转变增长方式案例及启示

案例1：绍袋推广变频调速技术 浙江东盛印染有限公司投资278万元，给所有动力设备都安装上了变频率器（约369只，以国产变频器为主，平均每台7500元左右），使每米成品布的电费开支由原来的0.1323元下降到0．1119元，节电率达到18．2％；与此同时，企业设备的运转率也有较大提高，在同样限电负荷的情况下，运转率从53％上升到66．9％：以平均每月生产成品布600万米计，每月可节约成本18万元，按现行电价计算1年不到就可收回全部成本。目前，浙江省绍兴县印染行业共安装变频器约12000台，如果按照每台变频器每天节电29％计算，全年就可节电11300万KWH，节约电费6394万元。在纺织行业的示范带动下，金属加工、水泥等行业也开始采用变频调速技术改造现有用电设备，并尝到了甜头。     

生猪屠宰企业成本核算模型设计

对生猪屠宰企业成本进行准确合理的分配与核算对促进生猪屠宰企业的正常运行具有重要意义。完整准确的归集生猪屠宰企业成本费用是准确合理分配生猪屠宰企业成本的基础。本文提供了完整归集屠宰企业成本费用的基本方法。在此基础上按照联产品成本分配理论给出了按产量分配、按系数分配、按分离点销售价值分配几种核算模型,通过对几种成本分配模式进行比较,文章认为,生猪屠宰企业较为合理的成本分配核算方式是选择按分离点销售价值进行成本分配。     

关于企业用电特性与分时电价作用的探讨

一、分时电价对企业电位支出的回响我国长期以来所采用的电价制度．是对所使用的电能不区分发生消耗的时间．一律采用相同的电价计费。事实上，电网在不同时间向用户提供电能的生产成本是不一样的，一律采用相同的价格收费无法正确反映电能的实际生产成本。分时电价的产生。便是针对电能成本的合理补偿问题。所谓分时电价．就是以日为计算周期，根据一天中电力系统的负荷特性不同，把24小时划分为尖峰负荷、中间负荷和低谷负荷三个时间区段，对发生在不同时间区段的电能消耗分别规定不同的价格。采用分时电价的意义主要有两方面：其一是合理…     

浅析基本电费在水厂经济运行中的作用

本文对基本电费的计价方式进行分析,在此基础上对水厂负荷实际情况和设计原则加以介绍,通过对黄岩水厂进行分析,得出水厂在负荷方面的特点以及水厂的最大受电容量,确保电费支出能够有效降低。通过分析,我们可以发现,水厂结合其实际的电量需要进行计费,能够实现用电成本的有效降低,从而大大提高其经济效益。     

现代电费电价管理分析

电费和电价管理作为电力企业生产管理中至关重要的环节,它直接关系到客户对电力企业的满意程度,在最大程度上决定了电力企业的最终利润。本文主要通过分析现代电费电价管理中存在的问题,从而提出相应的管理措施,以推动现代化、高效化的电费电价管理工作。     

“十二五”深化电价改革研究

国务院要求在十五末期建成的竞争性电力市场尚无踪影,已进行的发电企业与大用户直接交易试点均不具有推广意义,电网公司电价至今未按规则监管,基于国际惯例的煤、电价格联动规则事实上已遭废弃、可再生能源电价政策缺乏相应的配套措施。因而尽管电价改革成绩显著,但深化空间仍然巨大。十二五期间,应继续推进电价的市场化改革,因地制宜地做好竞争性电力市场设计,落实电力体制改革的领导责任,建立基于市场经济的电力监管体系,鼓励和规范过渡期的自主性电力交易。要用改革解决煤、电矛盾,设计并执行上网电价正常的调整机制和不可控成本及时转移机制。应尽早实现电力输、配的价格独立。重建风电引发系统运行成本的分摊机制,风电输送成本和因此而导致的系统调峰成本应全部纳入可再生能源开发成本,建立中央与地方两级可再生能源发展基金征收与使用制度。     

基于外部性内部化与国家意愿支付的脱硝电价定价研究

本文从外部性内部化理论和费用效益理论出发,提出按照国家意愿支付确定脱硝电价,并在研究国家意愿支付与脱硝边际成本的变动规律基础上论证了该脱硝电价算法的合理性。接着,构建了基于国家意愿支付的脱硝电价模型,在分析2004年我国电力行业脱硝成本与脱硝环境效益的基础上,对脱硝电价进行了案例研究,对在实践上如何计算脱硝电价做了有益的尝试。     

住宅小区配变容量的合理选择

文章时当前住宅小区负荷预测提供了两种计算方法,根据负荷预测选择配变容量,并举例说明了选择住宅小区配变容量的方法.     

发改委出台全国光伏上网统一电价

业界期待已久的光伏电价上网政策终于尘埃落定。国家发改委日前正式披露,我国将制定全国统一的太阳能光伏发电标杆上网电价,上网电价按不同建设时段和地区分为1元和1．15元每千瓦时两档。分析人士认为,这一电价水平将促使国内光伏市场快速启动。发改委表示,这一电价水平是按照社会平均投资和运营成本,参考太阳能光伏电站招标价格,以及中国太阳能资源状况,     

风险负荷下研发网络相继失效建模与仿真

由于企业内外部环境不稳定和研发网络结构比较复杂,针对企业之间容易发生的相继失效问题进行研究。根据研发网络特点,引用加权无标度模型生成研发网络,从风险负荷视角出发,借鉴负载容量模型思想,从节点初始负荷、节点容量和失效节点负荷重分配3个方面构建研发网络相继失效模型,运用数值仿真方法揭示相关规律。结果发现,网络相继失效规模随着容许参数的增加而稳定不变,在达到某一临界值后便直线下降直至稳定,此时对应的临界值即为关键风险阈值;每个可调参数对应着唯一一个关键风险阈值,并随着可调参数的增大而减小;网络相继失效规模随着可调参数的增大而扩张,随着权重系数的增大而降低;平均度与相继失效规模不相关。     

“递进”买方势力视角下两部收费制的规制机理研究--兼论政府反垄断部门应对策略

近年来,两部收费制策略引发的反垄断案件频发,下游买方势力的逐渐增强使得纵向控制规制问题变得更加错综复杂。以往研究对买方势力动态变化影响企业策略性决策以及弱化上游市场竞争的问题关注不足。基于此,构建由上游在位者、潜在进入者和下游零售商组成的纵向产业链模型,以下游零售商买方势力的递进变化为切入点,深度剖析两部收费制策略的内在规制机理。结果表明:当下游企业没有买方势力或者具有较弱的抗衡势力时,两部收费制策略从本质上并未弱化上游市场竞争。然而,一旦潜在进入者无法打破在位者建立的进入壁垒,在位者便会充分利用其市场支配地位实施转售价格维持、搭售等一系列纵向控制手段,进而弱化上游市场竞争,以期实现“一家独大”。当下游企业主导交易时,在满足一定条件下,通道费合约会产生排他效应,其弱化上游竞争的程度有限。因此,政府反垄断部门制定规制政策应充分考虑企业纵向控制和逆纵向控制行为。     

Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination

We analyze a simple linear demand bilateral monopoly situation where one of the firms, either the up-stream manufacturer or the down-stream retailer, is socially concerned in terms of its desire to enhance its end-customers’ welfare in addition to the traditional profit motive. Two cases are explored: the up-stream producer exhibits corporate social responsibility (CSR) in one case and the down-stream retailer in the other. In the two-stage game, the retailer makes their quantity-setting decision in stage-two, given the two-part tariff (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) set by the stage-one producer. In this setting, among other things, we find that the optimal channel-coordinating tariff is very different from the standard pure profit-maximizing two-part tariff. For example, if either firm in the supply/marketing chain exhibits CSR, we show the optimal wholesale price does not equal the manufacturer’s marginal production cost, nor does the fixed fee equal the monopoly profit earned by the retailer. Finally, we find that our two-part tariff CSR model provides a theoretical rationale for the empirical finding of little to no correlation between CSR and firm profits.     

区域配电网全寿命周期成本优化研究

为了有效控制配电网运营成本和提高效益,针对新一轮电力体制改革的深入改革,区域配电网全寿命周期成本优化已成为一个重要研究方向。本文首先借助系统动力学模型分析了配电网复杂成本构成和筛选了影响成本的关键因子,并采用了改进蒙特卡法对关键影响因子进行混合抽样,得出配电网各关键因子对区域配电网全寿命周期成本影响的综合灵敏度系数；其次,建立了以关键影响因子对配电网全寿命周期成本总影响量最小为目标的成本优化模型,以及提出了GAACS组合算法对模型进行求解；最后,选取了某省的10kV配电网区域进行了实例分析,结果可得,经济条件对配电网成本影响最大,以及技术条件差的区域降低成本能力较大。。     

核电建设项目费用控制影响因素分析——基于ISM-Fuzzy AHP模型

通过识别核电建设项目费用控制的主要影响因素,采用结构解释模型方法分析各因素的相互影响关系,按影响因素的驱动力和依赖性对其进行排序,最终建立相应的解释结构模型,并在此基础上运用Fuzzy-AHP方法对各层影响因素进行判断比较、确定其权重值。结果表明:核电建设项目的决策阶段是费用控制的关键环节;建设目标、建设规模和投资分析水平是最重要的影响因素,在核电建设过程中应对其重点控制。     

WELFARE COST OF AN OIL IMPORT FEE

This paper examines the impacts on the US. oil market of a $5-per-barrel tariff on imported crude oil. The analysis shows that the United States currently is a price taker in the world oil market. This means that "optimal tariff" arguments for an oil import fee have no validity. The author also argues that any economic losses that oil supply disruptions generate are better addressed with alternative policy tools. To forecast the effects of the tariff on US. production, the author uses a domestic oil supply model that she developed elsewhere. She calculates the resulting gains in producer surplus and then combines them with an estimate of consumer surplus losses and government revenues so as to yield an estimate of the tariff's welfare cost. This welfare cost amounts to approximately $17 billion (in present-value terms) over the 1988–1998 period.     

Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff

We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.     

农村义务教育经费保障机制研究

与建设社会主义新农村的要求相比,目前农村义务教育经费保障方面存在着投资责任重心下移、教育经费管理制度不健全等问题。建立农村义务教育经费保障机制是解决现存问题的关键所在。为此,应尽快建立《农村义务教育投入法》,加强对经费的使用监督,优化配置教育资源,开辟新税种作为教育经费的来源,引入政府采购制度,建立多渠道筹措义务教育经费制度。     

Regulatory design and incentives for renewable energy

Increasing electric power production from renewable energy sources is currently one of the major objectives of energy policy. The intermittent nature of renewables, such as wind and solar, necessarily imposes complex trade-offs for regulatory objectives, such as resource adequacy (and system reliability) versus reductions in green house gas emissions. We develop a highly stylized model of investments in order to derive insights regarding the workings of regulatory incentives for increased renewable energy. We first show that incentives are indeed needed when there are significant economies of scale in the form of “learning by doing” or alternatively, when there is excess capacity in conventional technology due to legacy investments. We analyze two different regulatory schemes (feed-in tariffs and renewable portafolio standards) aimed at increasing investment in renewable capacity. We show that neither scheme is capable of inducing the socially optimal level of investment in renewable capacity. A single feed-in tariff fails to induce optimal investment as a feed-in tariff exceeding marginal costs of conventional technology incentivizes over-development of the most attractive sites which preempts investment in less attractive, yet socially valuable sites. A renewable portfolio standard that promotes increased investment in renewable technology induces under-investment in the conventional technology. These results suggest that a “clinical” regulatory design, that is, one that promotes the right amount of renewable capacity without affecting conventional capacity is a challenging proposition.     

Wind Power in Europe: A Simultaneous Innovation–Diffusion Model

The purpose of this paper is to provide a quantitative analysis of innovation and diffusion in the European wind power sector. We derive a simultaneous model of wind power innovation and diffusion, which combines a rational choice model of technological diffusion and a learning curve model of dynamic cost reductions. These models are estimated using pooled annual time series data for four European countries (Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom) over the time period 1986–2000. The empirical results indicate that reductions in investment costs have been important determinants of increased diffusion of wind power, and these cost reductions can in turn be explained by learning activities and public R&D support. Feed-in tariffs also play an important role in the innovation and diffusion processes. The higher is the feed-in price the higher is, ceteris paribus, the rate of diffusion, and we present some preliminary empirical support for the notion that the impact on diffusion of a marginal increase in the feed-in tariff will differ depending on the support system used. High feed-in tariffs, though, also have a negative effect on cost reductions as they induce wind generators to choose high-cost sites and provide fewer incentives for cost cuts. This illustrates the importance of designing an efficient wind energy support system, which not only promotes diffusion but also provides continuous incentives for cost-reducing innovations.