内部审计机构开展对本部门所属领导干部任期经济责任审计的几点思考

全覆盖的经济责任审计监督体系已在法律层面上得到了确认,参照《规定》是内审机构开展经济责任审计工作的基础;结合实际制定与本部门、本单位工作目标相适应的规范、制度或办法,是内审机构开展经济责任审计工作的行动指南;接受委托,寓服务于监督之中,是内审机构开展经济责任审计的基本工作任务;合理定位、拓展审计领域、不局限于财务收支、实施审计调查、绩效审计等开放式审计,是内审机构开展经济责任审计可以考虑的思路。     

浅谈对经济责任审计的认识与思考

经济责任审计是我国改革开放过程中形成的一种特有的审计制度,是指国家审计机关依法对党政领导干部或国有及国有控股企业的领导人任职期间所在部门单位财政财务收支活动的真实、合法、效益以及领导干部个人履行经济责任,遵守财经法纪廉洁自律情况进行的监督、鉴证和评价活动。随着公司制的出现与发展,财产的所有权与管理权逐渐地分离开来,委托人将自己的财产物资交付给受托人进行管理,受托人接受委托后即应承担所托付的责任,这种责任就是受托责任。由于委托人与受托人之间信息的不对称,委托人需要了解受托人是否全面有效地履行了受托经济责任,而受托人也有证实自己努力工作,消除委托人顾虑的需求,在这种基础之上便产生了独立的审计机构,对受托人的经济责任履行情况进行审计以满足双方的需求。政府经济责任审计,是特指审计机关或其他审计组织,接受有关部门的委托,依据国家法律法规和有关政策,审计领导干部任职期间所在部门、单位财政财务收支的真实性、合法性和效益性,以及领导干部本人对有关经济活动应当负有的责任,包括主管责任和直接责任,借以评价领导干部履行经济职责情况的较高层次的经济监督活动。     

论国家审计产生的基础

国家审计是如何产生的,对于从事审计工作的人来说,似乎是一个再简单不过的问题。然而,对于这个最基本的审计问题,目前却没有真正搞清楚,或者说还没有形成共识,存在着不同看法和理论表述。比较典型的观点有:公共受托责任论、委托代理论、民主政治论、“免疫系统”论、权力制约论等。在理论上明确国家审计的产生基础,涉及对国家审计本质、审计范围、审计作用等一系列审计理论和实践问题的认识,因此有必要对国家审计产生的基础进行深入探讨。     

依托外包提升内部审计人员专业能力

<正>党的十八大以来,党中央、国务院高度重视审计工作。2023年5月23日,习近平总书记在二十届中央审计委员会第一次会议上强调,审计是党和国家监督体系的重要组成部分,是推动国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重要力量。内部审计作为审计监督体系的重要组成部分,同时也是单位内部控制体系的重要组成部分。然而,受限于各种主、客观因素,内部审计尚未完全适应本单位事业发展的需要。目前,由于内部审计人员数量较少、专业胜任能力尚有待提高、审计经验不够丰富等原因,有些单位尚不具备完全自主开展内部审计工作的条件,财务收支审计、经济责任审计等大型审计项目主要采取外包方式委托给外部会计师事务所实施。     

构建市长经济责任审计体系 促进中原经济区建设

经济责任审计在加强干部管理监督、促进党风廉政建设、落实依法治国方略、提高党政领导干部执政能力、推动完善国家治理和保障经济社会科学发展等方面具有积极作用。河南省审计厅充分发挥经济责任审计监督、服务和保障作用,提升经济责任审计的影响力,加强对地方政府主要领导干部权力的制约和监督。在认真总结南阳、安阳两个省辖市试点经验的基础上,2008年,省委组织部一次性委托,利用4年时间对所辖省辖市市长开展经济责任审计轮审。近日,随着2011年6名省辖市市长经济责任审计查出问题整改完毕,全省完成了对全部18个省辖市市长的经济责任审计,取得了很好的政治     

经济责任审计的几点体会

经济责任审计已成为对领导干部进行有效管理和监督的重要措施,随着经济责任审计的覆盖面越来越大,对该项审计工作的要求越来越高,而会计师事务所受各级政府监管机关及企业集团的委托,也越来越多地参与到经济责任审计工作中。经济责任审计属于专项审计的范畴,与会计报表审计业务相比有其特殊性。以下是笔者从事经济责任审计的一些粗浅认识。     

浅谈经济责任审计工作有关问题

经济责任审计是在我国改革开放过程中形成的一种审计制度,是我国传统审计在新形势下的继承和发展。由于经济责任审计工作起步时间不长,理论和实践上的不足暴露的十分突出。一、经济责任审计需注意的问题一是树立正确的经济责任审计理念。实践证明,实行经济责任审计制度是对领导干部进行考察监督的一个重要渠道,是完善干部监督机制的一个有效措施,是加强干部监督工作的重要一环。经济责任审计必须坚持与时俱进的科学态度,从依法履行审计监督职责和适应加强干部监督工作需要的高度出发,提高认识,加强领导,把实施经济责任审计作为审计机关认真…     

企业负责人经济责任审计评价指标体系探析

<正>企业负责人经济责任审计是伴随着我国经济体制和政治体制改革的进程产生并逐步发展起来的,是具有中国特色的融审计监督、组织监督、纪检监督为一体的一种特殊监督活动。对企业负责人履行经济责任进行全方位监督是经济责任审计的一个根本职能。通过建立企     

简析报业集团经济责任审计

企业经济责任审计是指审计机构接受干部监督管理部门的委托,依据国家法律、法规和有关政策,通过对企业资产、负债、损益的真实、合法、效益性以及有关经济活动的审计,对企业领导人员任职期间经济责任履行情况进行的监督、评价和鉴定活动。实行企业经济责任审计制度,将     

风险导向下的经济责任审计实践思考

<正>经济责任审计是为加强对干部的管理和监督,促进领导干部廉洁自律、认真履行工作职责而采取的一项重要措施。我们以服务公司发展为目标,以标准化管理为手段,深入推进审计工作转型,将风险管理理念融入审计项目中,积极探索经济责任审计的新思路、新方法,努力提高审计工作质量。一、将风险审计理念贯穿于经济责任审计的各阶段在经济责任审计实践过程中,我们遵循标准化的PDCA循环,将风险导向贯穿于经济责任审计的全过程。被审计单位     

公司审计委员会动因的政治视角解析

本文简要回顾了公司审计委员会的发生、成长及现状,对公司审计委员会产生动力的观点进行归纳。从企业的成长、法人权力在市场和社会中的扩张、公司经济权力与政治权力的日益融合、企业社会责任的增强、专家体制下分散决策等方面,证明公司了审计委员会是公司与社会之间的一个权力制衡器。     

The effect of audit committee shareholding,financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures

In recent years, corporate failures and accounting irregularities have led to concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees in the financial reporting process. In response, corporate governance committees in different countries have made specific recommendations designed to enhance the role of the audit committee in executing its financial reporting oversight duties. We investigate in this study, the effect of some of these recommendations by empirically examining the relationship between selected audit committee characteristics and the level of disclosure in interim reports of a sample of 262 UK listed companies. Specifically, the audit committee characteristics examined are shareholding of audit committee members (as a proxy for audit committee independence), audit committee size and audit committee financial expertise. Employing both a weighted and unweighted index to measure interim disclosure, the results indicate a significant negative association between shareholding of audit committee members and interim disclosure. Our results provide evidence of a significant positive association between interim disclosure and audit committee financial expertise. We find no significant relationship between audit committee size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Overall, however, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics have an impact on its monitoring effectiveness of the financial reporting process. These results have important implications for corporate governance policy-makers who have a responsibility to prescribe appropriate corporate governance structures to ensure that shareholders are protected.     

国家经济安全审计：基础、依据与机理

国家审计是国家经济安全保障体系中的重要组成部分,在该体系中处于最基础、最重要和最具操作性的地位。维护国家经济安全是国家审计的首要任务。文章探讨了国家审计维护经济安全的理论基础、基本依据与作用机理,研究发现:国家审计维护经济安全的理论基础溯源于受托责任理论和公共选择理论,基本依据涵盖审计产生原始动因与审计目标、公共受托责任、审计法定职责和免疫系统功能四个方面,作用机理涉及国家审计工作的监测、鉴证、预防、预警、纠偏和修复六个维度。     

A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure

The primary objective of this study is to test a theoretical framework relating four major corporate governance attributes with the extent of voluntary disclosure provided by listed firms in Hong Kong. These corporate governance attributes are the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the board, the existence of a voluntary audit committee, the existence of dominant personalities (CEO/Chairman duality), and the percentage of family members on the board. Using a weighted relative disclosure index for measuring voluntary disclosure, the results indicate that the existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure, while the percentage of family members on the board is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. The study provides empirical evidence to policy makers and regulators in East Asia for implementing the two new board governance requirements on audit committee and family control.     

An Investigation of Audit Committees' Oversight Responsibilities

Audit committee performance has come under close scrutiny in recent years from a variety of policy-makers, interest groups and researchers. In particular, the adequacy of audit committee oversight has been challenged. At the same time, audit committees are under pressure to increase the scope of their oversight work. This study examines audit committee oversight from the internal perspective of active U.S. audit committee members. A two-part survey used Wolnizer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee objectives related to accounting and reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in general as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the key tasks and issues currently addressed by audit committees. The results indicate that audit committee members appreciate the importance of all audit committee members having sufficient expertise in oversight areas related to accounting, auditing and the law. However, some respondents agreed they lacked sufficient expertise in many or all of these areas. In addition, the findings indicate that audit committee members tend not to recognize their assigned responsibilities, but agree with the proposed expansion of committee responsibilities. Using a multimethod approach, internal control evaluation was consistently listed and ranked as the most important oversight responsibility. These findings provide insight into the priority perceived by audit committee members as to their oversight responsibilities, and the adequacy of U.S. reporting disclosures as signals of audit committee work.     

Costs and Returns on Graduates of the University of Bradford

Global repercussions of the Enron scandal and particularly the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in the USA, resulted in significant changes in the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance, including an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK-listed company chief financial officers, audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality post-SOX. Four hundred and ninety-eight usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. However, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance-compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine independent dimensions: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size and, lastly, ISAs and audit inspection. Post-SOX regulations have introduced additional dimensions to the factors influencing audit quality. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, a finding consistent with regulatory over-reaction.     

The impact of audit committee expertise on audit quality: Evidence from UK audit fees

Governance regulators currently place great emphasis on ensuring the presence of financial expertise on audit committees (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code 2010–2016). Underlying this is a belief that greater expertise enhances the effectiveness of audit committees and, by extension, the quality of the external audit. This study investigates the impact of audit committee expertise on one measure of audit quality - audit fees paid by FTSE350 companies. Our analysis finds that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated with higher audit fees. When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-accounting, we find that the positive impact identified is driven by non-accounting expertise. Furthermore, when we separate FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms we find the impact of financial expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms. Our findings are important as they highlight the usefulness of segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-specialists, something which regulators in the UK and in the USA currently do not do. Our findings also highlight the potential value of audit committee expertise in smaller as opposed to larger listed firms, suggesting that the value of expertise to audit quality depends on the specific financial reporting challenges firms face.     

Problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality

The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences for financial reporting quality of having audit committees that include problem directors, that is, directors with prior involvement in corporate bankruptcies, major accounting restatements, or other accounting scandals. An ordinary least squares regression model is used to examine the association between problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality as proxied by accruals and real earnings management. Results reveal that there is a positive association between the presence of problem directors on the audit committee and real earnings management, and this association is more pronounced in cases where those problem directors have been involved in prior instances of accounting restatements and fraudulent reporting practices.     

Board and Monitoring Committee Independence

This study focuses on the composition of boards of directors and their monitoring committees (audit and compensation) for large Australian companies. For firms whose boards use a committee structure, much of the monitoring responsibility of the board is expected to rest with the independent committee members. We document a positive association between the proportion of independent directors on the full board and its monitoring committees, and a greater proportion of independent directors on both audit and compensation committees than the full board. Our hypotheses tests involve an examination of the impact of other mechanisms used to control agency conflicts on full board and committee independence, and the association between this independence and firm value. We find that full board independence is associated with low management ownership and an absence of substantial shareholders. Audit committee independence is associated with reduced monitoring by debtholders when leverage is low. While we predict a positive relationship between board and monitoring committee independence and firm value, our results do not support this conjecture.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.