Mitigating the Challenges of Partner Knowledge Diversity While Enhancing Research & Development (R&D) Alliance Performance: The Role of Alliance Governance Mechanisms

This article explores the answers to the following unresolved research question: How do firms mitigate the collaboration challenges associated with partner knowledge diversity and enhance alliance performance? The study provides an alliance performance enhancing framework by identifying two types of partner knowledge diversity: (1) technology base diversity and (2) R&D process experience diversity, and links them with R&D alliance performance. Additionally, the moderating effects of the two types of alliance governance mechanisms (i.e., interactive and contractual mechanisms) were examined to investigate which alliance governance mechanism is conducive to mitigate the collaboration challenges and enhance alliance performance. Using a data set of 316 alliances in the biopharmaceuticals industry, the study found that a moderate degree (not too low or high) of technology base diversity between alliance partners contributes more to R&D alliance performance. Similarly, there was also an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D process experience diversity and alliance performance; too much diversity in R&D process experience may increase the likelihood of partner opportunism, and therefore negatively affect alliance performance. Additionally, the results showed that alliance governance mechanisms played different roles in alliance collaboration; while the contractual alliance mechanisms help reduce relational uncertainty (e.g., opportunism), the interactive mechanisms promoting a more intensive interaction between partners mitigates task difficulty and facilitates complex technology activities. These findings extend the knowledge-based view (KBV) of strategic alliance and advance research on alliance governance design.     

The effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty

Research summary: We examine the interplay of behavioral and environmental uncertainty in shaping the effectiveness of two key governance mechanisms used by strategic alliances: contractual and trust‐based governance. We develop and test hypotheses, using a meta‐analytic dataset encompassing over 15,000 strategic alliances across 82 independent samples. We find that contractual governance works best under low to moderate levels of behavioral uncertainty and moderate to high levels of environmental uncertainty, while it is detrimental to alliance performance when both types of uncertainty are low or high. Trust‐based governance is most effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty and low levels of environmental uncertainty. It suffers a large loss of usefulness at high behavioral uncertainty as environmental uncertainty increases. Managerial summary: Strategic alliances allow firms to gain greater efficiency and create value. Yet, many such alliances fail because they are not able to deal with the twin challenges posed by behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Findings from our meta‐analysis imply that under conditions of high behavioral uncertainty and low‐to‐moderate levels of environmental uncertainty, the use of trust‐based governance alongside contractual governance might enhance the latter's effectiveness. The combined effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance under high levels of both behavioral and environmental uncertainty is not obvious. When both behavioral and environmental uncertainty are high, contractual governance hurts alliance performance while trust‐based governance does not function at its best either. Under these conditions, it might be better for firms to turn to hierarchy or vertical integration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relational norms and collaborative activities: Roles in reducing opportunism in marketing channels

Reducing opportunism is a critical task to support channel performance and channel member satisfaction. Recent research into marketing channels focuses on the role of relational governance in curbing opportunism; this study advances this thesis by positing that relational governance encompasses both relational norms and collaborative activities (i.e., joint planning and joint problem solving). In turn, the current research investigates how these two aspects of relational governance independently and jointly check opportunism in marketing channels. The tests of the hypotheses involve 149 Chinese manufacturer–distributor relationships. The results show that relational norms have a negative effect on opportunism, but the effect of collaborative activities is contingent on the level of consistency between the relational norms and collaborative activities that mark the relationship. A low level of relational norms prompts joint planning to inhibit opportunism and joint problem solving to exacerbate it. However, a high level of relational norms reverses these effects: Joint planning fosters opportunism, and joint problem solving curbs it. Thus collaborative activities have different properties that need to be devised in accordance with relational norms if the goal is to reduce opportunism.     

How contract enforcement reduces opportunism? The paradoxical moderating effect of interfirm guanxi

This study investigates the hitherto largely neglected effects of contract enforcement in interfirm relationship. Based on contract functions, we conceptualize contract enforcement as a two-dimensional construct comprising contractual control enforcement and contractual coordination enforcement. We examine how the effects of these two enforcements differ as the level of interfirm guanxi varies. The findings from a survey of 190 buyers in China suggest that both contractual control enforcement and contractual coordination enforcement mitigate sellers' opportunism. Moreover, contractual coordination enforcement is more effective in reducing opportunism when the interfirm guanxi is strong, whereas contractual control enforcement is more effective in reducing opportunism when the interfirm guanxi is weak. Our research contributes to both theory and practice by revealing the complex and paradoxical moderating role of interfirm guanxi.     

资源外包网络的治理研究

资源外包网络作为一种特殊的资源联合体,其运作过程并非十全十美,机会主义行为和知识分享问题及其引致的网络失灵成为网络治理的主要诱因。资源外包网络的治理包含两个层面:关系治理和结构治理。机会主义行为多发生于外包商和供应商双边交易过程中,对应于资源外包网络的关系治理;知识分享问题涉及网络整体的协调与管理,对应于网络的结构治理。论文分别从关系治理和结构治理两个角度剖析了资源外包网络的治理特点、作用机制和治理对策。     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Achieving relational governance effectiveness: An examination of B2B management practices in Taiwan

This study examines the antecedents of relational governance effectiveness in a country context where the prevalence of Confucian values is expected to create a culturally ingrained preference for relational governance. We also explore whether different management practices are better predictors of relational governance effectiveness under different collaborative inter-firm relationship configurations. Results from an analysis of 182 alliance relationships in Taiwan, a dynamic newly developed economy, reveal that, generally, demonstrating trustworthiness, establishing just and fair procedures, and building effective platforms for connectivity are management practices that are good predictors of relational governance effectiveness. The multi-group analysis provided more nuanced insights. The findings suggest that different inter-firm relationship configurations require different subsets of management practices. Building effective platforms for connectivity is a strong predictor of relational governance effectiveness in equity-based alliances with foreign partners. In equity-based alliances with domestic partners, establishing fair and just procedures is emphasized. In contractual alliances with foreign partners, ensuring contractual clarity and building effective platforms for connectivity are found to be facilitators of relational governance effectiveness. Last, contractual alliances with domestic partners seem to rely on a portfolio of management practices encompassing demonstrating trustworthiness, establishing just and fair procedures, and building effective platforms for connectivity.     

Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type

Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property‐based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge‐based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social power as an antecedence of governance in buyer-supplier alliances

Buyer-supplier alliances require certain governance mechanisms to be successfully controlled and coordinated. However, relatively little is known about how power differentials between the actors affect the applicability of those governance mechanisms. This paper follows the assumption that different sources of social power among firms directly influence the governance mechanisms and indirectly their performance. Our study utilizes a sample of 250 European firms to test the influence of four social power sources on three different governance mechanisms. We find different influences of social power on certain governance mechanisms. Suppliers' perception of buyers' coercive power leads to stronger contractual governance and stronger buyer directives but reduces the use of relational norms. Reward power only relates to contractual governance. Expert power steers towards buyer directives and relational norms. Referent power stimulates the development of relational norms. A cluster analysis of power types provides additional insights and enriches our managerial implications.     

Formalization,Communication Quality,and Opportunistic Behavior in R&D Alliances between Competitors

For technology ventures (and also other firms), R&D alliances provide great learning opportunities and access to scarce resources. However, R&D alliances, in particular between competitors, also involve the concomitant threat of opportunistic behavior, which many firms attempt to manage by formalizing the partnership. Yet, prior research provided mixed findings suggesting that formalization alleviates opportunism, fails to do so, or, ironically, even promotes it. The questions of whether and, if so, when formalization can deter opportunism remains topical. This study differentiates two forms of opportunistic behavior, strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation, and examines how they are affected by formalization per se and in combination with communication quality. Findings from 82 R&D alliances between competitors indicate that extensive formalization promotes opportunistic behavior. In contrast, communication quality mitigates the dysfunctional effect on strategic manipulation and also alleviates both forms of opportunism directly. Most effects vary with the type of opportunistic behavior. Our findings add to the literature by demonstrating a positive formalization–opportunism relationship in the context of R&D alliances and by suggesting that relational governance (communication quality) compensates for the dysfunctional effects of formal governance (formalization), rather than both having complementary relationships. The results also support the call for more research into nuances of opportunism: they show that differentiating forms of opportunism matters for understanding the efficacy of safeguards against opportunism. Managers are warned against over‐formalizing alliances, which spurs opportunism. Instead, they should cultivate an atmosphere of open communication while they can still maintain some “healthy distrust.” This attenuates the adverse effects of formalization, which is important since a certain level of formalization is often inevitable in R&D alliances.     

Safeguarding or coordinating? Unfolding the dual-function of contracts in manufacturer-distributor relationships

By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes     

Joining Forces or Going It Alone? On the Interplay among External Collaboration Partner Types,Interfirm Governance Modes,and Internal R&D

This paper adds to the emerging literature stream advocating a contingency view on open innovation. Drawing on the relational view of the firm, this study sheds light on the complex interplay among collaboration partner types (market‐ and science‐focused innovation partners), governance modes (informal, self‐enforcing and formal, contractual collaboration governance), and internal research and development(R&D). More specifically, it is proposed that the use of governance modes tailored to both the characteristics of each innovation partner type and the specific innovation objectives pursued by the focal firm (incremental and radical new product development) can increase the payoff from innovation collaboration. Moreover, appropriate collaboration governance is expected to reduce the focal firm's vulnerability to possible negative side effects often assumed to be associated with the simultaneous pursuit of external collaboration and internal R&D, among which most notably the not‐invented‐here (NIH) syndrome. Cross‐industry evidence from 2502 German firms underlines the critical role of collaboration governance—a contingency factor that is at the heart of the relational view, yet has remained surprisingly absent from the open innovation debate so far.     

Governance by targets and the performance of cross-sector partnerships: Do partner diversity and partnership capabilities matter?

Research Summary: This study examines the effectiveness of targets as a tool for the contractual governance of cross-sector partnerships. Applying a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that the use of explicit targets within performance contracts is an effective means for improving partnership outcomes, especially where partner diversity and partnership capabilities are high. Furthermore, we find evidence that target intensity is associated with stronger partnership performance. These findings suggest that contractual forms with explicit targets may be a particularly successful approach for enhancing the public value created by cross-sector partnerships. A downward turn in performance following the removal of targets lends further support to this conclusion. Managerial Summary: Cross-sector partnerships have become a vital means for creating value in pursuit of the public interest. In particular, the effective management of these partnerships is thought to hold the key to addressing the strategic and organizational challenges posed by major social and environmental issues, such as big data and climate change. In this article, we combine data on waste recycling from 2003 to 2014 with information on performance contracts between local cross-sector partnerships and higher levels of government in England to quantify the impact of governance by targets on the performance of those partnerships. The benefits of target-setting for partnership performance that we identify are even stronger when partner diversity is high and partnership capabilities are strong. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of our findings.     

How to enhance supplier performance in China: An integrative view of partner selection and partner control

Whereas effective supplier management necessarily involves both partner selection and partner control, extant literature considers each issue separately. With an integrative perspective, this study instead examines the joint effects of two selection mechanisms (i.e., public and social) and two control mechanisms (i.e., contractual and relational) on supplier performance. The results of an investigation of 208 buyer–supplier exchanges in China provide novel insights into how to adopt formal and informal approaches of partner selection and control to improve supplier performance. We find that mixed approaches (i.e., public selection and relational control, social selection and contractual control) enhance supplier performance. In contrast, relying on combinations of either formal (i.e., public selection and contractual control) or informal (i.e., social selection and relational control) means impairs supplier performance.     

关系契约与企业网络转型

关系契约是企业网络形成和运行的微观基础，它有两条形成途径：一是由专用性资产而形成的双方依赖．二是动用个体社会资本而锁定双方的关系。相应地，企业网络可分为契约型和关系型两大类。关系型企业网络是中国转型经济的特征，家族企业及其网络的发展和寻租性企业网络的大量出现是转型期的必然现象。关系型企业网络产生的根本原因是中国独特的家族文化。经济转型要求企业网络从关系型向契约型转变，实质就是从关系治理向契约治理的转变。为此，必须从产权和日常管理方面加强对家族企业和国有仓、止的管理。尤其要着力培育宏观社会资本．     

Concurrent sourcing,governance mechanisms,and performance outcomes in industrial value chains

We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in‐house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis‐à‐vis an external supplier and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Integration,knowledge creation and B2B governance: The role of resource hierarchies in financial performance

Knowledge is a critical competitive resource for firms that increasingly exploit resources and capabilities combined with those of channel partners to create new knowledge. However, the opportunism risks inherent in any B2B relationship require firms to employ governance mechanisms to protect their interests. These tensions call for further study of how B2B partners exploit combined resources to produce new knowledge. This research employs a Resource Hierarchy View of resource bundling to describe the ways that firms integrate internal and external processes to achieve financial performance through knowledge creation, and the role that relational governance approaches play in enabling those resource combinations. The study finds that normative and formalized governance forms both enable complex combinations of knowledge creation and integration resources in a way that affects financial performance more than either resource could in simpler combination. However, there are differences in how knowledge is created through internal and external process integration.     

Strategic alliance contracts: dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity

In contrast to prior studies examining strategic alliances as discrete governance structures (e.g., alliances vs. M&A, equity vs. non‐equity agreements), we investigate their particular contractual features. The analysis examines the dimensionality of the contractual complexity construct and investigates the determinants of firms' adoption of various contractual provisions. We find two underlying dimensions of contractual complexity, based upon the enforcement and coordination functions of different contractual provisions. The evidence reveals that firms' usage of particular contractual provisions is a function of asset specificity as well as whether the alliance's duration is pre‐specified or open‐ended. The findings also speak to the debate surrounding the roles of prior ties and trust for alliance governance. Firms that have collaborated with each other in the past are not less likely to negotiate enforcement provisions; rather, repeat collaborators are less likely to adopt contractual provisions that are informational in nature and are geared to the coordination of the alliance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effectiveness of contracts in marketing exchange relationships: A meta-analytic review

Exchange partners devise and implement contracts to improve performance within a relationship. Detailed, specific contracts provide a blueprint designed to guide desired interfirm behavior, and firms may use the contract to resolve disputes and to ensure the partner fulfills its obligations. Extant research, however, reports contradictory findings on the efficacy of contracts. The objective of our research is to provide a quantitative review of contract specificity and utilization in business-to-business marketing. The findings suggest that specificity and utilization enhance economic performance, relationship quality, and relational norms. Contract specificity is found to discourage opportunism, whereas contract utilization exacerbates opportunism. Theoretical (specific investments, product complexity, and relationship length) and contextual factors (product type, market type, and study location) moderate influences of contractual properties on exchange outcomes. Discussion of these results addresses the implications of the meta-analysis for marketing theory and practice.     

Boundary spanner relational behavior and inter-organizational control in supply chain relationships

Boundary spanner relational behavior is considered critical in the successful management of buyer–supplier relationships and may help avoiding high costs of more formal inter-organizational controls. Yet, the influence of partners' boundary spanners on effective supply chain collaboration has had much less inquiry than the influence of broader inter-organizational controls. We use survey data of 200 buyer–supplier relationships to examine how these individual and organizational control mechanisms influence the performance effects of interfirm collaborations that vary in scope of activities undertaken. Findings show that collaboration scope as well as boundary spanner relational behavior and inter-organizational controls are positively associated with performance. The effect of collaboration scope on firm performance, however, also depends on both mechanisms but in opposite directions: while its influence on performance is enhanced by inter-organizational controls, relational behavior of partners' boundary spanners has a negative moderating effect, indicating that such behavior contributes more to the effective management of collaborations of narrow scope than those of broader scope.