Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

Firm Productivity and the Foreign‐Market Entry Decision

We use Japanese firm‐level data to examine how a firm’s productivity affects its foreign‐market entry strategy. The firm faces a choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the case of FDI, the firm has two options: greenfield investment or acquisition of an existing plant (M&A). If it selects greenfield investment, it has two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture with a local company. Controlling for industry‐ and country‐specific characteristics, we find that the more productive a firm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting and greenfield investment rather than M&A.     

Strategic Choices at Entry and Relative Survival Advantage of Cooperatives versus Corporations in the US Bio‐Ethanol Industry, 1978‐2015

The sustainability of cooperatives versus corporations is hotly contested. We propose that strategic choices at entry can help to explain the endurance of these two governance modes. We hypothesize that cooperatives have a survival advantage if their major drawback – high coordination costs – is curbed by high levels of member engagement at founding. Our analysis of survival rates in the US bio‐ethanol industry shows that cooperatives outlive corporations (1) if investment size at founding is large (strong financial engagement), (2) if they enter de novo instead of de alio (strong product‐market engagement) and (3) if the cooperative venture has been carefully planned from the start (greenfield entry) instead of built upon the acquisition of an existing plant (strong venture‐building engagement). These findings caution against the view that a particular mode of governance is superior or inferior to another in all circumstances.     

Sustainability‐oriented capabilities for eco‐innovation: Meeting the regulatory,technology, and market demands

Despite consensus in the literature that regulation, technology push, and market pull drive eco‐innovation (EI), evidence remains limited on the diverse firm capabilities needed to boost EI. Building on the natural‐resource‐based view of the firm and the EI literature, this paper posits that firms need to renew and realign their capabilities, and ultimately develop distinctive sustainability‐oriented capabilities, in order to meet the rapidly changing regulatory, technology, and market demands. Results of the analysis, based on a survey of U.K. firms, reveal that EIs are more likely to arise when firms (a) build capabilities on voluntary self‐regulation (i.e., executive driven environmental management system and corporate social responsibility) because such organizational capabilities allow them to address increasing regulatory pressures; (b) invest in environmental research and development (i.e., eco‐R&D)—instead of generic research and development—because it provides them with the relevant and specific technological capabilities to tackle technology shifts towards sustainability; and (c) develop capabilities in green market sensing as such capabilities allow them to address green consumption needs.     

Entry threat,entry delay,and Internet speed: The timing of the U.S. broadband rollout

In a rapidly growing industry, potential entrants strategically choose which local markets to enter. Facing the threat of additional entrants, a potential entrant may lower its expectation of future profits and delay entry into a local market, or it may accelerate entry due to preemptive motives. Using the evolution of local market structures of broadband Internet service providers from 1999 to 2007, we find that the former effect dominates the latter after allowing for spatial correlation across markets and accounting for endogenous market structure. On average, it takes 2 years longer for threatened markets to receive their first broadband entrant. Moreover, this entry delay has long‐run negative implications for the divergence of the U.S. broadband infrastructure: 1 year of entry delay translates into an 11% decrease on average present‐day download speeds.     

Dynamics in a Mature Industry: Entry,Exit, and Growth of Big‐Box Grocery Retailers

This paper measures market dynamics within the U.S. grocery industry (defined as supermarket, supercenter, and club retailers). We find that despite being a mature industry, the grocery industry is remarkably dynamic. Each year retailers open or close roughly 7% of U.S. stores. We also find significant changes in the size of firms’ operations within markets over time. These changes in relative size are largely the result of expansion or contraction by incumbents rather than the result of firm entry or exit. In fact, entry and exit are quite rare, except by small firms. Moreover, only in small markets do new entrants gain substantial market share.     

Through the Looking‐Glass: The Impact of Regional Institutional Logics and Knowledge Pool Characteristics on Opportunity Recognition and Market Entry

This study investigates how regional variations in institutions and knowledge pools impact new firm entry into emerging industry sectors. Using the cleantech industry sector as a research context, we hypothesize and find that supportive regional institutional logics – shared meaning systems in a community that confer legitimacy upon particular goals and practices – generate cognitive schemas (mental models) that facilitate opportunity recognition and increase new firm entry rates. Drawing from research on socially situated cognition, we demonstrate that supportive institutional logics have a greater impact on new firm entry when a regional knowledge pool is larger, but a reduced impact on new firm entry when the knowledge pool is more specialized. These findings integrate previously distinct perspectives from institutional theory and knowledge economics, while contributing to research on how new industry sectors emerge.     

Do Prior Experiences of Top Executives Enable or Hinder Product Market Entry?

How firms achieve entry into new‐to‐the‐firm product markets is an important but overlooked topic. Some aspiring entrants fail during product development, and they miss the opportunity to enter. In such contexts, firms often take action to de‐risk entry, for example, by drawing upon the experience of top executives with market‐specific expertise obtained in prior jobs. However, the empirical evidence from this study shows that beyond a narrow threshold, greater prior experience in the top executive team was associated with a greater likelihood of failed entry attempts among the firms that I tracked over two decades in the biotechnology industry. This result held across product markets with low and high degrees of dynamism. Based on the literature on dynamic managerial capabilities, where entry into new markets indicates managers’ ability to reconfigure organizational resources and adapt to a changing environment, this study’s main contribution is to illustrate how and why experience matters for entry.     

Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry

We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others’ investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short‐ or a long‐term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a short‐term project cuts into firm j's market in the short‐term but frees‐up firm j's long‐term market, and vice versa. Our results show that, even in the absence of an owner–manager conflict, the owner anticipates the product market rivalry and optimally compensates their managers with short‐ as well as long‐term compensation. Although the optimal compensation design induces myopic investment decisions, it is shown to be in the owners’ best interest. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analysis of Internet topology with a three‐level components model

The vertical structure of the Internet is considered as having three‐level components: backhyphen‐bone‐level interconnection, mid‐level transit, and local‐level access. This paper considers single and cross mergers between an integrated provider and an entrant in the different area. As a result of these mergers, cross entry, in which both integrated providers merge with the retail entrants in the other areas, is more socially desirable than single entry, in which only one firm merges, which is, in turn, preferred to no entry. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.