An experimental investigation of bilateral oligopoly in emissions trading markets

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradable emissions permits, such as the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), can be dominated by relatively few large sellers or buyers. Previous studies on market power in emissions trading have assumed the existence of a subset of competitive players. However, a key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded by a small number of large sellers and buyers. Using a laboratory experiment, our objective in this paper is to test the performance of an emissions trading market utilizing a double auction in a bilateral oligopoly. Our results suggest that the theoretical bilateral oligopoly models can better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by the theoretical bilateral oligopoly model. How market power is exercised depends on the curvature of the abatement cost function. If the marginal abatement cost function of buyers (sellers) is less steep than that of sellers (buyers), the price of permits is lower (higher) than that under perfect competition. This is because the market power of buyers (sellers) exceeds that of sellers (buyers). The price of permits is close to the perfect competitive price when all traders have the sameslope of the marginal abatement cost function.     

Market Power of Domestic Marketers and its Influence on the Consequences of the Korea–US and Korea–Australia FTAs on the Beef Market

Domestic, US and Australian beef, which are differentiated by country of origin, are sold in Korea. In this differentiated product market, tariff reductions through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are expected to strengthen the competitiveness of imported beef and, therefore, to mitigate the effects arising from the market power of domestic marketers. The present study develops a simulation model that evaluates this mitigating effect by explicitly reflecting the market structure that domestic beef marketers constitute. The simulation results indicate that the farm-retail marketing margin would decrease by 10.59% or 6.79% due to the Korea–US and Korea–Australia FTAs, respectively, if domestic beef marketers formed a cartel or an oligopoly market (i.e. the degree of market power is 0.5), while the marketing margin under a competitive market scenario is simulated to have no change. The value of beef production would decrease by 1009 million dollars if the marketers form a cartel and hence exercise monopoly power. The FTAs are simulated to reduce the value of beef production by 564 million dollars under the competitive market scenario.     

Costly Buyer Search in a Differentiated Products Model: An Experimental Study

This study examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre‐ and postsearch), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to intuition, the presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. Data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition, and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted.     

Are trade creditors relationship lenders?

We test the hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship lenders using SME data from Japan. We find that the validity of the relationship lending hypothesis depends on the relative bargaining power between the buyer and sellers. Specifically, we find evidence that longer buyer–seller relationships may matter depending on the buyer–seller relative bargaining power. When a buyer depends too much on its main supplier, the supplier does not provide more credit as its relationship with the buyer matures. However, a longer buyer/main-supplier relationship is beneficial because a non-dependent buyer can obtain more overall credit from sellers. Depending on the extent to which this increase is due to an increase in the credit from the main suppliers, our findings are consistent with the relationship lending hypothesis. However, even if the increase mainly comes from other sellers, our findings imply that sellers extract a positive signal from a longer buyer/main-supplier relationship.     

二手车定价时存在禀赋效应吗?

通过对行为经济学中"禀赋效应"研究进行归纳拓展,构建了二手车定价模型,将卖方禀赋效应分离出来,并基于二手车交易网站的微观数据,实证检验了二手车定价时的禀赋效应是否存在。得到如下结论:二手车市场中卖方定价时会受到禀赋效应的影响,从而制定一个高于参照点(使用时间、行驶里程和原始价格形成的中立参照价)的价格。通过稳健性检验,认为禀赋效应的存在是普遍且稳定的,但有可能受到驾驶体验、交易物品特征等因素的影响。研究构建的定价模型对行为经济学中禀赋效应和参照点的设定具有理论和实践的参考意义。     

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets

In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of the side of the market on which it is levied. This principle of liability-side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability-side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Thus, we cannot reject liability-side equivalence.     

The Effect of Environmental Risk on the Efficiency of Negotiated Transfer Prices

This study investigates whether environmental risk affects the efficiency of negotiated transfer prices. We analyze a setting where the buyer faces environmental risk but the seller does not. From the risk‐neutral firm's perspective, the transfer should be made in our setting because the expected value of the buyer's profit is greater than the certain opportunity cost of the seller from the transfer. We develop hypotheses to predict that, as environmental risk increases, it becomes more difficult for buyers and sellers to reach agreement. Such difficulty reduces efficiency in terms of both firm profit and negotiation time. We test our hypotheses via an experiment in which buyer and seller dyads negotiate over the transfer of a resource at six levels of environmental risk. Results show that, as predicted, environmental risk decreases efficiency. Specifically, as environmental risk increases, the frequency of agreement decreases, thereby reducing expected firm profit. Further, environmental risk increases negotiation time for those dyads that are able to reach an agreement. Data suggest that the cause of the decreased efficiency is that buyers and sellers use different reference points for determining a fair transfer price and environmental risk exacerbates the effects of such differences.     

Market Interaction and Pro-Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.     

COMPETITION BETWEEN INTERMEDIATED AND DIRECT TRADE AND THE TIMING OF DISINTERMEDIATION

This paper analyses how intermediation by a middleman who buysfrom sellers and sells to buyers is affected if direct tradebetween buyers and sellers becomes possible. Without coordinationamong sellers and buyers, disintermediation may not occur whenit would be welfare-improving. With such coordination, disintermediationmay occur too early. If direct trade is active, the supply anddemand for intermediation become interdependent: an increasein the bid price thus increases both supply and demand. Thisprocess of interdependence by which the two trade mechanismscompete for trade is a feature of competing markets generally.     

Adverse Selection,Seller Effort,and Selection Bias

Several studies (Genesove 1993; Chezum and Wimmer 1997) use evidence of a correlation between seller characteristics and prices as evidence of adverse selection. This approach ignores the effect seller effort might have on the quality of goods sold. We develop a theoretical framework that accounts for both adverse selection and seller effort and provide a set of conditions under which sellers, who more likely adversely select the goods they sell, produce higher quality goods. Empirically, adverse selection emerges as a special case of selection bias. To disentangle the effects of adverse selection from seller effort, we employ a unique data set that allows us to model the selection decision explicitly. The evidence suggests that both adverse selection and hidden effort play important roles in the market for thoroughbred racehorse prospects.     

Illustrating Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets with a Classroom Game

This paper describes a classroom game that illustrates the effects of asymmetric information and adverse selection in health insurance markets. The first part of this game simulates a market in which buyers can purchase insurance from sellers; in some periods, government regulation prevents sellers from using information about buyer type to determine premiums. The results demonstrate the classic prediction that asymmetric information will result in adverse selection. Here, low-risk buyers will forego the purchase of insurance at a measurable loss of potential earnings. In the second part of the game, sellers and buyers can trade two different types of health insurance policies, one moderate and another generous. Under government-mandated community rating and limits on premium increases, no buyers will purchase the generous plan. Questions are provided to stimulate discussion of the causes and consequences of adverse selection for consumers and insurers and possible solutions for employer- and government-sponsored programs.     

The market for corporate subsidiaries in Japan: An empirical study of trades among listed firms

We investigate trades of wholly- or partially-owned subsidiaries between firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) for the years 1996–2010, to explore the economic impact in terms of strategic refocusing, stock market valuation and performance effects. By pairing both sides to each deal, we show differences in firm characteristics, returns, and subsequent performance of buying and selling firms. Unlike mergers between whole firms, most subsidiary deals straddled different industries. Most sellers were larger, more diversified and less profitable than buyers. Our event study reveals that abnormal returns were positive for buyers yet insignificantly different from zero for sellers. However, subsidiary sales in the core business earned negative returns, the more so the larger the deal. An analysis of ex-post operating results shows that the performance of sellers often declined after the trade, in particular for firms that divested a core-related subsidiary. We conclude that subsidiary trades in Japan in this period contributed importantly to strategic repositioning and a more efficient use of corporate assets.     

纯粹中介与套利中间人——一个普通商品市场微观结构内生化模型

本文给出了一个包括两种交易方式的普通商品市场微观结构内生化模型，其中，商品的买者、卖者不可以直接进行交易，但被允许在两种相互竞争的中介交易方式——“套利中间人交易”与被现有文献所忽略但又非常重要的“纯粹中介交易”——中进行选择。对于微观结构的内生性，模型给出了如下结论：交易意愿较高的个体倾向于通过套利中间人进行交易，而意愿相对较低的则会选择纯粹中介作为交易媒介；市场的微观结构决定于三个参数——跨期替代率、纯粹中介单位交易量的交易成本与最有效率的套利中间人单位交易量的成本。     

Imperfect Competition in German Food Retailing: Evidence from State Level Data

An increase in the level of retail concentration in food markets across Europe has raised concerns about the implications of retail dominance in the food supply. This paper measures oligopoly and oligopsony market power in the German food retail industry and incorporate specific details about the German meat market and the European BSE crisis. In this paper, simultaneous estimates of the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony market power in the German food retail industry are derived by applying a set of monthly state level retail beef and pork marketing data in the federal state of Hessen, Germany, from 1995–2000. Results strongly suggest evidence of retail oligopoly and oligopsony power. Lerner index estimates indicate retail market power accounts for 0.5% to 11% of the retail unit margins of beef and pork.

Do Health Insurers Possess Market Power?

During the 2009–2010 health care reform debates, many policy makers presumed that a lack of competition in the U.S. health insurance industry had resulted in greater levels of uninsurance. However, such a presumption has no basis in current research. This study, with a panel data set of the 50 states and the District of Columbia over the years 2001–2007, examines how health‐insurer market concentration at the state level influences the percentage of the population with either individually purchased or employer‐sponsored private health insurance. Two‐stage least squares estimates are derived using a lagged measure of health‐insurer concentration as an instrument. Results suggest that health insurers exercise market power on the seller side of the health insurance marketplace, but the restriction of output is limited to the individually purchased insurance market segment.     

Market structure and bank conduct in Lesotho

Lesotho's banking industry is highly concentrated and is perceived to be uncompetitive. However, high market concentration does not necessarily imply a lack of competition in the market. Until now, there is no evidence supporting the view that the industry is uncompetitive. Therefore, this paper uses monthly bank-level data from 2013:10 to 2019:5, and employs the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Boone indicator to examine competition in Lesotho's banking industry. We find that the industry acts as a ‘monopoly’ or a ‘perfectly colluding oligopoly’. We, therefore, argue that policy makers should set up the long anticipated antitrust agency to oversee conduct in this industry, and all other industries to improve societal welfare.     

Methodological approach to the market structure type identification (using the example of the fish production market of Primorskii krai)

The article is devoted to the search of a way to solve one of the fundamental problems of economic analysis of industrial markets, that is, the identification of the market structure type, lying at the interface of oligopoly and monopolistic competition or oligopoly and monopoly. It is proposed to conduct such an identification procedure on the base of using the instruments of L. Zadeh’s possibility theory. The proposed approach has been evaluated on the example of the fish production market in Primorskii krai.     

Squeezing the bears: cornering risk and limits on arbitrage during the ‘British bicycle mania’, 1896–8

This article examines the extent to which Victorian investors were short‐sale constrained. While previous research suggests that there were relatively few limits on arbitrage, this article argues that short‐sales of stocks outside the Official List were indirectly constrained by the risk of being cornered. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from three corners in cycle company shares which occurred in 1896–7, two of which resulted in substantial losses for short‐sellers. Legal efforts to retrieve funds lost in a corner were unsuccessful, and the court proceedings reveal a widespread contempt for short‐sellers, or ‘bears’, among the general public. Consistent with the hypothesis that these episodes affected the market, this study's findings show that cycle companies for which cornering risk was greater experienced disproportionately lower returns during a subsequent crash in the market for cycle shares. This evidence suggests that, under certain circumstances, short‐selling shares in Britain prior to 1900 could have been much riskier than previously thought.     

Subsistence and sales: the peasant economy of Württemberg in the early seventeenth century

This article examines the engagement of peasant cultivators with the grain market in Germany in the seventeenth century. It demonstrates a differentiated propensity to sell in regard to different grains; a preference among cultivators for retaining subsistence foodstuffs; the importance of payment in kind in the labour market; and the lack of a clear-cut social structural divide between grain sellers and buyers among those who cultivate arable land. It is thus argued that the analytical concept of 'the peasant' retains its use in understanding this society, but that attitudes displayed by the peasantry to 'the market' must be clearly set in the context of the specific product markets and practices to retain any analytical value.     

产品市场对寡头企业资本结构的影响——考虑破产成本的模型

从战略角度看,寡头企业的资本结构与产品市场密切相关,受到"有限责任效应"和破产成本效应的双重制约。企业对负债水平的选择实际是对这两种相互对立的制约因素的权衡。本文以一个典型的两阶段古诺博弈模型证明了,随着负债水平由低到高,企业的整体价值先升后降;在拐点处,企业实现了"最优资本结构"。