价值创造不是时髦标签

毫无疑问,中国的CFO们已经走到了价值创造的第一线.价值整合如何才能落到实处,是每一个CFO都无法回避的问题. 然而,现实并不乐观,价值创造正在被庸俗化.几乎所有的人都言必称"价值整合",似乎如果不如此.就OUT了.实际上,很多企业的理财行为,依然停留在很盲目的阶段,其CFO在企业中地位也很低,很难担当价值整合的角色.     

方军:软件CFO的硬道理

在规模快速成长的同时,如何持续提升本土软件公司的盈利能力?"发现价值,创造价值,实现价值和管理价值",这就是中软CFO方军坚信的CFO价值的"硬道理"。     

"价值整合"登场

无论您是否承认,在CFO崛起的前夜,中国的CFO们正在作为公司理财的主角,被推向企业价值整合的＂中枢＂。 有平衡计分卡之父之称的罗伯特.卡普兰就表示,CFO其实是＂首席价值官＂,而不仅仅只是作为一名守门员,永远坐在那儿。     

宁夏优秀企业集体采风:财务个性化成功

2011年7月,第四届"中国CFO年会"将在银川开幕之际,《新理财》(公司理财)专程赶赴宁夏,对宁夏回族自治区财政厅推荐的数家优秀企业代表,就其财务管理经验进行采访调研,以便与会的CFO和全国企业交流借鉴。     

破茧

为中国CFO阶层代言,是新理财选择的道路,也是我们的历史使命。每一期杂志里,我们都会对提升CFO地位、完善CFO职能进行鼓呼,也会报道优秀CFO的职业经历和人生感悟,更不会缺少财务管理和资本运营方面的优秀案例。但这并不是全部。这里不仅是公司理财的沙盘PK现场,不仅是交流、交友、交易的平台,更是一群财     

企业如何过"紧日子"

作为中国第一本为CFO定制的公司理财杂志,《新理财》（公司版）为了更好地CFO提供专属服务,开创性地推出了“客座总编辑”活动,本期,我们邀请了《新理财》的第一位客座总编辑李连清先生,就企业近期面对的紧迫形势进行了热点对话。     

2012转折性抉择

这虽然是一场并不针对公司理财的讨论,但是,全球投资者、中国经济学家以及国内个人理财者关于2012年的预判,对CFO们却有"触类旁通"之鉴。2011年12月17日,广发银行在京主办的"国际视野,中国智     

中国式实践

作为全新的管理工具,财务工程魔方的出现充分体现了中国式的财务智慧。 伴随着中国CFO群体的崛起,由CFO主导的公司理财也出现了很多创新的理财模式,徐工的＂财务工程魔方＂就是其中之一。实践证明,这个全新的管理理念和模式为徐工创造了极大价值，徐工的CFO吴江龙先生指出，如果没有这种财务工程系统优化理念，徐工就不可能有今天的成绩。     

谁与争锋：中国CFO成长三部曲——从诚信、国际化到提升公司价值

至今，中国CFO高峰论坛已经成功举办了三届。第一届主题是“在诚信中走向职业化”。第二届的主题是“直面国际化的挑战”，而本届的主题是“财务提升公司价值”!财政部副部长、中国CFO年度人物评选委员会主任李勇指出，活动主题的更迭变换反映了中国CFO从起步、发展到超越的历程[编者按]     

马雪征:市场追梦人

"传统的CFO就是会计、账房先生,现在要求CFO能够从财务角度对公司战略有所支持,在这个过程中CFO首先是要积极地参与,并提供有建议性的方向和角度。"     

财务精益时代的竞争·资本·运营——2012’中国CFO年会特别报道

2012年着眼当下,全球经济乱象或将持续,不稳定性和不确定性的因素在不断增多。在"十二五"规划实施第一年,中国经济社会发展保持良好势头的同时,也面临着国际经济格局重大改变所带来的影响。不平衡、不协调、不可持续的矛盾和问题仍较突出。从产业投资过剩到现金流告急,企业运营成本持续走高,行业内轮番洗牌,银行资金紧张、民间融资火爆等都将本土企业置于战略能见度极差的困境中。如何     

Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers? roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO?s power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents. Predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like SOX and the extent to which the CEO?s or CFO?s incentives significantly impact on earnings management. The model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non-powerful CEO can extract rents, which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between CEO power and “excessive” compensation.     

The value-adding CFO: an interview with Disney's Gary Wilson. Interview by Geraldine E. Willigan

Financing a company is more complex than ever-and more important to its economic success. The demands on a CFO are tremendous. Optimizing capital costs requires an unprecedented level of technical sophistication. Yet the best CFOs today are not mere technicians. They are also strategists and innovators. Gary Wilson exemplifies the new CFO. In his 5 years as executive vice president and CFO of the Walt Disney Company and his 12 years at Marriott Corporation, he has shown how the finance function can add value-not just account for it. How does a CFO create value for shareholders? "Just like all the great marketing and operating executives," Wilson says, "by being creative." To Wilson, being creative means rethinking assumptions and finding clever ways to achieve financial and strategic goals. Some of Wilson's innovative deal making-like the off-balance-sheet financing he used at Marriott-is well known. At Marriott, he discovered the power of separating the ownership of an asset from its control. Marriott's strength was in operations, yet the company had a great deal of money tied up in real estate. Growth would require even more investment in real estate. Wilson's solution was to sell the hotels-in effect, removing them and the debt used to finance them from the balance sheet-and contract to operate them. In this interview, Wilson gives his view of the role of finance in today's corporation and explains the thinking behind some of the successful deals he has engineered-including Disney's Silver Screen movie-making partnerships and Euro Disneyland.     

Corporate Portfolio Management Roundtable

The dean of a top ten business school, the chair of a large investment management firm, two corporate M&A leaders, a CFO, a leading M&A investment banker, and a corporate finance advisor discuss the following questions:

• ? What are today's best practices in corporate portfolio management? What roles should be played by boards, senior managers, and business unit leaders?
• ? What are the typical barriers to successful implementation and how can they be overcome?
• ? Should portfolio management be linked to financial policies such as decisions on capital structure, dividends, and share repurchase?
• ? How should all of the above be disclosed to the investor community?

After acknowledging the considerable challenges to optimal portfolio management in public companies, the panelists offer suggestions that include:

• ? Companies should establish an independent group that functions like a “SWAT team” to support portfolio management. Such groups would be given access to (or produce themselves) business‐unit level data on economic returns and capital employed, and develop an “outside‐in” view of each business's standalone valuation.
• ? Boards should consider using their annual strategy “off‐sites” to explore all possible alternatives for driving share‐holder value, including organic growth, divestitures and acquisitions, as well as changes in dividends, share repurchases, and capital structure.
• ? Performance measurement and compensation frameworks need to be revamped to encourage line managers to think more like investors, not only seeking value‐creating growth but also making divestitures at the right time. CEOs and CFOs should take the lead in developing a shared value creation model that clearly articulates how capital will be allocated.

     

Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments

Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm’s financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses.     

Management of operating cash flows before and after the scandals in the early 2000s: An examination of meeting or beating analyst cash flow forecasts*

We examine whether the stock market premium assigned to meeting or beating analyst estimates of cash flows from operations (hereafter, “CFO”) has changed after the publicized accounting scandals in the early 2000 s (“post-scandals period”). We also examine whether firms’ CFO management behavior associated with meeting or beating analyst CFO forecasts has changed after the scandals. We find that the market reward for firms that meet or just beat analyst CFO forecasts (“small beaters”) has increased in the post-scandals period, especially when the accuracy of CFO forecasts is relatively high. We also find that the extent of CFO management engaged in by small beaters has increased after the accounting scandals and that these firms appear to resort to the timing of CFO. Further, we find evidence that the “underpricing” of CFO is weaker in the post-scandals period that exhibits a greater extent of CFO management than before, suggesting that the reduction in the underpricing of CFO in the post-scandals period is at least partially due to CFO management. Overall, our findings suggest that firms responded to the rising importance of cash flow information after a series of accounting scandals by inflating reported CFO to a larger extent than they did before.     

中交的财务轨道

快速整合后整体上市,高负债结构下疏浚现金流,海外并购提速,以及有限多元化的资源与风险的平衡……中交集团CFO傅俊元在过去的五年中一直致力于铺设一条健康、平稳而且快速的财务轨道。     

电子商务:遥远的美好

疯狂的资本与疯狂的营销之下,只见规模不见盈利的中国电子商务行业,能熬过残酷的今天和明天,迎来遥远美好的明天吗?     

论商业保险基础风险原理对建立基本医疗保障制度的适用价值

2009年新医改重大举措不断,它对于我国相对薄弱的医疗保障体系无疑是必需和及时的。本文从理论上初步论述了商业保险基础风险原理对完善建立我国全民基本医疗保障制度的适用价值。通过总结国际医疗保障制度改革及其研究的趋势,论证以医疗保险的基础风险为依据,是实现社会医疗保险预期绩效的基本保证。同时指出定性定量分析我国全民医保的基础风险,才能从根本上找到完善建立相关制度的措施和方法,促进我国医疗保障体系的进一步科学发展。