Fixed‐Term Contracts: Short‐Term Blessings or Long‐Term Scars? Empirical Findings from the Netherlands 1980–2000

Using a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of prime‐age Dutch workers over the period 1980–2000, we examine how a previously held job with a fixed‐term contract influences both the likelihood and the duration of a future spell of unemployment. Analyses show that Dutch workers with fixed‐term contracts experience higher risks of future unemployment and have no shorter spells of unemployment compared to workers with regular contracts. Results also reveal that swifter employment re‐entries among men with fixed‐term contracts can be explained by their job search efforts before unemployment. Our study (partly) invalidates theoretical positions that claim that fixed‐term contracts foster employment security by shortening unemployment durations; suggesting that fixed‐term contracts are a short‐term blessing that could end, for some workers, in a recurrent unemployment trap.     

A Report on the Polish Labor Market: An Insider‐Outsider System

In the last decade, Poland has seen a dramatic increase in unemployment. Even though, mainly due to mass emigration, it has fallen, of late, the joblessness rate is still highest in the EU. It is pointed out that the strictness of employment protection legislation and high nonwage labor costs are behind this disappointing performance. The present article argues, in light of the insider‐outsider theory that, due to the power of Poland's trade unions, a two‐tier system has emerged, favoring employees on open‐ended contracts and discriminating against job seekers. Unions, as classic insiders, thwart attempts to ease stringent fire‐and‐hire regulations to modify early‐retirement schemes and to reform the public sector, which risks affecting the country's socioeconomic development.     

Does Homeownership Prolong the Duration of Unemployment?

We examine the effects of homeownership on individuals' unemployment durations. An unemployment spell can terminate with a job or with nonparticipation. The endogeneity of homeownership is addressed by estimating a full maximum likelihood function jointly modeling the competing hazards and the probability of being a homeowner. Unobserved factors contributing to the probability of being a homeowner are allowed to be correlated with unobservable heterogeneity in the hazard rates. Not controlling for ownership selection, there is neither a significant difference in the job‐finding hazard nor in the nonparticipation hazard of unemployed owners and renters. If we jointly model the ownership selection, we find that unemployed homeowners are more likely to find a job than renters.     

Employment Protection,Threat and Incentive Effects on Worker Absence

This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker absence. We use novel multi‐organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers' absence is influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.     

Economic Incentives,Business Cycles,and Long‐Term Sickness Absence

We investigate long‐term absenteeism in Norway, on the basis of register data covering 8 years and more than two million absence spells. Key findings are that: (1) a tighter labor market yields lower work resumption rates for persons who are absent, and higher relapse rates for persons who have already resumed work; and (2) the work resumption rates increase when sickness benefits are exhausted, but work resumptions at this stage tend to be short‐lived.     

中国就业岗位开发与创业扶持政策

本文根据对北京、上海和苏州三个试点城市及其他10余个城市实施积极就业政策的调查及国际比较，初步评估了中国实施积极就业政策尤其是针对国有企业下岗职工的创业扶持政策的成效和局限。文章认为，中国在特殊背景下实施积极就业政策是必要的，效果也是比较显著的，但随着劳动就业形势的变化，对积极就业政策的实施效果有必要进行认真的评估，并在此基础上进行适当的调整。     

基于失业结构性因素的税收对策分析

农民工“用工荒”和大学生“求职难”是我国劳动力市场失衡的重要表现。文章基于就业理论的最新发展,分析我国“用工荒”和“求职难”并存的原因,认为产业结构、人力资源结构的失衡以及分配结构不合理等是影响就业的重要因素。然后分析现行税收政策在失业的结构性因素方面存在的问题,在此基础上提出了减税支持中小企业发展和改善收入分配结构的建议。     

Who wants the Contrat de Travail Unique? Social Support for Labor Market Flexibilization in France

In France, a proposal was made to substitute a unique labor contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure to the existing open‐end and fixed‐term contracts. Using survey data, this paper analyzes the social support for this contrat de travail unique (CTU). Contrary to the prediction of insider/outsider theories, support for the CTU comes from insider groups, whereas most outsider groups oppose it. This result may be the consequence of the job protection increasing with tenure. This mechanism could reinforce certain types of market segmentation instead of abolishing employment precariousness.     

Gender Sorting at the Application Interface

We document gender sorting of candidates into gender‐typed jobs at the point of initial application to a company. At this step of the hiring process, the firm has implemented a policy whereby organizational screeners’ discretion has been eliminated such that there is no opportunity for contact between hiring agents and applicants. Thus, the job choices studied here offer unique insight as they are uncontaminated by screeners’ steering of candidates toward gender‐typed jobs. Even in the absence of steering, we find clear patterns of gendered job choices that line up with gender stereotypes of job roles. Moreover, these gendered patterns recur both within individuals and within race groups. Comparing our findings to the pattern of job sorting in the external local labor market, we find that supply‐side factors do not fully account for the levels job sex segregation observed in the open labor market. Although probably not the entire story, we show clear evidence that supply‐side sorting processes are important factors contributing to job sex segregation.     

Do Employers Prefer Overqualified Graduates? A Field Experiment

We test whether employers prefer overqualified to adequately qualified job candidates. To this end, duos of fictitious applications by bachelor's and master's graduates are sent to real job openings with a bachelor's degree as a minimum requirement. For the overall sample, we find that overqualified master's graduates are 19 percent more likely to be directly invited for a job interview and 11 percent more likely to get any positive reaction. This relative advantage for overqualified workers is found to be higher for bottleneck occupations. Relative preferences also differ across employers within labor‐market segments.     

Sidney and Beatrice Webb's Institutional Theory of Labor Markets and Wage Determination

Sydney and Beatrice Webb were among the most influential institutional labor economists of the pre‐World War II period yet this portion of their work has fallen out of sight for more than a half‐century. This paper reconstructs the Webbs' theory of labor markets and wage determination and explains how it differs from the rival neoclassical labor theory of Alfred Marshall. Key institutional components of their theory are developed, such as rent theory, institutional pyramid, chain of bargains, inequality of bargaining power, unemployed residuum, and common rule. The Webbs' theory is then used to explain the operation of labor markets and why in the absence of regulation they generate numerous social problems, including widespread poverty wages, excessive work hours and injuries, substantial unemployment, and human capital exploitation. Also described is the set of labor policies the Webbs advocate to solve these problems. Implications for modern labor theory and policy are developed.     

The Effects of a Job‐Creation Scheme: Evidence from Regional Variation in Program Capacities

In direct job‐creation schemes, unemployed individuals at risk of permanent labor market exclusion are offered temporary subsidized employment in public‐ or nonprofit‐sector firms in combination with skills training and sociopedagogical support. The main aim is to stabilize and qualify them for later re‐integration into the regular labor market. Exploiting exogenous regional variation in population‐group–specific program capacities, I find that, on average, such a program eases the transition out of unemployment but has no long‐term effect on regular employment.     

Workers' Views of the Impact of Trade on Jobs

This article uses new data to examine how workers' perceptions of the impact of trade on jobs like theirs are related to economic variables representing their career paths, job characteristics, and local labor market conditions. We find that only 17 percent of workers think trade creates jobs. And even fewer workers (4–7 percent) in any industry think trade has created better jobs. We find that workers' perceptions do not reflect their job characteristics or the movability of their jobs. Their perceptions of trade primarily reflect local labor market conditions (hiring and separation rates) and education. The determinants of workers' perceptions of trade present a different pattern compared with their perceptions of job security.     

The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme

We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor‐market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job‐vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.     

Analyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full‐line Forcing Contracts

Theoretical investigations have examined both anti‐competitive and efficiency‐inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications. We use an extensive dataset on full‐line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare. We identify and measure three primary effects of full‐line forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage and efficiency. We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor's gaining leverage over another. As a result, we estimate that full‐line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application.     

Long‐Lived Consumers,Intertemporal Bundling and Collusion

In a repeated price game with long but finitely‐lived consumers, long‐term contracts facilitate collusion. Intertemporal bundling reduces the gains from business stealing but has little effect on the cost of the resulting price war. When consumers anticipate future price wars, the maximum deviation profit is a single period of consumer surplus per consumer. Hence long‐term contracts do not increase the incentive to deviate per consumer, but do reduce the the number of consumers currently in the market by locking them into past contracts, so tacit collusion is sustainable for a wider range of discount factors and market structures.     

The Impact of Innovative Culture on Individual Employees: The Moderating Role of Market Information Sharing

Current innovation literature provides a very limited understanding of the potential impacts of innovative culture on employees. Building on resource‐based view theory, the authors investigate theoretically and empirically how a perceived innovative culture can be a building block for a firm's competitive resource and advantage by creating superior employee‐level outcomes and how a market information‐sharing process may moderate these effects. The authors identify three distinct types of individual‐level outcomes stemming from an innovative culture. The three outcome variables—job satisfaction, organizational dynamism perception, and firm performance perception—reflect employees’ psychological and cognitive reactions to the process of creating organizational innovation and innovative culture. The authors collect survey data from 3960 individual employees in China. Their findings first show that a perceived innovative culture significantly and positively affects employees’ job satisfaction and perceptions of organizational dynamism and firm performance. Moreover, organizational dynamism perception plays an important mediating role among three employee‐level outcomes by converting job satisfaction into firm performance perception. The authors also find support for the direct, positive effect of a perceived market information‐sharing process on job satisfaction but not on perceptions of organizational dynamism and firm performance. Most importantly, their findings on the significant moderating role of a market information‐sharing system contribute to innovation theory by emphasizing the importance of the innovation/marketing interface: bundling market information sharing and innovative culture together enhances employees’ positive attitudes and perceptions. This result also suggests that examining only the direct effects of innovative culture and market information sharing may lead to incorrect conclusions as to how to manage the cultural infusion process: the market information‐sharing process shows only a weak effect on job satisfaction and no effect on perceptions of organizational dynamism or firm performance. Organizational designs should ensure simultaneous consideration of both variables in the cultural transformation process to enhance employees’ derived benefits in the process of creating an innovative culture. We offer a new insight: a perceived market information‐sharing process may strengthen the effect of an innovative culture on employees’ job satisfaction and organizational dynamism perception, while it may weaken the effect of an innovative culture on firm performance perception. This more nuanced view of market information sharing in the cultural infusion process presents new wisdom and calls for further studies in entrepreneurial innovation.     

They Would If They Could: Assessing the Bindingness of the Property Holding Constraints for REITs

This study examines the bindingness of the property holding constraints which Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) face on their portfolios (the dealer rule), and illustrates how these constraints hinder REITs from exploiting opportunities to time the property market. I first simulate a set of filter‐based market timing strategies, which outperform a buy‐and‐hold strategy out of sample, and show that imposing a four‐year (or even the newer two‐year) holding constraint significantly reduces the excess returns the strategies generate. I then analyze actual holding periods of properties in REIT portfolios and find that there seems to exist a large degree of demand for short property holding periods and that the trades generated by the filter strategy generally resemble actual REIT trading activity, validating the relevance of the simulation results. A direct test for the constraint reveals that REITs' propensity to hold a property beyond the minimum period increases, the higher the profit from the transaction, consistent with the asymmetric nature in which the rule is enforced. By contrast, this effect is insignificant for Umbrella‐Partnership REITs (UPREITs), which are not as affected by the constraint. I further show that UPREITs overall achieve significantly better ex‐post market timing performance than non‐UPREITs. I thus find that overall REITs are limited by the dealer rule.     

Socially Useless Jobs

Recent research suggests that many workers in modern economies think that their job is socially useless, i.e., that it makes no or a negative contribution to society. However, the evidence so far is mainly anecdotal. We use a representative dataset comprising 100,000 workers from forty‐seven countries at four points in time. We find that approximately 8 percent of workers perceive their job as socially useless, while another 17 percent are doubtful about the usefulness of their job. There are sizeable differences among countries, sectors, occupations, and age groups, but no trend over time. A vast majority of workers cares about holding a socially useful job and we find that they suffer when they consider their job useless. We also explore possible causes of socially useless jobs, including bad management, strict job protection legislation, harmful economic activities, labor hoarding, and division of labor.