MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION IN A MULTI‐SECTOR OPEN‐ECONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi‐sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible‐price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

Financial frictions differ across countries and thus cause international differences in the transmission of shocks. This paper shows how the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy depends on these country-specific financial frictions. To this end, we build a two-country DSGE-model of a monetary union. Financial frictions are captured by the cost channel approach. We show that the traditional solution to the assignment problem – the common central bank stabilizes the inflation rate at the union level and the national fiscal authorities stabilize the national economies – does not hold in a world with financial frictions. The cost channel decreases the efficiency of monetary policy and increases the need for fiscal stabilization even at the union level. Moreover, the more heterogeneous the union, the more important is fiscal policy in stabilizing shocks. Finally, we evaluate the scenarios in terms of welfare of the representative household.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

Monetary union in Latin America: an assessment in the context of optimum currency area

The article applies the optimum currency area (OCA) theory to Latin America to assess the potential of a monetary union in Latin America and in its major existing regional trade agreements (RTAs). According to OCA criteria we find that Latin America is far from being an optimum currency area, as its countries’ exposure to asymmetric shocks is high and their capacities to adjust in response to macroeconomic disturbances are limited. Using a panel of 20 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2014, we apply the dynamic OLS estimation techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. We find that the costs are high, because Latin America’s economies are vulnerable to severe macroeconomic disturbances and its RTAs differ significantly in their response to negative demand shocks. Most of the monetary efficiency gains are shown to be the result of a common restrictive monetary policy which would result in higher FDI inflows and, to a more limited extent, increased GDP, both overall and per capita. Although Central American countries are shown to be most suitable for further monetary integration, we conclude that Latin American countries should head first towards greater economic and political integration.     

Fiscal risk in a monetary union

We present a dynamic and quantitative model of a fiscal solvency crisis in a monetary union. Diverse fiscal policies, which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks, can threaten a monetary union. The fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will. Stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit. In equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits, creating a fiscal solvency crisis. The dynamics leading to the crisis depend on the policy response to restore lending. We focus on two responses, default and policy switching. We simulate our model to quantify the probability of a fiscal solvency crisis in the European Monetary Union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values. Our model predicts the Greek crisis which occurred and warns of an Italian one.     

EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms

The theory of optimal currency areas states that a single currency zone should have symmetry of shocks and structures across regions. Research on monetary union in Europe has either assumed these conditions to hold close enough not to cause problems, or has focussed on asymmetries in shocks. But what if economic structures and/or market responses differ between countries or regions? This paper examines the consequences of a single monetary policy when there are asymmetries in i) the monetary transmissions; ii) the wage/price transmissions; and iii) private sector asset holdings. We find the first and last destabilise the business cycle, and put countries out of phase with one another in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit constrained fiscal policies. The effect is to delay convergence.     

West African Currency Unions: Rationale and Sustainability

Drawing on the recent literature and experience of monetaryintegration in Europe, the paper examines the rationale forestablishing regional currency unions in western Africa. Despitedramatic economic, political and historical differences betweenthe two regions, the analysis indicates that monetary unificationmight well be beneficial for a number of the member states ofthe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Themain reason is that the costs stemming from the loss of monetaryautonomy are often more than offset by the gains originatingin the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers. However,large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditureobjectives would not be attractive partners because they wouldbe expected to pressure the common central bank, creating excessiveinflation in the entire union. Hence, the desirability and sustainabilityof a currency union critically depends on fiscal disciplineamong its members. We also explore the vulnerability of regionalmonetary institutions to country-specific disturbances. Overall,the desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strongfiscal surveillance procedure both in the transition phase andafter the establishment of the union. (JEL E58, E61, F42)     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Stabilization mechanisms in a monetary union

The stability of a monetary union entails the establishment of mechanisms that allow the member countries to smooth their paths of consumption after negative shocks in their income. A centralized fiscal institution could help countries through a mechanism of taxes and transfers. In this paper we study the stabilizing effects of different mechanisms of compensation in a two-country general equilibrium model subject to asymmetric technology shocks. In particular, we have focused on an optimal system of taxes and transfers as opposed to a discretionary transfer mechanism, finding that the optimal transfer consists in an intertemporal distribution to the economy that experiences the negative shock instead of a current high transfer as in the non-optimal mechanism. Lastly, we have assessed the degree of stabilization related to the mechanisms in question, showing that the optimal mechanism can match the degree of stabilization the empirical literature attributes to the case of the United States.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

The dynamic effects of monetary policy and government spending shocks on unemployment in the peripheral Euro area countries

In this paper we study the response of unemployment to monetary policy and government spending shocks in the peripheral Euro-area countries. By applying the structural near-VAR methodology, we jointly model area-wide and national variables. Our main finding is that fiscal multipliers vary across countries and the results are consistent with the prediction of the standard New Keynesian model only in Italy and Greece. Instead, in Ireland, Portugal and Spain increases in government spending are recessionary. Thus we find that Keynesian results of fiscal policy seem to prevail in high public-debt countries, whereas non-Keynesian outcomes seem to characterize high private-debt countries. As for the monetary policy shock, we find that it plays an important role, jointly with the other area-wide shocks, as a long-term driver of national unemployment.     

The endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area criteria in East Asia

The Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 has increased interest in policies to achieve greater regional exchange rate stability in East Asia. It has renewed calls for greater monetary and exchange rate cooperation. A country's suitability to join a monetary union depends, inter alia, on the trade intensity and the business cycle synchronization with other potential members of the monetary union. However, these two Optimum Currency Area criteria are endogenous. Theoretically, the effect of increased trade integration (after the elimination of exchange fluctuations among the countries in the region) on the business cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Reduction in trade barriers can potentially increase industrial specialization by country and therefore resulting in more asymmetry business cycles from industry-specific shocks. On the other hand, increased trade integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. If the second hypothesis is empirically verified, policy makers have little to worry about the region being unsynchronized in their business cycles as the business cycles will become more synchronized after the monetary union is formed. This paper assesses the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, specialization and business cycle synchronization for East Asian economies using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The dynamic panel approach improves on previous efforts to examine the business cycle correlations — trade link using panel procedures, which control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Based on the findings on how trade, finance and sectoral specialization have effects on the size of common shocks among countries, potential policies that can help East Asian countries move closer toward a regional currency arrangement can be suggested. The empirical results of this study suggest that there exists scope for East Asia to form a monetary union.     

On the feasibility of monetary union: Does it make sense to look for shocks symmetry across countries when none of the countries constitutes an optimum currency area?

Usually, a monetary union is not considered feasible between countries if the correlations of shocks are positive but weak. This may not be so if the country with the larger output gap converges to full-employment equilibrium faster than the country with the smaller gap. We argue that common monetary policy can be destabilizing when countries' responses to non-monetary shocks are perfectly symmetric with a correlation of 1 but exhibit differing investment sensitivities to the real interest rate. We use Canada, Mexico and the United States to test the feasibility of a monetary union by documenting whether: 1) gross investments in Canada and Mexico are equally responsive to the real fund rate, and 2) Canada and Mexico's output growth and inflation respond differently to US monetary policy shocks and oil price shocks. This approach implicitly dictates whether the shocks themselves are symmetric or asymmetric. Using quarterly data and SVAR methodology, we conducted two layers of analysis. We estimated SVARs for the periods 1970–2008, 1970–1990 and 1991–2008 to find that a monetary union is feasible between Canada and the US for the first two sample periods. For Canada and Mexico, we find similar responses of output growth to US monetary policy shocks. We conducted further robustness tests by estimating two identified VARs with common US variables and oil prices for Canada and Mexico to assess commonality in responses to shocks with the US. These results affirm that a monetary union is also feasible between Canada and the US.     

THE SIZE OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND THE STANCE OF MONETARY POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Implementing fiscal programs during monetary policy expansions seems to improve significantly their economic stimulus. We find this result by estimating the effect of government consumption shocks on gross domestic product (GDP) using a panel of 23 developing economies. Our goal is to better understand the reasons for the low fiscal multipliers found in the literature by performing estimations for alternative exchange rate regimes, business‐cycle phases, and monetary policy stances. In addition, we perform counterfactual simulations to analyze the possible gains from fiscal‐monetary policy coordination. Our results also show lower multipliers in developing economies with flexible regimes, especially during economic slowdowns. (JEL E62, E63, F32)     

Commitment and the adoption of a common currency*

In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto‐dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.     

Exchange rate regimes and inflation: only hard pegs make a difference

Abstract.  Using data from a large sample of developing countries from 1985 to 2001, we confirm that hard pegs (currency boards or a shared currency) reduce inflation and money growth. There is no evidence that soft pegs confer any monetary discipline, after other factors are controlled for. Inflation triggers regime switches. Under hard pegs, monetary growth is unaffected by fiscal deficits or by inflation shocks. Under soft pegs, as under floats, increased fiscal deficits and positive inflation shocks are associated with higher monetary growth. The apparently slower per capita output growth under hard pegs is explained by their geographical distribution. JEL classification: F41     

Monetary union: A welfare based approach

This article attempts to shed light on the consequences of the transition to EMU for individual welfare following specific shocks. To this end, we develop a two country intertemporal general equilibrium model that extends the Obstfeld and Rogoff (Journal of Political Economy 103 (3) (1995) 624) specification to nominal rigidities through price adjustment costs and pricing-to-market behavior.We show that, when facing a positive asymmetric permanent shock to either technology or government expenditures occurring in one country, implementing a monetary union is beneficial to the households living in this economy. Conversely, it is detrimental to foreigners. Further, a sensitivity analysis shows that if the gains/losses to implementing monetary union are qualitatively robust when facing changes in the degree of nominal rigidities and the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, they are quite sensitive to the degree of pricing-to-market in the economy.