Payment Evasion

This paper shows that a firm can use the purchase price and the fine imposed on detected payment evaders to discriminate between unobservable consumer types. Assuming that consumers self‐select into regular buyers and payment evaders, we show that the firm typically engages in second‐degree price discrimination in which the purchase price exceeds the expected fine. In addition, we find that higher fines do not necessarily reduce payment evasion. We illustrate with data from fare dodging on public transportation.     

Down Payment Saving in the United States: Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics

We present a model of household saving toward a mortgage loan under an exogenous down payment requirement and preference for owning over renting. Our model explains a set of empirical observations such as the dual effect in the form of some households, in response to higher down payments, becoming discouraged savers while those who do not abandon purchasing plans save more. We also employ instrumental variable‐based methods to investigate the down payment saving behavior of first‐time home buyers in the United States. The empirical results based on Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data support the inelastic down payment elasticity of saving implied by our model.     

Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2009b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes contracts to buyers sequentially, excludes significantly more often than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive contract the higher the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.     

OK you are now an approved supplier—but you still do not get orders: Understanding the case of the P-Card

The purchase card (P-Card) was introduced in the 1990s as a payment mechanism for smaller value items so that purchase paperwork is reduced, itemized reporting and control become possible, and purchasing and payment are decentralized at the user level. Since the late 1990s, with E-procurement and B-to-B E-commerce, the possibilities of P-Card use have magnified exponentially. However, the adoption and success of P-Cards in organizations has been short of initial expectations.Using P-Cards with approved suppliers is an ideal situation for both buyers and sellers. In practice however, many P-Card users seem to buy many items from suppliers who are not on the approved supplier list. To make payments to these “new” suppliers, organizations need to make exceptions resulting in paperwork, costs, and loss of business for approved suppliers. However, there are many P-Card users who indeed follow the company-approved list and these users may be called “P-Card conforming users.”This article takes a knowledge-based approach and presents a model for conforming P-Card use (CPU). The model is tested in an organization, and results are used to derive managerial and research implications. While orientation training of P-Card users is important, both business marketers and purchasing departments need to reach out directly to the P-Card user to ensure that approved supplier lists work well in an electronic age.     

Temporary Buydowns and Affordability

This paper is directed to a neglected aspect of the problem of home ownership affordability: the impact on affordability of temporary buy downs. A temporary buydown is an option offered to home buyers to reduce the mortgage payment in the early years of the loan. The borrower allocates cash up front to an escrow account from which funds are withdrawn monthly to supplement the borrower's mortgage payment.
Temporary buydowns are underused partly because of the difficulty of determining whether, in any particular case, they will increase affordability. This paper develops a new instrument called the maximum affordable mortgage (MAX) which automatically allocates the buyer's available cash between buydown, down payment and other uses in a manner which maximizes affordability for the buyer, subject to whatever underwriting constraints the investor wishes to impose on payment graduation and/or the total size of the buydown.
The lender originating the MAX must be able to solve a complex algorithm at the point of sale, but the complexity is all behind the scenes. Using a computer, a loan officer can quickly find the cash allocation that maximizes affordability. The power of the MAX in increasing affordability may be enhanced if it is combined with a buyup wherein the lender trades off lower points against a higher rate.     

Inventory management in supply chains: A bargaining problem

This paper is focused on supply chain management from the perspective of inventory management. The coordination of order and production policies between buyers and suppliers in supply chains is of particular interest. When a buyer of an item decides independently, he will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer's EOQ may not lead to a favorable policy for the supplier. A cooperative order and production policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the dominant position to impose his EOQ on the supplier, then consequently no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative policy. To induce the buyer to order in quantities more favorable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a cooperative policy associated by a side payment to the buyer. The research presented in this paper provides several bargaining models depending on alternative production policies of the supplier. With these bargaining models the offered cooperative policy and the offered side payment can be derived.     

INPUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION WHEN BUYERS OPERATE IN MULTIPLE MARKETS*

This paper revisits third‐degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets. Such circumstances are prevalent since buyers often use the same input to produce different outputs, and even homogenous outputs are routinely sold through different locations. The typical view is that price discrimination stifles efficiency (and welfare) by resulting in price concessions to less efficient firms. When buyers serve multiple markets, price discrimination leads to price breaks for firms in markets with lower demand. When lower demand markets also have less competition, price discrimination can provide welfare gains by shifting output to less competitive markets.     

Assessment of mobile technology use in the emerging market: Analyzing intention to use m-payment services in India

The potential use of mobile payment is enormous and it is receiving attention as an alternative mode of payment worldwide. The present study develops a conceptual model to analyze the intention to use mobile payment services in the emerging market. Data was collected in India, one of the biggest emerging market, through a survey. The research hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling approach. The results offer support that innovativeness, stress and perceived ease of use influence the perceived usefulness of mobile payment services. Subsequently, perceived usefulness, perceived satisfaction, perceived risk and perceived trust influence the intention to use mobile payment services. The findings provide alternatives for companies to consolidate this technology-based payment service.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

Competition and the signaling role of prices

In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect to the quality of their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers' chances to trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among sellers affects the ability of sellers of high quality goods to achieve communication by means of appropriate pricing decisions in the context of a market populated by a large number of strategic price-setting sellers and a large number of buyers. When competition among sellers is weak high quality sellers are able to use prices as a signaling device and this enables them to trade. By contrast, strong competition among sellers inhibits the role of prices as signals of high quality, and high quality sellers are driven out of the market.     

Product type and the relative influence of buyers in commercial construction

Organizational purchasing is usually the product of collective decision making. While the seller's first contact with a prospective customer is with the purchasing agent, the purchasing agent is by no means the sole decision maker. The purpose of this study is to identify the relative influence of purchasing agents and other buyers in the commercial construction industry. Individual buyers and firms can also make use of the framework evolved to examine their own buying practices.     

Price discrimination by language: Field experimental evidence from a shopping mall

To investigate whether foreign shoppers are discriminated against, we conduct a field experiment at a large shopping mall. We employ 56 female foreigners speaking 11 different languages and 7 Korean natives and collect data on total 2267 store visits. To test price discrimination based on differential search costs, we randomly select buyers to send a signal of lower search cost. Results show that negotiation and signaling induce sellers to lower their price offers. Our experimental findings, combined with auxiliary survey data from foreign visitors, suggest that sellers use the language of buyers as a proxy for the distribution of reservation values.     

Collusion through Coordination of Announcements

A theory is developed to explain how sellers can effectively collude by coordinating on list prices (or surcharges), while leaving sellers to set their final prices. List prices are interpreted to be cheap talk announcements about cost information unknown to buyers. Buyers use those announcements to decide whom to invite to their procurement auction and the reserve price to set. By coordinating on a high list price to signal high cost, sellers produce supracompetitive prices by inducing buyers to be less aggressive, as reflected in a higher reserve price. We show that collusion can raise social welfare.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

Plural governance: The effect of internal production on supplier performance

We suggest that both making and buying the same product or service has several effects on supplier performance. A model is developed and tested by use of answers gathered from the Danish municipalities. The results support the three hypotheses that (1) the negative effects of technological uncertainty on supplier performance decrease when buyers combine internal production and external sourcing, (2) the negative effects of performance uncertainty on supplier performance decrease when buyers combine internal production and external sourcing, and (3) the negative effects of asset specificity on supplier performance decrease when buyers combine internal production and external sourcing. However, the moderating effects depend on how the plurality is measured. The results indicate that internal production may facilitate effective governance of the relationships with external suppliers. Implications for research on make-or-buy decisions and for practice are also discussed.     

Applying territoriality to steps in the buyer/seller process

Territoriality is the drive of an individual to stake out, establish, maintain, and defend an area of space for personal use. The “area of space” may be physical or psychological. Industrial buyers and others involved in the buying process, as members of organizations, will act to establish individual territories within the organization and may also act to represent an organization's territorial needs. Because an understanding of the behavior of buyers is important to industrial sales people, and because the concept of territoriality is a mixture of psychological processes, physical behavior, and the space surrounding an individual, a Territoriality Scan System is proposed to assist the salesperson in improving his or her sales communications with industrial buyers. A salesperson can gather important information about an industrial buyer's psychological processes by observing the buyer's physical behavior and surrounding physical space using the Territoriality Scan System. These observational measurements can then be used to enhance the entire sales presentation.     

House Search Duration in Hot and Cold Residential Markets

This study analyzes the determinants of house search duration of consumption‐driven buyers and individual investors in different housing market environments. We use data from surveys of recent house‐buyers in “hot” and “cold” housing markets in the 2000s housing bubble in California characterized by rising and declining residential house prices, respectively. The average house price and the surveyed geographical area are the same for both periods. Expected house ownership horizon is shown to be an important determinant of the realized search duration in addition to commonly considered housing and buyer characteristics. We find a statistically significant positive effect of it on the time until purchase in both housing price environments for consumption‐driven buyers. We also find that consumption‐driven house purchases were highly pronounced in coastal areas in the hot market and inland areas in the cold market. In contrast, long‐horizon investment activity leads that of consumption activity in those areas. Short‐horizon investors, on the other hand, concentrated their house search activity in inland areas in both housing market environments.     

Does how you pay influence the share of healthy items that you Buy? Assessing differences in nutritional quality of food purchases by payment type

Shoppers that use cash as a form of payment are more likely to evaluate the necessity of an item they purchase than shoppers that pay with other forms of payment, such as credit cards. In this paper, we hypothesize that the use of cash may nudge shoppers to buy more healthful food items. We empirically evaluate whether the payment method affects the nutritional quality of food purchases. We also test whether the effect of payment type differs between food-at-home and food-away-from-home events. Specifically, we test whether shoppers purchase a higher share of nutritious food items when they pay with cash compared to when they use credit and debit cards. We use the National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) data that tracks individual’s food purchases over one week. Using the Guiding Stars Program (GSP) algorithm to measure the nutritional quality of food items, we calculate the share of healthy items purchased at each event. We find that shoppers using cash purchase a higher share of healthy items than when they use credit or debit cards, and this nudging effect is primarily driven by food-away-from-home purchases.     

Assessing customer orientation in the context of buyer/supplier relationships using judgmental modelling

Retail buying is a particular form of industrial buying, one characterised by buying for the purposes of reselling to the ultimate customer, rather than for use. Retail buyers have a complex role. They are responsible for meeting the requirements of their target customers and they also have to manage relationships with suppliers in order to obtain the best terms and conditions.Modern retailing is also characterised by a high degree of concentration and centralisation of the buying function. Buyers can operate autonomously or within a buying group. Those selling or marketing to commercial buyers need to understand the needs of the buyer in order to be effective. They need to understand the buyers' businesses and how to develop relationships with them.A mediator in the development of a customer relationship is customer orientation. A customer orientation is a central factor in being market orientated, but despite the importance of customer and market orientation there has been little research into how well suppliers understand their customers in a commercial context.In the research reported here retail buyers of textile products were personally interviewed with the aid of decision analysis software to identify the significance of criteria they use in a defined buying situation. The same methodology was repeated with suppliers to identify how well suppliers understood the decision making of buyers in their market. The decision-making process was modelled using a compensatory approach, assuming six decision criteria in a choice of sourcing options. These criteria were partly selected from a pilot conducted with eight retailers in the UK and partly from the literature review and in particular the works of Nilsson and Høst [Nilsson J, Høst V. Reseller assortment decision criteria. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1987] and Weber et al. [Weber CA, Current JR, Benton WC. Vendor selection criteria and methods. Eur J Oper Res 1991;50(1):2-18].The study found that while buyers were able to understand the relative importance of decision-making criteria adequately, they underestimated the importance of certain criteria. The results demonstrate the potential for judgmental modelling in the appraisal of customer orientation.     

知识工作设计与知识型员工薪酬策略

从系统性、授权度与自由度三个维度讨论了知识工作设计，基于工作与薪酬的双重激励效用，利用委托代理方法分析了知识工作设计与薪酬机制间的关系．最后讨论了知识型员工的薪酬策略。研究表明，上述三个维度的工作设计可适应知识工作的复杂性、满足知识型员工的需求；增加三个维度的水平．工作的复杂性将增加．并能激励员工付出更高的努力水平，但复杂性不能超出员工的能力范围。否则工作设计将得不偿失：工作的复杂性增加时必须增加薪酬激励强度，并增加效益工资与基本工资的比值．但对于复杂性过高的工作，则应降低其比值；员工的薪酬水平决定于其工作价值。