DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

Strategic segmentation of a market

When competing firms target information towards specific consumers through direct marketing activities, complete segmentation of markets can result. We analyze a two-stage duopoly where, prior to price competition, each firm targets information to specific consumers and only consumers informed by a firm can buy from it. This has the effect of endogenously determining market segments in a model of ‘sales'. In equilibrium, pure local monopoly emerges; firms target and sell to mutually exclusive market segments. When the cost of marketing approaches zero, market shares reflect relative production efficiency (equal shares when firms are symmetric); this may not be the case when marketing cost is high.     

资本市场压力与企业策略性专利行为:卖空机制的视角

创新是一种不确定性高且周期长的投资活动,需要风险偏好更大、对失败容忍更高的市场环境,而资本市场具有筛选和发现创新型企业、有效分散创新风险的功能,因而对创新活动起着关键作用。然而,中国资本市场短期投资者比例高,融券交易成本高且交易不活跃,加上专利评价体系对不同质量的专利区分度较低,导致资本市场压力对创新活动没有发挥出信息机制和治理机制两种效应。相反,资本市场压力带来的负面信息表达渠道和管理层短期业绩压力,造成了中国专利申请中存在“重数量、轻质量”“重申请、轻维护”的企业策略性专利行为所衍生的“专利泡沫”问题。本文采用中国融资融券制度作为准自然实验,考察卖空机制对企业创新的影响效应和作用机理。研究发现,企业面临卖空压力时会更加积极地申请专利,但专利的申请质量有所下降,表现为专利授权率降低;专利结构有所恶化,最终授权数增加的主要是容易研发、授权快的实用新型专利和外观设计专利;专利得到授权后,企业放弃缴纳维持费用以终止专利权。这些策略性专利行为在短期内可以减少企业的卖空交易量,推高企业市值,但长期看对企业的业绩没有积极影响,是一种“创新假象”。卖空机制主要通过施压机制来影响企业创新,管理层业绩压力、外部监督压力、股价信息传递压力越大的企业,在面临卖空威慑时更有动力进行策略性专利行为。为促进企业创新向高质量发展,需要进一步完善融资融券制度和专利评价体系。     

Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly

We examine the effect of competition on the incentive of firms to disclose quality to consumers before trade when information disclosure is not costless. We demonstrate that no firm will disclose information in the limit, no matter how small the disclosure cost is; that is, the market outcome converges to complete concealment of information as the number of competing firms becomes larger. Nonetheless, it can be shown that under a mild condition, the equilibrium amount of information disclosure is socially excessive for any number of firms, so discouraging information disclosure by levying a tax may increase social welfare.     

COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE*

There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms can undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why it may be the case that only high‐quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market.     

Market Information Acquisition,Use, and New Venture Performance*

A substantial body of existing research has linked firm performance to the acquisition and use of customer, competitor, and other market information. This paper examines the impact on new venture performance of formal processes for market information collection and use. This study hypothesizes that new venture performance will be an increasing function of both market information and use. Two moderator hypotheses are also tested. In particular, it is expected that the impact of formal market information processes will be greater in market‐driven new ventures than in technology‐driven new ventures. These hypotheses were tested using data collected from 222 Chinese new ventures. The empirical analysis confirms the positive role of formal processes in new venture performance. However, the analysis does not support the moderator hypotheses. This study finds that (1) formal processes for information acquisition are equally important in technology‐driven and market‐driven firms and (2) formal processes for information use have a greater impact on new venture performance in technology‐driven firms than in market‐driven firms.     

Using supply chain management to leverage a firm's market orientation

Building supplier relationships and becoming more market oriented have similar building blocks and have similar effects. Strong supplier relationships tend to impact the firm's performance, in part, because the firm can respond to customer needs in a more timely fashion. Supplier relationships tend to be stronger in firms where there is cross-functional sharing of supplier and customer information. Market orientation is an organizational culture that focuses the company on generating market information, cross-functionally sharing that market information, and rapidly responding to that market information to positively impact the performance of the firm. This study explored whether the positive effects of strong supplier relationships are enhanced in market-oriented firms. Results support the notion that supplier relationships are one way of leveraging a firm's market orientation through improved customer responsiveness. Cross-functional sharing of information appears to be the link that ties market orientation and stronger supplier relationships together.     

Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market*

Using information on price bids in wholesale electricity pools and empirical techniques described in the literature on electricity markets, this study identifies the market power mitigation effect of public firms in the Colombian market. The results suggest that while private firms exercise less market power than is predicted by a profit-maximization model, there are marked differences between private and public firms in their exercise of unilateral market power. These findings support the hypothesis of the market power mitigation effect of public firms.     

Vertical equilibrium in a competitive input market

Imperfect competition, imperfect information, disequilibrium, and rationing all induce vertical integration in relatively straightforward ways. But can vertical integration arise when firms are competitive and markets clear rapidly? This paper demonstrates that a vertical equilibrium can be generated when the intermediate market is subject to external fluctuations and when there are economies of coordination for firms which avoid the market via integration. The vertical equilibrium is one in which some firms will be integrated while some will not, despite the fact that all firms are identical. Thus, one need not conclude that differential degrees of integration within industries are the result of differing circumstances among firms.     

Leaders,laggards, and the pursuit of foreign knowledge

This paper analyzes how firms in different technological and market share positions use foreign R&D to augment their technological capabilities. Technology transfer issues and absorptive capacity arguments are examined to analyze the different technological capabilities of leading and lagging firms. In addition, a new strategic rationale (in terms of non‐dominant market share firms) that has not been considered in prior studies analyzing knowledge‐seeking FDI is offered. From a panel dataset which includes information on all foreign R&D investments made by publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms (from 1974 to 1994), I show that Japanese firms investing in foreign R&D tend to be the non‐dominant market share firms, but also the technologically leading firms across fairly diverse industries. By considering both the technological and market share positions of firms, this study reveals important characteristics that influence when firms use foreign R&D as part of a strategy to augment their technological capabilities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

The treatment of market dominance

This paper first reviews the conceptual basis for Sherman Act treatments of market dominance. Chicago-UCLA objections to treatment are found to be weak and unproven. Then the results of leading past cases and of possible future candidates are discussed. A revival of Section 2 is needed, with extensive study of candidates, even if few firms are actually taken to legal action.     

Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard

We study coordination among competitors in the shadow of a market mechanism. Our main example is standard setting: either firms coordinate through a standard-setting organization (SSO), or a market solution—a standards war—emerges. A firms veto to participate in the SSO triggers a standards war. Participation constraints are demanding, and the optimal SSO can involve on-path vetoes. We show that vetoes are effectively deterred if firms can (partially) release their private information to the public. We discuss several business practices that can serve as a signaling device to provide that information and to effectively ensure coordination.     

Firm-like behavior in markets: The administered channel

Partially cooperative behavior of member firms of the same channel of distribution, normally under the leadership of a dominant firm, is often very firm-like, giving rise to the concept of the administered channel. Analysis suggests that it is information creation and control, and their associated costs, rather than the contract which determines the extent of firm-like behavior. Administered channels are frequent alternatives to vertical integration or entirely market directed allocation, but do not emerge unless the benefits from cooperation exceed the costs of maintaining that cooperation and also can be appropriated by those firms bearing the costs.     

Business groups and corporate transparency in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from India

This study examines the difference in corporate transparency of firms affiliated with business groups and unaffiliated firms in India. Based on previous studies we measured corporate transparency using equity analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. We find that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent than unaffiliated firms. Lack of transparency leads to higher analyst forecast error and dispersion. This study also finds that business group-affiliated firms with more intra-group capital transactions have higher forecast error and dispersion. The findings of this study suggest that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent due to their reliance on internal capital markets, and therefore lack incentives to disclose information to market participants. As a result, the information asymmetry between business groups and the capital market is higher, restricting the activities of information intermediaries such as equity analysts, who play an important role in the external capital market.     

Investor Reaction to Covert Corporate Political Activity

Research summary : Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and subsequent developments created a covert channel for firms to allocate resources from corporate treasuries to political activity. Through the use of a financial market event study of an accidental disclosure of firms' contributions to a Republican nonprofit organization, I examine investors' reactions to covert investment in independent political expenditures. I find that, on average, contributing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the disclosure event and that these abnormal returns were more positive for firms in heavily regulated industries as well as those previously making campaign contributions to candidates. However, firms that recently faced a shareholder resolution on political spending disclosure experienced negative abnormal returns, suggesting that the controversial nature of covert activity moderated investors' reactions. Managerial summary : The purpose of this study is to examine how investors reacted to an accidental disclosure of firms' investments in “dark money,” a new form of corporate political activity allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Citizens United decision. I find that, on average, investors reacted positively toward firms identified as making these new political investments, especially if the firms previously engaged in electoral politics or operate in heavily regulated industries. However, this reaction turned negative if the firm recently faced a shareholder resolution asking that it voluntarily disclose all of its political investments. An implication for managers is that they should consider their firms' legal and information environments as fully as possible before committing resources to new and potentially controversial political tactics. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Referrals in search markets

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could encourage consumers to purchase the product elsewhere. In a model of a horizontally differentiated product market with sequential consumer search, we show that valuable referrals can arise in the equilibrium: a firm will give referrals to consumers whose ideal product is sufficiently far away from the firm's offering. We allow firms to price-discriminate among consumers, and consumers to misrepresent their tastes. We found that the equilibrium profits tend to be higher in markets with referrals than in markets without. Consumers tend to be better off in the presence of referrals when search costs are not too low, and under a certain parameter range, referrals lead to a Pareto improvement.     

Perceptions of United Kingdom exporters in transferring technology into the People's Republic of China

The objective of this study was to identify for UK firms active in transferring technology into the PRC, their perceptions of the market and their clients. The research was progressed by questionnaire and interview. The companies approached were selected on the basis of contracts listed in Chinese government publications and the financial press.
The main findings relate to the lack of awareness in the UK of the role of the Chinese research institutes, the poor quality of Chinese management, the inadequacy of infrastructure and training needed to support the new technology and the absence of problems arising from cultural differences or leakage of proprietary information. The Chinese are eager to obtain new technology although there is some difficulty in identifying suppliers.     

Marketing Ignorance and the Validity of Narver and Slater's MKTOR Scale in High‐Tech Russian Firms

A firm's market orientation is an important factor influencing its ability to successfully develop and introduce new products. To measure market orientation, Narver and Slater's MKTOR scale has been accepted in the literature as a valid and reliable scale. In fact, it can be considered state of the art. This study, though, challenges the validity of that scale in high‐tech industries and transition economies. As part of a larger study, the scale was used to measure the market orientation of 10 Russian high‐tech small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises, next to other measures of market orientation. These were the respondent's perceptions of their market orientation; the firm's philosophy on selling goods/services or solving customer problems; and in‐depth interview questions on goals, strategies, network ties, targeted market segments, and competitive advantage. It was found that the firms obtained high scores on the MKTOR scale but that these scores were accompanied by ideas and behaviors reflecting a low or even lacking market orientation. On a scale from 1 to 7, the firms average 6.2 on customer orientation, but at the same time, they are not aware that they do not have customer‐focused strategies and do not fully understand the chain in which they operate. Further, the average on competitor orientation is 5.4. Some firms have competitor‐oriented characteristics, but others are ignorant of their competition and believe in their technological superiority as a source of competitive advantage. Analyzing these anomalies, it is concluded that the scale requires a minimum level of marketing knowledge of respondents. Without such knowledge, the MKTOR scale is susceptible to the respondent's unconscious incapability, thereby producing invalid results. In the 10 Russian cases, the respondents did not have much experience or education in marketing, which explains why they were incapable of adequately answering the items of the MKTOR scale. The results of this study help to explain the ambivalent findings in the literature about the effect of market orientation on innovation and new product development in high‐tech sectors and transition economies. The paper concludes with suggestions on how market orientation could be better measured in such contexts. It is suggested to replace the Likert‐scale by a semantic differential scale, where statements reflecting product, production, and sales orientations are confronted with statements reflecting a market orientation. Given the importance of experience and education in marketing as positive antecedents, measures of these factors should be included in the scale as well. With these adaptations, measures of market orientation will be more factual, will require less knowledge of marketing terminology, will reduce bias caused by respondents' perceptions, and will prevent ambiguity in terminology.     

Should You Really Produce What Consumers Like Online? Empirical Evidence for Reciprocal Voting in Open Innovation Contests

In open innovation, firms increasingly rely on online consumer votes to evaluate ideas for new products and services. Votes can represent cost‐effective external information about idea quality that can inform and facilitate a firm's task of evaluating and screening of ideas at the early stages of the innovation process. Challenging this perception, we proposed that consumer votes provided in open innovation contests can be socially biased by reciprocal voting. On the basis of theories related to cooperation and social influence, we argued that both gregarious consumers (those who solicit social ties) and consumers who initiate direct reciprocity (those who vote for others) signal a willingness to cooperate that stimulates reciprocal voting from peers. We empirically investigated consumer voting behavior using a unique dataset with information obtained from actual open innovation contests in which consumers could submit their own ideas and see and vote for the ideas of others. We found that both gregariousness and the initiation of direct reciprocity positively influence votes received. Such cooperation pays off for consumers because firms indeed use votes to inform internal idea evaluations. We also found, however, that the votes an idea receives during an innovation contest cannot significantly explain its later revealed quality. Reciprocity may be an effective form of cooperation among consumers, but it has potentially negative implications for firms' evaluations. Our results also indicated that beyond reciprocity, consumers and firms value different types of ideas, which further differentiates their evaluations. Thus, firms should not only be aware of social biases in votes but also account for the diverging idea preferences of customers.