A Post-Keynesian Response to Piketty's ‘Fundamental Contradiction of Capitalism’

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty presents a rich set of data that deals with income and wealth distribution, output-wealth dynamics and rates of return. He also proposes some ‘laws of capitalism’. At the core of his argument lies the ‘fundamental inequality of capitalism’, an empirical regularity stating that the rate of return on wealth is greater than the growth rate of the economy. This simple construct allows him to conclude that increasing wealth (and income) inequality is an inevitable outcome of capitalism. While we share some of his conclusions, we will highlight some shortcomings of his approach based on a Cambridge post-Keynesian growth-and-distribution model. The paper makes four points. First, r?>?g is not necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty succumbs to a fallacy of composition when he claims that a necessary condition for r?>?g is that capitalists save a large share of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesians can learn from Piketty's insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. Fourth, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production function does not exist and cannot explain income distribution.     

The Evolution of the Veblenian Dichotomy: Veblen,Hamilton, Ayres,and Foster

One of the most troubling developments in recent years has been widening income inequality in the United States and elsewhere. We argue Post Keynesian Institutionalism (PKI) provides insight into the causes of increasing income inequality and our contribution is threefold. First, we compare PKI to the “financialization” literature, noting key similarities and differences. Second, we examine changes in financial structure and income inequality for a sample of developed nations, showing that financialization has increased in nearly all the countries sampled and that this increase has generally been accompanied by a rise in income inequality. Third, we demonstrate that the development of modern financial structures does not preclude an expansive welfare state and egalitarian public policies. Our finding is congruent with Hyman Minsky's conception of PKI, which stressed both that “economic systems are not natural systems” and that capitalism comes in as many varieties as Heinz has of pickles.     

Considerations on Inequality,Corporate Governance,and Financialization

Abstract

Disjunctures between corporate governance, increasingly dominated by financial considerations, and social inequality have been among the motor forces of current world-wide “populist” voter revolts. This article looks for clues for the relation between economic inequality, corporate governance, and financialization by re-examining the work of Karl Marx and of Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means. Marx is widely considered, in Japan, to have pointed out that the division of profit into the wages of management and the profit of enterprise is considered as a path to the association. However, this general interpretation in Japan may not be sufficient for capturing capitalism’s contemporary reality. This presentation develops an alternative interpretation of this chapter by combining Marx’s explanation with the theory of the separation of ownership and management proposed by Berle and Means. We then explore causal relations among income inequality, corporate governance, and financialization.     

Piketty’s Elasticity of Substitution: A Critique

This article examines Thomas Piketty’s explanation of a falling wage share. Piketty explains rising income inequality between labor and capital as a result of one parameter of a production function: an elasticity of substitution, σ, between labor and capital greater than one. This article reviews Piketty’s elasticity argument, which relies on a non-standard definition of capital. In light of the theory of land rent, it discusses why the non-standard capital definition is a measure of wealth, not capital and is problematic for estimating elasticities. It then presents simple long-run estimates of σ in constant elasticity of substitution functions for Piketty’s data as well as for a subset of his capital measure that comes closer to the standard definition of productive capital. The estimation results cast doubt on Piketty’s hypothesis that σ is greater than one.     

Inequality: The original economic sin of capitalism? An Evaluation of Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the twenty-first century"

This is a review article of Thomas Piketty's book “Capital in the twenty-first century”. Piketty promotes the old theme that, under capitalism, the rich tend to become richer and the poor become poorer, at least in relative terms. We consider whether the data really shows that wealth and income are becoming more concentrated; the role of income transfers (Piketty's data is for pre-tax and pre-transfer income) and other influences on inequality such as real estate prices; the implications of social and economic mobility; the role of the state in fostering inequality; and the determination of socially acceptable inequality. We conclude that Piketty has not succeeded in showing that the inequality r > g (the rate of return is greater than the rate of growth) is the principal determinant of inequality. Piketty offers neither an accompanying theory of social justice nor a theoretical framework to support his case. In particular, lacking is a revealed appreciation of the effects of high marginal tax rates on growth and efficiency.     

Corporate profit tax,firm entry with unemployment,and income inequality

In this paper, we provide a general equilibrium analysis of corporate profit tax on income distribution, unemployment, and wage inequality. With firm dynamics in industrial sector, we identify a new channel through which profit tax affects income and wage inequality: profit tax cut will widen not only the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor, but also exacerbate the wage inequality of unskilled labor among different sectors. The welfare effect of profit tax cut depends on unemployment deepening (labor-distortion effect) and more manufacturing firms enter the market (business-creation effect), eroding the market share of incumbent firms (business-stealing effect).     

Financialization and the rentier income share – evidence from the USA and Germany

During the past two decades, there has been a shift of significance from the real to the financial sector. In the course of (financial) globalization, measures of liberalization and deregulation have contributed to a strengthening of financial capital. The concept of shareholder value orientation has become more powerful, capital income has increased tremendously, while real wages have stagnated. Most industrial countries have experienced a decline in the share of labor income. Based on a review of empirics and literature, this paper seeks to determine who gained from the fall in the labor share of income in the USA and Germany, respectively. If financialization is indeed responsible for the decline, rentiers should be the beneficiaries. In order to identify the relevant effects, the profit share of the two countries under observation is split between the share of retained earnings and the share of net property income (= rentiers’ income) using a modification of the approach chosen by Epstein and Jayadev (2005 Epstein, G. and Jayadev, A. 2005. “The rise of rentier incomes in OECD countries: Financialization, central bank policy and labor solidarity”. In Financialization and the world economy, Edited by: Epstein, G. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  [Google Scholar]). The evidence presented shows that the development of the rentier income share indeed corresponds quite well with the stages of development of financialization in the two different countries: in the US, where the important shift towards financialization occurred in the early 1980s, the rentiers’ share of income shows a corresponding leap upwards exactly at that time and remains on a higher level until the end of the observation period. In Germany, the process of financialization started much later – in the beginning of the 1990s – and followed a much more gradual transition, which is perfectly mirrored by the development of income shares: from the 1990s onwards, the rentiers’ income share gradually increased over time.     

Wealth,Capital and the Theory of Distribution: Some Implications for Piketty’s Analysis

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) has been spectacularly successful. One reason for this is that while it often challenges received views and supports a non-apologetic interpretation of capitalism, at the same time it relies on mainstream economics. This theoretical framework, however, is not always conducive to consistency and interpretative accuracy. This paper points out some of the book’s analytical weaknesses and shows that some empirical evidence, a clearer distinction between wealth and capital, and a different theoretical perspective, could lead to questioning some of the book’s claims. In particular, it argues that the increase in the wealth-to-output ratio (but not the capital-to-output ratio) cannot explain the observed changes in income shares. It also contends that non-mainstream perspectives on income distribution and growth suggest that changes in income distribution are due more to policy and power relations than to the factors Piketty identifies.     

Thomas Piketty's Historical Macroeconomics: A Critical Analysis

There has been a great deal of interest in the data on income and wealth inequality collected by Thomas Piketty. This paper does not question that data; rather, it questions the framework of Piketty's analysis, both theoretically and empirically—namely the alleged upward tendency of the ratio of wealth to national income and the rise of wealth inequality. First, in the mechanism put forward, wealth can only grow as a result of savings, thus ruling out any form of price effect (as in urban land). Second, Piketty’s second law defines an asymptotical trajectory, in which variables grow in parallel, something incompatible with the rise of the ratio between two variables. In addition, Piketty’s model does not match data for the USA. The historical profile of the ratio of wealth/national income is actually the inverted image of the productivity of capital (the ratio of output/firms’ fixed capital). Doubts are also expressed concerning the dramatic fall of the ratio of wealth/national income in Europe around World War I.     

Financialization of the Economy and Income Inequality in China

The income gap between the financial sector and other sectors has been widening since the mid-1990s. Why do financiers in China earn more than others? We analyze this issue against the background of financialization of the economy. The year 1993 was a watershed year, in which China began the process of rapid financialization. Since 1993, the financial sector has become increasingly powerful, overshadowing other sectors. Evidence shows that the high income levels that exist in the financial sector are related to this process of financialization in China. Financialization influences income distribution in China through two channels: money issuance and liquidation of social capital. The labor market equilibrium of the financial sector and wage level determination are not naturally formed but constructed. The increasing income inequality between the financial sector and other sectors is a consequence of financialization of the economy in China.     

Can the link between functional and personal income distribution enhance the analysis of inequality?

The aim of this paper is to present a framework which links functional and personal income distribution. In the first part of the paper, Piketty’s book “Capital in the XXI Century” is briefly reviewed. Piketty’s framework is discussed arguing that it can only partially explain levels and changes within personal income distribution. Piketty links the returns from capital r to the rate of growth of national income g in a very innovative way comparing them within a macroeconomic framework. He claims that when returns on capital rise more quickly than the overall economy and taxes on capital remain low, a vicious circle of ever-growing dynastic wealth and growing concentration of wealth takes place. However, the rise in the inequality of personal income distribution cannot only be explained by the rise of capital incomes. An analysis of the generation of personal incomes, and consequently of inequality, requires a suitable framework that links incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and incomes at the level of the individual/household. It is possible to set up this framework starting from individual endowments and their link to the productive structure: that is to what can be called the “generating function of personal income.” This function transforms personal endowments into personal earnings, given the productive structure, the technologies, and the market rules that determine the functional distribution. Personal income distribution and its inequality are linked to the functional one through the shares of capital and labor owned by each individual. The framework introduced here seems to be a suitable tool to account for the fact that personal income distribution is inextricably tied up to different sources of inequality in the distribution of national income. Sources come from institutional and productive structures (matrix Y), but also from the distribution of endowments and of individual/household entitlements (matrix S). This approach, we argue, allows for the assessment and evaluation of the effects of “ambitious new policies,” aimed at reducing poverty and inequality ex-ante, as suggested by Atkinson in his last book.     

The Literature on Piketty

The extensive critical literature on Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century is surveyed under nine headings. The first deals with the conservative argument that inequality in the distribution of wealth does not matter, since a rising tide lifts all boats. Second, it is claimed that Piketty’s prediction of continuously increasing inequality and the return of ‘patrimonial capitalism’ is unjustified. Third, the quality of the empirical evidence that he cites is questioned, on a number of quite different grounds. Fourth, some critics object that Piketty’s explanation of long-run trends in the distribution of wealth is too general and too theoretical. Fifth is the argument that he has used the correct (neoclassical) theory incorrectly, exaggerating the elasticity of substitution of capital for labour. Against this, post-Keynesian critics claim, sixthly, that Piketty is using the wrong theory, and should have drawn on the Kaldor–Pasinetti model of distribution and growth, and not the discredited neoclassical analysis. Seventh, Piketty has been criticised for ignoring the distribution of wealth in developing countries. Eighth, there is a wide range of objections to his most striking policy proposal, for a progressive global wealth tax. Finally, several critics from outside economics complain that Piketty has neglected a number of non-economic dimensions of inequality. I conclude by welcoming both the book and the critical literature, and calling for the distribution of wealth to be placed back on the political agenda.     

Men of Steel Meet the Market: Interpreting Firm Behavior in Russia’s Metallurgy Industry

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) explains growing income inequality via the difference between the rate of return on capital and the growth rate of the economy: the “r > g” inequality. Even if it is true that r > g leads to increasing inequality, nearly every school of economic thought predicts that r will fall as the economy grows. Thus, for Capital (2014) to be a comprehensive theory of inequality, a more adequate theory of r is required. I term this the “Piketty Problem.” I offer a solution to this problem from an institutionalist perspective.     

Political aspects of the capital controversies and capitalist crises

The Cambridge controversies about the theory of capital were ultimately underpinned by a clash between two different visions of capitalism, the neoclassical view, according to which distribution depends on the supply and demand curves of capital and labor, and the post Keynesian view, according to which distribution depends on political and institutional factors instead. I shall argue that the distinction between “meritocratic capitalism” and “patrimonial capitalism,” which underpins the discussions surrounding Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, is also connected to those two different visions of capitalism, which were behind the Cambridge controversies. These two visions of capitalism have important implications for our understanding of political power over workers, and also to our understanding of political power over land and its natural resources. The role of land and natural resources was not discussed in the Cambridge controversies, but is addressed in Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities, and is implied in Piketty’s inclusion of land in his definition of capital, which brings in a geographical dimension to our understanding of capitalism and capitalist crises, as I shall argue.     

The Evolution of Income Composition Inequality in Italy, 1989–2016

We study the evolution of inequality in income composition in terms of capital and labor income in Italy between 1989 and 2016. We document a rise in the share of capital income accruing to the bottom of the distribution, while the top of the distribution increases its share of labor income. This implies a falling degree of income composition inequality in the period considered and a weaker relationship between the functional and personal distribution of income in Italy. This result is robust to various specifications of self-employment income; nonetheless, it hinges crucially on the treatment of rental incomes. While the dynamics of imputed rents has brought about a more equitable distribution of capital incomes across the income distribution, that of actual rents has led to higher concentration of capital incomes at the top in the decade preceding the outbreak of the financial crisis. Finally, we conceptualize a rule of thumb for policy makers seeking to reduce income inequality in the long run.     

税收、收入不平等和内生经济增长

企业家(通过金融中介)从家庭借贷来支撑创新。二者在企业家的努力不为外人所见的情形下双方签订信用合同分享创新带来的垄断利润(即蛋糕)。两个有代表性经济人(企业家和家庭)的存在允许人们在内生经济增长模型里研究收入不平等。本文研究发现,企业家分配份额的增加一开始会提升增长速度,但是过了一定值后会拉低增长速度;而该份额的增加一直拉大企业家和工人间的收入差距。所以降低企业家获得的蛋糕的份额的分配改革可缩小收入差距。提高企业家来自创新的收入的税率将降低他们的努力程度,从而降低增长速度,但是该税率的提高有助于降低收入不平等程度。存款收入的税率提高尽管不会改变企业家的努力程度,但是也会降低经济增长速度,而且不会降低收入不平等(如果工人有一定比例的存款)。对于劳动收入(工人工资)的税率增加会加剧工人和企业家间的收入不平等,但对经济增长速度没有影响。     

Neoliberal Capitalism: A Time Warp Backwards to Capitalism’s Origins?

The global economy’s neoliberal transformation recalls Polanyi’s analysis of the great transformation. Present policies of destroying the welfare state or breaking resistance to substantial real wage reductions, strongly recall the 1930s, Speenhamland and Vienna succumbing to the attack of political forces powerfully sustained by economic arguments. Brought about deliberately, “globalisation” is the preferred neoliberal argument. Deregulation, reducing public economic influence, the WTO-system and multilateral treaties lock-in present policies, reducing future governments’ options of change and preventing the return of Keynesianism. Privatisation opens huge private profit opportunities mostly realised at substantial costs to individuals or social costs, as the British railway system or boosting private pension funds illustrate. State intervention is generally condemned, but bailing-out speculators is welcome. Seen as dangerous to neoliberal capitalism, democracy is rolled back. These developments and economic crisis have again given rise to right-wing movements. The attack on Keynesian welfare policies occurred as predicted by Kalecki in 1943. The effects of neoliberalism are discussed in detail at the examples of trade policy, the liberalisation of capital accounts (promoted by the IMF in open breach of its own constitution), and the attack on the public pension system, which opens a riskless bonanza to private investors.     

A tale of two Ginis in the US, 1921–2012

Following a methodology by Jantzen and Volpert (2012), we use IRS Adjusted Gross Income data for the US (1921–2012) to estimate two Gini indices representing inequality at the bottom and the top of the income distribution, and to calculate the overall Gini as a function of the parameters underlying the two indices. A steady increase in the overall Gini since the Second World War actually hides two different periods of distributional changes. First, the increase in inequality from the mid 1940s to the late 1970s is driven by rising inequality at the bottom of the income distribution that more than offsets a decrease in inequality at the top. The implication is that middle-income earners gained relative to high-incomes, and especially relative to low-income earners. Second, the rise in the Gini after 1981 is driven by rising inequality at the top. Third, top-driven inequality follows a U-shaped trajectory consistent with Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006). Fourth, the welfare effects of the different distributional changes behind increasing inequality can be evaluated in light of the Lorenz-dominance criterion by Atkinson (1970): we argue that the rise in inequality since 1981 is much more likely to be associated with a social welfare loss net of compensating growth.     

Do Piketty and Saez Misstate Income Inequality? Critiquing the Critiques

A large body of literature points to sharply growing income inequality over the past half century. The Piketty and Saez dataset that measures income distribution provides empirical support for this claim. Our article evaluates three prominent criticisms of this dataset as well as the responses of Piketty and Saez to these criticisms. One key argument against using their dataset is that Piketty and Saez do not control for income shifting by top income earners in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and thus overstate income inequality. In evaluating this criticism we find that a segment of their dataset likely understates income inequality; this is just the opposite of what critics assert. This implies that the Piketty–Saez dataset is a valuable resource for income inequality research and that scholars can use it to build more refined, accurate and insightful measures of income inequality.     

Waves of Populism: A Recent Manifestation of Polanyi’s “Double Movement”?

Abstract:

Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, there has been a new wave of populism in the United States and in Europe. The hypothesis of this article is that this GFC has created the conditions for the resurgence of populism. According to Polanyi’s work of 1944, The Great Transformation, the market is “utopian” and must be imposed by the state. Further, there is a disciplinary dimension, which separates the individual worker from the community, for the purposes of allowing the “prod of hunger” to be effective. This disciplinary dimension of the market, which is based on Polanyi’s analysis of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, can be extended. Several phenomena in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have intensified the tensions inherent in the market: fragmented production by means of finely divided global supply chains, increasing inequality due to the market structure; automation, declining labor share; increasing indebtedness; financialization; and erosion of protective labor market institutions, such as welfare and unionization. Populist movements are part of the backlash or “double movement” against these tensions inherent in the market.

Polanyi’s analysis may contribute to a greater understanding of what may be a global inflection point at present.