Intellectual Capital,Monitoring, and Risk: What Predicts the Adoption of Employee Stock Options?

We use empirical analysis to analyze company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of broad‐based stock option plans. First, a cross‐sectional analysis evaluates what company characteristics are now associated the incidence of such plans. Second, a longitudinal analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. Our results show that firms with higher levels of intellectual capital and capital intensity are more likely to adopt and maintain employee stock option plans.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Employee Ownership and Employment Stability in the US: 1999–2011

Do firms with employee ownership (EO) programs exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economic downturns? In particular, are firms with EO programs less likely to lay off workers during negative shocks? In this article, we examine the relationship between EO programs and employment stability in the United States using longitudinal Form 5500‐CompuStat matched data on the universe of publicly traded companies during 1999–2011. We examine how firms with EO programs weathered the recessions of 2001 and 2008 in terms of employment stability relative to firms without EO programs, and also whether such firms were less likely to lay off workers when faced with negative shocks more broadly. In our econometric analyses, we use a rich array of measures of EO at firms, including the presence of EO stock in pension plans, the presence of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), the value of EO stock per employee, the share of the firm owned by employees, the share of workers at the firm participating in EO and the share of workers at the firm participating in ESOPs. We also consider both economy‐wide negative shock measures (increases in the unemployment rate, declines in the employment‐to‐population ratio) and firm‐specific negative shock measures (declines in firm sales, declines in firm stock price). Our results indicate that EO firms exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economy‐wide and firm‐specific negative shocks.     

The Impact of Employee Stock Option Adoption and Incidence on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. Panel Data

This paper examines the productivity effect of broad‐based and executive stock option programs in adoption year and five subsequent years. The findings include a positive impact on productivity, which is maintained over a five‐year period after adoption for executive plans but diminishes immediately for broad‐based plans. We interpret these findings as evidence of stock option usage being of benefit to organizations. However, to sustain the impact of broad‐based plans options, grants may need to be made with the same frequency as executive option grants.     

Broad-based Employee Stock Options in US 'New Economy' Firms

This paper compares the performance of 229 'New Economy' firms offering broad-based stock options to that of their non-stock option counterparts. A simple comparison of these firms reveals that the former have higher shareholder returns, Tobin's q and new knowledge generation. Multivariate analysis using panel data also suggests that the adoption of a stock option plan results in higher levels of value added per employee. However, we do not find evidence that these plans result in superior growth in Tobin's q or new knowledge generation.     

Do Broad‐based Employee Ownership,Profit Sharing and Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?

This article analyses the linkages among group incentive methods of compensation (broad‐based employee ownership, profit sharing and stock options), labour practices, worker assessments of workplace culture, turnover and firm performance in firms that applied to the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For in America’ competition from 2005 to 2007. Although employers with good labour practices self‐select into the 100 Best Companies firms sample, which should bias the analysis against finding strong associations among modes of compensation, labour policies and outcomes, we find that employees in the firms that use group incentive pay more extensively participate more in decisions, have greater information sharing, trust supervisors more and report a more positive workplace culture than in other companies. The combination of group incentive pay with policies that empower employees and create a positive workplace culture reduces voluntary turnover and increases employee intent to stay and raises return on equity.     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership Plans?

Profit-sharing and employee ownership in companies have attracted considerable interest, yet there has been little research on factors predicting the adoption and maintenance of these plans. This study uses new data from a survey of 500 US public companies, and panel data on corporate financial variables, to examine factors predicting the presence and adoption of profit- sharing and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the 1975–91 period. Several findings support productivity-related motivations for such plans (including higher R&D levels among old profit-sharing firms, and recent adoption of job enrichment programmes among new profit-sharing firms), while others support flexibility-related motivations (including higher variance in profits prior to the adoption of profit-sharing plans and ESOPs). Unionized firms were less likely to have either type of plan in 1975, but equally likely to adopt them subsequently (often in concessionary contracts). Comparisons of cross-sectional and panel results illustrate advantages of panel data in disentangling the causes and effects of profit-sharing and ESOPs.     

HRM Practices and the Within‐Firm Gender Wage Gap

The effect of HRM practices on the within‐firm gender gap in wages in manufacturing is investigated merging a 1999 survey on work practices among Danish firms to matched employer–employee panel data. Self‐managed teams, project organization and job rotation schemes are the most widely introduced practices. Accounting for non‐randomness in adoption, the pay gap is reduced among hourly paid workers but increases among salaried workers. Considering practices individually, wage gains from adoption accrue to males except for salaried workers in firms that adopt project organization and for hourly paid workers in firms that introduce quality control circles.     

The Effects of Non‐Expensed Employee Stock Bonus on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese High‐Tech Firms

The choice of whether to expense broad‐based stock incentives has been a highly controversial debate in both academic research and practice circles. We provide insightful findings to reconcile certain debates regarding the effectiveness of non‐expensed, broad‐based stock incentives. Using a unique longitudinal dataset from Taiwanese high‐tech firms over the 1997–2008 period, our results indicate that non‐expensed employee stock bonus incentives exerted positive effects on short‐term organizational value added creation. The dilution effects of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan, however, exerted a negative influence on profitability and eroded share return. The negative effects were even more severe in the following year, and overexploitation of employee stock bonus also damaged the long‐term organizational performance of Taiwanese high‐tech firms. This negative aspect of non‐expensed employee stock incentives resulted in more evidence for changing the regulatory context of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan.     

A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Compensation strategy: does business strategy influence compensation in high‐technology firms?

Drawing on the strategic employee group concept, this study empirically examines whether a firm's innovation strategy influences compensation systems for strategic employee groups in the high‐technology industry. We focus on compensation packages for R&D employees who play a critical role in successful implementations of innovation strategy. Using compensation data for middle‐level managers and professional employees from 237 firms in the high‐technology industry, we found that a firm's strategic intention to pursue innovation has a significant influence on the relative pay level, compensation time horizon, and stock option vesting period lengths of this strategic employee group. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status

Research summary : Because employees can provide a firm with human capital advantages over competitors, firms invest considerably in employee recruiting and retention. Departing from the retention imperative of strategic human capital management, we propose that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the labor market. Specifically, increased rates of career‐advancing departures by a firm's employees can signal to potential future employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience that enhances external mobility opportunities. Characterizing advancement based on subsequent employers and positions, we analyze data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of perceived firm status between 2004 and 2013. We find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Managerial summary : Firms often emphasize employee retention. Employee departures, especially as a result of being hired away by competitors, are often viewed as threats to a firm's competitive advantage. We propose, however, that employee retention need not be an unconditional strategic imperative. We argue that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the market for human capital by signaling to potential employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience, which can help them obtain attractive positions with other employers. Analyzing data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of firm associates between 2004 and 2013, we find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New Product Development Practices and Early‐Stage Firms: Two In‐Depth Case Studies

New product development practices (NPD) have been well studied for decades in large, established companies. Implementation of best practices such as predevelopment market planning and cross‐functional teams have been positively correlated with product and project success over a variety of measures. However, for small new ventures, field research into ground‐level adoption of NPD practices is lacking. Because of the risks associated with missteps in new product development and the potential for firm failure, understanding NPD within the new venture context is critical. Through in‐depth case research, this paper investigates two successful physical product‐based early‐stage firms' development processes versus large established firm norms. The research focuses on the start‐up adoption of commonly prescribed management processes to improve NPD, such as cross‐functional teams, use of market planning during innovation development, and the use of structured processes to guide the development team. This research has several theoretical implications. The first finding is that in comparing the innovation processes of these firms to large, established firms, the study found several key differences from the large firm paradigm. These differences in development approach from what is prescribed for large, established firms are driven by necessity from a scarcity of resources. These new firms simply did not have the resources (financial or human) to create multi‐ or cross‐functional teams or organizations in the traditional sense for their first product. Use of virtual resources was pervasive. Founders also played multiple roles concurrently in the organization, as opposed to relying on functional departments so common in large firms. The NPD process used by both firms was informal—much more skeletal than commonly recommended structured processes. The data indicated that these firms put less focus on managing the process and more emphasis on managing their goals (the main driver being getting the first product to market). In addition to little or no written procedures being used, development meetings did not run to specific paper‐based deliverables or defined steps. In terms of market and user insight, these activities were primarily performed inside the core team—using methods that again were distinctive in their approach. What drove a project to completion was relying on team experience or a “learn as you go approach.” Again, the driver for this type of truncated market research approach was a lack of resources and need to increase the project's speed‐to‐market. Both firms in our study were highly successful, from not only an NPD efficiency standpoint but also effectiveness. The second broad finding we draw from this work is that there are lessons to be learned from start‐ups for large, established firms seeking ever‐increasing efficiency. We have found that small empowered teams leading projects substantial in scope can be extremely effective when roles are expanded, decision power is ground‐level, and there is little emphasis on defined processes. This exploratory research highlights the unique aspects of NPD within small early‐stage firms, and highlights areas of further research and management implications for both small new ventures and large established firms seeking to increase NPD efficiency and effectiveness.     

Stock market undervaluation of resource redeployability

Research Summary : Stock market undervaluation of resources was often assumed to have strategic implications. Such undervaluation lets firms buy resources relatively cheaply, but it can also constrain resource deployment. This article shows that the option to redeploy a firm's resources to a new business can be undervalued in stock markets when investors face ambiguity about that option due to uniqueness of redeployment. The developed formal model derives conditions under which stock markets undervalue resources. Those conditions are summarized with an empirical operationalization that can be tested with a broad range of strategic implications. Besides, the model provides a more complete account of resource redeployability by demonstrating the redeployability paradox. The paradox highlights that some determinants of redeployability enhance undervaluation, while simultaneously increasing objective value of redeployable resources. Managerial Summary : Stock markets can systematically undervalue resources. On the one hand, such undervaluation creates a profitable opportunity for a firm that needs some resources for its growth and compares the option to buy stock in another firm, whose resource are undervalued, with the option to build those resources internally. On the other hand, such undervaluation poses limits to resource deployment strategies of the undervalued firm. When does such undervaluation occur? This study highlights one possible source for undervaluation, ambiguity that is faced by stock market investors about the option to redeploy a firm's resources to a new business. The study specifies conditions under which stock markets are more likely to undervalue resources. The understanding of those conditions can guide managers toward strategic opportunities.     

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.     

Employee Mobility and Interfirm Relationship Transfer: Evidence from the Mobility and Client Attachments of United States Federal Lobbyists, 1998–2014

Research summary : Employee mobility can erode competitive advantage by facilitating interfirm knowledge and relationship transfer. This study investigates the latter and identifies factors that influence the likelihood of its occurrence. Using a novel database that tracks the employment and client attachments of U.S. federal lobbyists, I show that repeated exchange with employees (firms) increases (decreases) the likelihood clients follow employees who switch firms. Structurally, multiplexity reduces the likelihood of client transfer and weakens the effect of employee–client repeated exchange, with the multiplexity effect strongest when team members have specialized expertise. By examining the main and interactive effects of repeated exchange, multiplexity, and specialized human capital, this study extends prior work by demonstrating how individual, organizational, and structural relationship characteristics affect client transfer and retention ex‐post employee mobility . Managerial summary : When do clients follow employees who switch firms? What can firms do to guard against it? These questions are important in service‐based industries where clients may become loyal to individual employees within the firm rather than to the firm itself. This study provides evidence that helps practicing managers: (a) identify which clients are most at risk of defecting if employees exit, and (b) structure relationships in ways that mitigate the likelihood that employee exit results in client loss. Findings suggest that a client is more likely to defect when she has extensive history working with the exiting employee, particularly if the employee was the sole link between the client and firm. Managers, however, can reduce the risk of client loss following employee exit by structuring relationships so that clients work with teams of employees rather than exclusively with an individual and by increasing the degree of specialization within these teams . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.