Repeating a familiar pattern in a new way: The effect of exploitation and exploration on knowledge leverage behaviors in technology acquisitions

Research Summary: We identify two types of knowledge leverage behaviors undertaken by acquiring firms: integrated and independent knowledge leverage. We address how the prior exploitation or exploration orientation of acquirers influence these two modes of knowledge leverage behaviors. The degree of exploitation of acquirers promotes integrating their existing knowledge with acquired knowledge in innovative actions. In contrast, the degree of exploration of acquirers increases the likelihood that new innovations will use acquired knowledge without integrating it with their prior knowledge. In addition, the firm's prior acquisition rate moderates the relationship between the acquiring firms’ previous exploitation or exploration orientation and their knowledge leverage mode. The findings of this article suggest that pre‐acquisition innovation capabilities are distinct from but influence the post‐acquisition innovation actions. Managerial Summary: Firms often undertake acquisitions to gain access to new knowledge, but they can differ dramatically in how they leverage acquired knowledge. We show that the firm's prior innovation patterns drive this choice. Firms that have previously focused on incremental innovations in their internal innovation efforts tend to integrate acquired knowledge with their own prior knowledge. In contrast, firms that have previously pursued bold innovations tend to leverage acquired knowledge alone in new innovations. Thus, we show that firms use acquisitions as a means to extend their internal innovation patterns—firms that have focused on incremental innovations extend that with acquisitions by linking new innovations to their prior knowledge while firms that have pursued bold initiatives use acquired knowledge to move in new technology directions.     

Launch Decisions and the Early Market Survival of Innovations: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Mobile Value‐Added Services (VAS) Industry

There is a surprisingly high number of new products and services that fail to produce enough return on the firm's investments in development and launch activities. Literature has shown that these failures can be due to a poorly planned and executed launch. Although a vast stream of research has studied how strategic and tactical launch decisions affect the performance of new products and services, some issues still need theoretical and empirical investigation. This paper aims to extend new product launch research in two ways. First, it studies how tactical launch decisions (i.e., investments in advertising and involvement of external organizations in the launch process) interact with an important strategic choice (i.e., the degree of radicalness of the new product or service) to affect new product performance. Second, it focuses on a particular dimension of performance, that is, early market survival, which has been overlooked in launch strategy and tactics research so far. Using a data set comprising more than 9300 new mobile value‐added services launched in Italy between 2003 and 2006, the paper finds that launch tactics interact with the radicalness of the innovation to affect early market survival. In particular, communicating the distinctive characteristics of the new product or service and partnering with external organizations during the launch process are tactics that work particularly well with radical innovations. This is possibly due to the fact that they help reduce customers’ uncertainty regarding expected benefits and transaction costs, and hence contribute to win their resistance to adopt the innovation soon after launch. Investments in corporate advertising lead instead to a tangible improvement of the probability of early market survival for both radical and incremental innovations. In other words, the positive impact on the probability of early survival of increasing investments in corporate advertising appears to be relevant for both radically and incrementally new services. One possible explanation is that this tactic helps increase the number of potential customers who come to know about the existence of the innovating firms and its offering soon after launch, but this is likely to be equally important to stimulate early diffusion of both incremental and radical innovations.     

Fast and expensive: the diffusion of a disappointing innovation

Firms seek to imitate innovations that yield competitive advantage, but imitation can presage disappointment when the innovation value is below expectations. Empirical research has only rarely examined the diffusion of such disappointing innovations, and it is not known whether negative information from past adopters will halt the diffusion process. Likewise, the effect of heterogeneity in the innovation value on its spread has not been systematically investigated. Here, a unique dataset on a disappointing innovation is used to examine how adoption decisions are imitated, but actual use and subsequent abandonment can yield information that reduces the likelihood that others will adopt. The findings show imitation of the adoptions of other firms, but avoidance of the innovation once these firms start using the innovation or abandon it. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry timing and innovation strategy in feature phones

Research summary : This inductive study examines how firms make decisions about the timing of innovations, focusing on the mobile handset industry during the feature‐phone era. Through qualitative and quantitative data, we reveal how individual technology‐entry decisions are influenced by a portfolio‐level timing preference, and how this preference informs other aspects of innovation strategy, too. Early movers address greater, more uncertain revenue opportunities with broader, less selective innovation portfolios. Conversely, late movers target lower, more certain revenue opportunities with narrower, more selective portfolios. While timing per se seems unrelated to performance, a timing‐strategy alignment is. Future research on the equifinal configurations we propose—broad/nonselective for early movers and narrow/selective for late movers—could thus help resolve the debate about the link between timing and performance. Managerial summary : We study how firms make decisions about the entry of new product features, in this case mobile phone technologies. During development firms weigh the scale and likelihood of features' commercial success. Some firms display a preference for earlier entry, which offers temporary monopoly rewards if uncertainty resolves favorably, while others tend to opt for later entry, which offers greater certainty but lower rewards due to competitive preemption. The innovation portfolios of these companies thus pursue differently structured opportunities, bringing about different strategic approaches. Since early movers aim for big hits to compensate for a higher failure rate, they launch a broader set of features and exert little selective pressure on the development portfolio. By contrast, late movers' lower payoffs reduce their tolerance for failure, making them launch fewer features and emphasize selectiveness; i.e., they invest in learning from the resolution of uncertainty so as to choose features more discriminately. When we examine innovation performance, timing has no significant effect but matching timing with feature breadth does. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Commercializing Technological Innovation: Learning from Failures in High‐Tech Markets*

Commercialization is known to be a critical stage of the technological innovation process, mainly because of the high risks and costs that it entails. Despite this, many scholars consider it to be often the least well managed phase of the entire innovation process, and there is ample empirical evidence corroborating this belief. In high‐tech markets, the difficulties encountered by firms in commercializing technological innovation are exacerbated by the volatility, interconnectedness, and proliferation of new technologies that characterize such markets. This is clearly evinced by the abundance of new high‐tech products that fail on the market chiefly due to poor commercialization. Yet there is no clear understanding, in management theory and practice, of how commercialization decisions influence the market failure of new high‐tech products. Drawing on research in innovation management, diffusion of innovation, and marketing, this article shows how commercialization decisions can influence consumer acceptance of a new high‐tech product in two major ways: (i) by affecting the extent to which the players in the innovation's adoption network support the new product; (ii) by affecting the post‐purchase attitude early adopters develop toward the innovation, and hence the type of word‐of‐mouth (positive or negative) they disseminate among later adopters. Lack of support from the adoption network is found to be an especially critical cause of failure for systemic innovations, while a negative post‐purchase attitude of early adopters is a more significant determinant of market failure for radical innovations. There follows a historical analysis of eight innovations launched on consumer high‐tech markets (Apple Newton, IBM PC‐Junior, Tom Tom GO, Sony Walkman, 3DO Interactive Multiplayer, Sony MiniDisc, Palm Pilot, and Nintendo NES), which illustrates how commercialization decisions (i.e., timing, targeting and positioning, inter‐firm relationships, product configuration, distribution, advertising, and pricing) can determine lack of support from the innovation's adoption network and a negative post‐purchase attitude of early adopters. The results of this work provide useful insights for improving the commercialization decisions of product and marketing managers operating in high‐technology markets, helping them avoid errors that are precursors of market failure. It is also hoped the article will inform further research aimed at identifying, theoretically and empirically, other possible causes of poor customer acceptance in high‐tech markets.     

Launch Strategy, Launch Tactics, and Demand Outcomes

In a typical new product development process, the role of the launch stage is to maximize the chances of profitably achieving acceptance in the target market. A launch plan can include strategic decisions (such as relative innovativeness, mass versus niche targeting, and lead versus follow) as well as tactical decisions (including the types of communication and distribution activities to emphasize, introductory pricing, branding, and when to announce new items and delete old ones). Unfortunately, the existing literature offers limited decision-making guidance to managers on how to prioritize and integrate the various strategic and tactical options. This article presents a conceptual framework that suggests that the strategic and tactical challenges posed in various product launch situations depend in large measure on the specific type of buying behavior to be influenced. Depending on the degree of product innovativeness, managers may establish one of three types of desired demand outcomes: (1) trial and repurchase, (2) customer migration, or (3) innovation adoption and diffusion. The degree to which the desired demand outcome is realized is shown to be dependent on buyers' perceptions of the new product's relative advantage and of its compatibility with buyers' values and experiences. Perceptions of the product on these two characteristics are initially influenced by the launch strategy. Given an understanding of these perceptions, managers can then select launch tactics designed to clarify or leverage relative advantages or to demonstrate or enhance compatibility to the target market. The framework also demonstrates how the linkages among launch strategy, launch tactics, and the demand outcomes are impacted by the product-market environment, the technological dynamics of the industry, and the firm's resources and capabilities. The author argues that, by examining a given launch situation in the context of this framework, managers will be able to think more systematically about the strategy and tactics required for market acceptance.     

Seller–Buyer Interactions During the Commercialization of Technological Process Innovations

For buyers and sellers alike, high-tech process innovations can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, technological process innovations (e.g., computer hardware and software, factory automation equipment) offer buyers the potential for reduced production costs and enhanced product quality. However, early adoption of such innovations is often a risky proposition. For the seller, successful commercialization requires stimulating not only adoption, but also successful implementation of the innovation. In other words, effective management of seller—buyer relations during the development and commercialization process go a long way toward determining the success of a high-tech process innovation. Gerard A. Athaide, Patricia W. Meyers, and David L. Wilemon examine the relationship marketing activities employed by successful sellers of high-tech process innovations. They identify eight strategic marketing objectives that underlie these relationship marketing activities: product customization, information gathering on product performance, product education and training, ongoing product support, proactive political involvement (to encourage support for the innovation from the various affected parties in the buyer's organization), product demonstration and trial, real-time problem-solving assistance, and clarification of the product's relative advantage. Their findings suggest that successful sellers engage in relationship marketing activities throughout all phases of the commercialization process. Rather than simply trying to close a deal, these firms seek active involvement from potential customers, ranging from codesigning of products to seeking feedback on product-related problems or desired modifications. This broader scope of customer involvement necessitates cooperation among various groups in the seller's organization. Product development and engineering work closely with the customer during product customization. Those groups must communicate effectively with the salespeople who demonstrate the product and with the customer support people who obtain feedback and provide real-time problem-solving support. In other words, these relationship marketing activities cut across functional barriers. Consequently, a clear understanding of the buyer's needs and environment is essential throughout the seller's organization, not just in the sales and marketing departments.     

The Role of Marketing Resources in Radical Innovation Activity: Antecedents and Payoffs

While radical product innovations represent significant engines of firm growth, questions remain over whether marketing helps or hurts (1) a firm's radical product innovation activity and (2) its rewards from radical product innovation activity. By attaching an attention‐based view of the firm to a market‐based assets view of marketing, this paper examines the role of three marketing resources—market knowledge, reputation, and relational resources—on radical innovation activity. Our conceptual framework posits differentiated effects among marketing resources as antecedents of radical innovation activity and as moderators of its impact on firms' financial performance. Using a survey of a broad set of high‐tech business‐to‐business (B2B) firms to test hypotheses, it is found that firms with strong relational resources enjoy a higher propensity for, and stronger financial rewards from, radical innovation activity. Reputational resources come with a trade‐off as they hurt the incidence of radical innovation but enhance its financial rewards. However, market knowledge resources appear to hurt both radical innovation activity and its financial rewards. Our results point to the multifaceted role of marketing in radical innovation activity, which is unlikely to come with a single benefit or liability as prior work often posits. Rather, our research heightens the alertness of managers to assess their firms' marketing strength as a bundle of stocks of several marketing resources. Managers must understand the distinct benefits and drawbacks of each resource in developing and launching radical innovations. Our research underscores the differentiated value of marketing in radical innovation activity in B2B high‐tech contrary to the entrenched idea of a limited or even stifling role of marketing in this context.     

Innovations—Doomed to Fail? Investigating Strategies to Overcome Passive Innovation Resistance

The constant and successful market introduction of new products is of major concern to companies throughout all industries. However, empirical research points to high failure rates of innovations, indicating that most new products fail as they are rejected by consumers due to their resistance to innovation. Several studies have confirmed the importance of passive innovation resistance as a dominant barrier, which has to be overcome before new product adoption can start. However, empirical evidence on how to overcome passive innovation resistance is still lacking. This study intends to address this gap by evaluating the effectiveness of marketing instruments (i.e., mental simulation and benefit comparison) to reduce negative effects of passive innovation resistance on new product adoption. The results of a scenario‐based experiment (n = 679) confirm high effectiveness for both instruments. However, the effectiveness varied with the type of passive innovation resistance present. More specifically, mental simulation was found to be the most effective instrument in the case of cognitive passive resistance, whereas benefit comparison was found to be most effective in the case of situational passive resistance. Thereby, the effect of both marketing instruments was stronger the more radical the new product was perceived. Hence, companies should assess the type of passive innovation resistance that is predominant in their target market, and align their choice of marketing instruments that accompany a new product launch to most effectively overcome passive innovation resistance. Employing such new product launch tactics should decrease initial market resistance and thus help companies in reducing innovation failure rates.     

PERSPECTIVE: Creating a platform-based approach for developing new services

This article explores the design and renewal of services. We do this through the lens of methods and processes for developing product platforms for physical products. We first articulate principles for effectively developing next generation product lines using platform concepts, and illustrate these principles with examples drawn from computer and electronic products. These principles include creating new insights into a firm's market segmentation, understanding both the perceived and latent needs of users, and doing so for new as well as existing groups of customers. These platform principles also include the design and implementation of subsystems and interfaces that can be used across different products and across different product lines. Such subsystems and interfaces become the operational platforms for new product development purposes. An approach to platform-centric organization design is also presented.
We then make the extension to services by applying these principles to understand the innovations of a large international reinsurer. This company has resegmented its market to identify unfulfilled needs and growth opportunities. It also defined new service platforms, comprising operational activity areas that closely follow the value chain of how it wished to provide new reinsurance solutions to its customers. This reinsurer also had to organize differently to facilitate the development and deployment of the capabilities required for its new services. The analogies between these service innovations and those platform innovations of manufacturers are both clear and striking.
We conclude by considering the difficulties faced by firms seeking to transition from a single product, nonplatform focused approach to new product development to the platform-centric ones described here.     

Launching new product features: a multiple case examination

The present study investigates the strategies that eight companies employed in launching new product features in a variety of markets. A literature review shows that launching new product features is an under‐researched area. This lack of attention may be detrimental to companies, as in many mature markets—such as those for durable consumer goods like television sets, coffee machines or videocassette recorders—the launch of new product features is perhaps the single most important product development activity that companies employ. We sought to address three research questions, namely what are the current strategies used by managers for launching new product features, how do these strategies differ, and what are the opportunities and pitfalls of these strategies? A multiple case study involving 38 managers from different functional backgrounds was used, thereby investigating the feature introductions of eight companies in‐depth. The study first identifies six feature launch decisions: the feature's position in the feature life cycle, the core technology concerned, the focus on feature or product, the differentiation practices used by the firm, feature diffusion in the product line, and the make‐or‐buy decision. Based on these decisions, four distinct feature launch strategies were distinguished: dictatorship, pioneering, establishing, and following. Dictatorship companies launch feature innovations that are based on fundamentally new technologies. Pioneers are not as powerful as dictators and focus on features that are based on applied and proven rather than on fundamentally new technologies. Establishes copy and improve successful features and launch them quickly and broadly as a standard in mass markets. Followers launch standard features that already existed in the mass market. These four strategies describe how the firms in our sample launched new features in the marketplace. As such, they describe when and where in the product line what feature was introduced. Such a typology of feature launch strategies helps to proactively understand the strategies firms have for launching new product features. The article discusses for each strategy the relevant feature launch decisions, possible applications, and opportunities and pitfalls. We conclude with the implications of our study for research and managerial practice.     

The thin red line between success and failure: Path dependence in the diffusion of innovative production technologies

The wide variation in the success of innovations obscures similarities in the process of firms being influenced by other firms when choosing production technology. We argue that diffusion processes are similar across successful and failed innovations. Production asset innovation success results not only from innovation quality differences—early chance events and subsequent path dependence are also intrinsic to diffusion processes. Thus, diffusion processes do not reliably spread the best innovations, producing competitive advantage for firms with an early lead producing innovations and firms adopting high‐quality innovations. We test these predictions quantitatively by analyzing the diffusion of the DC‐10 and L‐1011 airplanes, and find support for our theory linking the social information provided by firm adoptions to the success of innovative production technologies. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bigger and safer: the diffusion of competitive advantage

Research on the diffusion of technologies that give competitive advantage is needed to understand the role of technology in competition. Predictions on which firms first obtain useful technologies are made by cluster theory, which holds that the diffusion is geographically bounded, and network theory, which holds that adoption is more rapid in central network positions. These predictions can be evaluated using data on the diffusion of supplier innovations that give competitive advantage to firms in the buyer industry. Here, the diffusion of new ship types is studied using the heterogeneous diffusion model and data on shipping firm‐shipbuilder networks, showing that valuable innovations remain rare because they are not adopted by distant firms in geographical and network space. The strong influence of geographically dispersed interfirm networks on technology diffusion justifies a greater role of interorganizational networks in the theory of competitive advantage. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Supporting product innovativeness and customer value at the bottom of the pyramid through context-specific capabilities and social ties

Local firms operating in bottom of the pyramid (BoP) markets face significant challenges in managing their innovation practices and creating value for customers. Operating in resource-constrained environments, local BoP firms need to behave as bricoleurs, deploy capabilities that help creatively combine and leverage their limited available resources to innovate and create value for customers. Employing the capability-based view (CBV) of the firm and social capital theory (SCT), we develop a research model to explain the extent that local BoP manufacturers use bricolage to develop innovative products that create value for BoP customers. Analysis of data obtained from 150 local BoP manufacturing firms (three managers in each firm) and two of their major customer firms shows that the relationship between bricolage and product innovativeness is more complex than previously understood. Results show that the curvilinear relationship is attenuated differently by social ties with government versus ties with civil society organizations. Furthermore, findings also support the contingency role of BoP firms' marketing capabilities in translating product innovativeness into customer value in BoP markets. These findings present specific implications for scholars and practitioners interested in BoP markets.     

Launch Decisions and New Product Success: An Empirical Comparison of Consumer and Industrial Products

Many articles have investigated new product development success and failure. However, most of them have used the vantage point of characteristics of the product and development process in this research. In this article we extend this extensive stream of research, looking at factors affecting success; however, we look at the product in the context of the launch support program. We empirically answer the question of whether successful launch decisions differ for consumer and industrial products and identify how they differ. From data collected on over 1,000 product introductions, we first contrast consumer product launches with industrial product launches to identify key differences and similarities in launch decisions between market types. For consumer products, strategic launch decisions appear more defensive in nature, as they focus on defending current market positions. Industrial product strategic launch decisions seem more offensive, using technology and innovation to push the firm to operate outside their current realm of operations and move into new markets. The tactical marketing mix launch decisions (product, place, promotion and price) also differ markedly across the products launched for the two market types. Successful products were contrasted with failed products to identify those launch decisions that discriminate between both outcomes. Here the differences are more of degree rather than principle. Some launch decisions were associated with success for consumer and industrial products alike. Launch successes are more likely to be broader assortments of more innovative product improvements that are advertised with print advertising, independent of market. Other launch decisions uniquely related to success per product type, especially at the marketing mix level (pricing, distribution, and promotion in particular). The launch decisions most frequently made by firms are not well aligned with factors associated with higher success. Additionally, comparing the decisions associated with success to the recommendations for launches from the normative literature suggests that a number of conventional heuristics about how to launch products of each type will actually lead to failure rather than success.     

Coevolutionary Dynamics of Automotive Competition: Product Innovation,Change, and Marketplace Survival

Innovation and new model development have been paramount in the U.S. automotive industry. The industry has invested around $16–18 billion annually to launch new models and improve existing ones in response to incessant evolution of consumer preferences, competitive pressures, and changes in safety and emission regulations. Although these investments have significantly reduced cycle time and increased efficiency (e.g., through platform communization), it still costs around $1 billion to develop and launch a new model from scratch. Therefore, the strategic focus in the U.S. automotive industry is rapidly shifting away from manufacturing efficiency to product development and innovation as firms engage in an “arms race” to develop innovative new products ahead of the competition. The outcome of this new focus manifests itself in the total development time for a new platform vehicle, which is expected to drop from roughly four years in 1998 to two years in 2014. As development cycles continue to shorten, competition in the industry intensifies, and a new insight is needed to better understand how increased competition can affect the gains from innovations. The need for research to fill this gap is especially critical as executives continue to grow more cynical about returns offered by increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures and see no statistically significant relationship between R&D expenditures and firm performance. This study attempts to address this gap by adopting a coevolutionary perspective that analyzes the relationship between innovations and firm performance by accounting for the impact of competitive forces in the industry. First, this study explicitly models competitive interactions between firms, known in the ecology literature as the Red Queen competition, in which gains from innovations are relative and impermanent. Second, hypotheses are tested using a comprehensive data set comprising all automobile manufacturers ever known to compete in the U.S. automobile market at any time between 1891 and 2000. Complete coverage of 110 years enables precise analysis of the link between innovations and firm performance as well as the coevolution in the U.S. automobile industry. The results suggest that although extensiveness of an innovation is relevant, a firm's ability to keep up with the competition in the innovation arms race is a more significant driver of survival in the market. Thus, firms cannot simply evaluate their innovation efforts in a silo but must constantly assess their efforts versus the innovation launches of their key competitors. Based on the findings, automotive manufacturers must develop a structured product development program that allows for continual and steady new product introductions; otherwise, even momentary setbacks can have a damaging impact on a firm's ability to survive in the automotive marketplace.     

Perspective: The Innovation Dilemma: How to Innovate When the Market Is Mature

Most companies have ambitious growth goals. The trouble is there are only so many sources of market growth. Markets in many countries and industries are mature and increasingly commoditized; achieving growth in market share is expensive; and acquisitions often do not work. For most companies, product development means line extensions, improvements, and product modifications, and only serves to maintain market share. Markets aren't growing, so firms increasingly compete for a piece of a shrinking pie by introducing one insignificant new product after another. The launch of a truly differentiated new product in mature markets is rare these days. As a result, development portfolios have become decidedly less innovative since the mid‐1990s, and R&D productivity is down. The answer is bold innovation—breakthrough products, services and solutions that create growth engines for the future. This means larger‐scope and more systems‐oriented solutions and service packages. Examples such as Apple's iPod are often cited. (Note that Apple did not invent the MP3 player, nor was this opportunity in a blue ocean; in fact there were 43 competitors when Apple launched!) What Apple did succeed in was in identifying an attractive strategic arena (MP3s) where it could leverage its strengths to its advantage and then to develop a solution that solved users’ problems. The result—an easy‐to‐use, easy‐to‐download MP3 system, which also happened to be “cool.” Our benchmarking studies reveal that five vectors must be in place to undertake this type of innovation to yield bolder and more imaginative development projects. First, develop a bold innovation strategy that focuses your business on the right strategic arenas that promise to be engines of real growth. Most businesses focus their efforts in the wrong areas—on flat markets, mature technologies, and tired product categories. Break out of this box towards more promising strategic arenas with extreme opportunities. Next, foster a climate and culture that promotes bolder innovation. Leadership is vital to success. If senior management does not have the appetite for these big concepts, then all your efforts and systems will fail. Senior management plays a vital role here in promoting an innovative climate in your business. Next, create “big ideas” for integrated product‐service solutions. The best methods for generating breakthrough new product ideas are identified in this paper. Then drive these “big concepts” to market quickly via a systematic and disciplined idea‐to‐launch system designed for major innovation initiatives. Just because these projects are imaginative and bold is no reason to throw discipline out the window. In fact, quite the reverse is true. Finally build a solid business case and focus on the winners. Most innovation teams don't get the facts, and consequently build weak business cases; the result is that many worthwhile innovations don't get the support they need to be commercialized. It's essential to do the front‐end homework, and so build a compelling business case. Then make the right investment decisions—evaluating “big concepts” for development when little information is available. Note that financial models don't work well when it comes to evaluating major innovations, because the data are often wrong. But other methods can be used to make these tough go/kill decisions. Illustrations and examples are provided from many industries and companies to show how to implement these five vectors.     

Complementarity in product,process, and organizational innovation decisions: evidence from European firms

This work uses a sample of firm-level data from seven EU countries to explore the possible roles of simultaneity and heterogeneity in determining firms' decisions to engage in three types of innovation. Process, product, and organizational innovations are considered jointly, by applying a multivariate probit specification. The results support the hypothesis that the three innovation decisions are interdependent. This has straightforward implications for the practice of R&D managers. In order to gain advantages from an innovation, innovation managers need to jointly exploit these different types of innovation activities and their potential synergies. Given that the innovative firms in the sample, desire additional credit which actually they do not obtain, R&D managers should also be concerned with the financing sources firms have access to. Finally, from the analysis it also emerges that public support boost all the three forms of innovation.     

Learning to let go: Social influence,learning, and the abandonment of corporate venture capital practices

Research summary: This study examines the abandonment of organizational practices. We argue that firm choices in implementing practices affect how firms experience a practice and their subsequent likelihood of abandonment. We focus on utilization of the practice and staffing (i.e. career backgrounds of managers), as two important implementation choices that firms make. The findings demonstrate that practice utilization and staffing choices not only affect abandonment likelihood directly but also condition firms' susceptibility to pressures to abandon when social referents do. Our study contributes to diffusion research by examining practice abandonment—a relatively unexplored area in diffusion research—and by incorporating specific aspects of firms' post‐adoption choices into diffusion theory. Managerial summary: When do firms shut down practices? Prior research has shown that firms learn from the actions of other firms, both adopting and abandoning practices when their peers do. But unlike adoption decisions, abandonment decisions need to account for firms' own experiences with the practice. We study the abandonment of corporate venture capital (CVC) practices in the U.S. IT industry, which has experienced waves of adoption and abandonment. We find that firms that make more CVC investments are less likely to abandon the practice, and are less likely to learn vicariously from other firms' abandonment decisions, such that they are less likely to exit CVC when other firms do. Staffing choices also matter: hiring former venture capitalists makes firms less likely to abandon CVC practices, while hiring internally makes abandonment more likely. Plus, staffing choices affect how firms learn from the environment, as CVC managers pay attention to and learn more from the actions of firms that match their work backgrounds; i.e., firms that staff CVC units with former venture capitalists are more likely to follow exit decisions of VC firms, while those that staff with internal hires are more likely to follow their industry peers. Our results suggest that firms wanting to retain CVC practices should think carefully about the implementation choices they make, as they may be inadvertently sowing seeds of abandonment. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.