Mimicking insider trades

We examine whether outside investors mimic insider trades by analyzing the daily transactions of foreign institutional investors (FII) in the Indian emerging market. We find that the value relevance of insiders' opportunistic buy trades is much higher in our context relative to that reported for developed markets. More importantly, we find that FII mimic opportunistic buy trades, which is more pronounced for firms that are informationally more opaque or have lower corporate governance quality. A long-short strategy based on FII's transactions after opportunistic trades generates an additional abnormal return of approximately 29% annually, compared to transactions based on routines trades.     

The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to Insider Trading

Trading by corporate insiders and their tippees is analyzed in Anheuser-Busch's 1982 tender offer for Campbell Taggart. Court records that identify insider transactions are used to disentangle the individual insider trades from liquidity trades. Consistent with previous studies, insider trading was found to have had a significant impact on the price' of Campbell Taggart. However, the impact of informed trading on the market is complicated. Trading volume net of insider purchases rose. Contrary to the broad implications of adverse selection models, Campbell Taggart's liquidity improved when the insiders were active in the market, and the insiders received superior execution for their orders.     

Are the Insider Trades of a Large Institutional Investor Informed?

We use a unique data set to consider whether a large institution's (Fidelity funds) insider trades are informed. Theoretical studies of large informed traders suggest that their information advantage could be greater for buy trades than sell trades, be short‐ or long‐lived, and be exploited by varying the pace of trade execution. Although there is evidence of each of these, Fidelity seems to be informed only for quickly executed buy trades. Other trades outperform a stock market index but not a four‐factor return model. This performance profile is consistent with Fidelity's fees, which depend on performance compared to an index.     

Sell-side analyst heterogeneity and insider trading

This study explores insider trading patterns under different earnings surprises. After controlling for stock market liquidity and earnings announcements returns, we show that insiders sell more aggressively depending on the heterogeneity of analysts whose EPS forecasts are met or beaten to camouflage their trades. Specifically, insiders sell more shares of their company sooner after the publication of earnings when top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten. Consistent with the informed trading literature, insiders strategically select these moments because the stock price impact is low and the legal scrutiny of their trades is minimal. To support this result, we employ an exogenous drop in firms' analyst coverage due to the closure or merger of brokerage houses. Furthermore, in line with the camouflage incentives, by selling after top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten, stock prices adjust slowly to insider trades. Finally, we show that the incentives of insiders to hide their trades are concentrated in opportunistic insiders and members of the top management team, who are more likely to bear the costs of selling shares after positive news.     

Do Investment Newsletters Move Markets?

We analyze the market impact of stock recommendations made by a single investment newsletter that focuses on instances of heavy insider trading. The market reacts positively to the actual insider trades and the associated Form 4 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings that attracted the newsletter's interest. The subsequent recommendations, which occur within a delay of several days, are associated with an even larger announcement period return and higher trade volume. Thus, despite the fact that recommendations are largely based on publicly available information on insider trades and the reach of the newsletter is limited, the newsletter has a significant impact on the market.     

Insider-trading,discretionary accruals and information asymmetry

Using US data for the period from 2004 to 2012 and alternative discretionary accruals measures, we examine whether insiders manipulate earnings in an asymmetric information environment to profit from their informed trades, and whether the intervening information environment influences the relationship between earnings management and insider trading. We show that insider trading dominated by sell trades has a positive association with discretionary accruals. The incremental effect of information asymmetry as well as the interaction with insider trading is also prevalent in this relation, confirming the moderating effect of asymmetric information. Further, we show that the active involvement of some key insiders in high discretionary accruals is for personal benefit more in growth firms than in value firms. Our results also suggest that earnings management allows for insiders’ opportunistic, rather than routine, buy and sell trades. Our findings highlight that regulators should oversee and scrutinise both insider trading and earnings management to mitigate the risk of the opportunistic behaviour of insiders to avoid future corporate scandals.     

A logit model of retail investors' individual trading decisions and their relations to insider trades

Among the various external information sources that influence individual investors' trading decisions, no research has considered the important influence of insiders' transactions. Retail investors might copy the behavior demonstrated by insiders' trading; therefore, this study establishes an approach to estimate the buying probability for a certain stock by a certain investor at a certain point in time and analyzes whether insider trade reports influence this probability. Using a sample of more than 270,000 retail trades in Germany between 2008 and 2009, along with more than 3000 insider trades in the same period, we find evidence of copying of insiders' trades by retail investors. The basic mimicry hypothesis holds, even when we consider an information event hypothesis and an insider attention effect hypothesis as alternative explanations. A robustness test also supports the findings.     

Management friendship and insider opportunism

This study documents a significant increase in both trading activity and profitability of opportunistic top managers when a CEO develops a strong connection with subordinate executives through co-opting the executives who share social ties with him/her. This baseline evidence is robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative measures of management connection and insider opportunism, as well as controlling for other CEO and board attributes. Further analyses reveal that interpersonal connections between top managers are more likely to increase opportunistic insider trading in firms with lower-quality voluntary disclosures, more sociable executives, and relaxing legal barriers to insider trades. Increased insider opportunism in response to the CEO’s connection with other top executives engenders less informative stock prices and depresses stock market liquidity. Finally, insider trades in firms with stronger management connection are more predictive of future stock returns.     

The costs of entrenched boards

This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, a reduced firm value. Finally, we show that the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards that are established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which shareholders can amend).     

Management earnings forecasts,insider trading,and information asymmetry

We investigate whether senior officers use accrual-based earnings management to meet voluntary earnings disclosure (i.e., management earnings forecasts) before selling or buying their own shares when they have private information. This study is the first to use the differences in timing of trades by senior officers and other insiders (e.g., directors or large shareholders) to infer information asymmetry. We hypothesize that the timing of senior officers' trades with no other insiders' trades at the same time indicates opportunistic trades and asymmetric information between senior officers and other insiders. Our results show that senior officers' exclusive sales are negatively associated with future returns, indicating that they tend to use insider information. Moreover, senior officers are more likely to meet their earnings forecasts when they plan to sell stocks.     

Impact of outsiders and disclosed insider trades

We analyze a dynamic market where outsiders share part of the information about a security with a corporate insider and update their incomplete information by learning from disclosed insider trades. Particular focus is on the insider's response to increasing number of learning outsiders.     

Does Dividend Policy Relate to Cross‐Sectional Variation in Information Asymmetry? Evidence from Returns to Insider Trades

We examine the relation between dividends and information asymmetry by using insider returns as a proxy for information asymmetry. We find that dividends are negatively related to returns to insider trades across firms. Firms that pay consistently high dividends have lower insider returns than do firms that pay consistently low dividends. These results do not support traditional dividend signaling models. Rather, they are consistent with the proposition that firms with the highest dividends have the lowest levels of information asymmetry.     

Wealth Transfer Effects of Analysts' Misleading Behavior

We investigate a sample of 50 firm‐events, identified in the Global Research Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted misleadingly ex post. In this setting, analysts' incentives caused them to issue public disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these firms' institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small‐size trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while daily large‐size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors' trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts' misleading behavior.     

Insider Investment Horizon

We examine the relation between insiders’ investment horizon and the information content of their trades with respect to future stock returns. We conjecture that an insider's investment horizon establishes a benchmark for expected patterns of continued trading behavior and thus helps identify unexpected insider trades, which should be more informative in efficient markets. Consistent with this conjecture, the trades of short-horizon insiders are both more unexpected and more informed, on average, than those of long-horizon insiders. Short-horizon insiders and their firms also tend to display characteristics that are associated with a greater focus on short-termism.     

Insider Trading, News Releases, and Ownership Concentration

This paper investigates the market's reaction to U.K. insider transactions and analyzes whether the reaction depends on the firm's ownership. We present three major findings. First, differences in regulation between the U.K. and United States, in particular the speedier reporting of trades in the U.K., may explain the observed larger abnormal returns in the U.K. Second, ownership by directors and outside shareholders has an impact on the abnormal returns. Third, it is important to adjust for news released before directors' trades. In particular, trades preceded by news on mergers and acquisitions and CEO replacements contain significantly less information.     

Asymmetric information consolidation and price discovery: Inferring bad news from insider sales

Due to the paucity of sources of negative firm‐specific information, US capital markets have more difficulty identifying and incorporating bad news into stock prices than they do good news. Even though insider selling is a potentially important proxy for undisclosed bad news, researchers have difficulty ex ante identifying information‐based sales due to an inability to separate liquidity‐motivated from information‐based insider trades. We hypothesize that when insiders in multiple firms sell shares of one firm in which they are insiders and at the same time buy shares of other insider portfolio firms, the sale is more likely to be information‐based, since the proceeds are reinvested. Conversely, when an insider sells one firm without purchasing others or sells multiple insider firms the sale is likely liquidity‐motivated. We find that insider sales identified as information‐based using this algorithm are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. Information‐based sales are also more likely to be associated with delistings, earnings declines and earnings restatements. Analysts are also more likely to revise their earnings forecasts downwards for these firms. It is thus possible to ex ante identify insider sales with information content. Our results will be of interest to investors and also to regulators designing insider trading rules.     

Analyst talent,information, and insider trading

We examine 1984–2018 data and show that the talent or ability of sell-side financial analysts affects a covered firm's information environment—more so than the simple number of analysts covering a firm. We find that while analysts in general produce market and industry-level information, high-ability analysts contribute more firm-specific information. Firms covered by high-ability analysts experience significantly less insider trading prior to positive earnings news. Results only reside in opportunistic (not routine) trades. When an analyst initiates (terminates) coverage we find decreased (increased) subsequent insider trading. Both changes are primarily driven by analyst talent. Analyst ability also negatively relates to insider trading profitability.     

THE EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS

We investigate whether insider trading restrictions had their intended effects during the 1960s and 1970s. We examine insider trading and stock market behavior before dividend initiations and omissions announced between 1935 and 1974. Contrary to existing research and commentary, we show that restrictions had meaningful effects. During the 1960s and 1970s, insiders sold less frequently before dividend omissions, and the average profitability of insider trades declined. In addition, the positive (negative) stock price runup before dividend initiations (omissions) decreased after 1961. The results provide some vindication for the Securities and Exchange Commission's adjudicative approach toward insider trading regulation.     

What do insiders know? Evidence from insider trading around share repurchases and SEOs

We examine the nature of information contained in insider trades prior to corporate events. Insiders' net buying increases before open market share repurchase announcements and decreases before seasoned equity offers. Higher insider net buying is associated with better post-event operating performance, a reduction in undervaluation, and, for repurchases, lower post-event cost of capital. Insider trading also predicts announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns following events. Overall, our results suggest that insider trades before corporate events contain information about changes both in fundamentals and in investor sentiment.     

Aggregate insider trading and market returns: The role of transparency

Using a sample of countries that require timely disclosures of insider trades, I investigate the effect of country‐level institutions that promote transparency on the extent to which aggregate insider trades predict market returns. I find that financial information transparency mitigates the predictive content of aggregate insider trades when markets are more likely to deviate from fundamentals (i.e., during market fads), and when there is greater co‐movement in stock prices. In contrast, there is some evidence that governance and investor protection mitigate the association between aggregate insider trades and future earnings surprises. Hence, holding constant the timely disclosures of insider trades, other capital market institutions play complementary roles in mitigating the informational frictions that give rise to the predictive content of aggregate insider trades.