INFORMATION THEORETIC APPROACHES IN ECONOMICS

Economics has seen a recent rise in interest in information theory as an alternative framework to the conventional notion of equilibrium as a fixed state, such as Walrasian market‐clearing general equilibrium. The information theoretic approach is predicated on the notion of statistical equilibrium (SE) that takes a distribution over all possible states as an equilibrium, and therefore predicts the endogenous fluctuations of the system along with its central tendency simultaneously. For this reason, SE approaches can explain the observed data without relying on arbitrary assumptions about random noise and provide useful insights for many interesting economic problems that conventional methods have not been able to satisfactorily deal with. In this paper, we review the key elements of information theory focusing on the notions and applications of entropy and SE in economics, particularly paying attention to how entropy concepts open up a new frontline of economic research.     

Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies

We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.     

Quasi‐fixed inputs and long‐run equilibrium in production: a cointegration analysis

This paper proposes a cointegration approach to testing the validity long‐run equilibrium in production, where capital and labour are taken as quasi‐fixed inputs. Previous studies consider only capital as the quasi‐fixed input and do not take account of the time series properties of the variables, assuming implicitly that they are stationary. The canonical cointegrating regressions (CCR) procedure is employed to test for cointegration in both the single‐equation and the seemingly unrelated regressions framework, and long‐run equilibrium conditions are tested. The evidence from US manufacturing reveals that capital and labour are not fully adjusted to their long‐run optimal values, casting doubt on the long‐run equilibrium hypothesis. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An equivalence theorem for a differential information economy

In a pure exchange economy with differential information and a finite set of traders, physical commodities and states of nature, we characterize the Walrasian expectations or Radner equilibria by using the veto power of the grand coalition. We prove that an allocation x is a Radner equilibrium allocation if and only if it is “privately non-dominated” by the grand coalition in every economy obtained by perturbing the original initial endowments in the direction of x. The first and second welfare theorems become particular cases of our main result. Since the deterministic Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie model is a special case of the differential information economy model we also provide a new characterization of the Walrasian equilibria.     

THE NEW NEO‐MERCANTILISM: CURRENCY MANIPULATION AS A FORM OF PROTECTIONISM

Three waves of mercantilism have arisen in the past few centuries. The first wave was countered by the classical economists. The second wave (neo‐mercantilism) hit during the inter‐war period. Today's third wave uses monetary policy. We explore the mercantilist waves and argue in favour of a free trade policy. We conclude that an international system of free banking best protects the economy from currency manipulation as a form of protectionism.     

Land and Its Taxation as Issues in Economic Theory: What Is the Reason for Their Eclipse?

A bstract . Despite the continuing practical importance of the subject, land and its taxation have lost their prominence in modern economic theory. This evolution in economic thought is traced briefly. An explanatory hypothesis is offered based on the theoretical bias of the two major traditions in neo-classical theory : the Marshailian tradition does not distinguish land from capital (treating land as only one among many forms of capital) while the Walrasian tradition cannot distinguish capital from land (treating capital as an "original" factor similar to land). Though both Alfred Marshall and Léon Walras had a considerable interest in questions of land taxation, their followers, on the whole, have been neither able to overcome nor have they even been aware of the confinement of their respective theoretical perspectives.     

Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model

We study the assignment model where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the extreme and interior points of the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors for this model. Our characterizations are in terms of demand sets of buyers. Using these characterizations, we also give a unique characterization of the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. Also, necessary and sufficient conditions are given under which the interior of the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is non-empty. Several of the results are derived by interpreting Walrasian equilibrium price vectors as potential functions of an appropriate directed graph.     

Cournot vs. Walras: A reappraisal through simulations

Best-reply behavior in Cournot oligopolies generally leads to Cournot-Nash equilibrium, but imitative behavior selects the Walrasian equilibrium as the unique stochastically stable state. Previous work (Alós-Ferrer, 2004) showed that in the presence of memory, imitative behavior leads to a non-trivial dynamics selecting all quantities between the Cournot and Walrasian outcomes. However, the scope of previous results was limited to specific assumptions on demand and cost functions, and did not provide information on the shape of the distribution of outcomes. We use computational simulations to address these limitations. We show that the selection result for non-trivial memory holds beyond the set of well-behaved Cournot games previously analyzed. Further, we find that, in Cournot games, the limit distribution of long-run outcomes is highly skewed towards the Walrasian quantity. Although longer memory increases the importance of the Cournot equilibrium, the competitive outcome remains the dominant prediction.     

Core equivalence and welfare properties without divisible goods

We study an economy where all goods entering preferences or production processes are indivisible. Fiat money not entering consumers’ preferences is an additional perfectly divisible parameter. We establish a First and Second Welfare Theorem and a core equivalence result for the rationing equilibrium concept introduced in Florig and Rivera (2005a). The rationing equilibrium can be considered as a natural extension of the Walrasian notion when all goods are indivisible at the individual level but perfectly divisible at the level of the entire economy.     

Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian

We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer by setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In our model agents choose to trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) trading through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the spread as gains. A buyer or seller who trades privately shares all the gains to trade with this trading partner, but risks costly delay in finding a partner. We show that as the cost of delay vanishes, the equilibrium bid and ask prices converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices. Received: 2 February 1996 / Accepted: 28 March 1997     

Convergence to Walrasian equilibrium with minimal information

We consider convergence to Walrasian equilibrium in a situation where firms know only market price and their own cost function. We term this a situation of minimal information. We model the problem as a large population game of Cournot competition. The Nash equilibrium of this model is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We apply the best response (BR) dynamic as our main evolutionary model. This dynamic can be applied under minimal information as firms need to know only the market price and the their own cost to compute payoffs. We show that the BR dynamic converges globally to Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game like the Cournot model. Hence, it converges globally to the Walrasian equilibrium under minimal information. We extend the result to some other evolutionary dynamics using the method of potential games.

     

Firm Productivity Moderated Link Between Human Capital and Compensation: The Significance of Task‐Specific Human Capital

The human capital of a firm as manifested by employee knowledge and experience represents a key resource of a firm's capabilities. Prior empirical studies have found that firms composed of high levels of human capital experience superior firm performance. Human capital theory proposes that an individual's general or firm‐specific human capital is positively related to compensation. However, empirical studies examining firm‐specific human capital's association with higher employee compensation have been inconclusive. The current study proposes that firm‐specific human capital be categorized as task‐specific and non‐task‐specific. Employees accumulate task‐specific human capital through duties conducted in their current position. Non‐task‐specific human capital represents experiences gained in prior positions to an employee's current job within the firm. Utilizing human capital data from 38,390 employees representing 76 firms in the IT sector, this study examines the association between forms of human capital and employee compensation at different levels of firm productivity. Results show that task‐specific human capital is associated with higher employee compensation. In addition, firm productivity moderates this association.     

First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent.     

The Institution of Hukou‐based Social Exclusion: A Unique Institution Reshaping the Characteristics of Contemporary Urban China

This conceptual article contributes to institutional analysis and the neo‐institutional theory literature by identifying and analysing the linked rules, values, norms and patterned practices that surround and structure the way rural migrant workers are treated in urban areas of China in terms of Scott's integrated model of institutions. It argues that these hukou‐based rules, values, norms and patterned practices that discriminate against rural migrants can be considered to be a unique institution — the institution of hukou‐based social exclusion (IHSE). IHSE has dominated Chinese urban society for 3 decades and significantly shaped the lives of millions of rural migrant workers, the character of contemporary China and the nature of managerial practices among Chinese firms. This is the first article to examine the social exclusion of rural workers from the perspective of neo‐institutionalism, providing the first systematic analysis of the regulative, normative and cognitive dimensions that together socially exclude migrants in urban areas of China. It presents a holistic picture of the newly identified institution that offers new insights into China's urban society and management, and a new starting point for research.     

Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.     

Dynamic incentive effects of assignment mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Optimal assignment and matching mechanisms have been the focus of exhaustive analysis. We focus on their dynamic effects, which have received less attention, especially in the empirical literature: Anticipating that assignment is based on prior performance may affect prior performance. We test this hypothesis in a lab experiment. Participants first perform a task individually without monetary incentives; in a second stage, they are paired with another participant according to a pre‐announced assignment policy. The assignment is based on the first‐stage performance, and compensation is determined by average performance. Our results are largely consistent with a theory: Pairing the worst‐performing individuals with the best yields 20% lower first‐stage effort than random matching (RAM) and does not induce truthful revelation of types, which undoes any policy that aims to reallocate types based on performance. Perhaps surprisingly, however, pairing the best with the best yields only 5% higher first‐stage effort than RAM and the difference is not statistically significant.     

The Eurozone Crisis and Emerging‐Market Expansion: Capital Switching and the Uneven Geographies of Spanish Urbanization

The theory of capitalist urbanization posits that the built form serves as a crucial sink through which overaccumulated capital is ‘switched' from industrial production into long‐term investment in urban infrastructure. Since Harvey's (1978) deployment of the theory, researchers have attempted to empirically substantiate the switching thesis with limited success. Christophers (2011) revisited the debate with new data and methods to support the claim that significant investment had switched into the built environment at the onset of the 2007/08 financial crisis. However, Christophers' study overlooks how crises are also geographically displaced. This article analyses Spanish trade data for the years 1993 to 2013, the years prior and subsequent to the housing‐induced economic crisis (1997 to 2006). Two studies are undertaken. The first replicates Christophers' methodology to assess how and to what extent a sectoral switch into property investment occurred in Spain between 1997 and 2006. The second modifies the methodology to investigate the extent to which overaccumulated capital in Spain has been geographically displaced through investment in the Moroccan building industry since 2006. These approaches situate uneven development (geographical switching) and turnover time (sectoral switching) as the twin dynamics through which capitalist urbanization is spatio‐temporally fixed.     

A Neo‐Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations*

ABSTRACT A neo‐Gramscian theoretical framework for corporate political strategy is developed drawing from Gramsci's analysis of the relations among capital, social forces, and the state, and from more contemporary theories. Gramsci's political theory recognizes the centrality of organizations and strategy, directs attention to the organizational, economic, and ideological pillars of power, while illuminating the processes of coalition building, conflict, and accommodation that drive social change. This approach addresses the structure‐agency relationship and endogenous dynamics in a way that could enrich institutional theory. The framework suggests a strategic concept of power, which provides space for contestation by subordinate groups in complex dynamic social systems. We apply the framework to analyse the international negotiations to control emissions of greenhouse gases, focusing on the responses of firms in the US and European oil and automobile industries. The neo‐Gramscian framework explains some specific features of corporate responses to challenges to their hegemonic position and points to the importance of political struggles within civil society. The analysis suggests that the conventional demarcation between market and non‐market strategies is untenable, given the embeddedness of markets in contested social and political structures and the political character of strategies directed toward defending and enhancing markets, technologies, corporate autonomy and legitimacy.     

Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core

We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of expenditure-minimizing Walrasian allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the expenditure minimization. An expenditure-minimizing Walrasian equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the expenditure minimization.