Initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations

Our paper examines the initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations. Building on prior literature on executive job demands, we posit that new CEOs hired in turnaround situations will receive higher pay, particularly higher performance‐based pay, and that the pay premium will incentivize them to undertake retrenchment and restructuring turnaround initiatives. An interaction between pay premium and CEO credentials is shown to have a stronger effect on the extent to which firms engage in such turnaround initiatives. Our empirical results, based on 98 new CEOs hired in 223 turnaround situations, largely support our arguments. We discuss the contribution of our study to the CEO compensation, executive job demands, and corporate turnaround literature. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive succession and strategic change in Japan

Scholars studying upper echelons have found that executive succession can serve as an important adaptation mechanism. The bulk of these findings, however, derive from market‐based governance settings, which raises an issue of contextual robustness. This study examines this issue by investigating the link between executive succession and strategic change in Japan, a context noted for relatively weak market‐based corporate governance and lack of board independence. We find a greater likelihood of strategic change after non‐routine executive succession, with the extent of change unaffected by firm performance. Routine succession in the case of a powerful prior president leads to less post‐succession strategic change. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic concepts as micro‐level tools in strategic sensemaking

Research Summary: The purpose of this article is to illuminate the role of concepts in strategic sensemaking. Based on a longitudinal real‐time study of a city organization, we demonstrate how the concept of “self‐responsibility” played a crucial role in strategic sensemaking. We develop a theoretical model that elucidates how strategic concepts are used in meaning‐making, and how such concepts may be mobilized for the legitimation of strategic change. Our main contribution is to offer strategic concepts as a missing micro‐level component of the language‐based view of strategic processes and practices. By so doing, our analysis also adds to studies on strategic ambiguity and advances research on vocabularies. Managerial Summary: Our analysis helps to understand the role of strategic concepts, that is, specific words or phrases with established and at least partly shared meanings, in an organization's strategy process. We show how adopting the concept “self‐responsibility” helped managers in a city organization to make sense of environmental challenges and to promote change. Our analysis highlights how such concepts involve ambiguity that can help managers to establish common ground, but can also hinder implementation of specific decisions and actions if it grows over time. We suggest that under environmental changes, development of new strategic concepts may be crucial in helping managers to collectively deal with environmental changes and to articulate a new strategic direction for the organization.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Heavy lies the crown? How job anxiety affects top executive decision making in gain and loss contexts

Research summary: Despite abundant anecdotal evidence that many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, the upper echelons literature has remained largely silent on the organizational implications of executive job anxiety. In this study, we theorize that job anxiety will cause executives to (1) create a social buffer against threats by surrounding themselves with supportive decision‐making teams, and (2) pursue lower‐risk firm strategies. We further argue that these effects will vary depending upon whether strategic decisions occur in gain versus loss contexts. We test our ideas using a novel multisource, multimethod approach that includes data from 84 top executives of large organizations, their decision‐making teams, their friends and families, and archival sources. Results from an analysis of 154 major strategic decisions provide general support for our theory. Managerial summary: Although many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, some struggle more with anxiety than others. Our paper is the first to focus on how job anxiety affects executives' decisions. We analyze 154 major strategic decisions made by 84 top executives of large organizations in a range of industries, collecting data from personal interviews with executives and surveys of their decision‐making teams, spouses, and friends. We find that anxious executives take fewer strategic risks, especially when things are going well. We further argue that anxious executives focus more on “buffering” themselves from threats, and find that they surround themselves with close supporters when times are tough. Our results demonstrate a pattern through which anxiety causes top executives to focus more heavily on avoiding potential threats. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Symbolic or substantive document? The influence of ethics codes on financial executives' decisions

With the recent spate of scandals resulting from the questionable behavior of corporate leaders, there have been calls for various governance mechanisms including ethics codes to guide executive decision‐making. However, the extent to which ethics codes are actually used by executives when making strategic choices as opposed to being merely symbolic is unknown. We develop our hypotheses by combining stakeholder management theory and the theory of planned behavior, and test them with a survey of 302 senior financial executives (e.g., CFOs, VPs of Finance). We find that financial executives are more likely to integrate their company's ethics code into their strategic decision processes if (a) they perceive pressure from market stakeholders to do so (suppliers, customers, shareholders, etc.); (b) they believe the use of ethics codes creates an internal ethical culture and promotes a positive external image for their firms; and (c) the code is integrated into daily activities through ethics code training programs. The effect of market stakeholder pressure is further enhanced when executives also believe that the code will promote a positive external image. Of particular note, we do not find that pressure from non‐market stakeholders (e.g., regulatory agencies, government bodies, court systems) has a unique impact on ethics code use. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于Heckman选择模型的高管激励与技术创新关系研究——以医药行业上市公司为例

本文以我国医药行业上市公司为研究对象，采用Heckman选择模型避免样本选择偏差，同时将线性关系与非线性关系相结合，考察“十二五”期间我国医药上市公司高管激励对技术创新的影响。实证研究结果表明：短期薪酬激励与技术创新之间并非简单的线性相关关系，两者之间呈明显的倒U型关系；长期股权激励对技术创新具有显著的正向影响。从而找到薪酬激励的极大值，提出避免过度薪酬激励、适当提高股权激励水平、建立合理的高管激励体系等对策建议。     

The psychological costs of pay‐for‐performance: Implications for the strategic compensation of employees

Most research linking compensation to strategy relies on agency theory economics and focuses on executive pay. We instead focus on the strategic compensation of nonexecutive employees, arguing that while agency theory provides a useful framework for analyzing compensation, it fails to consider several psychological factors that increase costs from performance‐based pay. We examine how psychological costs from social comparison and overconfidence reduce the efficacy of individual performance‐based compensation, building a theoretical framework predicting more prominent use of team‐based, seniority‐based, and flatter compensation. We argue that compensation is strategic not only in motivating and attracting the worker being compensated but also in its impact on peer workers and the firm's complementary activities. The paper discusses empirical implications and possible theoretical extensions of the proposed integrated theory. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Mediating Role of Strategic Orientations on the Relationship between Ambidexterity‐Oriented Decisions and Innovative Ambidexterity

Building on upper echelon theory and strategic process theory, this article analyzes the relationship between ambidexterity‐oriented decisions and innovative ambidexterity. While ambidexterity‐oriented decisions embrace the capability of top management teams to manage contradictory strategic directions, namely adaptability and alignment, innovative ambidexterity captures the ability of firms to simultaneously develop discontinuous and incremental innovations. In addition to the direct relationship between ambidexterity‐oriented decisions and innovative ambidexterity, it is argued that innovation orientation and cost orientation denote two cultural implementation mechanisms that mediate this effect. Using two top‐executive data sets collected in the United States (n = 83) and India (n = 78), the empirical analysis shows that innovation orientation and cost orientation partially mediate the direct influence of ambidexterity‐oriented decisions on innovative ambidexterity, thus further explaining how formulated decisions made by the top management team nurture ambidextrous innovation behavior. Hence, this article extends prior literature that emphasizes a positive influence of top managers on innovation through incorporating an organizational ambidexterity perspective. Second, this study contributes to ambidexterity literature through integrating strategic process theory. While ambidexterity‐oriented decisions primarily relate to strategy formulation, innovation orientation and cost orientation are associated with strategy implementation. The results show that both strategic subprocesses are vital in enabling ambidextrous innovation behavior. Third, an operationalization for the ability of top management to balance adaptability‐ and alignment‐oriented decisions is provided based on prior literature.     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Settling up in CEO compensation: The impact of divestiture intensity and contextual factors in refocusing firms

We examine the relationship between strategic change and CEO compensation by studying how a firm's refocusing program influences CEO compensation after completing the change. We contribute to the ‘settling up’ literature by arguing that strategic change is often uncertain for both the CEO and the board of directors responsible for executive compensation. As such the firm is likely to settle up with the CEO by paying for compensation risk and effort undertaken during refocusing after the extent and impact of strategic change are better known. We find that refocusing intensity is positively related to post‐refocusing CEO total compensation, suggesting that ‘settling up’ through post hoc compensation is an important factor in strategic change. We also find that prior firm performance, governance structure and industry dynamism are important moderators of this relationship. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.     

How Do Transformational Leaders Promote Exploratory and Exploitative Innovation? Examining the Black Box through MASEM

Understanding how firms can promote exploratory and exploitative innovations is of high interest for both scholars and practitioners. Although a substantial body of research has emphasized that top management's transformational leadership is crucial to innovation, the mechanisms through which strategic leaders influence these distinct types of innovations remain unclear. Building on upper echelon and social learning theory, this study develops and empirically examines a model that investigates the mediating roles of three distinct strategic orientations (market, learning, and entrepreneurial orientation) on the relationship between transformational leadership and exploratory and exploitative innovation. Using meta‐analytic methods combined with structural equation modeling, this study integrates findings from separate research streams, covering over 15 years of research, and using a sample of 215 effect sizes from 75 studies. The results from the partial mediation model reveal that transformational leaders play a key role in creating these specific strategic orientations which, in turn, support different innovation outcomes. Specifically, the findings indicate that transformational leaders promote exploitative innovations predominantly by building a market orientation, whereas they foster exploratory innovations by stimulating an entrepreneurial and a learning orientation. Hence, this study extends upper echelon research by uncovering the different mechanisms through which transformational leaders promote exploratory and exploitative innovations as it theoretically identifies and empirically validates the unique mediating roles of three specific strategic orientations. The results thus provide valuable insights for the challenging management of exploratory and exploitative innovations, as they provide a “guiding map” which reveals how transformational leaders from the top may use specific orientations to foster these distinct types of innovations.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Skew and heavy‐tail effects on firm performance

Research summary : Most strategic management studies adopt an average‐centered view that uses the central tendency to explain between‐group variation in performance (i.e., performance differences between business units, firms, industries, and countries). In this study, we explain within‐group variation using a variance‐centered view that focuses on the peripheral characteristics of performance distributions as defined by skew and heavy tails (i.e., variance and kurtosis). Drawing on performance feedback theory, we hypothesize that successful firms tend to develop a positive skew in their performance distributions, which we call a “positive skew effect” in this study, and that heavy tails moderate this effect. Our analysis of the performance of a group of foreign affiliates provides general support for our hypotheses at both the firm and segment (industry and country) levels. Managerial summary : Managers of multi‐business firms use various approaches to improve the aggregate performance of their business units. Some expand the range of upper performance outliers (exploration) or reduce the range of lower outliers (downsizing); others improve the performance of current business units (exploitation). We find that firms with superior performance tend to have a balanced mix of the three approaches. We also find that segments (countries and industries) with higher mean performances provide environments that facilitate the entry of productive firms and the exit of unproductive firms and provide environments in which incumbents can further improve their performance by learning from others. We observe that successful firms and segments have a positive skew in their performance distributions, which we call a “positive skew effect.” Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choose to Fight or Choose to Flee? A Network Embeddedness Perspective of Executive Ship Jumping in Declining Firms

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship‐jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network‐based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive‐level ship‐jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship‐jumping decision. Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (*ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U‐shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well‐established firm‐level alliance network discourage the ship‐jumping choice. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do some outside successions fare better than others? The role of outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity

Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post‐succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide support for our theory. This study contributes to upper echelon theory and research by identifying outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity as an important aspect of their background that influences a range of major organizational outcomes, including CEO turnover, director turnover, and firm performance. Managerial summary: It is challenging to be a new CEO who comes from outside of the organization. Our study examines why some new outside CEOs fare better than others. We suggest that a positive relationship with the board of directors is a key factor in a new outside CEO's success. A new outside CEO can better manage the relationship with the board if he or she has prior experience working with other demographically diverse boards. In contrast, when the focal board is more diverse than the other boards on which the new CEO previously served, the new CEO tends to struggle in managing his or her relationship with the board, experiencing a higher likelihood of turnover and delivering worse financial performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive repertoire complexity: Governance antecedents and performance outcomes

Research summary : Past inquiry has found that implementing complex competitive repertoires (i.e., diverse and dynamic arrays of actions) is challenging, but firms benefit from doing so. Our examination of the antecedents and outcomes of complex competitive repertoires develops a more nuanced perspective. Data from 1,168 firms in 204 industries reveal that complexity initially harms performance, but then becomes a positive factor, except at high levels. We use agency and tournament theories, respectively, to examine how key governance mechanisms—ownership structure and executive compensation—help shape firms' competitive repertoires. We find that the principals of agency theory and the pay gap of tournament theory are both important antecedents of competitive complexity, and an interaction exists wherein firms build especially complex repertoires when both influences are strong. Managerial summary : In boxing, the fight does not always go to the bigger or stronger person, or even to whomever throws the most punches—the fight is sometimes won by the boxer who is unpredictable, such as throwing an uppercut when the opponent expected a right hook. Similarly, when companies compete in the marketplace, advantage is afforded not only to those with more resources or who engage in more competitive activity, but also to those whose actions are unpredictable. In this study, we develop the notion of “competitive complexity,” which describes the diversity and changing nature of a company's competitive moves. Implementing complex competitive repertoires can be painful in the short term but, if done correctly, can help company performance in the long run. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.