An experimental study of prosocial motivation among criminals

The fact that criminal behavior typically has negative consequences for others provides a compelling reason to think that criminals lack prosocial motivation. This paper reports the results from two dictator game experiments designed to study the prosocial motivation of criminals. In a lab experiment involving prisoners, we find a striking similarity in the prosocial behavior of criminals and non-criminals, both when they interact with criminals and when they interact with non-criminals. Similarly, in an Internet experiment on a large sample from the general population, we find no difference in the prosocial behavior of individuals with and without a criminal record. We argue that our findings provide evidence of criminals being as prosocially motivated as non-criminals in an important type of distributive situations.     

James Buchanan’s contractarian individualism: A personal account

This is a personal account of my relationship with James M. Buchanan, his significance for my academic career and the influence of his work on my own research.     

James Buchanan's contributions to social and economic thought: Citation counts,self-assessment,and peer review

This paper demonstrates James Buchanan's impact on socio-economic thought through citation analysis of his published works, a discussion of Buchanan's own views of what his work means and is, and summary discussions of the assessments of other scholars. Thus the central themes of his work are illuminated as well. These themes include a deep distrust of government interference in the economy and in the personal lives of members of the polity, and his absolute conviction that collective decisionmaking should take place only within the framework of a contractual agreement, the fundamental principles of which have been derived through near unanimity.     

Making a difference matters: Impact unlocks the emotional benefits of prosocial spending

When does giving lead to happiness? Here, we present two studies demonstrating that the emotional benefits of spending money on others (prosocial spending) are unleashed when givers are aware of their positive impact. In Study 1, an experiment using real charitable appeals, giving more money to charity led to higher levels of happiness only when participants gave to causes that explained how these funds are used to make a difference in the life of a recipient. In Study 2, participants were asked to reflect upon a time they spent money on themselves or on others in a way that either had a positive impact or had no impact. Participants who recalled a time they spent on others that had a positive impact were happiest. Together, these results suggest that highlighting the impact of prosocial spending can increase the emotional rewards of giving.     

Stanfield’s Concepts of Social and Political Economy: Introduction to the Special Issue

This paper examines the contributions of James Ronald Stanfield to social and political economy. We start the analysis with Stanfield’s contribution to institution building through his education of PhD students, building a graduate program in political economy, and through the associations of social and political economy. Then we go on to scrutinise his creative developments and applications of the notions of economic surplus and social reproduction. This is followed by his extensive work on Karl Polanyi and the disembedded economy. Finally we explore his path-breaking analysis of the great capitalist restoration, the nurturance gap and love. Stanfield was one of the greatest institutionalists and social economists of the last hundred years, and these four areas of energetic creativity are his prime achievements in the area.     

Economic Surplus,Social Reproduction,Nurturance and Love

This paper examines the contributions of James Ronald Stanfield to social and political economy. We start the analysis with Stanfield’s contribution to institution building through his education of PhD students, building a graduate program in political economy, and through the associations of social and political economy. Then we go on to scrutinise his creative developments and applications of the notions of economic surplus and social reproduction. This is followed by his extensive work on Karl Polanyi and the disembedded economy. Finally we explore his path-breaking analysis of the great capitalist restoration, the nurturance gap and love. Stanfield was one of the greatest institutionalists and social economists of the last hundred years, and these four areas of energetic creativity are his prime achievements in the area.

     

Agents as Empirical Macroeconomists: Thomas J. Sargent’s Contribution to Economics*

Thomas J. Sargent has fundamentally changed and, in the words of Art Rolnick, who interviewed him in 2010, “irrevocably transformed” the field of macroeconomics—whether as sole author, as co‐author with collaborators, as an author influenced by others, or as a teacher of the profession, influencing others. This paper is about his contribution to our field. The Nobel Memorial prize to Thomas J. Sargent and Christopher A. Sims has been awarded for the “empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy” or, more broadly, for macroeconometrics. One often likes to distinguish between theorists, on the one hand, and empiricists and econometricians, on the other. Thomas J. Sargent holds a unique position in between. A key theme in a large part of his work has been to put the agents in his model on equal footing with the econometrician who is observing data from the model (i.e., to assume that agents are themselves empirical macroeconomists or macroeconometricians). In this paper, I use this theme to examine his work and his contributions to the study of economics.     

The Economic Contributions of James J. Heckman and Daniel L. McFadden

This paper analyzes the economic contributions of Daniel L. McFadden and James J. Heckman, who were awarded the Nobel Prize in economic science in 2000. McFadden's analytical work on discrete choices and related theory brings economic tools to bear on policy questions that previously had not been empirically investigated. The multinomial logit and similar models developed by McFadden enable researchers to empirically model factors that affect individual choices (e.g. of travel mode, occupation or employment, and residential location) with discrete outcomes. Heckman's research on selective samples demonstrates the difficulty of achieving generalizable results in analyses of choice-based behavior. In addition, his work on the evaluation of social programs has challenged conventional beliefs about the infallibility of experimental evaluation results and explored the limits and potential of non-experimental methodologies in a range of social science applications.     

James Buchanan’s public debt theory: a rational reconstruction

James Buchanan’s Public Principles of Public Debt is universally associated with the claim that debt allows the cost of public activity to be shifted onto future generations. This claim treats a generation as a unitary and acting entity. Such treatment is standard fare for those macro theorists who work with representative agents and societal averages in place of the actual individuals who constitute a society. This treatment, however, conflicts with the central tenor of Buchanan’s scholarly oeuvre. This essay undertakes a rational reconstruction to render reasonable his claim about debt shifting, while also rendering it consistent with his oft-repeated claim that cost can be experienced only by individuals and never by such aggregates as generations. This reconstruction reveals a cleavage between approaching public debt through macro theory and approaching it through public finance.     

Remembering Jim Buchanan

James Buchanan was an important influence on the Austrian revival and not incidentally on my own career. By taking the work of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Israel Kirzner seriously at a time when Austrian economics was ignored by the economics profession and by making his own contributions to subjectivist economics, Buchanan helped make the Austrian perspective professionally respectable, and inspired a generation of young economists interested in the Austrian school.     

Constraining Leviathan

This article commemorates James M. Buchanan and his contributions to public choice and constitutional political economy. It focuses on what Buchanan had to say about constraining the State, or as he often referred to it, Leviathan. It concentrates on a handful of his major works that I think capture important elements of his thinking. It discusses Buchanan’s writings on public debt and government deficits; the size of the state; federalism; and taxation, among other things. It is argued that the main emphasis in Buchanan’s work as it pertained to constraining the State was to include provisions in the constitution that could achieve this end. These included a balanced budget amendment, rules governing the expansion of the money supply, constraints on the types of taxes that could be levied, linking expenditure proposals to the taxes that would finance them, earmarked taxes, and a generality principle, which would avoid a majority coalition’s exploitation of a minority. The article also includes a discussion of the current constitutional crisis in the United States.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

SIR JAMES STEUART'S STATESMAN REVISITED IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINENTAL INFLUENCE1

The author assesses the influence Continental thought had on Sir James Steuart and places him in the Continental setting in order to understand his most controversial message, his theory of the state, and how it differed from that of his contemporaries, above all from Adam Smith's     

Andre Gunder Frank: ‘Unity in Diversity’ from the Development of Underdevelopment to the World System

The purpose of this article is to critically review the work of Andre Gunder Frank. This is no easy task given the prolific and controversial nature of his life work. His main distinction is as a paradigm breaker and a paradigm maker. Frank is one of the founders of contemporary world system theory. He coined some memorable expressions such as the ‘development of underdevelopment’ and ‘Re-Orient’. Indeed, these two concepts highlight two distinct phases in his work. His first phase is characterised by his writings on dependency theory and his initial understanding of world system theory broadly in line with Amin, Arrighi and Wallerstein. His second phase is distinguished by what he considers to be the ‘Eurocentric’ interpretation of world system theory of Wallerstein and others as well as by his critique of his own earlier work. While some of Frank's analyses and assertions proved to be wrong, he provided much inspiration to a new generation of scholars and activists, some of whom provided the necessary empirical evidence and theoretical rigour lacking in parts of Frank's work. But he excelled in his mission of providing the big picture, asking the unimaginable questions and exploring hitherto inconceivable interrelationships.     

Steuart's position on economic progress

This paper attempts to understan James Steuart's position on economic progress in terms of the Hayekian version of the natural law tradition and the civic–humanist approach. It is argued that the latter paradigm offers a more relevant framework. Particular attention is to Steuar's preoccupation with ‘frugality’ in connection with his treatment of the stages of trade and his position is contrasted with that of Hume. Without denying Steuart's link with the Scottish Historical School, the mercantilist aspect of his outlook is emphasized.     

James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order

The distinct characteristic in James Buchanan’s thinking about federalism in contrast to the traditional theory of fiscal federalism is his view about fiscal competition. In this paper, it is demonstrated that this thinking went through three stages. From the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, his analyses were well embedded in the traditional fiscal federalism literature and concerned with equity and efficiency issues. In the Leviathan approach starting from the mid-seventies, he considered competition between jurisdictions as a means to restrict Leviathan governments. In his interpretation of federalism as an ideal political order, Buchanan binds these perspectives together and adds a procedural view: Federalism enables citizens to exert political control, it raises their interest in politics because one vote has more influence, and it facilitates to act morally within their moral capacity.     

Old (Chicago) school,new century: the link between Knight and Simons’ Chicago plan to Buchanan’s constitutional money

James Buchanan had long been a champion of the early Chicago school’s emphasis on the essential role that institutions play in framing the market process. In his post-2009 analysis of the financial crisis, Buchanan echoed his old Chicago mentors like Frank Knight and Henry Simons in arguing that the Great Recession, like all previous financial crises, was primarily a failure of the rules governing our monetary-financial system. This “old Chicago” emphasis on the institutional “rules of the game” formed the basis of his essential post-2009 argument that the financial crisis fundamentally represented not a market failure, per say, but a constitutional failure. In this paper, I connect the dots in Buchanan’s post-2009 analysis of the Great Recession and his reaffirmation of the need for “constitutional money” to his old Chicago mentor’s strikingly similar calls for a radical restructuring of the monetary-financial system in the Chicago Plan of the 1930s. Though Buchanan’s twenty-first century resurrection of these ideas has yet to conjure up the academic support of his predecessors, certain elements of his “old school” monetary-financial reforms have experienced a strong revival since the financial crisis, as has Buchanan’s more general call to “constitutionalize money.”     

Hayek,Friedman, and Buchanan: On Public Life,Chile, and the Relationship between Liberty and Democracy

This article places recent evidence of Hayek's public defense of the Pinochet regime in the context of the work of the other great twentieth-century classical liberal economists, Milton Friedman and James M. Buchanan. Hayek's view that liberty was only instrumentally valuable is contrasted with Buchanan's account of liberty situated in the notion of the inviolable individual. It is argued that Hayek's theory left him with no basis on which to demarcate the legitimate actions of the state, so that conceivably any government action could be justified on consequentialist grounds. Furthermore, Friedman's account of freedom and discretionary power undermines Hayek's proposal that a transitional dictatorship could pave the way for a genuinely free society. It is contended that Hayek's defense of Pinochet follows from pathologies of his theories of liberty and democracy.     

A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fund-raising: The Role of Refunds

Andreoni (1998, Journal of Political Economy 106 , 1186–1213) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be extended to a mechanism where refunds are possible. We then argue that a greater "bang per buck" may be achieved if the seed money is targeted to cover the administrative costs of providing refunds.     

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules within which political activity takes place. Rules that meet the criterion of agreement are desirable constitutional rules, and Buchanan recognized that not all government activity satisfies that criterion. Buchanan is the father of the subdiscipline of constitutional political economy, and his “politics as exchange” approach provides the foundation for much work in that area. Buchanan has created a foundation that is rich in ideas, but leaves behind a number of unanswered questions that point the way toward a further development of the research program in constitutional political economy.