Representing preferences with nontransitive indifference by a single real-valued function

Let be an interval order on a topological space (X, τ), and let x _˜^* y if and only if [y z x z], and x _˜^** y if and only if [z x z y]. Then _˜^* and _˜^** are complete preorders. In the particular case when is a semiorder, let x _˜⁰ y if and only if x _˜^* y and x _˜^** y. Then _˜⁰ is a complete preorder, too. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of continuous utility functions representing _˜^*, _˜^** and _˜⁰, by using the notion of strong separability of a preference relation, which was introduced by Chateauneuf (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1987, 16, 139–146). Finally, we discuss the existence of a pair of continuous functions u, υ representing a strongly separable interval order on a measurable topological space (X, τ, μ, ).     

Revelations of a gambler

Knowing that a decision maker maximizes expected utility with respect to some (unknown) utility U and some (unknown) probability P, what can one tell about P by observing his decisions? We discuss this revealed preference question primarily in the simple case of a two-element (H and T) state space, and show that the possible revelations of P_T/P_H are precisely those of the form P_T/P_Hε∪^K_k=1 (γ_k,δ_k), for some algebraic numbers γ_k,δ_k.     

A theory of coalition formation in committees

Let G = (N,W) be a strong weighted majority game and let A be a set of alternatives. Denote by L the set of linear orders on A. A social choice function F:L^N → A is a representation of G if the simple game G¹(F) associated with F equals G. A coalition S is determining in G if it satisfies the following condition. Let F be a representation of G and let R^N ? L^N. Then, if a simple majority of the members of S consider an alternative x to be their best choice, then S can ‘enforce’ x to be a Nash equilibrium payoff in the resulting non-cooperative voting game g(F,R^N). In this paper we generalize the above notion of a determining coalition to committees (i.e., proper and monotonic simple games), and give a complete characterization of the set of determining coalitions of a committee. Furthermore, we discuss our notion of a determining coalition in the light of some real-life data on formation of coalitions in town councils in Israel.     

Sulla convergenza di un algoritmo di direzioni ammissibili per problemi di ottimo a vincoli lineari con funzione oggetto convessa non differenziabile

Se, essendof la funzione obiettivo del problema, {x ^k } e {f(x ^k )} sono le successioni delle approssimazioni rispettivamente di una soluzione ottimax ^* e dell' ottimof(x ^*) generate da un noto algoritmo di direzioni ammissibili a parametri antizigzag _k , mostriamo che per avere (a) lim _k f(x ^*)=f(x ^*) basta assumere lim _{k k} =0. Inoltre, ove si assuma in più la stretta convessità dif, si ha anche (b) lim _k x ^k =x ^*. Da quest'ultima condizione deriviamo infine specifiche ipotesi, in ordine alla (b), per il caso particolare del problema di trasporto stocastico.

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Summary The aim of the present paper is to analyze, without differentiability of the objective functionf, the convergence of a known «feasible directions» algorithm for constrained optimization problems having the constraints linear [8], 6.5.2.In these circumstances (i.e. iff is not differentiable) one must, almost in general, verify some preliminary conditions to obtain convergence [4]. Nevertheless, this work is not always easy to accomplish particularly in absence of differentiability.Here, we establish that under the convexity assumption forf, the only condition lim _{k k} =0, where the _k are the antizigzag parameters, suffices to obtain the convergence of the algorithm, i.e. lim _k f(x ^k )=opt., thex ^k being the approximate solutions to problem. The proof is obtained by application of the Th. 24.5, [6]. Successively, we consider the question if one has also the convergence of {x ^k } to optimal solution. By using now the Cor. 27.2.2, [6], we establish, for this purpose, that under an additional general qualification forf — precisely the strict convexity — the convergence of {x ^k } is also stated. Finally, we examine the above property for the stochastic transportation problem [1] for which we indicate special conditions in order to verify the latter convergence property.

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pervenuto il 28-4-82     

A numerical representation of preferences with intransitive indifference

It is shown that, under certain conditions on a preference relation on a subset X of R^m, there exist real-valued functions u and v on X such that x is preferred to y if and only if u(x)>v(y). This generalises the familiar representation of preferences by a utility function in the case where the preference and indifference relations are transitive. The continuity of the functions u and v is also discussed.     

On a study of the exponential and Poisson characteristics of the Poisson process

Based on the exponential and Poisson characteristics of the Poisson process, in this work we present some characterizations of the Poisson process as a renewal process. More precisely, let γ_t be the residual life at time t of the renewal process A={A(t),t≥0 }, under suitable condition, we prove that if Var(γ_t)=E ² (γ_t),∀t≥0, then A is a Poisson process. Secondly, we show that if Var (A(t)) is proportional to E (A(t)), then A is a Poisson process also, and Var (A(t))=E (A(t)). Received: August 1999     

The Perron-Frobenius theorem without additivity

We prove the following non-linear generalization of the Perron-Frobenius theorem. Let A:R^m₊→R^m₊ be continuous, homogeneous of degree 1 and primitive (i.e., for some integer l, x≥yA^lxA^ly); then A has a positive eigenvector x₀, unique up to multiplication by a positive scalar, and for all x0, Aⁿx/|Aⁿx| converges to x₀/|x₀|.     

Tests of significance for the average square deviation from target in a finite lot

Consider lots of discrete items 1, 2, …,N with quality characteristicsx ₁,x ₂, …,x _N . Leta be a target value for item quality. Lot quality is identified with the average square deviation from target per item in the lot (lot average square deviation from target). Under economic considerations this is an appropriate lot quality indicator if the loss respectively the profit incurred from an item is a quadratic function ofx _i −a. The present paper investigates tests of significance on the lot average square deviationz under the following assumptions: The lot is a subsequence of a process of production, storage, transport; the random quality characteristics of items resulting from this process are i.i.d. with normal distributionN(μ, σ ²); the target valuea coincides with the process meanμ.     

Euclidean preferences

This note is devoted to the question: how restrictive is the assumption that preferences be Euclidean in d dimensions. In particular it is proven that any preference profile with I individuals and A alternatives can be represented by Euclidean utilities with d   dimensions if and only if d≥min?(I,A−1)$d\ge \min ?(I\text{,}A-1)$. The paper also describes the systems of A points which allow for the representation of any profile over A alternatives, and provides similar results when only strict preferences are considered. These findings contrast with the observation that if preferences are only required to be convex then two dimensions are always sufficient.     

Central limit theorem for linear eigenvalue statistics of the Wigner and the sample covariance random matrices

We consider n × n real symmetric random matrices n ^?1/2 W with independent (modulo symmetry condition) entries and the (null) sample covariance matrices n ^?1 A ^T A with independent entries of m × n matrix A. Assuming first that the 4th cumulant (excess) κ ₄ of entries of W and A is zero and that their 4th moments satisfy a Lindeberg type condition, we prove that linear statistics of eigenvalues of the above matrices satisfy the central limit theorem (CLT) as n → ∞, m → ∞, ${m/n\rightarrow c\in[0,\infty)}$ with the same variance as for Gaussian matrices if the test functions of statistics are smooth enough (essentially of the class ${\mathbb{C}^5}$ ). This is done by using a simple “interpolation trick”. Then, by using a more elaborated techniques, we prove the CLT in the case of non-zero excess of entries for essentially ${\mathbb{C}^4}$ test function. Here the variance contains additional term proportional to κ ₄. The proofs of all limit theorems follow essentially the same scheme.     

Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core

We consider a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the weak core in a finite exchange economy where every commodity is available only in integer quantities. We show that if the aggregate upper contour set is discretely convex, then the weak core is nonempty. In addition, we give two sufficient conditions for the aggregate upper contour set to be discretely convex. One is that every upper contour set of every agent is M^?${\text{M}}^{?}$-convex. The other is that the number of commodities is two and every agent’s preference relation is weakly monotone and discretely convex.     

Bayesian Hypothesis Testing: a Reference Approach

For any probability model M={p(x|θ, ω), θεΘ, ωεΩ} assumed to describe the probabilistic behaviour of data xεX, it is argued that testing whether or not the available data are compatible with the hypothesis H₀={θ=θ₀} is best considered as a formal decision problem on whether to use (a₀), or not to use (a₀), the simpler probability model (or null model) M₀={p(x|θ₀, ω), ωεΩ}, where the loss difference L(a₀, θ, ω) –L(a₀, θ, ω) is proportional to the amount of information δ(θ₀, ω), which would be lost if the simplified model M₀ were used as a proxy for the assumed model M. For any prior distribution π(θ, ω), the appropriate normative solution is obtained by rejecting the null model M₀ whenever the corresponding posterior expectation ∫∫δ(θ₀, θ, ω)π(θ, ω|x)dθdω is sufficiently large. Specification of a subjective prior is always difficult, and often polemical, in scientific communication. Information theory may be used to specify a prior, the reference prior, which only depends on the assumed model M, and mathematically describes a situation where no prior information is available about the quantity of interest. The reference posterior expectation, d(θ₀, x) =∫δπ(δ|x)dδ, of the amount of information δ(θ₀, θ, ω) which could be lost if the null model were used, provides an attractive nonnegative test function, the intrinsic statistic, which is invariant under reparametrization. The intrinsic statistic d(θ₀, x) is measured in units of information, and it is easily calibrated (for any sample size and any dimensionality) in terms of some average log‐likelihood ratios. The corresponding Bayes decision rule, the Bayesian reference criterion (BRC), indicates that the null model M₀ should only be rejected if the posterior expected loss of information from using the simplified model M₀ is too large or, equivalently, if the associated expected average log‐likelihood ratio is large enough. The BRC criterion provides a general reference Bayesian solution to hypothesis testing which does not assume a probability mass concentrated on M₀ and, hence, it is immune to Lindley's paradox. The theory is illustrated within the context of multivariate normal data, where it is shown to avoid Rao's paradox on the inconsistency between univariate and multivariate frequentist hypothesis testing.     

Stochastic convex programming: Kuhn-Tucker conditions

Optimality criteria are derived for stochastic programs with convex objective and convex constraints. The problem consists in selecting x₁R^n₁ and so as to satisfy the constraints and minimize total expected cost, where σ is a probability measure. The (basic) Kuhn–Tucker conditions are obtained in terms of conditions on the existence of saddle points of a Lagrangian associated with the stochastic program. We also give an interpretation of these results in terms of equilibrium theory with particular emphasis on a nonstandard price system associated with the restriction that the (first stage) decision x₁ must be chosen independent of the random elements of the problem.     

Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules

We propose the following weakened version of WARP: if the decision maker selects an alternative x and rejects another alternative y in some context, he cannot select y and reject x in another context. This axiom is consistent with cyclic choices. It is necessary and sufficient for the choice from every subset A of a (finite) universal set X to coincide with the weak upper-contour set of the transitive closure of some fixed complete relation at some alternative in A. Adding further simple axioms forces the choice from each subset to coincide with the top cycle (in that subset) of some fixed tournament over the universal set.     

Testing whetherF is more IFR thanG

A distributionF is said to be “more IFR” than another distributionG ifG ⁻¹ F is convex. WhenF(0) =G(0) = 0, the problem of testingH ₀ :F(x) =G (θx) for someθ > 0 andx ⩾ 0, against the alternativeH _A:F is more IFR thanG, is considered in this paper. Both cases, whenG is completely specified (one-sample case) and when it is not specified but a random sample form it is available (two-sample case) are considered. The proposed tests are based onU-statistics. The asymptotic relative efficiency of the tests are compared with several other tests and the test statistics remain asymptotically normal under certain dependency assumptions. Research supported in part by a grant from the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research.     

Distributions determined by conditioning on a single order statistic

LetX ₁,X ₂, …,X _n(n ? 2) be a random sample on a random variablex with a continuous distribution functionF which is strictly increasing over (a, b), ?∞ ?a <b ? ∞, the support ofF andX _1:n ?X _2:n ? … ?X _n:n the corresponding order statistics. Letg be a nonconstant continuous function over (a, b) with finiteg(a ⁺) andE {g(X)}. Then for some positive integers, 1 <s ?n $$E\left\{ {\frac{1}{{s - 1}}\sum\limits_{i - 1}^{s - 1} {g(X_{i:n} )|X_{s:n} } = x} \right\} = 1/2(g(x) + g(a^ + )), \forall x \in (a,b)$$ iffg is bounded, monotonic and \(F(x) = \frac{{g(x) - g(a^ + )}}{{g(b^ - ) - g(a^ + )}},\forall x \in (a,b)\) . This leads to characterization of several distribution functions. A general form of this result is also stated.     

Utility theory based on rational probabilities

Classical utility theory assumes that a preference order is defined for all mixtures αa+(1?α)b of pure prospects a,b for all real numbers α between 0 and 1. If α is irrational such mixtures are hard to interpret intuitively. We show here how to modify the usual axiomatisations to deal with the case where α is restricted to rational values, or even further to values of the form m/2ⁿ corresponding to mixtures built up from even bets.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Notes and Comments:</Emphasis> The numeraire portfolio in financial markets modeled by a multi-dimensional jump diffusion process

In continuous time, we study a financial market which is free of arbitrage opportunities but incomplete under the physical probability measure P. Thus one has several choices of equivalent martingale measures. In the present paper, the (unique) martingale measure P ^* is studied which is defined by the concept of the numeraire portfolio. The choice of P ^* can be justified by a change of numeraire in place of a change of measure. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 90A09, 91B28, 91B62, 93E20, 62P05 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G10, G12, G13     

Utility functions for Debreu's ‘excess demands’

Given an arbitrary function x: $\text{R}$^l→$\text{R}$^l satisfying Walras law and homogeneity, Debreu decomposed x into the sum of l ‘individually rational’ functions x(p)=Σ^l_k=1[uvbar|x]^k(p). Here we find explicit utility functions u^k, constructed on the basis of a simple geometric intuition, which give rise to Debreu's excess demands [uvbar|x]^k(p).     

On the maximum number of balancing subsets

Let a₁,…,a_n be a finite sequence of n real numbers. A subset {i₁,…,i_r} of the set {1,…,n } is called a balancing subset for a₁,…,a_n if a_i1 + … + a_ir = 0. We discuss in this paper the maximum number of balancing subsets for given n.