基于进化博弈理论的分销渠道合作分析研究

文章研究了由制造商和零售商组成的简单分销渠道,采用博弈最新发展的进化博弈理论,分析了制造商和零售商的决策问题。研究表明在完全理性下通过讨价还价来分配合作总利润,不会实现帕累托最优策略——合作,并且根据分配比例的不同范围可以得到不同的博弈类型;在有限理性下制造商和零售商通过长期反复博弈,学习和调整,渠道合作的可能性与超额利润成正比;当超额利润趋近无穷时,制造商和零售商完全合作。如果制造商（或零售商）合作,零售商（或制造商）不合作,制造商（或零售商）合作的损失越小,渠道关系趋近合作的可能性越大;渠道合作的可能性与各自的贴现因子成正比。     

嵌入讨价还价博弈的经营者报酬对公司绩效影响研究

文章研究表明:董事会与CEO之间的权力博弈是影响CEO报酬和公司绩效关系的重要因素.中国国有上市公司董事会与CEO之间的博弈扭曲了CEO报酬机制,损害了CEO报酬对公司绩效的促进作用,应当从博弈的制度环境入手矫正上述博弈机制,理顺CEO报酬机制的作用机理.     

高流动性对我国企业劳资冲突的影响——基于完全非完美信息动态博弈模型的分析

国际金融危机持续扩散蔓延,我国劳动力市场呈现出高流动性的特征。文章根据金融危机下我国企业劳资冲突的现状构建博弈模型,分析国际金融危机下劳动力市场高流动性对我国企业劳资冲突的影响。结论是：无论是国有企业还是非国有企业,劳动力的高流动性都可能会使原本不可置信的威胁变成现实。在非国有企业中,要做好使工人回复序贯理性的工作,搞好再就业与创业。另外,我们必须考虑国有企业面临金融危机时,是不是应该以摆脱包袱为改制的唯一目的。而且,即使实行了私有化的改制,就必须采取措施让工人意识到他们的权益不会被侵犯。     

Water Externalities: Tragedy of the Common Canal

Laboratory experiments are used to investigate alternative solutions to the allocation problem of a common‐pool resource with unidirectional flow. Focus is on the comparative economic efficiency of nonbinding communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, allocation by auction, and allocation by exogenous usage fee. All solutions improve allocative efficiency, but communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations. An exogenously imposed optimal fee results in the greatest allocative efficiency, closely followed by an auction allocation that determines the usage fee endogenously.     

The price of land and the process of expropriation

Summary The price of land and the process of expropriation This paper applies a game theoretic model to situations in which the Dutch government expropriates land from some farmers in order to create a new public project. The model is a version of a finite period bargaining model with asymmetric information and one-sided offers. It is shown that the model can explain some casual observations as the fact that usually, but not always, the government and the farmers settle by agreement.This article springs from a paper that was written for the course Non-cooperative Game Theory and its Applications, Erasmus University, Spring 1994. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

MBO:完善上市公司管理层约束与激励的新思路

本文从企业投资角度且以团队为基础 (传统的分析基本上是以边际工人为基础的 ,研究企业人力资本投资客体与投资主体共同进行企业人力资本投资决策问题 ,建立了利润分享式契约下企业人力资本投资模型 ,对企业利润分享式契约下专用人力资本和通用人力资本进行了投资博弈分析。     

地方政府财政政策与企业股权融资:理论与实证

论文通过建立连续时间动态讨价还价模型对地方政府与企业所有者之间的博弈关系进行了理论研究．并对双方策略选择关系进行了实证检验。理论研究的结果表明，如果博弈双方的时间偏好相同，剩余控制权（或者称之为相对讨价还价优势）的配置与博弈双方的福利水平无关：而时间偏好不相同时，剩余控制权的配置将影响双方的福利水平，这个研究结论与是否存在交易成本不必相关。通过实证研究，论文的研究结果表明：（1）地方政府追求预算外盈余的行为会导致其增加财政支出最终导致财政赤字持续增加，但这些财政赤字并没有为企业股权融资提供有效的支持；（2）地方政府的财政更愿意与企业在预算外的领域合作，而企业则更愿意与地方政府在预算内合作：（3）非国有企业较国有企业更愿意和地方政府在预算外合作，而地方政府也更愿意和非国有企业在预算外的领域合作。这些实证结果说明地方政府在时间偏好不一致的情况下拥有剩余控制权。     

最后通牒实验与人类的公平感

作为行为博弈的代表性实验之一,最后通牒实验中提议者公平分配方案的提议行为和响应者对不公平分配方案的拒绝行为表明人们具有超越经济人自利的公平感。本文围绕最后通牒实验。简要梳理了最后通牒实验的渊源、争议及其相应发展,同时对最后通牒实验中的公平感及其神经基础做了简单介绍,最后针对公平感背后的经济学解释介绍了一个实验研究。     

外资并购的股权博弈与政策规制——租金分成视角

本文从租金分成角度考察外资并购的股权博弈与政策选择问题。契约不完全和竞争不充分导致的准租金是并购双方股权博弈的经济动因,而外资政策决定了双方的博弈顺序。分析表明:中性外资政策导致静态博弈,均衡股权比例收敛于双方相对能力;偏向性政策导致Stackelberg博弈,均衡股权比例偏离企业相对能力并引发先动方对跟随方的利益剥夺。由于租金规模的变动,行业竞争越不充分、资产专用性程度越低,政策因素的扰动效应越强。因此,通过适当的政策安排控制租金规模可以实现经济增长与产业安全的双重目标。这一研究为中国实行差异化外资政策和投资甄别制度提供了切实的理论依据。     

The wages of sin: Employment and salary effects of violence in the national hockey league

This paper investigates the proposition that violence is a significant determinant of player salary and employment in the National Hockey League. The basic hypothesis is that teams are composed of two types of player: the skill player whose performance and reward depends on scoring and the like and the physical player who is rewarded for bringing violence to the game. Testing this hypothesis ultimately involves constructing a model of salary determination and testing for the joint equality of the coefficients of skill and physical players. The data consist of a sample of 388 players for the 1989–90 season. The major conclusion is that the coefficients of the estimated models are significantly different for skill and physical players, thus confirming the hypothesized distinction.     

Most games violate the common priors doctrine

The type of a player in a game describes the beliefs of that player about the types of others. We show that the subset of vectors of such player-type beliefs which obey the consistency condition sometimes called the Harsanyi doctrine is of Lebesgue measure zero. Furthermore, as the number of players becomes large the ratio of the dimension Harsanyi-consistent beliefs to the set of all beliefs tends to zero.     

Negotiated tariffs in free entry oligopoly under integrated markets

Using the Nash bargaining approach, this paper analyzes the negotiation of tariffs between two countries in free-entry oligopolies under integrated markets. Employing a symmetric model with linear demand and cost functions, the paper shows that for both countries Pareto-efficient negotiated tariffs are larger than the tariffs at the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tariff game (tariff war) in which each country imposes its optimum tariff.     

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This “holdout problem” is a common feature of the land‐assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi‐person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff‐improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi‐period bargaining treatments relative to single‐period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi‐period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single‐period treatments, both with and without delay costs.     

Firm-specific human capital in different market conditions: Evidence from the Japanese football league

This paper examined how and the extent to which obtaining skills to meet team specific human capital is important to improve football player’s performance by comparing the top league and the second league. Based on panel data of individual players during the 2012–2016 seasons of the Japan Professional Football League (J League), we found; (1) In the top-league, changing team reduced player’s performance and their performance improved as player’s tenure of the team and also tenure of J League increased. (2) returns from acquiring team specific skills on time of play in the game increase and then decrease as years have passed. (3) benefit from moving team depends on the timing of moving, and so rookie players can benefit from moving when team tenure reach 4 years or more. (4) In the second league, neither team tenure nor experience of the professional football player does not influence player’s performance.     

Some rationalizability results for dynamic games

We study the relation between dynamical systems describing the equilibrium behavior in dynamic games and those resulting from (single‐player) dynamic optimization problems. More specifically, we derive conditions under which the dynamics generated by a model in one of these two classes can be rationalized by a model from the other class. We study this question under different assumptions about which fundamentals (e.g. technology, utility functions and time‐preference) should be preserved by the rationalization. One interesting result is that rationalizing the equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric dynamic game by a dynamic optimization problem that preserves the technology and the utility function requires a higher degree of impatience compared to that of the players in the game.     

Risk Aversion and Wages: Evidence from the Baseball Labor Market

We develop a bargaining model to assess how workers and employers might allocate wages inter-temporally in order to cope with risk. We then apply this model to 106 long-term contracts for major league baseball players’ services. Most of these agreements not only smooth employee compensation over time but suggest greater relative risk aversion for teams than players. Compared to the wages they might pay to retain these players on a succession of one-year contracts, teams often pay a premium on longer-term agreements to protect against market volatility and potential inability to replace a key player on the open market.     

Financial Management, Bargaining and Efficiency within the Household; an Empirical Analysis

This paper analyzes data from the British Household Panel Survey on households' financial management and financial decision-making. Direct subjective information was collected by asking questions like ‘Who has the final say in big financial decisions?’. All questions were answered separately by both partners. We consider two competing models explaining how finances are organized. The first model is based on a household production approach, in which behaviour is determined by an efficient allocation of both partners' time to market work, financial management, and leisure. In the second model, which is game-theoretic in nature, financial management is a reflection of bargaining power. The two models have different implications for the effect of explanatory variables, in particular wages, on the dependent variables. Empirical results indicate that financial management is primarily determined by bargaining considerations.     

Noncooperative foundations for the kalai-smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures

In bargaining, players may adopt different prominence structures when making demands: (i) each player might use (1/N)th of his maximum monetary payoff as the prominence level or (ii) players might use a common prominence level. This paper considers a scheme in which players alternate making demands. It turns out that if the prominence levels described by (i) are used and if players have utilities linear in money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as players' prominence levels get smaller. If the common prominence level of (ii) is used and if players have identical constant marginal utilities of money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the equal sacrifice solution as that prominence level gets smaller.     

我国中央企业工资收入分配改革的方向与策略——基于工资集体协商视角

一年来,面对复杂经济环境,中国政府将"拉动内需"作为经济发展的重要途径。为促进消费,政府积极引导企业建立和实践工资集体协商,以合理、有效地增加职工工资收入。文章从工资集体协商视角对央企工资收入分配改革的方向和策略进行研究。指出应该在央企监管部门、央企所属行业工会和人保部门之间建立行业级工资集体协商机制以保障协商谈判的效率与公平。基于合作博弈理论,构造了协商主体的效用函数;通过模拟赋值,对三种联盟结构下的工资协商主体的整体效用进行计算,进而得出央企效益类型以及议定工资增长率的高低决定协商主体策略选择的结论。     

Stee-rike four! What's wrong with the business of baseball? edited by Daniel R. Marburger praeger press, 1997, 218 pp.

This is a review of a 14-article volume edited by Daniel R. Marburger. These articles examine such topics as collective bargaining, player salaries, antitrust issues, and the problems of and future prospects for baseball. Major league baseball is an unregulated monopolist whose plant (stadium) is government-subsidized and whose unionized workers (players) share the monopoly profit with management. This sharing has led to considerable labor strife including strikes and lockouts. The major issues discussed in the book include the competitive imbalance as a result of large differences in team revenues, the player salary cap, and revenue sharing. The principal conclusions of the book include the marginal economic impact and benefits of a team on a city and the need to permit low-revenue teams to migrate.