基于对称管理模型的配置委托权限管理

配置委托权限管理是大门户解决权限管理的有效方法.文章提出的对称管理模型的对象一边包括函数与角色,另一边包括用户与组,权限控制源于函数对数据的操作,通过委托路径来将数据、函数及角色的操作权限委托给组与用户.文章还指出基于配置委托权限管理的委托路径规则与委托撤销规则,为大型企业门户的权限委托提供统一的模型与规范的方法.     

一种通用权限管理方案的设计方案

分析了权限管理的概念和一些与权限管理容易混淆的概念。提出了一种目前可以应用到绝大多数与权限有关的系统设计中的通用权限管理方案。该方案以角色对用户进行分组，通过用户数据库、角色数据库、权限数据库、用户一权限数据库以及角色一权限数据库来实现权限的分层管理。该设计方案能够由管理员方便的对权限进行设置。通过对角色的权限设置可以达到快速设置权限。通过对用户的权限设置可以达到权限的精确控制。文章最后以某项目为基础对该权限设计方案进行了实现。通过测试，该方案能够很好的对用户权限进行控制，从而提高整个系统的安全性。     

ERP中用户管理的设计与实现

ERP系统的合理利用与企业管理的充分结合，成为企业信息化成败的关键。一个优秀的用户权限管理模块可以有效地管理整个软件系统，协调好系统用户、权限、角色之间的关系。基于角色访问控制的分配策略能够将企业的实际岗位情况同所开发的系统中的特定角色较一致地结合起来，便于统一、敏捷的管理各岗位角色和用户的权限。     

信息系统安全性分析与设计

文章针对以往信息管理系统安全管理中所出现的弊端,提出了一种基于岗位角色的用户权限控制管理的方法。该方法描述了用户、岗位角色和权限的关系,通过分配和取消岗位角色来完成用户权限的控制,较好地解决了系统用户权限管理方面的问题。     

基于业务流程的网络会计信息系统权限控制方法

完善的权限设置和控制措施是防止敏感会计信息泄露的有效手段。本文基于企业业务流程，按岗位分组进行业务操作分析，细化操作的信息需求并将其转化为相匹配的操作权限，形成岗位的信息操作权限集合一角色，最后将角色赋予用户形成用户的最终权限。该方法符合权限管理的最小化原则。简化了权限管理，使角色的权限设置保持相对稳定。     

委托代理下政府危机管理的激励约束博弈研究

委托代理关系普遍存在于社会经济生活当中,如何促使代理人更为积极有效地行使委托人赋予的代理权以及更好地维护委托人的权益,一直是人们关注的重点,而激励约束问题一直是公共行政研究中的热点也是难点问题之一。文章试图从博弈论的角度来分析委托代理关系,并侧重于其中的激励约束机制,来对政府危机管理进行研究。文章建立了相应的委托代理博弈模型,给出了模型的策略解及其经济解释,并通过分析得出相关结论,以便为政府危机管理提供决策支持。     

数据权限管理的研究和设计

本文对数据权限进行逐步深入的分析,提出了利用定义数据对象对系统数据资源进行分类管理,通过定义数据对象的权限规则确定该数据对象的权限,把数据分为工作流数据和非工作流数据得出动态和静态权限控制方式,最后建立了数据权限管理模型。针对该模型的系统实现,对其数据库进行了设计,对模型内的类以及类之间的关系进行了初步的设计。     

基于RBAC模型权限管理的设计与实现

对RBAC模型分析和研究的基础上,对RBAC模型进行了改进,设计了可以同时对角色和用户进行授权的更灵活的权限管理模型,满足了企业多样化的授权管理需要。     

当前村级财务会计管理中的问题和对策

文章按照财政部印发的<关于开展村级会计委托代理服务工作的指导意见>,以安徽省208户样本村集体经济组织基础数据为依据,侧重围绕村集体经济组织财务状况、经营成果、收益分配、财务会计管理模式等问题,对村级财务会计管理现状进行深入分析,提出进一步规范实施村级会计委托代理制度,提升村级财务会计管理执行力的基本构想.     

基于MVC的WEB信息系统RBAC权限管理和菜单生成设计

文章通过节点,角色,用户和这三者之间两两关系的数据库表设计,实现了三个好处:系统的维护灵活度增加了,新增功能只需要简单几步就可以加入菜单;用户对应多个角色可以减少了每个用户设定权限的工作量;方便的生成每个用户对应的菜单。     

Delegation and Incentives under Evolutionarily Stable Conjectures

Existing results show that in a homogenous Cournot duopoly, commitment by delegation harms profit. This conclusion presupposes that market conduct is the same whether incentives are aggressive or accommodating. We study delegation and incentives under evolutionarily stable conjectures and show how performance pay co‐determines market conduct. In fact, in equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures, we show that commitment through delegation leads to a profit increase. Manipulation of managerial incentives produces less competition and therefore benefits firms' owners even in symmetric homogenous oligopoly. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delegation in first‐price all‐pay auctions

In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial overconfidence,overinvestment, and R&D spillover

This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost‐reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse.     

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Generalized Oligopolistic Case

The main purpose of this paper is to disclose the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the differentiated‐products model with two stages: (i) owner‐shareholders negotiate managerial compensation with their managers that comprises their profits and sales (sales delegation) and (ii) they engage in their market competition. The other purpose of this paper is to study the differentiated goods model in which an owner bargains the managerial compensation with her/his manager that comprises her/his profit and her/his rival's profit (relative performance delegation). We further investigate the situation wherein the firm with sales delegation and the firm with the relative performance delegation coexist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.     

Great Expectations of Public Service Delegation: A systematic review

Politicians use a variety of expectations to justify the delegation of public services to public, semi-public or private organizations. This article reveals expectations of delegation, as well as its correlates. Empirical evidence is drawn from a systematic review of 250 peer-reviewed articles published in leading public administration journals between 2000 and 2012. This study identifies a discourse with three main categories of justifications: scientists and practitioners expect economic, political, and organizational benefits. The effects associated with delegation are not in line with these expectations. Delegation has inconsistent correlations to outcomes when governments maintain a role in service delivery. Complete privatization is associated with negative outcomes. These results have important implications for the study and practice of delegation.     

Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers

This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the riskiness of the tournament. In these situations a manager's type may serve as a substitute for delegation via contracts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers, firms can escape the rat race nature of R&D tournaments. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transfer of authority within hierarchies

This paper studies delegation and communication in a model of three-tier hierarchy. There is an uninformed principal, and uninformed intermediary, and an informed agent. Under delegation the principal chooses an interval of actions to delegate to the intermediary, and the intermediary chooses a sub-interval from that interval to delegate to the agent. Under communication, the agent communicates with the intermediary, after which the intermediary communicates with the principal. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under delegation and communication. We show that under delegation the principal can appoint a more biased individual to be the intermediary, and a less biased individual to be the agent. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the principal can prefer to communicate with the subordinates rather than delegate decision rights to them if the intermediary and the agent have opposing biased.     

Apple's disaster: Linking two‐sided markets and strategic delegation

Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two‐sided markets not captured in the analysis of one‐sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two‐sided markets. Contrary to one‐sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two‐sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.     

A property rights approach to legislative delegation

This paper applies the property rights theory to study both positive and normative aspects of legislative delegation in a setup where interest groups directly influence lawmaking by initiating regulatory bargaining. A self-interested legislature choosing between the direct exercise of its legislative authority and delegation to an administrative agency must therefore trade off the value of bureaucratic competence against bureaucratic drift and, importantly, loss of control over bargaining. Our analysis, first, clarifies when the legislature’s choice between delegation and no delegation is socially efficient or socially inefficient; second, highlights the role of political bargaining and shows that precluding interest group influence through bargaining may actually increase the scope for socially inefficient outcomes; and, third, illustrates the model’s predictions in light of selected stylized facts and the practice of scant empirical work on legislative delegation.