using professional baseball in our model, we test the assumption that major league owners tend to maximize expected monetary value (EMV), finding that claims of divergence are invalidated in dispute management contexts where there is a broad range of other motivations for settling. Decision models offer even further support for the use of final-offer arbitration in such settings.     

Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms

A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983.     

‘til Dissolution Do Us Part: (Re)Assessing the First Contract and Trial Marriage Goals of First Contract Arbitration in Ontario

Using a series of labor law reforms in the Canadian province of Ontario between 1991 and1998, this article seeks to (re)assess and compare the effectiveness of two forms of first contract arbitration (FCA) in satisfying the primary policy goals of aiding in the achievement of a first contract and in establishing lasting bargaining relationships. In contrast to previous research findings using this setting, the analysis fails to identify any statistically significant difference in the achievement of first contracts across the automatic and no‐fault forms of FCA. Further, estimates do not appear to identify a statistically significant difference in the establishment of lasting bargaining relationships, defined as the settlement of three of more collective agreements, across the two forms of FCA. These findings indicate that differences observed during this period in the first contract success rate and the establishment of bargaining relationships may be confounded with other factors than the changes to first contract arbitration.     

Works Councils and Plant Closings in Germany

This paper is the first study to investigate the impact of workplace representation on plant closings in Germany, using data from a nationally representative establishment panel. Across all establishments in our sample, we find evidence of a positive association between works council presence and plant closings. There is the contrary suggestion that industry‐wide collective bargaining plays a neutral to benign role. As for the interaction between collective bargaining and workplace representation, this appears strongest for establishments with fewer than 50 employees: such plants are much more likely to close if they have a works council and are not covered by a collective agreement.     

Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence

Auctions are inherently risky: bidders face uncertainty about their prospects of winning and payments, while sellers are unsure about revenue and chances of a successful sale. Auction rules influence the allocation of risk among agents and the behavior of risk-averse bidders, leading to a breakdown of payoff and revenue equivalence and a heightened significance of auction design decisions by sellers. In this paper, we review the literature on risk aversion in auctions, with an emphasis on what can be learned about auction design from theoretical modeling and empirical studies. We survey theoretical results relating to the behavior of risk-averse agents in auctions, the comparison of standard auction formats in the presence of risk aversion and implications for auction design. We discuss standard and more recent approaches to identifying risk preferences in empirical studies and evidence for the significance of risk aversion in auction applications. Finally, we identify areas where existing evidence is relatively scant and ask what questions empirical research might ask given the theory and where further theoretical research may be beneficial given existing empirical results.     

Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Alignment from Without in Germany

It is sometimes alleged that collective bargaining coverage in Germany is understated because uncovered firms “orient” themselves toward sectoral agreements. In fact, although orientation has grown as sectoral bargaining has declined, their joint frequency has fallen. Further, where orientation occurs at firms that leave a sectoral agreement, it provides only partial compensation. The small deficits involved, in conjunction with some indirect evidence on joiners, suggest some modest attenuation of the undoubted decline in collective bargaining.     

The Metamorphosis of Australian Industrial Relations

This article outlines the current processes of change in Australian industrial relations - processes whose ultimate direction and effects are unforeseeable. The traditional dominance of conciliation and arbitration tribunals is giving way to more devolved arrangements. Some protagonists of change envisage a move towards collective bargaining, with trade unions having a pervasive and secure role; others believe the place of unions is in question. The impulse for change comes partly from market-oriented ideology, but this is not extensively discussed, A second source is the desire of the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Labor Government to determine wage policy jointly, with the role of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission being essentially that of implementation. Also important is a widely held view that reform of industrial relations is a path to better productivity performance. The paper discusses the justification for that view. Various questions remain to be answered. These include the possibility for enduring wages policy; the legal framework necessary for bargaining; the nature of the industrial relations system of non-union enterprises; and the congruence of enterprise bargaining with the structure of trade unionism.     

Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: The Consequences of Restraint and Structural Change

We study public‐sector bargaining and contract outcomes using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. We have a number of interesting results, but our principal findings are from our analysis of wage settlements. We find that the essential services designation, which only allows non‐essential members of a bargain unit to strike, is associated with decreases in wages. Our estimates also suggest that there is an arbitration wage premium and that making adjustments to the ability to pay criterion used by arbitrators to determine awards does not affect this premium. We also discuss the implications of our estimates.     

Collective Bargaining,Inter‐Sectoral Heterogeneity and Competitiveness: A Cross‐National Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance

Research on the performance effects of bargaining remains inconclusive. One reason for this is neglect of heterogeneity of the bargainers, namely differences in exposure to world markets and their implications for international competitiveness. Since the effects of bargaining on competitiveness depend on coping with productivity differentials between the exposed and sheltered sector, we discuss how distinct bargaining structures interact with these differentials. Exposed‐sector pattern setting is predicted to be the only bargaining structure that is sensitive to productivity differentials. The findings from time series cross‐sectional analysis corroborate the expected impact on labour costs and the current balance, whereas no employment effects are discernible.     

The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.     

考虑损失厌恶的物流服务供应链质量承诺决策分析

在物流服务供应链系统中，服务质量承诺能够有效降低客户的感知风险，是物流服务顺利交付的重要保证。本文考虑了客户的损失厌恶这种心理机制，以物流服务供应链整体效用最大化为目标构建集成商的质量承诺决策模型，并分析了质量监控成本、质量补偿成本、客户感知质量均值、客户收益敏感度以及客户损失厌恶程度对最优的质量承诺的影响。分析结果表明，集成商在考虑客户损失厌恶偏好情景下的质量承诺水平要高于仅考虑质量成本的情景。同时，客户损失厌恶程度和收益敏感度对质量承诺决策产生积极的作用，其中客户收益敏感度影响更大。     

Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory Than Practice

The theory of final offer arbitration promises more than its actual performance delivers, based on admittedly limited experience. There is no showing that fewer negotiations reach impasse than would occur under conventional arbitration. There is evidence, however, that final offer arbitration does tend to produce awards less equitable than warranted by the positions and strengths of the parties, particularly when there are multiple issues at impasse and when arbitrators may select only one overall package or another. This tendency is built-in to the process, since the whole point of final offer arbitration is deterrence, with little or no concern for getting a good settlement through arbitration. “Bad” awards cannot fail to generate irritation and to have a corrosive effect on responsible contract administration. It is possible that such awards, and their effects, will be accepted as the necessary price of a final offer selection system. What seems more likely, however, is that the system will be modified along the lines of those in Eugene and Michigan. Those modifications can be expected to have two effects. First, they will make it more likely that the parties will be able to reach their own agreement by encouraging mediation and further negotiations, even after arbitration has been invoked. Second, they will increase the possibility of an acceptable arbitrated settlement by allowing the arbitrator greater flexibility in making an award. By doing these things, however, the deterrent effect of final offer selection will be substantially weakened, and what will be left will be a useful form of mediation-arbitration but not a substitute for the strike which contains an equivalent incentive to negotiate.     

The Ascendancy of Employment Arbitrators in US Employment Relations: A New Actor in the American System?

In this paper, we survey the underpinnings of the trend towards employment arbitration in the United States, and its implications for the broader industrial relations system. Specifically, we address the question of whether or not employment arbitrators have been substituted for collective bargaining by the government to an extent that warrants their inclusion as an actor in the industrial relations system. We review developments in workplace dispute resolution in the United States, the literature that attempts to explain these developments and posit an assessment of the stability of employment arbitration, and employment arbitrators, as a central feature of the US industrial relations system.     

A Quantitative Assessment of the Effect of First Contract Arbitration on Bargaining Relationships

This article investigates first contract arbitration's (FCA) capacity to foster bargaining relationships and deter misconduct by analyzing its effect on decertifications. Using time‐series cross‐sectional (TSCS) analysis with data from nine Canadian provinces over a four‐decade period, it shows: (1) FCA correlates with 20 to 37 percent fewer decertifications in provinces that have an FCA provision relative to those that do not; (2) of the various types of FCA, the automatic and fault forms have the most robust effect on decertifications while the mediation‐arbitration form may have the largest effect on decertifications; and (3) the effect of FCA is heightened in the presence of card‐check certification such that the best results for fostering bargaining relationships may be found in the presence of both policies.     

Price Dispersion in Mortgage Markets

Using transaction‐level data on Canadian mortgage contracts, we document an increase in the average discount negotiated off the posted price and in rate dispersion. Our aim is to identify the beneficiaries of discounting and to test whether dispersion is caused by price discrimination. The standard explanation for dispersion in credit markets is risk‐based pricing. Our contracts are guaranteed by government‐backed insurance, so risk cannot be the main factor. We find that lenders set prices that reflect consumer bargaining leverage, not just costs. The presence of dispersion implies a lack of competition, but our results show this to be consumer specific.     

Pivotal Buyers and Bargaining Position

Securing sales to a large buyer can be pivotal to a supplier's decision to produce. While conventional wisdom suggests that being pivotal improves a buyer's bargaining position, the opposite is shown in a multilateral bargaining model. If other buyers' payments fall short of costs, a pivotal buyer must cover the shortfall or forfeit consumption. This affords leverage that the supplier lacks when bargaining with non-pivotal buyers. The analysis illuminates contracting in markets with high fixed costs, such as cable television programming, motion pictures, and large-scale project finance, and has implications for the FCC's horizontal ownership limits on cable system operators.