Arm yourself for the coming battle over Social Security

The U.S. Social Security system is in deep trouble--and that's not just bad news for your friends and family. It's also bad news for your company. Unless the Social Security system is changed, by 2017 the cash flowing out of it will exceed the cash coming in, and by 2041 the system will be utterly insolvent. But the trouble will start sooner than that: In the next decade, the very prospect of the rising deficit will mean serious pressure on recent tax cuts, higher long-term interest rates, increased pension-funding costs, and other punishing conditions for U.S. businesses. Clearly, there's a lot at stake for companies, which is why executives need to participate in the growing debate about Social Security reform, says Robert Pozen, a visiting professor at Harvard Law School who served on the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security. In this article, he urges business leaders to take a stance on how the system should be reformed, suggesting they work with interest groups to make their voices heard. After taking a comprehensive look at the debates surrounding Social Security reform, Pozen outlines the three main alternatives executives might choose to support: increasing contributions to Social Security, decreasing the growth of benefits for more-affluent workers, and increasing investment returns on Social Security assets. What's needed to fix the current system, he contends, is a careful balance of all three.     

Lead from the center. How to manage divisions dynamically

Conventional wisdom holds that a company's divisions should be given almost total autonomy--especially under conditions of uncertainty--because they are closer to emerging technologies, customers, and competitors than corporate headquarters could ever be. But research from Michael Raynor and Joseph Bower suggests that the corporate office should be more, not less, directive in turbulent markets. Rapid changes in an industry make it difficult to predict where and when synergies among divisions might emerge. With so many possibilities and such uncertainty, companies can't afford to sacrifice their ability to flexibly execute business strategy. Corporate headquarters must play an active role in defining the scope of division-level strategy, the authors say, so that divisions do not act in ways that undermine opportunities to collaborate in the future. But neither can companies afford to sacrifice the competitiveness of their divisions as stand-alone businesses. In creating corporate-level strategic flexibility, a corporate office must balance the need for divisional autonomy now with the potential need for cooperation in the future. Through an examination of four corporations--Sprint, WPP, Teradyne, and Viacom--the authors challenge traditional approaches to diversification in which a company's divisions are either related (they share resources and collaborate) or unrelated (they compete for resources and operate as stand-alone businesses). They argue that companies should adopt a dynamic approach to cooperation among divisions, enabling varying degrees of relatedness between divisions depending on strategic circumstances. The authors offer four tactics to help executives manage divisions dynamically.     

In search of global leaders

For all the talk about global organizations and executives, there's no definitive answer to the question of what we really mean by "global." A presence in multiple countries? Cultural adaptability? A multilingual top team? We asked four CEOs and the head of an international recruiting agency--HSBC's Stephen Green, Schering-Plough's Fred Hassan, GE's Jeffrey-lmmelt, Flextronics's Michael Marks, and Egon Zehnder's Daniel Meiland--to tell us what they think. They share some common ground. They all agree, for example, that the shift from a local to a global marketplace is irreversible and gaining momentum. "We're losing sight of the reality of globalization. But we should pay attention, because national barriers are quickly coming down", Daniel Meiland says. "If you look ahead five or ten years, the people with the top jobs in large corporations ... will be those who have lived in several cultures and who can converse in at least two languages." But the CEOs also disagree on many issues--on the importance of overseas assignments, for instance, and on the degree to which you need to adhere to local cultural norms. Some believe strongly that the global leader should, as a prerequisite to the job, live and work in other countries. As Stephen Green put it, "If you look at the executives currently running [HSBC's] largest businesses, all of them have worked in more than one, and nearly all in more than two, major country markets." Others downplay the importance of overseas assignments. "Putting people in foreign settings doesn't automatically imbue new attitudes, and it is attitudes rather than experiences that make a culture global," says Fred Hassan. The executives' essays capture views that are as diverse and multidimensional as the companies they lead.     

Making business sense of the Internet

For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.     

Divestiture: strategy's missing link

Although most companies dedicate considerable time and attention to acquiring and creating businesses, few devote much effort to divestitures. But regularly divesting businesses--even good, healthy ones--ensures that remaining units reach their potential and that the overall company grows stronger. Drawing on extensive research into corporate performance over the last decade, McKinsey consultants Lee Dranikoff, Tim Koller, and Antoon Schneider show that an active divestiture strategy is essential to a corporation's long-term health and profitability. In particular, they say that companies that actively manage their businesses through acquisitions and divestitures create substantially more shareholder value than those that passively hold on to their businesses. Therefore, companies should avoid making divestitures only in response to pressure and instead make them part of a well-thought-out strategy. This article presents a five-step process for doing just that: prepare the organization, identify the best candidates for divestiture, execute the best deal, communicate the decision, and create new businesses. As the fifth step suggests, divestiture is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to a larger end: building a company that can grow and prosper over the long haul. Wise executives divest so that they can create new businesses and expand existing ones. All of the funds, management time, and support-function capacity that a divestiture frees up should therefore be reinvested in creating shareholder value. In some cases, this will mean returning money to shareholders. But more likely than not, it will mean investing in attractive growth opportunities. In companies as in the marketplace, creation and destruction go hand in hand; neither flourishes without the other.     

The ambidextrous organization

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges--it requires executives to explore new opportunities even as they work diligently to exploit existing capabilities--and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives who have the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is by no means easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand. Given the executive will to make it happen, any company can become ambidextrous.     

IT doesn't matter

As information technology has grown in power and ubiquity, companies have come to view it as ever more critical to their success; their heavy spending on hardware and software clearly reflects that assumption. Chief executives routinely talk about information technology's strategic value, about how they can use IT to gain a competitive edge. But scarcity, not ubiquity, makes a business resource truly strategic--and allows companies to use it for a sustained competitive advantage. You only gain an edge over rivals by doing something that they can't. IT is the latest in a series of broadly adopted technologies--think of the railroad or the electric generator--that have reshaped industry over the past two centuries. For a brief time, as they were being built into the infrastructure of commerce, these technologies created powerful opportunities for forward-looking companies. But as their availability increased and their costs decreased, they became commodity inputs. From a strategic standpoint, they became invisible; they no longer mattered. that's exactly what's happening to IT, and the implications are profound. In this article, HBR's editor-at-large Nicholas Carr suggests that IT management should, frankly, become boring. It should focus on reducing risks, not increasing opportunities. For example, companies need to pay more attention to ensuring network and data security. Even more important, they need to manage IT costs more aggressively. IT may not help you gain a strategic advantage, but it could easily put you at a cost disadvantage. If, like many executives, you've begun to take a more defensive posture toward IT, spending more frugally and thinking more pragmatically, you're already on the right course. The challenge will be to maintain that discipline when the business cycle strengthens.     

Selling the brand inside

When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

Using VoIP to compete

Internet telephony, or VoIP, is rapidly replacing the conventional kind. This year, for the first time, U.S. companies bought more new Internet-phone connections than standard lines. The major driver behind this change is cost. But VoIP isn't just a new technology for making old-fashioned calls cheaper, says consultant Kevin Werbach. It is fundamentally changing how companies use voice communications. What makes VoIP so powerful is that it turns voice into digital data packets that can be stored, copied, combined with other data, and distributed to virtually any device that connects to the Internet. And it makes it simple to provide all the functionality of a corporate phone-call features, directories, security-to anyone anywhere there's broadband access. That fosters new kinds of businesses such as virtual call centers, where widely dispersed agents work at all hours from their homes. The most successful early adopters, says Werbach, will focus more on achieving business objectives than on saving money. They will also consider how to push VoIP capabilities out to the extended organization, making use of everyone as a resource. Deployment may be incremental, but companies should be thinking about where VoIP could take them. Executives should ask what they could do if, on demand, they could bring all their employees, customers, suppliers, and partners together in a virtual room, with shared access to every modern communications and computing channel. They should take a fresh look at their business processes to find points at which richer and more customizable communications could eliminate bottlenecks and enhance quality. The important dividing line won't be between those who deploy Vol P and those who don't, or even between early adopters and laggards. It will be between those who see Vol P as just a new way to do the same old things and those who use itto rethink their entire businesses.     

Kill a brand, keep a customer

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.     

Stop making plans; start making decisions

Many executives have grown skeptical of strategic planning. Is it any wonder? Despite all the time and energy that go into it, strategic planning most often acts as a barrier to good decision making and does little to influence strategy. Strategic planning fails because of two factors: It typically occurs annually, and it focuses on individual business units. As such, the process is completely at odds with the way executives actually make important strategy decisions, which are neither constrained by the calendar nor defined by unit boundaries. Thus, according to a survey of 156 large companies, senior executives often make strategic decisions outside the planning process, in an ad hoc fashion and without rigorous analysis or productive debate. But companies can fix the process if they attack its root problems. A few forward-looking firms have thrown out their calendar-driven, business-unit-focused planning procedures and replaced them with continuous, issues-focused decision making. In doing so, they rely on several basic principles: They separate, but integrate, decision making and plan making. They focus on a few key themes. And they structure strategy reviews to produce real decisions. When companies change the timing and focus of strategic planning, they also change the nature of senior management's discussions about strategy--from "review and approve" to "debate and decide," in which top executives actively think through every major decision and its implications for the company's performance and value. The authors have found that these companies make more than twice as many important strategic decisions per year as companies that follow the traditional planning model.     

Creating new growth platforms

Sooner or later, most companies can't attain the growth rates expected by their boards and CEOs and demanded by investors. To some extent, such businesses are victims of their own successes. Many were able to sustain high growth rates for a long time because they were in high-growth industries. But once those industries slowed down, the businesses could no longer deliver the performance that investors had come to take for granted. Often, companies have resorted to acquisition, though this strategy has a discouraging track record. Over time, 65% of acquisitions destroy more value than they create. So where does real growth come from? For the past 12 years, the authors have been researching and advising companies on this issue. With the support of researchers at Harvard Business School and Insead, they instituted a project titled "The CEO Agenda and Growth". They identified and approached 24 companies that had achieved significant organic growth and interviewed their CEOs, chief strategists, heads of R&D, CFOs, and top-line managers. They asked, "Where does your growth come from?" and found a consistent pattern in the answers. All the businesses grew by creating new growth platforms (NGPs) on which they could build families of products and services and extend their capabilities into multiple new domains. Identifying NGP opportunities calls for executives to challenge conventional wisdom. In all the companies studied, top management believed that NGP innovation differed significantly from traditional product or service innovation. They had independent, senior-level units with a standing responsibility to create NGPs, and their CEOs spent as much as 50% of their time working with these units. The payoff has been spectacular and lasting. For example, from 1985 to 2004, the medical devices company Medtronic grew revenues at 18% per year, earnings at 20%, and market capitalization at 30%.     

How CEOs manage growth agendas

When does it make sense for companies to grow from within? When is it better to gain new capabilities or access to markets by merging with or acquiring other companies? When should you sacrifice the bottom line in order to nurture the top line? In a thought-provoking series of essays, five executives--Kenneth Freeman of Quest Diagnostics, George Nolen of Siemens USA, John Tyson of Tyson Foods, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, and Robert Creifeld of Nasdaq--describe how they have approached top-line growth in various leadership roles throughout their careers. They write candidly about their struggles and successes along the way, relaying growth strategies as diverse as the companies and industries they represent. The leaders' different tactics have almost everything to do with their companies' particular strengths, weaknesses, and needs. Freeman, for instance, emphasizes the importance of knowing when to put on the brakes. When he first became CEO of Quest, he froze acquisitions for a few years so the company could focus on internal processes and "earn the right to grow." But for Greifeld, it's all about innovation, which "shakes up competitive stasis and propels even mature businesses forward." The executives agree, though, that companies can grow (and can do so profitably) by distinguishing their offerings from those of other organizations. As Ranjay Gulati of Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management points out in his introduction to the essays, no matter what strategies are in play,"it's important to remember that growth comes in many forms and takes patience.... The key is to be ready to act on whatever types of opportunities arise."     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Are U.S. Companies Really Holding That Much Cash—And If So,Why?

Non‐financial S&P 500 companies are now estimated to hold a total of $2.1 trillion of “cash,” a figure that is larger than the annual GDP of all but eight countries. In this report, J.P. Morgan's Corporate Finance Advisory team notes that while many observers have attributed the buildup to offshore cash growth alone, onshore cash levels are also up significantly. To be sure, the companies that have shown the greatest increases also tend to be highly successful, with strong cash flow and business performance. And the managers of such companies tend to prefer to retain much if not most of this cash to take advantage of investment opportunities and to maintain the flexibility to respond to the next economic downturn. Also adding to the cash build‐ups, the executives of large MNCs with significant overseas cash holdings typically try to avoid the higher tax bill triggered by repatriating funds to the U.S. Nevertheless, investors continue to expect growth and high returns on capital; and corporate distributions of capital in the form of dividends and stock buybacks can play an important role in encouraging companies to operate efficiently. While pursuing both of these goals—preservation of enough cash to weather downturns and invest in all positive‐NPV projects, and commitment to paying out excess capital—boards and senior decision makers should continuously reexamine their cash holdings and capital allocation policies to ensure they are appropriate not only for today's environment, but throughout the economic cycle.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

The Chinese negotiation

Most Westerners preparing for a business trip to China like to arm themselves with a list of etiquette how-tos. "Carry a boatload of business cards," tipsters say. "Bring your own interpreter." "Speak in short sentences." "Wear a conservative suit." Such advice can help get companies in the door and even through the first series of business transactions. But it won't sustain the prolonged, year-in, year-out associations Chinese and Western businesses can now achieve. The authors' work with dozens of companies and thousands of American and Chinese executives over the past 20 years has demonstrated that a superficial adherence to etiquette rules gets executives only so far. They have witnessed communication breakdowns between American and Chinese businesspeople time and time again. The root cause: the American side's failure to understand the much broader context of Chinese culture and values, a problem that too often leaves Western negotiators flummoxed and flailing. American and Chinese approaches often appear incompatible. Americans see Chinese negotiators as inefficient, indirect, and even dishonest, while the Chinese see American negotiators as aggressive, impersonal, and excitable. Such perceptions have deep cultural origins. Yet those who know how to navigate these differences can develop thriving, mutually profitable, and satisfying business relationships. Four cultural threads have bound the Chinese people together for some 5,000 years, and these show through in Chinese business negotiations. They are agrarianism, morality, the Chinese pictographic language, and wariness of strangers. Most Western businesspeople often find those elements mysterious and confusing. But ignore them at any time during the negotiation process, and the deal can easily fall apart.     

Strategies for surviving a shakeout

Shakeouts are a fact of life in almost every industry-witness the shrinking number of players in areas as diverse as banking, software, and hospital supply distribution. The key to survival is sensing your industry's shakeout before the competition does. And the first hurdle for managers to overcome is the belief that it can't happen to them. It can and it probably will. George Day describes two shakeout syndromes that affect different types of industries. A boom-and-bust shakeout afflicts hot emerging markets or highly cyclical businesses. A glut of competitors enter the market during boom times, but many of them fail when growth slows or a dominant design emerges. A seismic-shift shakeout strikes mature industries that have enjoyed years of protected prosperity as a result of, for example, local regulations or import barriers. But deregulation, globalization, or technological change can pull the rug out from under them. Day outlines how companies can detect the early warning signs of a shakeout. He explains how adaptive survivors, such as Dell Computer, successfully adjust their businesses in the midst of a bust, and how aggressive amalgamators, such as Arrow Electronics, cut costs and acquire smaller rivals in order to remain standing after a seismic shift. But the fact remains that most companies will get squeezed out during a consolidation. Although it is enormously difficult for executives to come to terms with the grim news, the sooner they do so, the better. And, as Day points out, all is not necessarily lost: with the right timing, also-rans can make a profitable exit from an industry.     

Sense and reliability. A conversation with celebrated psychologist Karl E. Weick. Interview by Diane L. Coutu

Most of us see the organizations we operate in--our schools or companies, for instance--as monolithic and predictable, subjecting us to deadening routines and demanding dehumanizing conformity. But companies are more unpredictable and more alive than we imagine, according to Karl Weick, a psychology professor at the University of Michigan and an expert on organizational behavior. Weick says executives can learn a lot about managing the unexpected from organizations that can't afford surprises in the workplace--nuclear plants, firefighting units, or emergency rooms, for instance. In this conversation with HBR senior editor Diane Coutu, Weick examines the characteristics of these high-reliability organizations (HROs) and suggests ways that other organizations can implement their practices and philosophies. The key difference between high-reliability organizations and other companies is the mindfulness with which people in most HROs react to even very weak signs that some kind of change or danger is approaching. For instance, nuclear-plant workers Weick has studied immediately readjust dials and system commands when an automated system doesn't respond as expected. Weick contrasts this with Ford's inability to pick up on weak signs in the 1970s that there were lethal problems with the design of the Pinto gas tank. HROs are fixated on failure. They eschew plans and blueprints, looking instead for the details that might be missing. And they refuse to simplify reality, Weick says. Indeed, by cultivating broad work experiences and enlarging their repertoires, generalist executives can avoid getting paralyzed by "cosmology episodes"--events that make people feel as though the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system.