MARKET REACTION TO NYSE LISTINGS: TESTS OF THE MARKETABILITY GAINS HYPOTHESIS

This study examines the market reaction to listing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The marketability gains hypothesis states that investors expect liquidity gains for the less liquid over-the-counter (OTC) stocks but not for their liquid counterparts after their listing on the NYSE. The hypothesis is supported even after accounting for other firm-specific news releases. Stocks with low liquidity on the OTC exhibit a positive reaction, whereas stocks with high liquidity show a non-positive market reaction around the announcement of the listing application. The findings imply that the two different marketplaces, NYSE and OTC, are suitable for stocks with different liquidity characteristics.     

UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES,LIQUIDITY, AND STOCK RETURNS

In this study we examine the effect of dual trading through unlisted trading privileges (UTPs) on liquidity and stock returns. Stocks with UTPs trade in a different market structure than stocks listed and traded only on the AMEX and NYSE. Differences in market structure may affect stock returns through liquidity services provided by the competing markets. The sample comprises 852 AMEX and NYSE firms that began unlisted trading on the Philadelphia, Pacific, Midwest, or Cincinnati exchanges between 1984 and 1988. The results show significantly positive abnormal returns around the SEC's announcement of a regional exchange's filing for UTPs. The results also suggest that increased competition improves trading liquidity. Only stocks with low liquidity before UTPs announcements experience significantly improved liquidity and positive stock returns.     

Does Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?

Goyal and Santa‐Clara (2003) find a significantly positive relation between the equal‐weighted average stock volatility and the value‐weighted portfolio returns on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks for the period of 1963:08 to 1999:12. We show that this result is driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq, and is in part due to a liquidity premium. In addition, their result does not hold for the extended sample of 1963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks. More importantly, we find no evidence of a significant link between the value‐weighted portfolio returns and the median and value‐weighted average stock volatility.     

THE EFFECT OF THE 1986 TAX REFORM ACT ON EX-DIVIDEND DAY RETURN BEHAVIOR

In this study I examine whether the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has an effect on ex-date stock return behavior. Results indicate that the tax reform has a significant effect on ex-date returns for NASDAQ stocks, but not for NYSE/AMEX stocks. Further analysis suggests that the ex-date returns on NASDAQ stocks are primarily determined by the tax premium. However, the ex-date returns on NYSE/AMEX stocks are more influenced by short-term trading.     

Testing for micro-structure effects of international dual listings using intraday data

This paper examines the impact on the liquidity of NYSE/AMEX listed stocks when they were subsequently listed on the London or the Tokyo Stock Exchanges. It can be argued that the increased competition from foreign market makers will reduce the monopoly rents that specialists can earn, thereby improving their quotes. We find, however, that spreads do not decrease following a dual listing, though the depth of the quotes increases as predicted. The apparent increase in depth disappears once we account for changes in price, volume and return variance. We also find that the level of informed trading increases, which increases the cost to the specialist of providing liquidity, and explains why spreads do not decline in spite of increased competition. Consistent with an increase in informed trading, we also document an increase in trading activity.     

Volatility increases Subsequent to NYSE and AMEX Stock Splits

The post-split increase in daily returns volatility is less for AMEX stocks than for NYSE stocks. The exchange trading location is a significant factor in explaining the volatility shift even after stock price and firm size are considered. Furthermore, when measured on a weekly basis, there is no increase in AMEX stocks' returns volatility. These results suggest that measurement errors created by bid-ask spreads and the 1/8 effect, and also one or more of the elements that make the NYSE different from the AMEX, explain why the estimated volatility of daily stock returns increases after the ex split date.     

The Operating Performance of Firms that Switch Their Stock Listings

In this article we examine the operating performance of stocks that switch from NASDAQ to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the New Stock Exchange (NYSE) and from AMEX to the NYSE. Specifically, we investigate whether post‐listing operating performance is consistent with the reported negative long‐term drift of post‐listing stock returns and whether there is evidence of self‐selection of the listing time. We find evidence of negative post‐listing changes in operating return on assets and sales, which, on a match‐adjusted basis, are significant for the relatively small NASDAQ stocks switching to AMEX. We also find evidence that firms self‐select the time of listing changes.     

The Impact of the Reduction in Tick Increments in Major U.S. Markets on Spreads,Depth, and Volatility

This study presents an analysis of the impact of the introduction of quotes in sixteenths of a dollar on the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE in mid-1997 on select market characteristics such as spreads, effective spreads, quoted depth, and volume. The findings of the study document reductions in the bid-ask spread, effective spread, and a statistically significant increase in the number of quotes. Interestingly, we find that liquidity, as measured by the total depth at the bid and ask, declines significantly on the AMEX and NYSE, but increases on the Nasdaq. Trading volume increases on the NYSE, but remains unchanged for the AMEX and Nasdaq. We also find that the proportion of even-increment quotes is a relevant factor affecting percentage spreads for Nasdaq both before and after and for the NYSE only after the change in quoting increments.     

EXCHANGE LISTINGS AND DELISTINGS: THE ROLE OF INSIDER INFORMATION AND INSIDER TRADING

We examine whether insiders systematically exploit their private information before exchange listings and delistings they are likely to know about before outsiders/investors. Analyzing a comprehensive sample of over-the-counter (OTC) firms, which listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) during 1977–93, we find evidence that insiders act on their private information of an impending exchange listing by purchasing or postponing the sale of stock on private account. For firms delisting from the NYSE or AMEX, we find that insiders of these firms sell stock on private account before delisting. Overall, the evidence indicates that insiders act on their private information before exchange listings and delistings.     

Sources of liquidity for NYSE-listed non-US stocks

We examine the components of displayed (quoted) liquidity and the amount of non-displayed liquidity on the NYSE for a sample of non-US stocks. Consistently with prior work, non-US stocks have less displayed liquidity than similar US stocks. Extending prior research, we find that this is true both in the limit order book and on the floor. As Domowitz et al. [Domowitz, I., Glen, J., Madhavan, A., 1998. International cross-listing and order flow migration: Evidence from and emerging market. Journal of Finance 53, 2001–2027] posit, non-US stocks from transparent/linked home markets have more displayed NYSE liquidity when the home market is open but non-US stocks from opaque/non-linked home markets have more NYSE displayed liquidity when the home market is closed. Non-US and US stocks have similar supplies of non-displayed liquidity, consistent with the idea that the conditional nature of non-displayed liquidity allows NYSE traders to mitigate adverse selection problems inherent in trading non-US stocks. Our results imply that non-US stocks have less total (displayed plus non-displayed) liquidity than US stocks.     

Trading Mechanisms and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread

We compare the relative magnitudes of the components of the bid-ask spread for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks to those of National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) stocks. We find that the order-processing cost component is smaller, and the adverse selection component is greater on the NYSE/AMEX trading systems than on the NASDAQ/NMS system. The inventory holding component is also greater for exchange-traded stocks than for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, but this may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of the firms whose stocks trade on the respective systems.     

Liquidity and Stock Exchange Listing

This study examines the pattern of stock price behavior for a sample of 71 firms that moved from NASDAQ and NASDAQ/NMS to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) between 1982 and 1987. The study tests the liquidity gains hypothesis, which states that investors expect liquidity gains for the less liquid over-the-counter stocks but not for their more liquid counterparts after their listing on the AMEX. The results support the hypothesis by showing a significant difference between the two groups of stocks on the day the AMEX announced approval of the listing. Thus, companies with low liquidity are the largest beneficiaries of listing. The evidence provides little support for the anomalous negative pattern of returns during the post-listing period reported in previous studies.     

On the Stability of the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns in the Cross‐Section: Understanding the Curious Role of Share Turnover

In this paper, we shed further light on cross‐sectional predictors of stock return performance. Specifically, we explore whether the cross‐section of expected stock returns is robust within stock groups sorted by past monthly return. We find that the book/market and momentum effects are remarkably robust to sorting on past returns. However, share turnover is negatively related to future returns for stocks with abnormally low stock price performance in the recent past, but postively related to returns for well‐performing stocks. This casts doubt on the use of turnover as a liquidity proxy, but is consistent with turnover being a proxy for momentum trading which pushes prices in the direction of past price movements. Our results are robust to both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, and also robust to stratifying the sample by time period.     

Determinants of the components of bid-ask spreads on stocks

In this paper we show that George et al. (GKN, 1991) estimators of the adverse selection and order processing cost components of the bid-ask spread are biased due to intertemporal variations in the bid-ask spread. We use alternative estimators that correct this bias and that are applicable to individual securities, and estimate these cost components empirically using data on NYSE/AMEX stocks. As expected, our results indicate that on average adverse selection costs account for approximately 50% of the bid-ask spread, sharply higher than the estimates of 8-10% obtained by GKN for NASDAQ stocks and 21% that we obtain for NYSE/AMEX stocks using GKN's estimators. We then conduct cross-sectional regressions designed primarily to determine whether adverse selection costs vary across specialists after controlling for firm size and other factors. Consistent with previously established hypotheses, we find that adverse-selection costs vary across specialists, and that this variation is related to the number of securities that the specialist handles.     

Stock Splits, Tick Size, and Sponsorship

A traditional explanation for stock splits is that they increase the number of small shareholders who own the stock. A possible reason for the increase is that the minimum bid-ask spread is wider after a split and brokers have more incentive to promote a stock. I document a large number of small buy orders following Nasdaq and NYSE/AMEX splits during 1993 to 1994. I also find strong evidence that trading costs increase, and weak evidence that costs of market making decline following splits. This is consistent with splits acting as an incentive to brokers to promote stocks.     

THE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE TRADING HALTS

This paper examines the over-the-counter (OTC) market activities for stocks temporarily suspended by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Unlike previous studies, we use transaction-to-transaction data on the NASDAQ during NYSE trading halts to investigate the price adjustment process between market equilibria. The evidence indicates that while being halted by the NYSE, the same stocks have exhibited significantly greater volatility in the OTC market. Since the volatile price movement is mainly random and provides no arbitraging opportunities for the OTC market traders, we do not find support for the proposal that trading halts should be mandatory for all trading locations.     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND REPORTED TRADING VOLUME: NASDAQ VERSUS THE NYSE

Trading volume for common stocks is of interest to financial economists, investors, and securities lawyers. NASDAQ is a dealer market where trades with dealers are included in reported trading volume. This procedure does not accurately measure the trading volume by public buyers and sellers. Trading volume reported on the NYSE, which is primarily an auction market, provides a much closer measure of trades by public investors. We examine a sample of firms whose stock traded on the NASDAQ/NMS and subsequently on the NYSE. When trading switches to the NYSE, the firms' trading volume drops to about 50 percent of the volume previously reported on NASDAQ. A control group of firms that switched from the AMEX to the NYSE shows a small, but statistically insignificant, increase in trading volume.     

The Cross-Section of Expected Trading Activity

This article studies cross-sectional variations in trading activityfor a comprehensive sample of NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks overa period of about 40 years. We test whether trading activitydepends upon the degree of liquidity trading, the mass of informedtraders, and the extent of uncertainty and dispersion of opinionabout fundamental values. We hypothesize that liquidity (ornoise) trading depends both on a stock’s visibility andon portfolio rebalancing needs triggered by past price performance.We use firm size, age, price, and the book-to-market ratio asproxies for a firm’s visibility. The mass of informedagents is proxied by the number of analysts whereas forecastdispersion and firm leverage proxy for differences of opinion.Earning volatility and absolute earning surprises proxy foruncertainty about fundamental values. Overall, the results providesupport for theories of trading based on stock visibility, portfoliorebalancing needs, differences of opinion, and uncertainty aboutfundamental values.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

LIQUIDITY AND ASSET PRICING UNDER THE THREE‐MOMENT CAPM PARADIGM

We examine whether the use of the three‐moment capital asset pricing model can account for liquidity risk. We also make a comparative analysis of a four‐factor model based on Fama–French and Pástor–Stambaugh factors versus a model based solely on stock characteristics. Our findings suggest that neither of the models captures the liquidity premium nor do stock characteristics serve as proxies for liquidity. We also find that sensitivities of stock return to fluctuations in market liquidity do not subsume the effect of characteristic liquidity. Furthermore, our empirical findings are robust to differences in market microstructure or trading protocols between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ.