Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations

By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.     

Turning Agents into Psychological Principals: Aligning Interests of Non‐Owners through Psychological Ownership

Principals who delegate tasks to agents face the perennial challenge of overcoming agency problems. We investigate whether feelings of ownership among senior managers in the absence of formal ownership can align agents' interests with those of principals, thus turning agents into psychological principals. Using a moderated mediation model, we find that psychological ownership is positively related to company performance through the mediating effect of individual‐level entrepreneurial behaviour. We also find that the effect of psychological ownership on individual‐level entrepreneurial behaviour and, ultimately, company performance is weaker for high levels of monitoring compared to low levels. These findings offer important contributions to agency, psychological ownership, and entrepreneurship literatures.     

‘Types’ of private family firms: an exploratory conceptual and empirical analysis

Family firms that can leverage entrepreneurial experience and knowledge can shape local economic development. Practitioners concerned with fostering enterprise sustainability need to be aware that family firms cite contrasting goals, resource profiles and requirements. Family firms are not a homogeneous entity. The ‘targeting’ of support to ‘types’ of family firms could enable practitioners to satisfy their wealth creation and social inclusion objectives. To stimulate increased critical reflection, insights from agency and stewardship theories were drawn upon to illustrate six conceptualized ‘types’ of private firms based on company ownership and management structures as well as company objectives. Cross-sectional survey evidence was gathered from key informants in family firms in the UK. An agglomerative hierarchical QUICK CLUSTER analysis identified seven empirical ‘types’ of family firms. Four out of the six conceptualized ‘types’ were validated by the exploratory empirical taxonomy. Implications for policy-makers and practitioners as well as researchers are discussed.     

Employee stock ownership and financial performance in European countries: The moderating effects of uncertainty avoidance and social trust

This study investigates how the effect of employee stock ownership on financial performance may hinge on the diverse cultural and societal contexts of European countries. Based on agency and national culture theories, we hypothesize that the positive relationship between employee stock ownership and return on assets (ROA) is stronger in those nations with lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust. Using a multisource, time‐lagged, large‐scale dataset of 1,741 firms from 21 countries in Europe, our multilevel, random coefficient modeling analysis found evidence for these hypotheses, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance and social trust serve as important contextual cues in predicting the linkage between employee stock ownership and financial performance. Our supplemental analysis with distinction between the managerial and nonmanagerial employee stock ownership further indicates managerial employee stock ownership has a direct positive effect on ROA. Although nonmanagerial employee stock ownership had a nonsignificant association with ROA, the relationship was positive and significant when uncertainty avoidance was low and social trust was high. This research contributes to the existing literature by illuminating some of the contextual influences altering the effectiveness of employee stock ownership. Our findings also offer practical suggestions for effectively using employee stock ownership.     

Investment and financing choices by time-inconsistent managers

This paper provides an analytically tractable continuous-time model in which a time-inconsistent manager can divert part of the firm’s cash flows as private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders. We endogenously determine the investment scale, investment threshold, optimal coupon and default threshold under managerial discretion. We demonstrate that time-inconsistent managers each have a trade-off between the timing and scale of investment.Among a number of important implications, by exploring agency costs of equity as deviations from the investment and financing policies that maximize equity value, our analysis reveals that a certain degree of time inconsistency in managerial preferences decreases the agency costs of equity. We also find that a naive manager more severely distorts the investment and financing policies than does a sophisticated manager, which leads to higher agency costs of equity. Finally, we document that the impacts of corporate governance variables, such as the managers’ property parameter and/or the level of managers’ ownership, depend on the managers’ beliefs regarding their future time-inconsistent behavior; this prediction provides novel empirical tests.     

Moving Beyond The Clash of Interests: On stewardship theory and the relationships between central government departments and public agencies

Abstract

This paper analyses the relationships between central government departments and agencies through the lens of stewardship theory. Stewardship theory has been developed as an alternative to agency theory and focuses on shared goals and norms. The paper first shows how current regulations are strongly imbedded in agency theory and then proceed to analyse, on the basis of a survey and focus groups, how the problems experienced by public managers generally point to the relevance of stewardship. On this basis and with input from sixty public managers, a stewardship model for the relationships between agencies and central governments is developed.     

The role of ownership structure in integrated reporting policies

Integrated reporting (IR) is used to demonstrate a firm's capacity to create value in the short, medium, and long term. It can better represent existing relationships between the company and its stakeholders, with a particular focus on investors. Attention to IR has grown considerably in recent years. However, studies on the determinants of IR quality are still limited. This study aims to bridge this literature gap by being the first study to analyse the role of ownership structure in IR context. To this end, it uses agency theory and is based on a sample of 152 international companies that have adopted IR. The results indicate a positive effect of institutional ownership and a negative effect of ownership concentration, managerial ownership and state ownership on the quality of integrated reports. These results are also consistent with the level of alignment of integrated reports with the <IR> framework. To our knowledge, this is the first study that analyses the role of ownership structure in the IR policies.     

Viceroys or Emperors? An Institution‐Based Perspective on Merger and Acquisition Prevalence and Shareholder Value

We study how cross‐country variance in institutions that aim to address core agency problems influences consequential strategic decisions of firms around the world. Scholars frequently argue that the interests of minority shareholders are threatened by merger and acquisitions (M&As) due to principal‐agency problems. Rather than acting in shareholders’ best interests, managers potentially act as viceroys, using M&As to cushion themselves from risk and extract more pay. Yet equally salient is the issue of principal‐principal agency, where controlling shareholders can behave as emperors who use M&As to siphon off assets and profits, and appropriate wealth of shareholders with fewer control rights. Taking an institution‐based perspective on these ‘viceroy’ and ‘emperor’ problems, we conjecture that institutions aimed to address these agency problems can generate the desired outcome regarding M&A prevalence, but may also produce unintentional negative consequences for shareholder value as a side‐effect. Empirical evidence covering M&As from 73 countries supports our hypotheses.     

The effect of corporate governance on credit ratings: Evidence from China's bond market

This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings.     

Expanding the boundaries of buyer-supplier agency problems: Moving from dyad to triad

Extant agency theory addresses dyads consisting of a principal and an agent. It informs us about how to overcome agency problems in the buyer-supplier relationship. In this conceptual paper, we propose a theoretical argument that if we expand the boundary conditions from dyads to triads, we find new solutions to dealing with agency problems. To the buyer-supplier dyad, we add the supplier’s supplier, the buyer’s other supplier, the supplier’s other customer, and the buyer’s customer. As such, we consider four types of triads in supply chains and propose that the buyer as the principal could reframe agency problems with the focal supplier by moving to one of these triads. In particular, we investigate alternative mechanisms that may reduce the level of goal incongruence, information asymmetry, and power asymmetry in the buyer-supplier relationship. Our conceptualization suggests that supply managers should look outside the buyer-supplier dyad for additional opportunities to resolve agency problems.     

Myth or reality? Assessing the moderating role of CEO compensation on the momentum of innovation in R&D

This study researches the influences of CEO compensation on firm behavior to examine the interactive relationship between the behavioral momentum of innovation in R&D and CEO compensation. The models presented in this study are based on evolutionary, institutional, and agency theories to test hypotheses using data from 107 companies in the high-technology sectors in the United States. The results indicate that the pre-succession innovative behavior of these high-technology firms on R&D can positively affect these firms' post-succession innovative behavior towards R&D. That is, positive momentum in R&D innovation prevails in a firm across a change of the CEO. However, for the role of CEO compensation, short- and long-term compensation does not positively moderate this behavioral momentum in R&D. Hence, the moderating impact of short- and long-term CEO compensation to enhance the momentum of innovation in R&D can be romanticized. These findings provide boards of directors with evidence as to how a CEO succession matters to a firm's behavioral momentum in R&D, and whether CEO compensation can be strategized to change a firm's innovation and momentous behavior.     

Managing information sharing and stewardship for public-sector collaboration: a management control approach

Information sharing is essential for public-sector collaboration but needs to be balanced with information stewardship obligations. There is little research on how public-sector managers can influence the attitudes and behaviours of their employees to achieve these competing objectives. To investigate this, the study applies a management control framework to a case study of a law enforcement organization attempting to improve its information sharing and stewardship. The study extends prior literature by providing insights into the specific effects that different management controls have for the information sharing and stewardship behaviours of employees involved in public-sector collaboration.     

Performance Measurement and Compensation Practices in Hospitals: An Empirical Analysis in Consideration of Ownership Types

Against the background of regulatory initiatives that put hospitals under increasing financial pressure, we explore performance measurement and compensation practices in hospitals through a multiple case study. We extend previous research by comparing practices among different ownership types (i.e. public, non-profit, and private) and by providing initial evidence on compensation schemes for the clinical staff. Our empirical investigation is embedded in the ‘stewardship–agency axis’ that allows the development of theoretical arguments about the interdependencies between ownership and performance measurement systems (PMS). We distinguish two primary levels of analysis – the types of measures implemented and their linkage with compensation and decision-making. Our findings suggest that the types of measures are primarily affected by regulatory pressures, while powerful internal actors considerably influence the linkage between these measures and compensation. Consistent with our theorised patterns, cross-case analyses indicate differences between ownership types concerning the performance dimensions that are prioritised and the linkage of performance measures with compensation of the clinical staff. Together, these findings provide evidence on the interdependent effects of the regulatory environment, the type of ownership and internal actors on a hospital's PMS. We also provide some tentative explanations for these findings based on insights from institutional and behavioural theory.     

Why and when organizational culture fosters affective commitment among knowledge workers: the mediating role of perceived psychological contract fulfilment and moderating role of organizational tenure

Drawing on Denison and Mishra (1995)’s framework of organizational culture, this study examines why and when organizational culture is related to knowledge workers’ affective commitment. Data were collected from 640 employees working in three high-technology companies in China. The findings indicate that the relationship between organizational culture and affective commitment is mediated by perceived psychological contract fulfilment. In addition, organizational tenure moderates the relationship between two external dimensions (i.e. adaptability and mission) of organizational culture and perceived psychological contract fulfilment. This study extends the current theoretical framework of organizational culture by demonstrating the underlying mechanism and the boundary condition of the relationship between organizational culture and affective commitment. The findings also provide practical implications for international managers to design appropriate human resource management policies and practices in China.     

也谈商事代理

本文从商事代理的概念界定出发,通过考察两大法系商事代理理论基础和法律制度的不同,对商事代理的本质规定性予以剖析,认为商事代理应仅限于商人所为的直接代理法律关系,英美法系的广义代理概念并不宜取。文中比较了商事代理与民事代理的不同特点,并对商事代理的类型予以划分,最后就我国商事代理制度之完善建构提出个人的思考,以期促进我国商事代理立法的完善和商事代理实践的规范有序运行。     

On the job and co-worker commitment of Dutch agency workers and permanent employees

This article explores the relationship between employment status (agency workers vs. permanent employees) and affective and normative job and co-worker commitment. Our study was conducted on employees from four metal companies in the Netherlands. As HRM practices seem to influence employee commitment, we performed 89 interviews across all four companies and included blue-collar workers, their managers (direct supervisors, HR managers and production managers), as well as works council members. To test our hypotheses on commitment differences, we conducted quantitative research within the companies (permanent employees N = 167; agency workers N = 54), all blue-collar workers. Results show that permanent employees and agency workers express similar degrees of commitment to their job and to their co-workers, apart from affective commitment to co-workers, which is lower for agency workers than for permanent workers. We argue that national legislation, as well as managers' attempts to offer HR practices equal to those of permanent staff, play a prominent role in stimulating agency workers' commitment.     

我国中小企业融资约束、代理成本与生产效率关系研究——基于我国180家上市公司的统计数据

中小企业是我国国民经济发展的重要组成部分,对于我国国民经济持续稳定的发展有着重要的促进作用。但是我国中小企业由于存在规模都比较小、体制不完善等问题,因此在融资时有许多困难;并且现代企业制度所有权和经营权分离,又会出现代理成本问题;同时目前国内生产资料价格普遍上升,就如何提高生产效率降低生产成本成为这些中小企业共同面临的问题。文章就上述中小企业问题进行实证研究,检验了融资约束、代理成本与生产效率之间存在的关系。     

Stakeholder Relationship Bonds

Scholars and managers continue to seek a better explanation for the behaviours displayed by various stakeholders. An enhanced understanding of the drivers of these behaviours ought to improve an organization's ability to appropriately manage relationships with stakeholders, thereby improving firm performance. This paper provides a detailed look at the concept of a relationship, from the perspective of the stakeholder, by focusing on the perceived psychological bonds that drive a stakeholder to decide whether to continue a relationship with the firm and, if the relationship does continue, how much pro‐relationship behaviour to exert. Our analysis works out how the strength of the perceived psychological bond is measured and establishes the conditions under which bonds will be broken. We also develop conditions that either promote or quash stakeholders’ pro‐relationship behaviour.     

The effect of CEO compensation structure on the early internationalization of newly public firms

This study suggests the incentive perspective as an antecedent of early internationalization. We argue that early internationalization is a risky strategy for a CEO in a relatively young firm and that a potential agency problem arises between a CEO and shareholders in such a context. By drawing on agency theory, we theorize that the CEO compensation structure plays a critical role in the early internationalization decision. In a sample of 145 newly public U.S. firms, we find that the likelihood of early internationalization is negatively associated with the CEO’s secured cash pay and positively associated with the CEO’s equity-based compensation. In addition, we find that the positive association between equity-based compensation and the likelihood of early internationalization becomes stronger as the CEO’s tenure increases. These findings show that the interest alignment between a CEO and shareholders affects the strategic decision of early internationalization. Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and international business by underscoring the importance of the compensation structure as a significant driver of value-creating strategic initiatives and by identifying incentive factors that spur firms to internationalize early.