The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal,firm size,and firm profits

We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking

This research explores the effects of CEO equity ownership and corporate diversification on firms' risk‐taking and risk avoidance behaviors. Hypotheses regarding these effects are tested through econometric analysis of mergers in the U.S. cable television industry. Risk taking and avoidance are measured as horizontal expansion through acquisitions and as the divestiture of assets, respectively, in the face of increasing environmental turbulence. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stock market reaction to CEO certification: the signaling role of CEO background

As a direct result of the corporate scandals that started with Enron and led to general unrest in the financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission required chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers of large publicly traded companies to certify their financial statements. Using market signaling theory, we propose that attributes of the CEO send important signals to the investment community as to the credibility of the CEO certification and thus the quality of the firm's financial statements, which in turn impact the stock market reaction to the CEO certification. We find that a CEO's shareholdings and external directorships are positively related to the abnormal returns of CEO certification. Further, the stock market penalizes a firm with a CEO who is associated with the firm's prior financial restatement and rewards a firm with a CEO who is appointed after the firm's prior financial restatement. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early‐stage CEO evaluation

This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early‐stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO Dismissal: The role of investment analysts

While poor firm performance has been shown to be a predictor of CEO dismissal, little is known about the role of external constituents on the board's decision to dismiss the firm's CEO. In this study, we propose that investment analysts, as legitimate third‐party evaluators of the firm and its leadership, provide certification as to the CEO's ability, or lack thereof, and thus help reduce the ambiguity associated with the board's evaluation of the CEO's efficacy. In addition, the board tends to respond to investment analysts because their stock recommendations influence investors, whom the board wants to appease. Using panel data on the S&P 500 companies for the 2000–2005 period, we find that negative analyst recommendations result in a higher probability of CEO dismissal. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO founder status and firm financial performance

Founders create their organizations, yet are often expected to eventually become liabilities to these same organizations. Past empirical research on the relationship between CEO founder status (i.e., is the CEO also the founder?) and firm performance has yielded inconsistent results. This study of 94 founder‐ and nonfounder‐managed firms finds that founder management has no main effect on stock returns over a 3‐year holding period, but that firm size and firm age moderate the CEO founder status–firm performance relationship. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Specificity of CEO human capital and compensation

Much research on top management compensation has focused on the relationship between pay and firm performance. Firms, however, may compensate executives for inputs such as skills, as well as for outputs such as firm performance. This study refocuses attention on the links between managerial abilities and compensation by examining pay differences between types of CEO successors who have differential skills—namely, internal and external successors. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO duality,succession-planning and agency theory: research agenda

In response to Harris and Helfat's commentary on our article, ‘One hat too many: Key executive plurality and shareholder wealth,’ we suggest that their arguments are quite plausible, but we believe further empirical tests are needed. These proposed tests are described in our response. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How quickly do CEOs become obsolete? Industry dynamism,CEO tenure,and company performance

Scholars have characterized CEO tenures as life cycles in which executives learn rapidly during their initial time in office, but then grow stale as they lose touch with the external environment. We argue, however, that the opportunities for adaptive learning are limited because (1) a CEO assumes office with a relatively fixed paradigm that changes little thereafter; (2) inertia limits the speed at which an organization can align itself with a new CEO's paradigm; and (3) for any within‐paradigm learning to occur, the external environment must be stable enough so that the cause–effect relationships that CEOs glean today remain relevant tomorrow. In a longitudinal study of 98 CEOs in the relatively stable branded foods industry and 228 CEOs in the highly dynamic computer industry, we found results that strongly supported our hypotheses. In the stable food industry, firm‐level performance improved steadily with tenure, with downturns occurring only among the few CEOs who served more than 10–15 years. In contrast, in the dynamic computer industry, CEOs were at their best when they started their jobs, and firm performance declined steadily across their tenures, presumably as their paradigms grew obsolete more quickly than they could learn. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Industry structure and CEO characteristics: an empirical study of succession events

Based on 134 CEO succession events in nondiversified, manufacturing firms, this study examines the relationships between industry structure and the characteristics of CEO successors. The paper also explores the performance implications of the fit between industry structure and CEO successors. Results indicate that industry structure plays an important, but not pervasive, role in explaining variations in newly selected CEOs. Specifically, the higher the level of industry product differentiation, the lower the organizational tenure, the higher the educational level and the greater the likelihood of a nonthroughput background in the CEO successor; the higher the industry growth rate, the lower the organizational tenure and age of the CEO successor. However, findings provide very limited support for the normative view that firms which match CEO successor characteristics to industry structure realize better postsuccession performance than those with lower levels of fit. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting organizational identification at the CEO level

To develop further insight into antecedents of the CEO's psychological orientation toward the firm, we investigate what might lead CEOs to identify with their firms. Although research suggests that CEO organizational identification can be quite consequential for the firm, little research attention has been paid to its determinants. To predict how the special context of the CEO position might lead to identification, we consider a set of motives that members have for identifying with their organizations and consider how unique features of the CEO position might be relevant to those motives. Our theory and supportive findings help explain how the context of the CEO position, including variables often conceptualized as control mechanisms in agency theory research, can have important effects on subsequent CEO organizational identification. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

The CEO Performance Effect: Statistical Issues and a Complex Fit Perspective

How CEOs affect strategy and performance is important to strategic management research. We show that sophisticated statistical analysis alone is problematic for establishing the magnitude and causes of CEO impact on performance. We discuss three problem areas that substantially distort the measurement and sources of a CEO performance effect: (1) the nature of performance time series, (2) confounding and (3) the discovery of many interactions associated with the CEO performance effect. We show that the aggregate of empirical research implies complex interdependency as the driver of the CEO performance effect. This suggests a ‘fit’ model requiring new research approaches. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.