Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search Costs,Switching Costs,and Market Power

A number of authors have argued that the divestiture of AT & T did not reduce the rates of long distance telephone companies as often believed. However, the literature has offered few explanations as to why competition has not lowered rates. This study argues that rates have failed to fall due to the importance of search and switching costs in the industry. Using a panel data set of rates for the three largest long distance carriers, stretching from 1984 to 1993, a reduced form equation is specified to empirically test for the influence of search and switching costs on the price cost margin of the three carriers. The results illustrate that both search and switching costs have provided long distance carriers with market power.     

Search Costs, Lags and Prices at the Pump

Evidence is mounting that long lags and asymmetric price responses to changes in wholesale prices are characteristic of many retail markets. Although long lags are often attributed to search costs, little empirical evidence exists to support this claim. The analysis offered in this paper compares price responses in gasoline and diesel markets in 15 U.S. cities. Search costs vary across these two markets, and the evidence indicates a much faster response in the diesel market where search costs are lower. Asymmetric responses, where prices rise faster than they fall, are also evident in the data. While asymmetric responses have been attributed to oligopolistic behavior, the arguments presented in this paper point to search theory as an alternative explanation.     

Diversification,coordination costs,and organizational rigidity: evidence from microdata

This paper examines the impact of coordination costs and organizational rigidity on the returns to diversification. The central thesis is that coordination costs offset economies of scope, while organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, further constraining economies of scope. The empirical tests of this proposition identify the effects of coordination and organizational rigidity costs on business unit and firm productivity, using novel data from the Economic Census on taxicab and limousine firms. The key results show that coordination and organizational rigidity costs are economically and statistically significant, while organizational rigidity itself accounts for a 16 percent decrease in paid ride‐miles per taxicab in incumbent diversifiers, controlling for the other costs and benefits of diversification and incumbency. The findings suggest that coordination costs, in general, and organizational rigidity costs, in particular, limit the scope of the firm. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hassle Costs, Price-Matching Guarantees and Price Competition: An Experiment

We experimentally investigate whether the collusion-facilitating nature of price-matching guarantees survives the introduction of hassle costs incurred by buyers to enforce these guarantees. The presence of an arbitrarily small number of positive hassle costs buyers may completely undermine incentives for collusion. To evaluate this possibility, we develop four one-shot price competition models that test the hassle cost argument by varying proportions of positive and zero hassle cost buyers present in the market. Although the theory predicts that the competitive price should emerge in equilibrium in all four models, we experimentally find significant price differences.     

信息技术、交易成本与激励:论经济组织形式的中间化

基于交易成本理论的分析框架难以对信息技术作用下的经济组织变革趋势作出很好的解释．本文融合了资源基础观的相关观点，建立了一个新的分析框架，比较全面地分析了企业、中间组织和市场这三种经济组织形式。进一步的，通过考察信息技术应用的相关影响，我们得出了信息时代经济组织形式趋于“中间化”的结论。     

Synergy,coordination costs,and diversification choices

Sharing common inputs across business lines can potentially generate synergy that justifies related diversification. The pursuit of such synergy through diversification is, however, fundamentally driven by the indivisibility of inputs between firms. Following Penrose's insight, I argue that to realize this synergy, a firm needs to actively manage the interdependencies between different business lines, which, in turn, increases its coordination costs. The coordination costs may increase faster than synergy and set a limit to related diversification. This is particularly salient when the firm's existing business lines already have complex interdependencies among them. I test these arguments on a dataset of U.S. equipment manufacturers for the period 1993 to 2003. The results show that a firm is more likely to diversify into a new business when its existing business lines can potentially share more inputs with the new business; however, the firm is less likely to diversify into any new business when its existing business lines are complex. Importantly, the firm's likelihood of diversifying into a new business decreases more with the complexity in the firm's existing business lines if they share more inputs with the new business. These results suggest that increasing coordination costs counterbalance the potential synergistic benefits associated with related diversification. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

幸福感、社会资本与代理成本

幸福感是社会学和经济学领域关注的热点问题,但较少研究幸福感对公司治理行为影响的经济后果。本文运用中国A股上市公司的经验数据,在对幸福感与代理成本的关系进行理论分析的基础上,首次检验了幸福感与代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:地区幸福感能够显著降低地方政府控制上市公司的代理成本,与之相反,地区幸福感加剧了民营控制上市公司的代理成本,并从幸福感的社会资本视角对地区幸福感与代理成本的关系进行了解读。本研究在一定程度上增进了企业代理成本问题的研究积累,研究结论对国民福利的公共政策和企业员工福利计划的制定具有一定的启示意义。     

Trading in strategic resources: Necessary conditions,transaction cost problems,and choice of exchange structure

The paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the exchange structure in the trading of imperfectly imitable and imperfectly mobile firm resources. It first explores the conditions for such resources to be gainfully traded between firms and then investigates the interconnections between barriers to imitation and impediments to trading. A major part of the paper is devoted to developing an integrative and yet parsimonious model for assessing the exchange structure between firms that are involved in the trading of strategic resources in the face of signifcant transaction cost problems. The model is applied in the last part of the paper to the analysis of the choice between acquisitions and collaborative ventures.     

Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring: The interplay of complexity,organizational design,and experience

This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of implementation that are neglected in strategic decision‐making processes—in the context of services offshoring. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that decision makers are more likely to make cost‐estimation errors given increasing configuration and task complexity in captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, we show that experience and a strong orientation toward organizational design in the offshoring strategy reduce the cost‐estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our findings contribute to research on the effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by stressing the importance of organizational design and experience in dealing with increasing complexity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

信息技术应用与企业边界的变动

信息技术通过节约企业的内部生产成本和市场协调成本影响企业边界的变动,而变动的方向则受到企业组织特征的影响。对于资本密集型企业来说,其组织特征有利于应用信息技术后更显著节约内部生产成本,从而边界朝扩大的方向发生变动;而对于知识密集型企业来说,其组织特征有利于应用信息技术后更显著节约市场协调成本,从而边界朝缩小的方向发生变动。     

Distinguishing costs of cooperation and control in alliances

Firms simultaneously face the need to cooperate with and control an alliance partner. To complement the transaction cost perspective's emphasis on the need to control and limit opportunistic behavior, we examine the sources and impact of the cooperation costs incurred in order to work with a partner. We propose that these costs increase with greater joint task complexity and interpartner diversity, and perceptions of equitable behavior affect the perceptions of these costs. Hypotheses derived from the framework are tested in a sample of 231 contractual alliances between architects and general contractors in the Hong Kong construction industry. We find that both cooperation costs and transaction costs affect the level of time and effort a manager expends on an alliance, supporting our fundamental proposition that the costs of cooperation and control are conceptually and empirically distinct. We argue that cooperation costs should be incorporated into studies that compare the choice of alternative partners and alliance structures, as well as among the broader categories of market, hierarchy, and hybrid governance forms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transactional hazards,institutional change,and capabilities: Integrating the theories of the firm

Using a detailed dataset from the Chilean construction industry, we explore how the predictions of the transaction cost and capabilities theories interact to explain building contractors' decisions to ‘make or buy’ the specialty trade activities needed to complete a construction project. We show that the contractor's productive capabilities strongly mediate the relationship between transaction hazards that originate from either temporal specificity or an exogenous change in the subcontracting law and the vertical integration decision. The inclusion of differential capabilities and its interaction with transactional hazards infuse contractors' boundary choices with systematic patterns of heterogeneity and contribute to the integration of these theoretical perspectives. Our analysis corrects for the endogeneity of the capabilities variable and provides a detailed assessment of the marginal effects in logit models. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

隐性质量成本初探

隐性质量成本对企业经营存在着潜伏性的危害,在企业管理中处于薄弱环节。文章阐述了隐性质量成本的涵义、特征和构成,剖析了隐性质量成本的产生原因,并从会计核算和管理体系两个方面提出了控制对策。     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trust, power and transaction costs in B2B exchanges — A socio-economic approach

The advent of the Internet has enabled organisations to reconfigure their inter-organisational relationships. This study presents three frameworks to analyse the outcome that the use of Internet based electronic markets has on the nature of inter-organisational relationships: transaction cost economics, social exchange theory and an integrated framework that combines the first two. The integrated framework proposes that the nature of inter-organisational relationships depends on the interaction between the logic of transaction cost economics and the need for trust and interdependencies between exchange parties. A single case study is used to illustrate the way the three frameworks can be applied to analyse the use of electronic markets in inter-organisational exchanges. The study finds that the integrated framework provides a more complete understanding of inter-organisational relationships, and suggests a modular approach to the implementation of electronic marketplaces.     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.     

Going direct to market: The influence of exchange conditions

When faced with the strategic choice of going direct to market versus the option of using intermediaries, a firm is posited to evaluate the benefits to customers from going direct to market, and the transaction costs involved in using intermediaries. In this paper, we discuss how these evaluations might differ depending upon the microcharacteristics of the exchange domain. Based on these theoretical considerations, specific propositions are offered regarding the conditions under which firms might rely more heavily on direct channels. These propositions are tested by conducting a cross'sectional empirical analysis using a large sample of manufacturing firms operating in diverse exchange domains. We also control for the impact of macrolevel environmental characteristics, as well as firm-level characteristics that may influence the direct to market decision. Our empirical results confirm that customer benefits and transaction costs are important considerations in going direct to market.     

Markets Linked by Rising Marginal Costs: Implications for Multimarket Contact,Recoupment, and Retaliatory Entry

This paper studies the effects on prices and welfare of multimarket contact when firms serve multiple markets from a single facility with rising marginal costs. Here a link is created between markets, even with independent demands: greater output in one market leads to a higher marginal cost and lower output in other markets; and multimarket contact can indeed lower welfare. Variations of the model can explain two other puzzling phenomena: “recoupment” – lower prices in one market “paid for” by higher prices in other markets; and “retaliatory entry” – the credible threat to enter a rival’s market if it enters yours.