Progressive entry and the incentives to invest in alternative infrastructures

In this paper we study an entrant’s incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step into the market by progressively acquiring market experience. We show that the acquisition of experience in the phase of service-based competition delays the entrant’s investment when the prospects for infrastructure investment are good, and accelerates investment otherwise. We also show that when the acquisition of experience depends on the entrant’s current customer base and facility-based entry is a long-term possibility, setting a low access price can accelerate the entrant’s investment.     

Strategic bypass deterrence

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. Second, we extend the baseline model studied in the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network installation. By analogy to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distinguish three régimes of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated bypass depending on the entrant’s unit cost. We show that the make-or-buy decision of the entrant is not necessarily technologically efficient: when bypass is chosen, it is always the cheapest option but access may be chosen when it is not cost effective.     

GRADUAL NETWORK EXPANSION AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS

ABSTRACT 1 : Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Unbundling the local loop

We study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop, where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own infrastructure. We use a dynamic model of technology adoption and study the incentives of the entrant to lease loops and compete “service-based”, and/or to build up a new and more efficient infrastructure and compete “facility-based”, given the rental price.We show that the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops; hence, the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective. The distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type (quality) of the new technology to be adopted. We also show that while regulating the rental price may suffice to achieve socially desirable outcomes, a sunset clause does not improve social welfare.     

The effect of entry restrictions on price: evidence from the retail gasoline market

I exploit a change in Spanish regulations to test the effect of the relaxation of entry restrictions on the equilibrium retail price of diesel. In February 2013, a Central Government reform permitted gasoline stations to operate in industrial and commercial areas. Over the following 2-year period, this deregulation led to a high number of new market entrants in these newly designated free entry areas. By isolating markets exposed to entry and markets unaffected by new entrants, and adopting a difference-in-difference approach, results show that gasoline stations exposed to a new market entrant within a one-mile radius lower their prices by an average 1.04%. This result is significant, representing almost one fifth of the average retail margin. Additionally, the results show that the reduction in the equilibrium price is caused by the first market entrant and that the effect decreases over time.     

Welfare effects of unbundling under different regulatory regimes in natural gas markets

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that enriches the literature on the pros and cons of ownership unbundling vis-à-vis lighter unbundling frameworks in the natural gas markets. For each regulatory framework, we compute equilibrium outcomes when an incumbent firm and a new entrant compete à la Cournot in the final gas market. We find that the entrant’s contracting conditions in the upstream market and the transmission tariff are key determinants of the market structure in the downstream gas market (both with ownership and with legal unbundling). We also study how the regulator must optimally set transmission tariffs in each of the two unbundling regimes. We conclude that welfare maximizing tariffs often require free access to the transmission network (in both regulatoy regimes). However, when the regulator aims at promoting the break-even of the regulated transmission system operator, the first-best tariff is unfeasible in both regimes. Hence, we study a more realistic set-up, in which the regulator’s action is constrained by the break-even of the regulated firm (the transmission system operator). In this set-up, we find that, for a given transmission tariff, final prices in the downstream market are always higher with ownership unbundling than with legal unbundling.     

Information transmission and incentives not to price discriminate

This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the demand level but also on the demand composition. A signalling game with two periods and two players (an established firm and a potential entrant) is considered. The potential entrant has incomplete information on market demand. There exist many sequential equilibria in which the uniform price policy acts as an entry deterrence device by hiding actual market profitability. We can interpret the uniform pricing policy as a rejection of the use of superior information on market demand composition in order to reduce the entrant's expected profits.     

Switching costs, consumer heterogeneity and price discrimination

In a duopoly with price discrimination and switching costs, we analyse the evolution of market structure, when an incumbent and a new entrant compete, and a new class of users with lower willingness to pay appears in the market. We find that the market share of the new entrant depends on the degree of heterogeneity and the level of switching costs. In particular, if the degree of heterogeneity is intermediate, the evolution of market structure is similar for high and null switching costs. Since consumer surplus and social welfare are unambiguously lower under high switching costs, this result points at the risk of inferring the degree of market competitiveness from the convergence in market shares.     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information

This paper studies price-matching guarantees in a market where entrant does not have perfect information about incumbent’s cost. The low-cost incumbent can adopt price-matching guarantees as a signal to distinguish itself from the high-cost type and thus effectively deter entry. On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent can successfully fool the potential entrant under certain conditions. Compared with the equilibriums in situations where the option of offering a price guarantee is not available, the use of this instrument either makes it easier for the low-cost incumbent to signal its cost, or expands the range of parameters over which the high-cost incumbent is able to deter entry successfully.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

Entry and espionage with noisy signals

We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off with an IS of relatively high quality. When the IS quality is private information of the entrant, the incumbent is better off with an IS of high expected precision while the entrant benefits from one of high quality. In this case espionage makes the market more competitive.     

Vertical technology transfer and the welfare implications of patent protection

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing-country firms, and many trading companies from developing countries create competition in the developed countries, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay considerable attention to these aspects. In a Cournot oligopoly with vertical technology transfer, we show that patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if the following three conditions hold together: (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods sellers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country producers is sufficiently high. We also show that patent protection in the developing country always creates higher developing-country welfare if no developing-country firm enters the final goods market. We also discuss the implications of Bertrand competition on our results.     

Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence

I study how a potential entrant influences quality in a model of vertical product differentiation with quality-dependent production costs. With identical costs, the incumbent will always deter entry if possible, i.e., if fixed costs are high. Quality will be set at a level lower than or equal to the optimal quality under either duopoly or monopoly. Results are completely different when the entrant has substantially lower costs. They are explained by the relative location of the entrant's quality best response to the incumbent's optimal quality choice in monopoly. This sheds new light on the influence of industrial policy on market conduct.     

Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

In entering a new market, firms face demand uncertainty. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. We allow firms to locate outside of the city and assume that market conditions are common knowledge. We then introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. We find that demand uncertainty can be seen as a differentiation force when faced by the first entrant and as an agglomeration force when faced by the second entrant. Finally, the second firm’s imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.