Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

Estimating the Wage Premium of Collective Wage Contracts: Evidence from Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset from western Germany, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms arise from the nonrandom selection of workers and firms into collective bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers employed in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart considerably from previous results relying on cross‐sectional data. Results from analyzing separate transitions show that leaving industry‐level contracts is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trend‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference approach indicate that particularly the transitions to no coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Overall, our findings provide no evidence of a “true” wage effect of leaving wage bargaining, once we account for differences in pretransition wage growth.     

The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.     

Dissecting Between-Plant and Within-Plant Wage Dispersion: Evidence from Germany

Using rich linked employer–employee data for (West) Germany between 1996 and 2014, we conduct a decomposition analysis based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions to analyze the relative contributions of various plant and worker characteristics to the rise in German wage dispersion. Moreover, we separately investigate the sources of between-plant and within-plant wage dispersion. We find that industry effects and the collective bargaining regime contribute the most to rising wage inequality. In the case of collective bargaining, both the decline in collective bargaining coverage and the increase in wage dispersion among the group of covered plants have played important roles.     

Rent‐Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using Belgian linked employer–employee data, we examine how collective bargaining arrangements affect the relationship between firms' profitability and individual wages via rent‐sharing. In industries where agreements are usually renegotiated at firm‐level (‘decentralized industries’) wages and firm‐level profits are positively correlated regardless of the type of collective wage agreement by which the workers are covered (industry or firm). On the other hand, where firm‐level wage renegotiation is less common (‘centralized industries’), wages are only significantly related to firms' profitability for workers covered by a firm‐level collective agreement. Thus, industry‐wide contracts that are not complemented by a firm‐level collective agreement suppress the impact of firm profits on workers' wages in centralized industries.     

Vertical Disintegration and the Disorganization of German Industrial Relations1

Drawing on case studies from the telecommunications and auto industries, the authors argue that the vertical disintegration of major German employers is contributing to the disorganization of Germany’s dual system of in‐plant and sectoral negotiations. Subcontractors, subsidiaries and temporary agencies often have no collective bargaining institutions or are covered by different firm‐level and sectoral agreements. As core employers move jobs to these firms, they introduce new organizational boundaries across the production chain and disrupt traditional bargaining structures. Worker representatives are developing new campaign approaches and using residual power at large firms to establish representation in new firms and sectors, but these have not been successful at rebuilding co‐ordinated bargaining.     

Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds

Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key but not yet studied source of the impact of unions and works councils. Their actions can shape multiple drivers of firm performance, including collective bargaining, strikes, and training. This article examines the impact of union representative mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in many countries. In the case of Portugal, which we examine here, while firms employing up to forty‐nine union members are required to have one union representative; this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with fifty to ninety‐nine (100–199) union members. Drawing on matched employer–employee data on the unionized sector and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the legal union representative/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7 percent. This result generally holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven by increased training. However, we find no effects of union representatives on firm‐level wages, given the predominance of sectoral collective bargaining.     

Works Councils,Collective Bargaining,and Apprenticeship Training – Evidence From German Firms

In this paper, we investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training in Germany. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co‐determination rights to training‐related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost‐benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm‐level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training, we find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in training compared to firms without such an institution. We also find that the fraction of former trainees still employed with the same firm 5 years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, thus enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, all works council effects are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.     

Do Multi‐Plant Firms Reduce Misallocation? Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing

Using Canadian plant‐level data, this paper shows that, depending on the industry, the differences in the average plant‐level productivity and cross‐plant allocation of resources between multi‐plant and single‐plant firms account for 1 to 15 per cent of the industry‐level TFP. A large part of this contribution stems from more efficient cross‐plant allocation of resources, measured by the covariance between plant size and productivity, in the pool of plants in multi‐plant firms compared to the pool of plants in single‐plant firms. There is less dispersion in the marginal products of the inputs, and thus less misallocation, in industries in which multi‐plant firms account for a larger share of output. The patterns found in the cross‐plant distribution of productivity and size are also consistent with better allocative efficiency among plants in multi‐plant firms than among plants in single‐plant firms.     

Works Councils and Plant Closings in Germany

This paper is the first study to investigate the impact of workplace representation on plant closings in Germany, using data from a nationally representative establishment panel. Across all establishments in our sample, we find evidence of a positive association between works council presence and plant closings. There is the contrary suggestion that industry‐wide collective bargaining plays a neutral to benign role. As for the interaction between collective bargaining and workplace representation, this appears strongest for establishments with fewer than 50 employees: such plants are much more likely to close if they have a works council and are not covered by a collective agreement.     

The Rise in Orientation at Collective Bargaining Without a Formal Contract

While firm participation in collective bargaining between unions and employers’ associations has been decreasing in Germany over the last two decades, orientation at collectively bargained wages has increased in popularity. Orientation implies that employers claim to set wages according to collective agreements but they are not formally bound by the respective bargaining contract, and in fact, I observe that they pay significantly lower wages than firms that are formally covered. Dynamic nonlinear panel estimation applied to establishment‐level data shows that this orientation is a stepping stone into formal participation. However, the decline in formal participation and the opposing rise in orientation are mostly due to a changing establishment composition rather than to behavioral transitions.     

Unions and Collective Bargaining in the Wake of the Great Recession: Evidence from Portugal

Against the backdrop of its industrial relations architecture, characteristic of the ‘southern European group’ and intimately linked to the recommendations of the Troika, this paper examines four key aspects of Portuguese collective bargaining. First, it provides definitive estimates of private sector union density for that nation. Second, it models the determinants of union density at firm level. Third, it yields estimates of the union wage gap for different ranges of union density. The final issue examined is contract coverage. The received notion that the pronounced reduction in the number of industry‐wide agreements and extension ordinances of late is to be equated with a fall in coverage is shown to be a chimera, the number of workers covered by new and existing agreements remaining largely unaffected by the economic crisis. The reduced frequency of new agreements and extensions is instead attributed to downward nominal wage rigidity in low‐inflation regimes.     

The R&D performance in Taiwan's electronics industry: a longitudinal examination

R&D investment has been widely regarded as an important input for firms, particularly for high‐tech firms, to achieve competitive advantage within their industry. Hence, a number of high‐tech firms are now investing substantial amounts into R&D. Since R&D efforts enable firms to raise the competitive advantage, one noticeable and interesting issue expected to know is the degree to which R&D investment influences firm output performance. In Taiwan, much greater emphasis is also being placed into R&D investment in the high‐tech industries; however, R&D output performance has never been seriously examined within this sector. Since the island's electronics industry is widely regarded as the most promising industry in the ‘high‐tech sector’, and is expected to place greatest emphasis on its R&D efforts, we take the electronics firms as our analytical sample. This paper therefore sets out to estimate the impact of R&D on firm performance, in terms of productivity growth and the rate of return on investment, within the electronics industry in Taiwan, whilst also examining the Schumpeterian hypothesis, that R&D performance is an increasing function of firm size. Our examination of R&D performance is based on a panel sample of 83 large electronics firms, completely balanced over the period from 1994 to 2000, with series data of R&D capital also being constructed. Based upon the extended Cobb‐Douglas production function, a random effects model is developed with the estimations revealing that the output elasticity of R&D is around 0.19 and the average rate of return on R&D is around 22%. These findings clearly demonstrate that investment in R&D by these electronics firms has had an impact on their competitive advantage. Compared to the findings of previous studies, where the analytical unit of data was at firm level, here the rate of return on R&D is consistent with similar estimates for the US and UK, but lower than those for Japan. However, our estimations do not provide support for the hypothesis that the impact of R&D on productivity is an increasing function of firm size.     

Does Individualizing the Labor Contract Hurt Women?

The twenty‐first century has been marked by a retreat of the collective bargaining rights of public employees throughout the United States. This study exploits the variation in legal environments resulting from these reforms to estimate the causal impact of different collective bargaining policies on public employee compensation. Using data from the American Community Survey, results show a modest wage penalty at the aggregate level for employees covered by constraints on collective bargaining. However, this wage penalty is differential and is concentrated on women in all but one case—a legal environment in which collective bargaining over wages has either been prohibited or directly constricted, allowing governments to periodically institute wage freezes and caps on raises for public employees. In this case, a pre‐existing wage gap in which men earned more than women is disappearing as male and female earnings converge at a lower wage. The paper suggests that the long‐term effects of restricting collective bargaining occur through the individualization of the labor contract and should be examined along individual‐level characteristics, such as gender.     

Wage Cyclicality Under Different Regimes of Industrial Relations

We analyze the effect of collective wage agreements and of works councils on the cyclicality of real wages. Using employer–employee data for western Germany (1995–2004), we find that wage adjustments to positive and negative shocks are generally not symmetric. Wage growth increases in all industrial relations regimes when unemployment is falling, but this inverse relationship is weaker when unemployment is rising. Moreover, in plants with individual‐level bargaining, wages do not adjust at all to rising unemployment. Works councils increase wage growth only in firms covered by sectoral agreements, but they do not affect the cyclicality of wages.     

The Flip Side of Organized Decentralization: Company‐Level Bargaining in Denmark

The Danish collective bargaining system is often considered a good example of organized decentralization. It has been characterized as a centralized decentralization suggesting a reproduction of sector‐level bargaining relations at company level. A recent survey on company‐level bargaining in the Danish industrial sector confirms this hypothesis with regard to the experiences of local managers and shop stewards. However, part of the survey also questions whether the reproduction will continue in the future. Small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises and their employees tend to miss out on the mutual benefits obtained through company‐level agreements. Furthermore, shop stewards often find it difficult to gain employee support during negotiations, which jeopardizes their bargaining relations with management.     

Collective Bargaining,Inter‐Sectoral Heterogeneity and Competitiveness: A Cross‐National Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance

Research on the performance effects of bargaining remains inconclusive. One reason for this is neglect of heterogeneity of the bargainers, namely differences in exposure to world markets and their implications for international competitiveness. Since the effects of bargaining on competitiveness depend on coping with productivity differentials between the exposed and sheltered sector, we discuss how distinct bargaining structures interact with these differentials. Exposed‐sector pattern setting is predicted to be the only bargaining structure that is sensitive to productivity differentials. The findings from time series cross‐sectional analysis corroborate the expected impact on labour costs and the current balance, whereas no employment effects are discernible.     

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm-Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian-linked employer–employee panel data, our findings show that firm-level agreements increase both wage costs and labour productivity (with respect to sector-level agreements). Relying on approaches developed by Bartolucci and Hellerstein et al., they also indicate that firm-level agreements exert a stronger impact on wages than on productivity, so that profitability is hampered. However, this rent-sharing effect mostly holds in sectors where firms are more concentrated or less exposed to international competition. Firm agreements are thus mainly found to raise wages beyond labour productivity when the rents to be shared between workers and firms are relatively big. Overall, this suggests that firm-level agreements benefit both employers and employees — through higher productivity and wages — without being very detrimental to firms’ performance.     

The Survival of National Bargaining in the Electrical Contracting Industry: A Deviant Case?

This article examines what is often seen to be a deviant case in bargaining structure in British industry, namely the electrical contracting industry, where multi-employer national bargaining is often said to have remained strong. The first main part of the paper briefly outlines the wider context of collective bargaining trends in British industry. The development of collective bargaining in electrical contracting is then outlined. The third part investigates recent developments and the degree to which arrangements in the industry have deviated from the rest of the private sector. In the final section, explanations are offered and implications explored.