Private Property and Economic Calculation: A Reply to Andy Denis

Two years ago, in an article in this journal, Andy Denis revisited and added to the Socialist Calculation Debate, one of the 20th century’s greatest debates in economic theory. Denis argued that Austrian economists draw unsupported conclusions from their argument in claiming that private rather than several property is necessary for economic calculation. We note in this article that Denis’ argument rests on two key points: first, that the legal owners of capital, or the capitalists, play a purely passive role in the resource allocation process, and, second, that it is the managers who bear the entire burden of speculative decision making and economic calculation. We then proceed to criticize both points. Key to our argument is the fundamental insight of Austrian economics that the market is an open-ended process of discovery, coordination and value creation, where resource ownership and allocation is impossible to sever from entrepreneurship due to the inherent uncertainty of the future. We argue that, from the Austrian market process perspective, economic calculation indeed requires private property, and not simply several control, because entrepreneurship under competitive discovery must be subject to both the lure of profit and the risk of loss.     

Economic Calculation: Private Property or Several Control?

Abstract

As the centenary of the 1917 Russian revolution approaches, it is worth reviewing the past 100 years’ discussion amongst economists on the possibility—or otherwise—of economic planning under socialism. The socialist calculation debate is of fundamental importance, not merely as a specialist application of economic ideas, but as an investigation of the foundations of economic activity. Every economic action is premised upon calculation, every choice depends upon an assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative between which the agent must choose. The view of that choice and its attendant calculation is constitutive of the schools of thought—Marxian, neoclassical and Austrian—which have contributed to the debate. An understanding of the calculation debate is therefore required to understand how these paradigms stand in relation to each other. This article addresses one aspect of that debate—the claim by Austrian economists that socialism is impossible because the absence of private property in the means of production precludes economic calculation. The article suggests that several control rather than private property is required for economic calculation, and that several control is consistent with public ownership of the means of production. The Austrian argument on this point, therefore, is without force.     

From socialism in the 1900s to socialism in the 2000s: the rise of liberal socialism

In the twentieth century, Europe and North America were at the epicentre of the century-long conflict between capitalism and socialism; more specifically, between the rule of law and the rule through law. By the early 1990s, socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe decayed from within leaving in its wake economic misery and intellectual emptiness. Yet, socialism is raising its head once again. This new variant of socialism, which I call ‘liberal socialism’, has one critical difference that sets it apart from its predecessors. Unlike all three types of socialism in the last century – Fascism, National Socialism and Communism – liberal socialism is not imposed from the top down; it is emerging from the bottom up. The incentive effects of increasing redistributional governmental programmes map a road to liberal socialism by influencing the median voter and weakening private property rights. However, election results in many European countries, and at state and local levels in the United States, suggest that the median voter has not moved to the left. At the same time, economic analysis and empirical evidence have established the economic efficiency of credible and stable private property rights relative to all other property rights arrangements. Thus, liberal socialism is a real threat to the rule of law but its success is far from certain.     

Enrico Barone's ‘Ministry of Production’: Content and Context

Abstract

Enrico Barone's famous article on economic planning, ‘Il Ministro della Produzione nello Stato Collettivista’ (‘The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State’), which showed the theoretical possibility of an economically efficient collectivist planned economy, was published in Giornale degli Economisti in 1908. Barone's article has been widely cited, particularly in the comparative economic systems literature, but it has not been very widely read or analysed in recent years, and there is not much literature that places Barone's ‘Ministry’ model in the context of his other works or in its historical, social, or ideological context. The aims of this article are: (a) to analyse and clarify Barone's model in depth; (b) to place it in the context of Barone's other writings and the literature on the subject; and (c) to examine the apparent contradiction between Barone's hostility to socialism and his attempt to formulate the pure theory of the collectivist economy.     

Relaxing benevolence: public choice, socialist calculation, and planner self-interest

The Austrian calculation argument suggests that inability to engage in economic calculation worsened outcomes in socialist states. We suggest that this is hardly the case. When Austrian assumptions of benevolence are relaxed, inability to engage in economic calculation prevents the non-benevolent planner from fully extracting all available surplus from the citizenry. Consequently, when planners are non-benevolent, calculation ceases to be a relevant argument against the desirability of central planning; its normative force reverses absent benevolent planners. JEL Code P0, P16, P50     

论私营企业产权制度变迁的实现机制

产权制度是社会发展的主要动力之一，它决定着社会如何组织生产和进行分配，因此，规范而有效率的产权制度是现代经济发展的基石。如何建立起高效的产权制度，是我国私营企业在发展过程中应该考虑的核心问题。本文对我国私营企业产权制度变迁及实现机制进行了系统分析。     

Carl Menger's theory of the evolution of money: some problems

The Austrian economist Carl Menger suggested that money, law and language may all evolve without state intervention. A preliminary task of this article is to clarify what is meant by ‘evolve’ in this context. It is further argued that there is a gap in the Mengerian argument: a neglect of potential quality variation in the emerging monetary unit. Attention to this factor suggests a role for intervention in the monetary system, by the state or another overarching authority such as a central bank, to police the currency against debasement, and to legitimate its value. Furthermore, the argument suggests why law is not an entirely spontaneous institution and may require state sanction that is not generally necessary in the case of language.     

Austrian Economics,Socialism and Impure Forms of Economic Organisation

Modern supporters of the Austrian school of economics maintain that their critical stance towards impure forms of economic organisation - such as the mixed economy - grew out of the arguments of Mises and Hayek during the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s. The paper assesses the two theorists, contributions in the debate and argues that their ideas cannot provide the basis for a general rejection of impure forms of economic organisation. First of all, and contrary to most modern Austrians, who consider the contributions of Mises and Hayek as essentially consistent, it is argued that Hayek's critique of socialism is much more effective than Mises' as it rests on his concept of tacit knowldge and on an evolutionary account of the emergence of capitalist institutions. However, the paper goes on to argue that, if Hayek's critique of state intervention is to have any relevance for contemporary capitalist economies, it must be in a position to show the non-viability not only of a fully centrally planned economy of the Soviet type but also of the mixed economy. It is argued that it is precisely in this that Hayek's evolutionism fails, for his teleological approach is not persuasive in ruling out the possibility of impure forms of capitalism in a manner that is consistent with truly evolutionary - i.e. non-teleological - ideas.     

Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? Rethinking the Core and Periphery in the Eurozone Crisis

Recent literature on the eurozone crisis has begun to rethink those explanations of its origins that rely on narratives stressing the ‘immaturity’ of political and economic governance in the countries of the European periphery. These narratives are typically challenged by frameworks which understand the eurozone as a region characterised by a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ hierarchy between the economic growth of Germany, which leads to precarious, ‘financialised’ growth in the periphery. Yet, this article shows that core–periphery scholarship is unable to adequately challenge the immaturity thesis due to its preoccupation with German ‘victimisation’ of the European periphery. By exploring country-specific direction of trade and capital lending statistics, I shows that there is little basis for the argument that Germany is to blame for the origins of the eurozone crisis in the individual countries of the European Periphery. This article shows that by bringing core–periphery analysis into dialogue with Comparative Political Economy, a critical approach to the Eurozone crisis can be developed which leaves behind the myth of the German ‘big bad wolf’. Instead, I show that imbalances between the core and periphery are a product of a flawed construction of the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union.     

Trade,Power, and Political Economy: Reason vs. Ideology in Edward Stringham’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

In Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life, Edward Stringham explains that private ordering is sufficient to secure full exploitation of gains from trade within a society. After describing the logic of Stringham’s claim on behalf of private ordering, the remainder of this essay examines an enigma that Stringham’s argument entails: private ordering is sufficient for social coordination and yet public ordering is ubiquitous. The exploitation of gains from trade might offer a useful ideology, but this provides but an incomplete basis for a theory of society. In this respect, societies are rife with antagonism and envy, though these often manifest themselves ideologically as claims about justice and fairness. Politics goes where the money is; private ordering reveals targets that public ordering subsequently exploits. The challenge for political economy is to integrate the autonomy of economizing action with the autonomy of political action, for these dual autonomies provide the crucible out of which emerges the material of political economy. Stringham has deepened our appreciation of what private governance can accomplish, but much unfinished analytical work confronts theorists of political economy.     

The Rise of Finance and the Decline of Organised Labour in the Advanced Capitalist Countries

The goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of finance and corporate governance reforms on organised labour since 1980. The argument is made that contemporary institutional and ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ as well as ‘Varieties of Unionism’ perspectives on labour market reform have overstated the power of states, institutions and organised interests in deflecting global economic pressures. Drawing on a range of recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics and qualitative studies, it is claimed that current developments in finance and corporate governance mark a fundamental break with post-war developments. Capital has reasserted its power over organised labour and labour markets not only in the US and UK, but throughout Western Europe as well. In assessing how far this reversal has gone, the article focuses on three key political economic changes: i) the rise in finance and adoption of corporate ‘shareholder’ systems; ii) the expansion of mergers and acquisitions and their negative effects on unionisation and manufacturing jobs; and iii) the effects of financial pressures and corporate reform on collective bargaining and wages. This is the first study to report on comparative changes and qualitative reforms to both finance and labour in 13 OECD countries between 1980 and 2005.     

Postsocialist privatization and agency-related property: from Coase to Locke

Differing concepts of private property and the state (Hobbes, Locke, and Smith) are discussed on an abstract level as well as to their relevance regarding transition in the countries of Soviet socialism. This discussion provides arguments to support the following claim: to gain an adequate understanding of what privatization means in the context of Eastern European reforms, it is essential to use models of thought which (1) relate property rights to agency and production and (2) treat political, judicial, organizational and spontaneous processes of establishing and enforcing rights as endogenous elements of the analysis. This would imply that for an attempt to conceptualize ‘transition’ and ‘privatization’, traditional neoclassical analysis might be misleading: it treats private property rights (‘endowments’) as related to exchange only and holds that they exhibit no patterns which are relevant to the analysis of a market society. It treats them as exogenous and hence arbitrary.     

What Makes Humans Economically Distinctive? A Three-Species Evolutionary Comparison and Historical Analysis

The fundamental problem, of what makes humans economically distinctive, is addressed here by using a highly focused cross-species analysis to examine the evolution of property relations. Chimpanzees and bonobos are compared with mobile human foragers, and it is argued that our egalitarian political practices, in conjunction with variance-reduction practices we applied prehistorically to large-game meat consumption, led to a critical evolutionary transformation. The transition began with private property at the ancestral level, but ended with humans having not only private property, but communal property. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

论我国知识产权战略中的政府角色定位

提高知识产权的利用、保护与管理能力,已成为维护国家利益和经济安全的战略性武器。知识产权制度的非理性扩张,使得政府作用的介入成为一种必然。当前我国正处于紧锣密鼓的知识产权战略制定过程中,政府的角色定位宜比拟为孵化器,通过培育私权精神和促进经济效益,从国内、国际两个层面作出合理选择和战略安排,才能更好地促进我国知识产权战略的运用。     

Polanyi and Post-neoliberalism in the Global South: Dilemmas of Re-embedding the Economy

Although Karl Polanyi Studied a different epoch and focused on Europe, his ideas have inspired an outpouring of studies on contemporary problems and prospects in the neoliberal era. The bulk of these studies pertain to industrial countries or global economic issues. However, the human, environmental and financial impact of market deregulation is arguably more devastating in the ‘developing’ countries than in the core. A question thus arises: do Polanyi's reflections on progressive alternatives to liberalism clarify contemporary debates on development alternatives in the Global South? I contend that democratic socialism – Polanyi's preferred remedy to the ‘demolition’ of society and nature occasioned by market civilisation – is problematical in light of what we have learned from the twentieth century, but his framework for evaluating alternatives – featuring the re-embedding of economy in society – remains as powerful as ever, I support this argument with an exploration of socialism and social democracy – as well as community – based alternatives arising from ‘reciprocity’. Each possibility raises distinctive dilemmas, as an analysis of cases reveals.     

论私有产权的限制

私有产权的限制可从两个层次看:一是立宪层次上的限制,它是私有财产所有者被动接受的限制,包括禁止侵害他物权的限制和保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制;二是法律上的私有产权界定后,私有产权所有者主动选择的限制,包括行使权利成本的限制和设立他物权的限制.保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制抑制了私有产权、市场交换作为调节资源稀缺性与人类欲望无限性矛盾手段的力量;其他限制则是发挥市场机制配置资源,实现产值最大化的要求,为不是限制的限制.     

Limits of the New Institutional Economics Approach to African Development

In the last two decades, there has been a marked shift in the research on Sub-Saharan Africa from standard neoclassical analysis to new institutional economics (NIE). The increasing emphasis on NIE is reflected in a wide range of works by international financial institutions and scholars. However, the NIE approach retains fundamental limitations due to its narrow interpretation of institutions, its over-reliance on analysis of transactions costs and property rights, and its ahistorical attachment to markets and private sector firms as major engines of development. Furthermore, NIE typically fails to look “inside institutions” to identify the complex cultural factors that shape the interests and behaviors of the members of institutions. This paper engages in a critique of NIE analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development, and suggests the need for a nuanced analysis of property rights and culture, along with development programs to address inequality and poverty and to foster state-led development.     

Energy,knowledge and economic growth

It is argued that the explosive growth experienced in much of the World since the middle of the 19th Century is due to the exploitation and use of fossil fuels which, in turn, was made possible by capital good innovations that enabled this source of energy to be used effectively. Economic growth is viewed as the outcome autocatalytic co-evolution of energy use and the application of new knowledge associated with energy use. It is argued that models of economic growth should be built from innovation diffusion processes, unfolding in history, rather than from a timeless aggregate production function. A simple ‘evolutionary macroeconomic’ model of economic growth is developed and tested using almost two centuries of British data. The empirical findings strongly support the hypothesis that growth has been due to the presence of a ‘super-radical innovation diffusion process’ following the industrial deployment of fossil fuels on a large scale in the 19th Century. Also, the evidence suggests that large and sustained movements in energy prices have had a very significant long term role to play.     

The uncertain foundations of the welfare state

The welfare state is often portrayed as provider of insurance against ‘uncertainties’, in Knight's (1921) sense of the term, which would be refused or underinsured on private markets. This image conflicts with the standard economic model of risk exchange founded on the subjective interpretation of probability, which predicts that all individual uncertainties will be insured by private markets. Our aim in this paper is to explain why this prediction fails and, building on contributions to decision theory that take seriously the idea of Knightian uncertainty, to show why social insurance may be justified.     

Organizing Economic Experiments: Property Rights and Firm Organization

Many economists, notably Austrian economists, have argued that the market process is essentially an experimental process. We briefly try to clarify this conceptualization, and then argue that we may understand the firm in much the same light. A basic view of the firm as an experimental entity is derived, drawing on property rights insights.