江苏建立稳态循环经济体系的政策研究

文章在介绍稳态循环经济的基础上,运用博弈理论说明,在缺乏合理政策机制的前提下,自利性的经济个体往往不会自觉地参与稳态循环经济体系的建设,因此政府的政策激励是必须的。文章以江苏省为例,研究了如何制订促进区域稳态循环经济体系建设的政策机制。     

In Defense of DEFECT

The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.     

Learning in society

In an individual experimentation problem a decision maker learns only from his own experience. It is well known that an optimal experimentation strategy for such problems sometimes results in the best alternative being dropped altogether, which is the so-called “Rothschild effect.” Many experimentation problems of interest, however, involve learning from both individual experience and the experience of others. This paper shows that learning in society can overcome the Rothschild effect. We consider an economy with a continuum of infinitely lived players in which each player faces a multi-armed bandit and in each period a player observes the action choice of another randomly chosen player. We show that social conformity always happens in the long run, and we use this fact to derive a condition on the distribution of prior beliefs that implies that the fraction of players who choose the best alternative always converges to one in the long run.     

On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model

We study local interaction within a population located on a connected graph. Subjects engage in several bilateral interactions during each round in a generalized Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). In each round of play one randomly selected player gets the possibility to update the action he plays in this PD. All individuals use the update rule Win Cooperate, Lose Defect, a multi-player variant of Tit-for-Tat. Theoretical results on the set of stable states of the associated dynamics are provided for the cases with and without rare mutations. Simulations provide insight into the probability distribution over these stable states. In both cases a rather high probability is assigned to stable states with a moderate level of cooperation implying that dominated strategies are used. Furthermore, the probability of reaching the stable state with Nash equilibrium play is small.     

地方政府引资偏好与产业结构优化

由于地方政府不同的引资偏好和投资冲动引致的产业结构问题正日益凸显,企业和地方政府之间短期利益的博弈已进入"囚徒困境".如何在中央宏观调控政策的引导下实现地方政府管理目标创新、企业产品升级和产业结构优化,已成为政府、理论界和实业界普遍关注的焦点问题.从鼓励地方政府创新、降低企业产品转换成本、实现产业结构优化的角度展开分析,得出诱致性制度变迁有助于地方政府引导企业实现产品低成本转换和产业结构优化的结论.     

On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private

I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies (i.e., do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting) yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax. I also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.     

Learning through experimentation in an oligopoly market with asymmetric information

Unlike previous literature, in which firms compete in the market with the same information, this article analyses a two‐period duopoly game in which only one firm is completely informed about the market conditions, whereas the other firm is unaware of one parameter of the demand curve. In this setting, we describe how the informed firm uses its price set in period 1 in order to reveal or to hide its private information and how the uninformed firm uses its own price in period 1 in order to learn the market conditions when they are not revealed by its rival. Specifically, we obtained the conditions under which the informed firm sets a higher price than its optimum in the first period to hide its private information in certain cases and to reveal that information in others. Likewise, this paper describes the conditions under which the uninformed firm sets a lower price than its optimum in period 1 in order to learn the unknown parameter. We found that the informed firm's cost of revealing its private information to its rival is lower than the uninformed firm's cost of learning the market conditions.     

Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis

We analyze social dynamics in a continuous population where randomly matched individuals have to choose between two pure strategies only ('cooperate' (C) and 'not cooperate' (NC)). Individual payoffs associated with the possible outcomes of each interaction may differ across groups, depending on the specific social and cultural context to which each agent belongs. In particular, it is assumed that three sub-populations are initially present, 'framing' the game according to the prisoner's dilemma (PD), assurance game (AG) and other regarding (OR) payoff configurations, respectively. In other words, we assume that common knowledge about the payoffs of the game is 'culturally-specific'. In this context, we examine both the adoption process of strategies C and NC within each sub-population and the diffusion process of 'types' (PD, AG and OR) within the overall community. On the basis of an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, the paper focuses on the problem of coexistence of PD, AG and OR groups as well as of 'nice' (C) and 'mean' (NC) strategies. We show that coexistence between C and NC is possible in the heterogeneous community under examination, even if it is ruled out in homogeneous communities where only one of the three types is present. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

高职学生英语学习动机调查分析及对策

在外语学习动机理论的框架下,通过问卷调查的方式,对高职学生学习英语的动机进行实证调查,并在分析调查结果的基础上阐述动机的类型及其产生的原因,提出相应的对策,指出在外语教学中,教师应善于运用动机理论激发和培养学生的学习动机,提高学生学习效果。     

合作学习打破大学英语课堂沉默的有效性研究

大学生消极的课堂沉默是多种因素共同作用的结果,不利于学生英语综合应用能力的培养和提高。合作学习以建构主义和人本主义理论为基础,强调学生的主体参与和生生之间的互动合作,既是一种有效的学习模式,也是一种新型的教学组织形式。以定量和定性的方式探讨了合作学习和传统教学模式跟课堂沉默的关系。研究表明,“以学生为中心”的合作学习对打破大学英语课堂沉默有明显效果,而“以教师为中心”的传统教学模式不仅会导致课堂沉默,而且会在一定程度上加重课堂沉默的程度。     

Kantian Equilibrium

Consider a game whose strategies are "contributions". A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if  no  player would like  all  players to alter their contributions by the  same multiplicative factor.  Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient. We characterize the allocation rules on several domains of environments that can be implemented as Kantian equilibria. The concept unifies the  proportional solution  on production economies and the  linear cost-share equilibrium  on public-good economies. We study Kantian equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma, in a voting problem, and in a political economy where redistribution is the issue. The Kantian dictum engenders considerable but not unqualified cooperation.     

高校学雷锋常态化研究

雷锋精神作为当代中国的一种道德范式,对于整个中华民族具有鲜明的时代价值。学雷锋活动是弘扬中国民族传统美德的典范,是高校德育价值实现的重要载体,对于大学生德育而言,是十分重要的德育资源。但是泛道德主义的绝对的无私奉献也是远离这个时代的,必然导致德育走向＂乌托邦＂理想。如何解读雷锋精神的时代价值,成为当代大学生可学可用,能学能用,长学长用,进而激活雷锋精神的道德影响力,使学雷锋活动走向常态化,是当今高校德育重要的时代课题。     

Learning to Open Monty Hall's Doors

The analysis in this paper searches for individual and group determinants of learning behavior in Monty Hall's Three Door problem examined in Friedman (1998, American Economic Review. 88, 933–946). The results show that the size of monetary incentives, individuals' initial abilities, and social interactions with others are all important determinants of initial choices and subsequent learning in this problem: (i) More able students have a greater initial propensity to make the right choice than less able students, and their learning curves are initially steeper; (ii) Individual learning can also be enhanced through social interactions; (iii) Interestingly, less able students benefit more than more able students from social interactions in the sample. These findings support the argument that learning models that take into account individuals' abilities and that allow for social interactions where agents can exchange information hold a great deal of promise for enhancing our understanding of actual learning environments, learning processes, and the formation of rationality.     

The Gender Wealth Gap in Europe: Application of Machine Learning to Predict Individual-level Wealth

This article provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 22 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The data on wealth are collected at the household level, while individual-level data are needed for the estimates of gender wealth gaps. We propose a novel approach using machine learning and model averaging methods to predict individual-level wealth data for multi-person households. Our results suggest that random forest performs best as the predicting tool for this exercise, outperforming elastic net and Bayesian model averaging. The estimated gender wealth gaps tend to be in favor of men, especially at the top of the wealth distribution. Men have 24 percent more wealth than women on average. We also find that a high home ownership rate is associated with a smaller country-level gender wealth gap. Our estimates suggest that the individual-level wealth inequality is on average 3 pp higher than the household-level wealth inequality in multi-member households.     

Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.     

基于时间维度的组织学习理论——组织从当前现状中学习的模型

基于组织学习时空理论的时间维度,提出组织从当前现状中学习的模型。该模型包括4个方面:"知",以组织面临的现状、机会和挑战为出发点,运用行动学习的方法,通过团队形式的讨论、反思和质疑、实践的循环,从当前现状中获得知识;"行",将学习到的知识运用于实践,改进自身方案和采取适当行动;知与行的转化,包含知与行的循环;从知和行两个维度评估学习的有效性。最后,总结了理论和实践贡献,并指出存在的不足和未来的改进方向。     

学习型城市的创建模式及其实践

在世界经济日趋全球化、信息化、知识化、网络化的今天,以区位空间结构、生产要素禀赋为基础的传统区域发展模式越来越难以适应时代要求,而以学习、创新和网络为基础的学习型区域——一种新型的区域发展模式则日显强大的竞争力。目前,国内外许多城市或区域提出了建设“学习型城市”、“学习型社会”的目标,但各地对如何创建学习型城市还不太明确,依据不同的理论出现了不同的创建模式。本文试图对学习型城市创建模式做一初步探讨,并进一步阐述如何创建学习型城市。     

如何提高中学生的英语学习效率（英文）

在帮助中学生提高他们的英语学习效率。首先介绍了学习效率的内容以及中学生高效学习效率的标准,包括数量和质量上的标准,然后又从不同角度分析了能够影响中学生英语学习的几点主要因素,包括生理因素、心理因素、学生的学习因素以及教师的教法因素,进而找到了能够解决这些影响因素的一些办法,例如：老师可在家长的帮助下,让学生对自己的身体健康重视起来。英语老师可以通过改善老师与学生之间的关系来引起学生对英语这门科目的兴趣与动力;可以通过在课堂上对英语的言语控制来提高中学生的英语学习效率;同时,英语老师也可以帮助学生提高他们的英语记忆能力。     

学习型组织与组织核心胜任特征的关系

在急剧变革的知识经济时代,组织处于激烈的环境变化之中,组织要取得持续发展的竞争优势,有效应对变革,就必须具备与战略相适应的核心胜任特征;因此,快速学习、持续学习。成为组织核心胜任特征产生的源泉,创建学习型组织,已成为组织获取核心竞争力、保持竞争优势的有效途径。