The economics of PIPEs

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.     

Commonality in hedge fund returns: Driving factors and implications

We measure the commonality in hedge fund returns, identify its main driving factor and analyze its implications for financial stability. We find that hedge funds’ commonality increased significantly from 2003 until 2006. We attribute this rise mainly to the increase in hedge funds’ exposure to emerging market equities, which we identify as a common factor in hedge fund returns over this period. Our results show that funds with a high commonality were affected disproportionately by illiquidity and exhibited negative returns during the subsequent financial crisis, thereby providing little diversification benefits to the financial system and to investors.     

Investing in equity mutual funds

We construct optimal portfolios of equity funds by combining historical returns on funds and passive indexes with prior views about asset pricing and skill. By including both benchmark and nonbenchmark indexes, we distinguish pricing-model inaccuracy from managerial skill. Modest confidence in a pricing model helps construct portfolios with high Sharpe ratios. Investing in active mutual funds can be optimal even for investors who believe managers cannot outperform passive indexes. Optimal portfolios exclude hot-hand funds even for investors who believe momentum is priced. Our large universe of funds offers no close substitutes for the Fama-French and momentum benchmarks.     

Is trading behavior stable across contexts? Evidence from style and multi-style investors

In this paper we study priming of identity within the context of inherent vs. contextual financial decision making. We use a sample of individual trading accounts in equity-style funds taken from one fund family to test the hypothesis that trading styles are inherent vs. contextual. Our sample contains investors who invest either in a growth fund, a value fund, or both. We document behavioral differences between growth fund investors and value fund investors. We find that their trades depend on past returns in different ways: growth fund investors tend towards momentum trading and value fund investors tend towards contrarian trading. These differences may be due to inherent clientele characteristics, including beliefs about market prices, specific personality traits and cognitive strategies that cause them to self-select into one or the other style. We use a sample of investors that trade in both types of funds to test this proposition. Consistent with the contextual hypothesis, we find that investors who hold both types of funds trade growth fund shares differently than value fund shares.     

Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha

To rationalize the well‐known underperformance of the average actively managed mutual fund, we exploit the fact that retail funds in different market segments compete for different types of investors. Within the segment of funds marketed directly to retail investors, we show that flows chase risk‐adjusted returns, and that funds respond by investing more in active management. Importantly, within this direct‐sold segment, we find no evidence that actively managed funds underperform index funds. In contrast, we show that actively managed funds sold through brokers face a weaker incentive to generate alpha and significantly underperform index funds.     

Do Invesrtors Capture the Value Premium?

Do investors realize higher returns by investing in value stocks instead of gorwth stocks? Examination of a sample of equity indexes, mutual funds, and large‐cap stocks reveals no evidence that value firms have earned higher returns than growth firms. The value premium reported in the literarture is historically strongest for small‐capitalization firms, yea average annual rerturns for small‐cap equity funds are 14.10% for value funds compared to 14.52% for growth funds. Despite dramatic increases in mutual fund expense ratios from 1965 to 2001, fee differences across style funds cannot explain the absence of a value premium.     

Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle

The returns that institutional investors realize from private equity differ dramatically across institutions. Using detailed, hitherto unexplored records, we document large heterogeneity in the performance of investor classes: endowments' annual returns are nearly 21% greater than average. Analysis of reinvestment decisions suggests that endowments (and to a lesser extent, public pensions) are better than other investors at predicting whether follow‐on funds will have high returns. The results are not primarily due to endowments' greater access to established funds, since they also hold for young or undersubscribed funds. Our results suggest that investors vary in their sophistication and potentially their investment objectives.     

The Mismatch Between Mutual Fund Scale and Skill

I demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds. Many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds. Active mutual funds with positive factor-related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform. I also show that the negative aggregate benchmark-adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds.     

Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible Mutual Funds?

To understand why investors hold socially responsible mutual funds, we link administrative data to survey responses and behavior in incentivized experiments. We find that both social preferences and social signaling explain socially responsible investment (SRI) decisions. Financial motives play less of a role. Socially responsible investors in our sample expect to earn lower returns on SRI funds than on conventional funds and pay higher management fees. This suggests that investors are willing to forgo financial performance in order to invest in accordance with their social preferences.     

Home bias among European investors from a Bayesian perspective

This paper determines to what extent the estimated expect returns on European equity indices will be affected by different degrees of prior confidence in the ICAPM. We also measure how fragile the investors’ prior confidence in ICAPM should be in order to explain the home bias of European pension funds. A Bayesian approach is used to estimate the expected asset returns under different prior scenarios. We show that a moderate mistrust in ICAPM results in estimates of the expected returns, which substantially deviate from the estimates by ICAPM. Furthermore, we find a strong home bias in most countries, which cannot be explained by any degree of disbelief in the ICAPM.     

Closed-End Fund Expenses and Investment Selection

Investment returns on closed‐end funds are highly volatile. Because expenses have a definite negative impact on closed‐end fund returns, investors should include the expense ratio as a criterion for fund selection in addition to performance, investment objective, and risk of the fund. This paper constructs a model of the expense ratio of closed‐end funds to explain cross‐sectional differences in the expense ratios for the period between 1989–1996. We relate closed‐end fund expenses to fund characteristics and identify the factors that can help investors choose low expense closed‐end funds.     

A note on fair value pricing of mutual funds

Mutual funds claim that they employ fair value pricing to prevent active investors from trading on their beliefs that the funds’ net asset values are stale. Our results support the funds’ assertions. We estimate the returns from the following active strategy: buy international open end mutual funds that do not employ fair value pricing on days that the S&P500 index rises by a large amount, and/or sell them on days that the S&P500 index declines by a large amount. These active strategies significantly outperform pure buy-and-hold strategies. We conclude that international mutual funds should make greater use of fair value pricing.     

Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability?

We study the out‐of‐sample and post‐publication return predictability of 97 variables shown to predict cross‐sectional stock returns. Portfolio returns are 26% lower out‐of‐sample and 58% lower post‐publication. The out‐of‐sample decline is an upper bound estimate of data mining effects. We estimate a 32% (58%–26%) lower return from publication‐informed trading. Post‐publication declines are greater for predictors with higher in‐sample returns, and returns are higher for portfolios concentrated in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk and low liquidity. Predictor portfolios exhibit post‐publication increases in correlations with other published‐predictor portfolios. Our findings suggest that investors learn about mispricing from academic publications.     

Selecting Australian equity superannuation funds: A retail investor's perspective

In this performance persistence study, two questions are addressed. First, what is the relationship between past fund returns and future performance? Secondly, does a ’hot hand‘ fund selection system deliver economically significant returns to investors? Using a sample of Australian equity superannuation funds over the 1990s, the answers from this study are as follows: on a raw and risk-adjusted return basis the authors find evidence of mean reversion, with prior annual performance having little influence on future fund return. Selecting funds based on a persistence strategy resulted in underperformance of industry and passive returns for the retail superannuation investor over the sample period. The findings of the study have serious implications for financial planning advisers who market superannuation funds based on past performance. The results suggest that previous annual performance has little influence on future returns.     

Which institutional investor types are the most informed?

We examine the informativeness of quarterly disclosed portfolio holdings across four institutional investor types: hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds and private banking firms. Overweight positions outperform underweight positions only for hedge funds. By decomposing holdings and stock returns, we find that hedge funds are superior to other institutional investors both at picking industries and stocks and that they are better at forecasting long‐term as well as short‐term returns. Furthermore, our results show that hedge funds, mutual funds and pension funds are able to successfully time the market. The outperformance of hedge funds is not explained by a liquidity premium.     

Institutional investors and stock returns volatility: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of institutional investors on stock market returns dynamics. The Polish pension system reform in 1999 and the associated increase in institutional ownership due to the investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique institutional characteristic. Performing a Markov-switching-GARCH analysis we find empirical evidence that the increase of institutional ownership has temporarily changed the volatility structure of aggregate stock returns. The results are interpretable in favor of a stabilizing effect on index stock returns induced by institutional investors.     

Did institutions herd during the internet bubble?

We examine the trading behavior of institutional investors during the internet bubble and crash of 1998–2001, and its impact on stock prices. Similar to some recent findings concerning the trading behavior of hedge funds and NASDAQ 100 stocks, we find that during the bubble all types of institutions herded with great intensity into internet stocks for a comprehensive sample of institutional investors and internet stocks. In addition to this, we present three entirely new results. First, institutional herding was much greater than what can be explained by momentum trading. Second, institutions as a group continued to increase their holdings of internet stocks for two quarters past the market peak during the first quarter of 2000, and three quarters past the peak for individual stock prices, suggesting that institutions were unable to time the price peaks. Finally and most importantly, we find positive abnormal returns contemporaneous with institutional herding and negative abnormal returns (reversals) at the point that herding ceased. This finding suggests that institutions’ trading created temporary price pressures, and may have contributed to the bubble.     

Is Timing Everything? The Value of Mutual Fund Manager Trades

I develop new measures of the value of active mutual fund management using portfolio holdings. These measures simultaneously test for trading and selection skill within stocks, industries, and characteristics. I demonstrate that most of the skill documented in prior studies comes from correctly trading stocks within industries, though funds also have some skill in timing industries. However, prior research focuses on the period 1980‐1994. I also test the hold out sample 1995‐2007. Contrary to prior results, the latter period (and the full sample) demonstrates that mutual funds generate no excess returns from any category of skill.     

Performance and diversification benefits of IPO-focused mutual funds

We investigate whether mutual funds that invest in initial public offerings (IPOs) outperform the Renaissance IPO Index, IPOX® 100 U.S. Index, and other comparable equity funds that do not invest in IPOs. We also explore whether investors gain diversification benefits by investing in IPO-focused mutual funds. Using a sample of active open-ended US equity mutual funds, we find that IPO-focused funds outperform the Renaissance IPO Index and comparable funds that do not invest in IPOs. Moreover, they provide investors with the benefit of diversification along with better returns. We also find the value added by active management based on IPO strategy.     

Do Fund Flow‐Return Relations Depend on the Type of Investor? A Research Note

This study investigates whether the relation between aggregate fund flow and market returns differs between retail and institutional funds. For the retail fund sample, we document a contemporaneous relation between flow and market returns and also find evidence of feedback trading. In contrast, there is little evidence of a relation between flow and market returns for the institutional fund sample. Consequently, it appears that retail and institutional fund investors use different investment strategies, with retail investors following a more naive strategy. We find no evidence of flow inducing price pressure for either type of fund.