Network modeling approaches for calculating wholesale NGA prices: A full comparison based on the Greek fixed broadband market

According to the European Commission Recommendation for setting copper and fiber wholesale prices where cost orientation is imposed as a remedy, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) should adopt a Bottom-UP Long-Run Incremental Cost Plus (BU LRIC+) costing methodology that estimates the current cost that a hypothetical efficient operator would incur to build a modern efficient Next Generation Access (NGA) network. The starting point of modeling an efficient operator investing in NGA networks is the network modeling approach. In this paper, we compare the most widely adopted network modeling approaches in terms of wholesale fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) prices. In particular, the modified scorched node approach is compared to the extreme cases of the scorched node and the scorched earth approaches. The comparison between the aforementioned scenarios sheds light on the impact of each approach on the wholesale FTTH prices. The main finding of this paper is that the scorched earth approach leads to a maximum of 10% reduction in the short-term access prices compared to the most inefficient scorched node approach, whereas further extending its optimizations by optimizing the number of central offices, both the short-term and long-term wholesale price reductions are quite significant (more than 20%) regardless of service speeds. Consequently, NRAs should consider a geographically differentiated modeling approach when regulating the wholesale market by adjusting the level of scorching in each area and network segment according to the investment plans of telecom operators. An appropriate variation of the modeled network operator's efficiency is expected to more accurately represent the costs of a reasonably efficient operator based on the real market conditions and a forward-looking perspective. These findings provide valuable information to both network operators and telecom regulators.     

The impact of different fibre access network technologies on cost,competition and welfare

Using a novel approach to the evaluation of new network technologies that combines an engineering cost model with a differentiated multi-player oligopoly model with wholesale access regulation this article evaluates the choice among different Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) architectures. The cost modelling relies upon an engineering bottom-up approach that feeds into a competition model. For addressing competition the pyramid model was chosen, which is an extension of the Hotelling model to multiple firms/services. The paper solves for price setting Nash equilibria between an incumbent, wholesale-access-based entrants and cable as an additional fully integrated network competitor. Welfare tradeoffs are highlighted with respect to cost differences and QoS differences between the various FTTH architectures and between the modes of regulation. According to the analysis architectures that can be unbundled (and that allow for greater speeds) outperform, from a social welfare perspective, architectures that (realistically) allow only for bitstream access.     

Economic implications of a co-investment scheme for FTTH/PON architectures

Due to the high costs associated with the deployment of the passive infrastructure of FTTH networks, a few alternative operators have pondered the possibility of making co-investments based on a network sharing model. The purpose of this article is to explore economic aspects of a co-investment scheme for present and future FTTH/PON architectures. The article describes the cost reductions that can be achieved when a co-investment scheme is used, as well as the relationship between market shares and the cost per home connected. A cost model was employed to calculate the investment per home passed and the investment per home connected. The investment per home passed for an alternative operator indicates significant cost reductions when a co-investment scheme is used. On the other hand, the results show that when the incumbent's market share is equal or higher than the total market share of all the alternative operators that share the network infrastructure, the investment per home connected for an alternative operator is higher than that for the incumbent operator. Moreover, to be cost competitive with the incumbent operator, the necessary market share that each alternative operator should achieve is much lower than that of the incumbent operator.     

Ex ante regulation and co-investment in the transition to next generation access

Investments in next generation access networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, arguments and possible guidelines are proposed, which might be useful to regulators and policy makers.     

Various wholesale price equilibria for mobile virtual network operators

In this paper, various equilibria are analyzed according to the leader–follower relationship between vertically integrated incumbents when downstream entries are present. This analysis broadens our understanding of the incentives involved in deciding the wholesale price, which can be applied to explain the different situations of diffusion of mobile virtual network operators in the telecommunications market. Several implications are derived to facilitate effective policy formulation and management.     

Infrastructure investment on the margins of the market: The role of niche infrastructure providers in the UK

Across Europe, policymakers and market forces are striving to deploy next generation access (NGA) networks and ensure ubiquitous access to superfast broadband services. Due to scale economies and sunk costs, the roll-out of NGA is expected to be profitable only for large-scale providers and in densely populated areas. Nonetheless, alternative providers, such as utilities and local communities, have significantly contributed to NGA diffusion in many countries. Over the past five years, several small-scale initiatives have emerged in the UK, bringing fibre networks to urban and rural areas previously overlooked by either commercial or subsidised deployments. A multiple case study approach is employed here to explore the nature and the drivers of niche providers in the UK NGA market. All these initiatives are demand-driven and to follow a modular approach. Despite adopting different business models, they all rely on the resources inherited from past broadband initiatives and relationships with local partners. By investigating the strategies of niche providers in NGA market, this analysis sheds light on their contribution to bridging the digital divide in the UK and is presented as a preliminary assessment of their sustainability and potential growth.     

Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in a Dynamic Contest Model

This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite time horizon. We show that the clubs’ investment decisions and the effects of revenue sharing on competitive balance depend on the following three factors: (i) the cost function of talent investments, (ii) the clubs’ market sizes, and (iii) the initial endowments of talent stock. We analyze how these factors interact in the transition to the steady state as well as in the steady state itself.     

Investments in next generation access infrastructures under regulatory uncertainty

This article studies the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. Thus, a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the regulator sets the access price after the deployment of the NGA network is used. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup, which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. It is found that when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in relation to the impact of investments on demand, the incumbent underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment level. On the contrary, in a more realistic case when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating an access markup into the access price.     

The effect of competition on pricing and product positioning: Evidence from wholesale club entry

This paper empirically examines incumbents’ reactions to market entry along price and non-price dimensions in the example of wholesale warehouse entry into grocery retail markets. Leveraging a detailed retail panel spanning 2001–2011 and a novel dataset documenting opening and closing dates and locations of all Costco warehouse clubs, we classify incumbent retailers’ strategic responses (e.g., pricing, assortment) by the storability of product categories, controlling for persistent systematic differences across retailer–product combinations. We find that retailers are substantially affected by increased competition from wholesale club warehouse openings and in response increase the variability of their prices, consistent with adoption of the Hi–Lo pricing strategy. In addition, incumbent retailers’ strategic responses differ significantly across storability levels: They are more likely to increase prices and reduce assortments for highly storable products and decrease prices and increase assortments for less storable products. We extend our analysis by exploiting the spatial variations in our data and analyzing divergent market effects across geographical areas. We find significant geospatial differences in these strategic responses.     

Public and private intervention for next-generation access deployment: Possibilities for three European countries

How next-generation access (NGA) deployment can be encouraged is a challenge that many countries are facing, and one that has been widely and actively discussed around the globe. This discussion has highlighted a dilemma that ultimately shapes investment—how to encourage the widespread deployment of NGA while enabling operators to achieve reasonable returns. This paper focuses on the tensions that arise as a consequence of this investment challenge in three countries – the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) – and uses the analysis of extensive data collection with k7ey actors to argue the case for the injection of public or private incentives. The paper finds that markets with competitive infrastructure will not benefit from public investment while markets with geographical constraints are in need of public support. The paper also explains that regulatory intervention is necessary in the early stage of NGA roll-out, even in currently competitive markets. In all the discussions it becomes evident that, among the three cases, the UK is most in need of public intervention.     

趸售业务分摊省级共用输配电网络费模型研究

输配电成本合理分摊是制定输配电价的基础。针对我国现阶段输配电业务中趸售电量比重较大的特点,研究趸售业务对省级共用输配电网络费的合理分摊问题;结合趸售电量输配特点,基于现有的省级共用输配电网络费分摊模型,建立了趸售业务对省级共用输配电网络费分摊模型;结合算例数据,验证了模型的可行性。     

Multiproduct Outputs and Scale Economies in Electric Power Production: Some New Estimates

The present study offers an argument, through a technical exposition, which suggests that there are cost differences inherent in serving different types of buyers in the electric utilities industry. To this end, we employ a translog joint cost function (for electricity production) with three outputs, which allows for the examination of the cost differences between wholesale and retail trade for vertically integrated, investor-owned companies in the industry. The regression estimates suggest different costs at the means, however the estimated marginal cost curve for wholesale power is not as robust as those for low-voltage and industrial power.     

Mergers of complements and entry in innovative industries

I study a merger between producers of complement inputs facing potential entry, with investment by the incumbents in deterministic cost reduction and by the entrants in probabilistic innovation, and then competition in prices. The merger solves Cournot complementarity problems in investment and pricing, which is what makes it profitable but also potentially anti-competitive. When the demand is inelastic the merger harms consumers by reducing R&D of the entrants if the incumbents are efficient enough (always when bundling is adopted). Instead, with a demand elastic enough, the merger increases consumer surplus (even with bundling).     

工业化、高速经济增长与协调分工的制度安排

在工业化过程中，后起国家可以利用模仿与“学习效应”（包括技术模仿、生产组织方式模仿、管理模仿等）获得“加速的成本下降”，而“加速的成本下降”可以使后起国家的工业化进程明显快于先行国家．因而在潜质上具有更高的经济增长速度。但在工业化初期，工业体系的形成需要大量的企业互补投资，由于产业发展的不确定性极强，资本市场和市场价格难以负载未来信息．市场很难在较短的时间内协调工业化早期所必须的分工．从而产生“协调失灵”现象。东亚国家都利用了各种不同程度和方式的政府干预成功地解决分工“协调失灵”问题．因而产生了具有与发达国家不同的市场体制．但这种体制也潜藏了较大的弊病．在日后的发展过程中逐步表现出来。     

Startups versus incumbents in ‘green’ industry transformations: A comparative study of business model archetypes in the electrical power sector

Scholars have recently argued that startups and incumbents play differential roles in the disruptive transformations of industries toward sustainability and that the transformations are only likely to succeed if both startups and incumbents contribute. To understand their respective contributions and, thus, to understand how industries make the transition toward sustainability, comparative studies of incumbents versus startups during this transformation have been identified as a central pursuit, but yet they are mostly lacking. Since business models have become a principal way of characterizing firms, the present study takes a business model perspective and derives business model archetypes in the electrical power sector from an analysis of 280 startups and incumbents in three different countries. The selected countries (USA, UK, and India) represent three different energy profiles and leading instances of disruption in the energy sector. The article, then, undertakes a comparative analysis of startups and incumbents based on the empirically distilled business model archetypes and develops propositions on startups, incumbents, and business models in industry transformations. This analysis produces several important insights. First, incumbents do not seem to engage in less business model experimentation than startups. Second, incumbents have adopted several new business models that are not pursued by startups. Third, startups have espoused some business models that are not pursued by incumbents. Fourth, foreign firms can also affect the ‘green’ transformation of an industry in a focal country. Finally, the identified business model archetypes are likely to be of interest to scholars and practitioners who are seeking an improved understanding of business models in the electrical power industry and the industry's competitive landscape.     

A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks

The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fiber-based Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks.     

Long term risk sharing contracts as an approach to establish public–private partnerships for investment into next generation access networks

This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.     

Competition in wholesale markets: Do MNOs compete to host MVNOs?

This paper extends previous research examining wholesale market shares of mobile network operators (MNOs). This study demonstrates that wholesale market concentration has decreased over time because of the increase of competition of MNOs for hosting mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). However, differences in wholesale market shares between MNOs have not disappeared. We propose that those operators that are late entrants in a market and belong to an international group with a proactive attitude towards hosting virtual operators positively influences wholesale market shares of MNOs. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data from 2000 to 2010 corresponding to MNOs and virtual operators in five European countries with high development of the virtual mobile industry. By closely examining KPN we show how being an international mobile group specialising in the wholesale market across Europe has enabled it to exploit complementarities that exist between traditional and virtual businesses.     

Collective exclusion

This paper studies collusion among vertically integrated incumbents who may either delegate output production to a more efficient downstream entrant (“accommodating regime”) or refuse to supply the entrant and produce the final good themselves (“exclusionary regime”). Accommodating agreements yield higher collusive profits, but suffer from contractual frictions: An incumbent may first offer the entrant a high wholesale price for the input, and then undercut the entrant on the final good market, so that the entrant cannot recover its high input costs downstream. When the efficiency gap between the incumbents and the entrant is small, this hold-up effect dominates over the efficiency effect. Depending on modeling choices, exclusionary collusion is then either more profitable than accommodation, or is the only sustainable collusive regime.     

MERCHANT TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT*

We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on ‘market driven’ investment to increase transmission network capacity needed to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model has a remarkable set of attributes that appears to solve the natural monopoly problem and the associated need for regulating electric transmission companies. We expand the merchant model to incorporate several attributes of wholesale power markets and transmission networks that the merchant model ignores. These include market power in wholesale electricity markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of transmission networks and associated property rights definition issues, strategic behavior by potential merchant transmission investors and issues related to the coordination of transmission system operators and merchant transmission owners. Incorporating these more realistic attributes of transmission networks and the behavior of transmission owners and system operators leads to the conclusion that several potentially significant inefficiencies may result from reliance on the merchant transmission investment framework. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for policymakers to assume that they can avoid dealing with the many challenges associated with stimulating efficient levels of investment in electric transmission networks by adopting the merchant model.