Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

A process perspective on regulation: Who bears the dispersed costs of regulation?

Scholars in both Austrian Economics and the Public Choice tradition intuitively understand that intervention often creates redistribution from lower income households to the middle class, but there has been little systematic inquiry into the distributional consequences of interventionism. This paper systematically applies Austrian insights to the dispersed costs side of the analysis of intervention to offer a better sense of how large those costs may be and who tends to bear them. An emergent literature on the regressive effects of regulation highlights those distributional consequences both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.     

Is NGO aid not so different after all? Comparing the allocation of Swiss aid by private and official donors

Being closer to the poor, NGOs are widely believed to provide better targeted aid than state agencies. But empirical evidence is largely lacking. We contribute to closing this gap by drawing on an exceptionally detailed Swiss database that covers different forms of NGO aid and several official aid benchmarks. The Tobit estimations account for both altruistic and selfish aid motivations. Whether or not NGOs provide better targeted aid depends on the source of NGO funding as well as the choice of the official benchmark. In contrast to widespread belief, however, the allocation of self-financed NGO aid reveals striking similarities to the allocation of official Swiss development aid.     

Did immigration contribute to wage stagnation of unskilled workers?

In this paper we first show that the timing and skill distribution of Immigrants to the U.S. between 1970 and 2014 imply they did not contribute to the decline in the wages of native, non-college educated workers – including high school dropouts – at the national level. We then review other evidence at the local level, which implies immigration is not associated with lower non-college wages. Rather, higher immigration seems associated with higher average (and college-level) wages. Local externalities, complementarities, efficient specialization and appropriate technological choice suggest at least part of the positive association is causal.     

Does international mobility of high-skilled workers aggravate between-country inequality?

This paper analyzes the interaction of international migration of high-skilled labor and relative wage income between source and destination economies of expatriates. We develop an overlapping-generations model with increasing returns which suggests that international integration of the market for skilled labor aggravates between-country inequality by harming those which are source economies to begin with while benefiting host economies. The result is robust to allowing governments to optimally adjust productivity-enhancing investments which could potentially attenuate brain drain. Optimal public investment tends to decrease in response to higher emigration.     

Optimal design of pension funds: a mission impossible?

Summary. Nowadays many employers offer their employees the possibility of an insurance against too large losses in income when retiring or becoming disabled. This paper models the optimization problem of the employer when setting up such a so-called pension fund. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the optimal solution depends on the premium the employees are willing to pay at most for such an insurance. Since this is private information for an employee and hence not known to the employer, he needs to collect information regarding these maximum premiums. It is shown that if employees' characteristics only differ in the maximum premium they are willing to pay, the employer is unable to perfectly inform himself on these maximum premiums, i.e. he cannot create the right incentives for his employees to reveal their maximum premiums truthfully. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee. The research of J. Suijs is made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). Correspondence to: J. Suijs     

Do workers perceive high wage settlements of craft unions as fair?

In recent years, Germany has experienced an increasing impact of craft unions that negotiate high wage increases for the occupations they represent. This article analyses under which conditions workers perceive such over-proportional wage increases for occupational groups represented by craft unions as (rather) fair. We use a vignette approach, asking respondents for their fairness perceptions of several hypothetical scenarios. The results show that perceptions depend on the burdens of the occupational group, the size of the wage increase, information policies and potential consequences for other groups. These findings are in line with social and organizational justice theories about equity and informational justice.     

Is emigration of workers contributing to better schooling outcomes in Nepal?

This paper presents evidence on how emigration for work affects schooling outcomes for primary and secondary school‐age children in Nepal. Using an instrumental variable strategy exploiting past migration network, we show that the identified effects critically depend on how schooling outcomes are measured. While conventional measures of school attendance indicate no impact, our new set of schooling status and schooling gap measures reveals significant impacts. Schooling status measures reveal favorable impacts for girls, and for emigration to India. Schooling gap measures reveal favorable effects of all emigration on schooling outcomes for girls and of emigration to other countries for boys.     

Capture or contract? The early years of electric utility regulation

Jarrell (J Law Econ 21:269?C295, 1978) found that electricity prices fell more slowly in states that adopted state regulation before 1917, suggesting that regulators were ??captured?? by the interests of the regulated electric utilities. An alternative explanation is that state regulation more credibly protected specialized utility assets from regulatory opportunism than did the municipal franchise contracting that preceded it. We test this alternative hypothesis using a panel of data from the U.S. Electrical Censuses of 1902?C1937. We find that the shift from municipal franchise contracting to state regulation was associated with a substantial decrease in investment propensity, an outcome supporting the capture hypothesis.     

How important is the type of working contract for job satisfaction of agency workers?

Previous research finds that agency workers are less satisfied with their job than regular workers. This paper analyzes whether this difference can be explained by the duration of the working contract agency workers are employed on. The analysis leads to three results. First, agency workers’ contract type does not explain their lower job satisfaction. Second, agency workers on permanent contracts are significantly less satisfied with their job than regular workers on the same contract. Third, agency workers on fixed-term contracts do not differ in job satisfaction from regular workers on both fixed-term and permanent contracts. The difference in job satisfaction between permanently employed agency and regular workers can partly be explained by changes in the reference point. Overall, the results, however, lend support to the conclusion that agency workers on fixed-term contracts regard their employment as stepping stone while those on permanent contracts appear to be trapped in this type of employment.     

Does the Optimal Size of a Fish Stock Increase with Environmental Uncertainties?

We analyze the effect of environmental uncertainties on optimal fishery management in a bio-economic fishery model. Unlike most of the literature on resource economics, but in line with ecological models, we allow the different biological processes of survival and recruitment to be affected differently by environmental uncertainties. We show that the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal size of a fish stock is ambiguous, depending on the prudence of the value function. For the case of a risk-neutral fishery manager, the overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of two opposing effects, the ‘convex-cost effect’ and the ‘gambling effect’. We apply the analysis to the Baltic cod and the North Sea herring fisheries, concluding that for risk neutral agents the net effect of environmental uncertainties on the optimal size of these fish stocks is negative, albeit small in absolute value. Under risk aversion, the effect on optimal stock size is positive for sufficiently high coefficients of constant relative risk aversion.     

To root or not to root? The economics of jailbreak

We construct a structural model that allows us to jointly estimate the demand for smartphones and paid apps using a Bayesian approach. Our data comes from more than 500 college students in Hong Kong and Shanghai. We find that the utility cost rather than the upfront monetary cost of jailbreaking smartphones determines its prevalence. Users mainly jailbreak smartphones to use paid apps for free, a reason more important among Android users than iPhone users. Paid apps contribute the lion’s share of the profits (between 66% and 59%) for both the Android and iPhone. Strictly prohibiting jailbreaking would decrease the aggregate market share of smartphones in the cell phone market. Apple, however, would sell even more iPhones at the expense of Android smartphones.     

How Bad is Corruption? Cross‐country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity

Most people today would argue that corruption is bad for countries' economic development. Yet, we still lack a reliable empirical estimate of the effect. This study addresses the econometric shortcomings of the literature and provides an estimate of the causal impact of corruption on gross domestic product per capita across countries. Certain dimensions of a country's culture are used as instruments for corruption. These instruments stay strong when the other deep determinants of economic development, geography, and the remaining dimensions of institutions and culture are controlled for. In the process of choosing controls, however, the entire set of variables available in the Quality of Governance online database (QOG) that includes all central variables from the literature on institutions and culture are included. It is found that corruption does exert a significant and negative impact on countries' productivity levels.     

Is Russia really a normal country? A numerical taxonomy of Russia in comparative perspective

Constitutional Political Economy - What sort of country has Russia become since the collapse of the Soviet Union? Scholars have tracked Russia’s political economy closely for almost three...     

The impact of hiring top workers on productivity: what is the role of absorptive capacity?

We examine the heterogeneous productivity impacts of hiring top workers on small and medium-sized enterprises, exploiting matched employer–employee panel data and employing within-firm as well as matching and difference-in-difference estimators. The results provide robust evidence that the productivity impact is stronger for firms with higher absorptive capacity. Technological laggards within an industry benefit more strongly from hiring top workers if their workforce is more well-educated.     

Regulation and pricing of pharmaceuticals: Reference pricing or price cap regulation?

We study the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing strategies using a unique policy experiment in Norway, which in 2003 introduced a reference price (RP) system called “index pricing” for a sub-sample of off-patent pharmaceuticals, replacing the existing price cap (PC) regulation. We estimate the effect of the reform using a product level panel dataset, covering the drugs exposed to RP and a large number of drugs still under PC regulation in the time before and after the policy change. Our results show that RP significantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices within the reference group, with the effect being stronger for brand-names. We also identify a negative cross-price effect on therapeutic substitutes not included in the RP system. In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that RP is more effective than PC regulation in lowering drug prices, while the cross-price effect raises a concern about patent protection.     

How important are minimum wage increases in increasing the wages of minimum wage workers?

Popular discussion presumes minimum wage increases primarily drive wage gains for minimum wage workers. We investigate this presumption using the Current Population Survey to assess the fraction of minimum wage workers receiving raises after 12 months. This fraction is moderately higher following state minimum wage increases, and positively correlated with several measures of labor market tightness. Finally, wage gains frequently follow industry and/or occupation switches, highlighting the importance of career progression for earnings growth among entry-level workers. Career progression and increases in labor demand rather than minimum wage increases appear to drive most wage gains for minimum wage workers.     

Which employers regard the threat of dismissal as a suitable incentive to motivate workers?

Using German establishment data, this study finds that the share of blue-collar workers, an outdated production technology and a high-wage policy increase the probability that employers regard the threat of dismissal as a suitable incentive. A participatory human resource management policy, the incidence of a works council and difficulties in filling vacancies decrease the probability.     

How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea

The Political Legislation Cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when legislators focus on voters’ welfare to be reelected. This paper verifies the theory on South Korean legislative production (1948–2016); it is the first test of the theory in a country undergoing a process of democratization, thus providing evidence relevant also for the conditional political cycles literature. Two insofar untested hypotheses are verified: 1) peaks of legislative production should increase with the degree of democracy; 2) as the party system and the mechanisms of legislative checks and balances develop, the PLC should become more evident in bills of legislative rather than executive’s initiative. A hurdle model estimated on both laws of parliamentary proposal and of government assignment lends empirical support to both hypotheses, with the noticeable feature that PLC in Korea appear more in the form of an upward trend than of pre-electoral peaks.