我国网对网跨区（省）电力交易价格机制创新

建立科学、合理的跨区（省）电力交易价格机制,有利于加快跨区（省）电网发展,有利于促进能源资源优化配置。由于我国电价机制正在完善中,独立输配电价机制尚未建立,当前跨区（省）电力交易尤其是网对网跨区（省）电力交易的价格机制存在一些突出问题。基于跨区（省）电力交易价格机制与方法的分析,借鉴国外跨国（区）电力交易中送电、输电和受电价格制定的经验,从完善价格体系、实施统一的价格机制、引入市场定价方法等方面提出了我国网对网跨区（省）电力交易价格体系与机制创新的政策建议。     

煤炭大宗商品交易中心建设研究——基于平台经济视角

为了更好地研究煤炭交易中心的运行规律和特点,引导煤炭交易中心健康可持续的发展,从平台经济理论的角度出发,对我国煤炭交易中心的结构、特征和拓展途径进行了探索。通过研究可以看出,煤炭交易中心具有非常明显的双边市场的特征,且交易中心可以从横向和纵向两方面进行拓展和提升,最后考虑交易中心的特征,对交易中心未来的发展提出了具体建议。     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

市场化的关联交易价格管理

<正>近年来,莱钢集团建立并完善了以市场为导向、逐步向市场化过渡的关联交易管理机制,建立了以价格管理和监督委员会为决策机构、价格管理和监督委员会办公室为日常管理机构和业务主管部门为具体事项管理及执行机构的三级关联交易管理体系,对关联交易管理进行了规范和加强,涉及到的关联交易价格部分实现了市场化定价,部分交易逐步向市场化定价靠拢,从而促进了集团公司和各关联交易单位之间互利共赢、和谐发展,有效     

基于模块化的银行卡产业价值创新研究：从价值链到价值群

以往关于模块化的应用研究主要集中于制造业,本文是模块化理论在金融服务业应用研究的一次尝试。本文认为,银行卡产业模块化的价值创新机理就在于实现了从价值链向价值群的价值创新系统转变。我国银行卡产业模块化价值创新应该从三个方面着手:一是在产品模块化创新层面,着重银行卡产品设计规则参与、产品创新和服务标准化;二是在企业模块化再造层面,着重银行卡业务组件模块化和组织管理模块化;三是在生产网络模块化层面,着重外包策略和网络联盟在实现模块价值创新中的重要作用。     

产业间平台合作下的双边定价机制研究——基于对固有收益影响的分析

本文以近期日益增多的产业间平台企业合作为背景,针对合作后平台用户固有收益水平提高这一特征,构建了双寡头竞争模型,以此分析合作对平台定价的影响。研究发现,随着合作平台上用户固有收益水平的提高,该平台将提高产生较弱网络外部性的一边用户的定价,而对另一边用户的定价则必须视平台双边用户交叉网络外部性大小差异而定。不仅如此,合作还增加了该平台上双边用户定价的非对称程度。对与之竞争的非合作平台而言,双边用户的定价则恰恰相反。研究还表明,合作可能提高合作平台的利润水平,增加消费者总剩余和社会总福利。这启示规制机构在对双边平台合作进行规制时要特别谨慎,切忌过度干预。     

春节，与银行卡有个约会

春节，农历年的岁首．是国人最隆重的传统节日。采办年货、吃喝玩乐、出国旅游。过节期间除了人和人的约会，因着这各式的花销原因，还要和钱包中的新宠——银行卡有个约会。 就在这个新宠越来越频繁出镜之时，涉及银行卡的诈骗也不断显现报端。2005年9月2日～10月18日短短46天内．仅重庆市就发生关于银行卡的手机短信诈骗案300多件，其中已实施诈骗行为的25起，涉案金额70多万元，最大一笔达14万元，最小的一笔也近万元。 本专题为银行卡持有人罗列了9种已经发生的骗局，并约请银行卡专家为持卡人传授破解骗局之法，希望持卡人在春节能够与银行卡有个甜蜜的约会。[编者按]     

储能项目定价机制分析

正国网河北省电力有限公司经济技术研究院立足于我国储能产业发展现状及现行政策体系,在厘清储能项目成本结构及基础上提出基于均化能源成本法并补偿辅助服务贡献的储能定价机制,研究了电力市场化交易机制下储能参与电力市场交易的盈利策略,对我国未来储能定价机制提出了合理化建议。     

小心!银行卡短信诈骗

你悬手机用户吗？这个问题问出来可能让你见笑了．是啊．现在都通信时代了．谁不玩个手机？你有银行卡吗？这个问题也有点多余了．当今流行无纸作业．钱也不例外．里何况现在通过银行卡可以领工资．取款、消费，甚至还可以透支．银行卡方便生活．省时省力．哪个人没有一两张？你收到过诸如“中奖”或”本公司……”之类的短信吗？你一定面露无奈之色．现在“垃圾短信“满天飞．孰能幸免？最后一个问题，你知道“银行卡短信诈骗”吗？如果你没有听说过．或者嗤之以鼻说什么“卡在我手里．一个短信岂能骗走，”之类的话．那可要提醒你了：看好你的钱包!     

“阳光阿拉环保卡”的故事——环保积分卡 环保消费卡 环保银行卡

<正>当今社会银行卡,交通卡,购物卡,会员卡…大大小小的各种卡片多不胜数。越来越多的产业相继与这名目繁多的卡片挂钩。而今阿拉环保·再生资源公共服务平台继推出第一代"阿拉环保"积分卡,第二代"赢点·阿拉环保"消费卡后,与光大银行联合推出第三代银行卡——"阳光阿拉环保卡",这将依托银行卡载体,深化全民参与环保,社会共建环保的理念,使居民参与废弃物交投的回馈更便捷高效。该卡更能在全球有"银联"标识的POS机上进行消费和结算,真正意义上成为全国第一家"环保银行"。     

Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects

In two-sided markets it is important to consider rebalancing effects following a merger, i.e. the impact of a change in margin on one side of the market, either due to a price change or to efficiency gains, on the pricing incentives on the other side. We propose modified versions for the indices of pricing pressure (UPP and GUPPI) that take this into account. We show that in two-sided markets where the cross-group externalities are positive the upward pricing pressure will typically be overstated if the rebalancing effect is ignored. Our approach explains why competition agencies should look at both sides of the market when assessing platform mergers.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered*

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm's relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then lowers average prices and raises consumer surplus. We can calculate the gain in consumer surplus and loss in firms' profits from uniform pricing based only on the market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (i.e., prices and quantities).     

Spatial Price Discrimination in Input Markets with an Endogenous Market Boundary

This paper examines the welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination in a vertically related market with one upstream monopolist that sells its input to a continuum of downstream markets. Assume that the market boundary of the monopolist is endogenously determined. It is found that social welfare is necessarily lower under discriminatory than uniform pricing, even if the market area of the former is greater than that of the latter. This finding is contrary to that in the extant literature on price discrimination in final goods markets.     

Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?

This paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets. While formally showing that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet, the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below-cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti-competitive conduct. Instead, I find that in sufficiently asymmetric two-sided markets, exclusion is always beneficial and if anything, there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry. Further, prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive (or inefficient) entry.     

Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets

A common feature in two-sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other. We show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand. The most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price. Full participation of the high-elasticity, low-price side of the market attracts the other side. As this side is less price elastic, the platform is able to extract high prices.     

Input Price Discrimination and Allocation Efficiency

This research examines the effects of input price discrimination on allocation efficiency and social welfare. Instead of assuming constant marginal costs, we allow downstream firms to produce under increasing marginal costs. When downstream firms operate in separate markets, even though total output remains unchanged, consumer surplus and social welfare could be greater under discriminatory pricing than under uniform pricing. Moreover, the social desirability of input price discrimination can still hold true when downstream firms compete either in Cournot or Bertrand fashion.

     

Personalized pricing and price fairness

Mobile web technology enables discriminatory, or personalized, pricing for many more consumer good categories than has traditionally been the case. Setting prices according to individual valuations, however, generates adverse consumer reaction unless consumers are invited to participate in the price-formation process. Consumer perceptions of price fairness are key to the sustainability of any discriminatory pricing regime. Perceptions of price fairness, in turn, are hypothesized to be shaped by “self-interested inequity aversion” in which prices tend to be regarded as unfair, and purchase probabilities fall, if others are perceived to pay a lower price, while prices tend to be regarded as more fair, and consumers more likely to purchase, if inequity is in the buyers favor. Our experimental data also shows that the implications of inequity aversion for sellers can be at least partially reversed if consumers are allowed to participate in the price-formation process by negotiating the price they pay. The primary implication of our findings is that, in order to be viable, any system of discriminatory pricing for consumer goods should invite consumers to have a stake in the price they pay. Such participatory pricing may provide one way out of the current trap of Hi–Lo, or promotional, pricing that neither retailers nor manufacturers regard as sustainable.     

如何破解中国天然气价格改革困局——天然气价格改革思考之二

在天然气产业格局深刻变化和社会主义市场经济深入发展的背景下,天然气价格改革的指导思想不能偏离经济体制改革的总方向,不能背离天然气产业的基本属性,不能脱离天然气价格的历史现实。必须坚持市场化的改革目标,强化管输和城市燃气环节的管制,逐步到位分步实施。由价格调节供需变化、保证市场配置资源的基础性作用,尊重市场主体利益、保证市场机制有效,同时同地同质同价、保证市场竞争秩序,运费差决定异地价差、保证市场物流秩序,这四项基本原则是市场经济秩序的保障,也决定了在市场条件下天然气市场价格的功能定位、水平确定、价格关系（不同用户之间和不同地区之间）。对现行天然气价格体制的技术性完善无法解决根本问题,必须构建新的天然气价格机制,即天然气市场回价机制,彻底改变现行天然气价格的顺价机制。为此,提出天然气价格改革方案,包括回价建秩序、管制门站价、权衡定水平、逐步市场化、政策调利益。