The evolving 5G case study in spectrum management and industrial policy

Even before the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) reaches consensus on spectrum allocations for fifth generation wireless technologies (“5G”), commercial ventures scramble to offer new equipment and services. Expediting 5G wireless service can benefit consumers and businesses at the risk of stressing the traditional process of spectrum planning that combines study, dialogue and consensus building at ITU conferences.This paper explains why most nations refused to endorse key United States 5G spectrum allocation proposals at the ITU’s, 2015 World Radio Conference. U.S. representatives underestimated the time needed for consensus building, despite increasing demand for wireless video and the evolving Internet of Things. Other contributing factors include U.S. support for treating spectrum like property, use of “incentive auctions” to clear broadcast television spectrum with unprecedented speed and enough existing wireless spectrum allocations in most nations.The paper concludes that the U.S. cannot expect faster frequency reallocations, particularly when it and other nations pursue matters having little to do with spectrum optimization. The paper offers recommendations on best practices for improving the consensus building process.     

Economics at the FCC, 2011–2012: Spectrum Incentive Auctions, Universal Service and Intercarrier Compensation Reform, and Mergers

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission covered a broad range of topics in telecommunications policy. This paper highlights the economic issues that are addressed in the following key areas: spectrum management, universal service and intercarrier compensation reform, and merger review. In spectrum management, the FCC received congressional authority to implement an ??incentive auction?? to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum into flexible-use licenses that will be suitable for mobile wireless service providers. We discuss some important issues in designing the auction. We next address some aspects of the FCC??s comprehensive reforms of intercarrier compensation, which mainly involves call termination rates, and of universal service. Finally, we discuss the economic analysis of two major mergers: AT&T-T-Mobile, which the FCC staff recommended should be referred to an administrative hearing, and Level 3/Global Crossing, which was cleared with no conditions.     

Why has multilateral space and spectrum resource management become more difficult?

This paper explains why the coordination of satellite orbits and spectrum use among nations may become more contentious and protracted. The potential for greater risks, delays, and conflicts may occur, despite treaty-level commitments by most nations to promote the peaceful uses of outer space and access to radio spectrum and satellite orbits free of signal interference and collision risk. Heretofore, specialized sectors of the United Nations (“UN”) have worked effectively in forging multilateral consensus on these matters.Since the onset of artificial satellite technology, the UN has created five space-related treaties covering such issues such as freedom of exploration, liability for damage caused by space objects, the prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment, the notification and registration of space activities, exploitation of natural resources in outer space and settlement of disputes. The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), a specialized agency of the UN, has largely achieved the goal of preventing harmful signal interference, formulating technical standards promoting equipment compatibility, and establishing uniform, operational rules of the road. Until now, month long ITU spectrum planning conferences have reached closure on both mundane and critical matters, albeit at a slow and methodical pace.The paper explains how several chronic and emerging factors challenge the successful record of multilateral consensus building on space and spectrum resource management issues. The probability of collisions of spacecraft with other objects, including space debris and harmful signal interference has increased, because the United States has opted to make domestic satellite rules and frequency allocations and in advance of final ITU consideration. Additionally, initiatives by China and Russia to expand the ITU’s mission to include elements of Internet governance could promote balkanization of Internet access and recognize the sovereign right of individual nations to surveil and control access to broadband networks.The paper assesses whether and how UN agencies can continue to establish timely and effective policies and procedures for reducing space debris and the potential for spacecraft collisions, and preventing harmful signal interference. The paper concludes that China, Russia, and the U.S., should renew efforts to promote collegiality, consensus building, and longstanding, shared goals at UN and ITU conferences.     

Expanding mobile wireless capacity: The challenges presented by technology and economics

As demand for mobile broadband services continues to explode, mobile wireless networks must expand greatly their capacities. This paper describes and quantifies the economic and technical challenges associated with deepening wireless networks to meet this growing demand. Methods of capacity expansion divide into three general categories: the deployment of more radio spectrum; more intensive geographic reuse of spectrum; and increasing the throughput capacity of each MHz of spectrum within a given geographic area. The paper describes these several basic methods to deepen mobile wireless capacity. It goes on to measure the contribution of each of these methods to historical capacity growth within U.S. networks. The paper then describes the capabilities of 4G LTE wireless technology, and further innovations off of it, to further improve network capacity. These capacity expansion capabilities of LTE-Advanced along with traditional spectrum reuse are quantified and compared to forecasts of future demand to evaluate the ability of U.S. networks to match future demand. Without significantly increasing current spectrum allocations by 560 MHz over the 2014–2022 period, the presented model suggests that U.S. wireless capacity expansion will be inadequate to accommodate expected demand growth. This conclusion is in contrast to claims that the U.S. faces no spectrum shortage.     

Economics at the Federal Communications Commission: 2006–2007

This article focuses on media ownership and spectrum auction design. These two issues have not only been particularly important at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the last year, but also are being informed by economic analysis either completed at the FCC or commissioned by the FCC.     

An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses

The Communications Act requires the Federal Communications Commission to assess whether proposed spectrum license transactions serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. We review the FCC’s implementation of this component of the Act. We provide a tractable economic model of competition among wireless service providers in which spectrum licenses are a cost-reducing input. This model allows us to evaluate the effects of (re-)assigning spectrum licenses on economic outcomes and to define operational measures of “warehousing” licenses. Calibrating the model, we find little evidence of warehousing and that the approved Verizon-T-Mobile-SpectrumCo transaction increased social surplus.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.     

The 5G spectrum auction in Chile

In 2021, the Chilean government implemented a first-price package auction to allocate electromagnetic spectrum for 5G mobile services. The auction was run sequentially for different spectrum bands, allowing firms to exploit band complementarities. It was a combinatorial auction, so firms could bid for any combination of blocks within a band. It contemplated spectrum caps – upper limits on the spectrum for each firm – to ensure competitiveness. The beauty contests used in previous processes became obsolete, as there was a need to promote competitiveness and transparency in the telecommunication sector. Four incumbents and one potential entrant participated in the auction. The auction raised more than USD $450 million, which was six times more than the sum of the revenues of all previous contests in the country. We discuss this experience and show how different aspects of the context justified our design choices.     

Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions

In spectrum auctions, bidders typically have synergistic values for combinations of licenses. This has been the key argument for the use of combinatorial auctions in the recent years. Considering synergistic valuations turns the allocation problem into a computationally hard optimization problem that generally cannot be approximated to a constant factor in polynomial time. Ascending auction designs such as the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) and the single-stage or two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) can be seen as simple heuristic algorithms to solve this problem. Such heuristics do not necessarily compute the optimal solution, even if bidders are truthful. We study the average efficiency loss that can be attributed to the simplicity of the auction algorithm with different levels of synergies. Our simulations are based on realistic instances of bidder valuations we inferred from bid data from the 2014 Canadian 700 MHz auction. The goal of the paper is not to reproduce the results of the Canadian auction but rather to perform “out-of-sample” counterfactuals comparing SMRA and CCA under different synergy conditions when bidders maximize payoff in each round. With “linear” synergies, a bidder's marginal value for a license grows linearly with the total number of licenses won, while with the “extreme national” synergies, this marginal value is independent of the number of licenses won unless the bidder wins all licenses in a national package. We find that with the extreme national synergy model, the CCA is indeed more efficient than SMRA. However, for the more realistic case of linear synergies, SMRA outperforms various versions of CCA that have been implemented in the field including the one used in the Canadian 700 MHz auction. Overall, the efficiency loss of all ascending auction algorithms is small even with high synergies, which is remarkable given the simplicity of the algorithms.     

Polish experience from first-ever spectrum auction

The Polish 4G spectrum auction was a watershed event for the Polish telecommunications market. For the first time in history, the Office of Electronic Communications decided to award spectrum by using an auction process. Polish regulators implemented a simultaneous multiple-round ascending-bid auction, which was widely used worldwide for selling spectrum. The process leading to the auction and the auction itself was lengthy and eventful. Due to the wrong auction design, the auction dragged on indefinitely, causing a delay in spectrum distribution. The auction ended only as a result of the government's intervention, after 8 months (513 rounds) of bidding that raised revenue of over PLN 9 billion (over EUR 2 billion). This paper describes in detail the rules of the Polish 4G auction, analyses bidding behaviour and auction dynamics of the crucial phases of auctions, and presents the final outcomes. It also draws lessons that could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in auction design.     

Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation

Over the past 80 years, the Federal Communications Commission has been responsible for the allocation of non-governmental use of the radio frequency spectrum. Over that time, here have been significant changes in spectrum use that have been driven by changes in demand and technology. The technical, regulatory, and business obstacles in past reallocations shed light on some of the FCC’s implementation decisions for its upcoming two-sided auction.     

Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies

The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas.     

The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum in the 1934 Communications Act

The Federal Radio Commission regulated radio broadcasting, 1927–1934. With the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the 1927 Radio Act (enabling the Commission) was re-enacted in whole. This congressional endorsement yields key evidence as to what policy outcomes were intended, differentiating competing theories for the origins of spectrum allocation law: Coase (J Law Econ 2(1):1–40, 1959), emphasizing policy error; Hazlett (J Law Econ 33:133–175, 1990), focusing on “franchise rents” in a public choice framework; and the “public interest” hypothesis, reconstructed by Moss and Fein (J Policy Hist 15(4):389–416, 2003). Congress’ revealed preferences prove consistent with the franchise rents theory, while contradicting the other two.     

Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.Significant differences were observed in national approaches to spectrum packaging, license obligations and reserve prices for efficiency purposes. Our analysis also shows that European national regulators are paying increasing attention to concerns over fairness of decisions on spectrum, or equity, especially by creating opportunities for local private networks to access the spectrum and by imposing requirements on network operators to guarantee more uniform population coverage of newly created 5G networks.     

Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices

The remarkable growth of mobile communication has reinforced the significance of the radio spectrum for mobile network operators. The availability of spectrum varies considerably between different countries due to national regulatory decisions. The focus in this paper is on India where operators have access to a limited amount of spectrum. This paper analyses the value of spectrum by estimating the opportunity cost, which is calculated by the savings that can be achieved by acquiring appropriate amount of spectrum rather than investing in additional base stations. The applied approach combines network deployment, user demand levels, cost, and capacity issues, which are integrated in the application in the opportunity cost approach for spectrum. The opportunity cost of spectrum is compared with prices paid at spectrum auctions. The analysis includes a discussion of drivers that determine the willingness to pay for spectrum. The results show that the opportunity cost of spectrum in relation to auction prices is lower than prices operators paid for 3G spectrum in the metro circles (service areas) while the value derived from the opportunity cost is higher than auction prices in the remaining circles.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

Toward international settlement reform: FCC benchmarks versus ITU rates

The global telecommunications service market is undergoing significant change as more countries privatize suppliers, liberalize national markets, and encourage entry. Despite these changes, international settlement rates remain significantly higher than the cost to terminate calls and many carriers reap substantial monopoly profits from the settlement payments they receive. Annual US settlement payments approximate $5 billion. Settlement rates are declining but the progress has been slow. High settlement rates, by raising the cost of international telephone service, result in high calling prices. To accelerate a reduction in settlement rates, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a set of maximum rates, called benchmark rates, which it expects US carriers to use in their settlements with other carriers and created a process designed to insure the implementation of these rates. The FCC benchmark rates vary primarily on the basis of a country's level of economic development. When the FCC took its action, the benchmark rates, which range from 15 to 23¢, were significantly below the rates in effect with most countries. The FCC action was widely criticized even though the rates exceed costs, vary according to countries’ levels of economic development, and will be phased in over five years to give countries time to adjust. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) took an unprecedented step of proposing an alternative set of settlement rates for its members. The ITU rates differ significantly from the FCC rates, being much lower for economically advanced countries and significantly higher for less developed countries. The ITU rates vary according to a country's teledensity but the rationale for the ITU categories lacks support. In addition, other, arbitrary categories are part of the plan. Neither the FCC nor the ITU approach to reducing settlement rates address the problem of reforming the international settlement process and replacing it with an economically efficient, market oriented payment scheme. The first stage of the FCC policy went into effect in 1999. Complemented by changing market conditions, the policy has lead to lower US settlement rates, but most rates still exceed competitive market levels. Virtually all US minutes in the FCC's top two income categories comply with the prescribed benchmark rates. In fact, many countries in these two categories have rates with US carriers that are below benchmark levels. Several less developed countries have also negotiated rates with US carriers that conform to the FCC plan. As a result, US carriers benefit from the FCC policy as their average settlement costs decline. These cost reductions make possible lower calling prices but the market structure of US international communications service industry may inhibit the flow-through of these savings to US consumers. US consumer's prices were falling before the FCC acted on settlement rates. The FCC action seems to have increased the pressure to further reduce these rates. At the same time, however, service markets are being increasingly segmented and price discrimination is more widely practiced so only some US consumers benefit from lower settlement rates.     

Opportunity cost of spectrum for mobile communications: Evaluation of spectrum prices in Bangladesh

The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the choice of the reserve price made by the telecom regulator to explain the under-performance of spectrum auctions in Bangladesh. The overestimation of the reserve prices for several auctions in Bangladesh including the auction of the 3G – 2100 MHz band in 2013, the 2G - 1800 MHz band in 2015, and the 4G – 1800 and 2100 MHz bands in 2018 is established by comparing the reserve prices to the economic value of spectrum, determined by using the engineering valuation and production function approaches. Possible reasons for the inflation of the reserve price are discussed.     

On regulations for 5G: Micro licensing for locally operated networks

Future 5G networks aim at providing new high-quality wireless services to meet stringent and case-specific needs of various vertical sectors beyond traditional mobile broadband offerings. 5G is expected to disrupt the mobile communication business ecosystem and open the market to drastically new sharing based network operational models. 5G technical features of network slicing and small cell deployments in higher carrier frequencies will lower the investment barrier for new entrants to deploy local radio access networks and offer vertical specific services in specific areas and allow them lease the remaining required infrastructure on demand from mobile network operators (MNO) or infrastructure vendors. To realize the full vision of 5G to benefit the society and promote competition, innovation and emergence of new services when the 5G end-to-end network spans across different stakeholders administrative domains, the existing regulations governing the mobile communication business ecosystem are being refined. This paper provides a tutorial overview on how 5G innovations impact mobile communications and reviews the regulatory elements relevant to 5G development for locally deployed networks. This paper expands the recent micro licensing model for local spectrum authorization in future 5G systems and provides guidelines for the development of the key micro licensing elements. This local micro licensing model can open the mobile market by allowing different stakeholders to deploy local small cell networks with locally issued spectrum licenses ensuring pre-defined quality guarantees for the vertical sectors’ case specific needs.